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Abstract 
 
 
My PhD thesis, The Flower of Suffering, offers a philosophical evaluation of Aeschylus’ 
Oresteia in light of Presocratic ideas. By examining several aspects of the tragic trilogy in 
relation to some of Aeschylus’ near-contemporary thinkers, it aims to unravel the 
overarching theological ideas and the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions 
underpinning the Oresteia’s dramatic narrative. My aim is to bring to relief those aspects of 
the Oresteia which I believe will benefit from a comparison with some ideas, or modes of 
thought, which circulated among the Presocratic philosophers. I will explore how reading 
some of this tragedy’s themes in relation to Presocratic debates about theology and cosmic 
justice may affect and enhance our understanding of the theological ‘tension’ and 
metaphysical assumptions in Aeschylus’ work. In particular, it is my contention that 
Aeschylus’ explicit theology, which has been often misinterpreted as a form of theodicy 
where the justice of heaven is praised and a faith in the rule of the gods is encouraged, is 
presented in these terms only to create a stronger collision with the painful reality dramatized 
from a human perspective.  
 
By setting these premises, it is my intention to confer on Greek tragedy a prominent position 
in the history of early Greek philosophical thought. If the exclusion of Presocratic material 
from debates about tragedy runs the risk of obscuring a thorough understanding of the 
broader cultural backdrop against which tragedy was born, the opposite is also true. Greek 
tragedy represents, in its own dramatic language, a fundamental contribution to early 
philosophical speculation about the divine, human attitudes towards it, indeed, the human 
place in relation to the cosmic forces which govern the universe. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I 
 Setting the Scene 
 
tí gàr brotoîj \neu Diòj teleîtai> 
tí tÏnd’ o÷ qeókrantón æstin> (Ag. 1487-8) 
 
When halfway through their exchange with Clytemnestra the Argive Elders cry out in 
despair their rhetorical questions about divine power, their chief preoccupation regards 
the relationship of god(s) with mortals and their affairs. And although at the forefront of 
the Chorus’ thoughts lies the question of Clytemnestra’s regicide and all the events that, 
having led to it, came up during their altercation with the queen (tí tÏnde), suddenly, 
and for a very brief moment,1 their mind drifts away from the concrete protagonists of 
the present action and their utterance acquires a universal flavour (brotoí). ‘For what 
comes to pass for mortals, except by Zeus’s doing?’ - they say – ‘what of all this is not 
divinely ordained’? This is not an unusual dramatic mechanism: earlier in the parodos 
the recounting of the heightened emotional events that took place at Aulis triggers the 
Chorus to suspend their narration and to focus instead on the role of divinity in relation 
to human suffering.2 The Choruses and the characters of the Oresteia often turn to the 
divine sphere hoping to find there the ultimate causal explanation for the tragic events 
in which they are immersed. 
 
That Aeschylus should have endowed his dramatic personae with such inclination is 
hardly surprising, especially considering that he wrote from within a poetic practice in 
which it was quite natural to recount traditional stories through the bifocal perspective 
of myths that were as much about human deeds as they were about gods’ participation 
in them. Yet when one looks just outside the boundaries of those poetic narratives – 
such as the epic cycle and lyric episodes – from which Aeschylus must have most 
directly inherited myths and poetic concerns, it is easy to observe a different picture. 
During the centuries preceding the birth of tragedy, the divine world had also been 
                                                
1 At 1489 their focus is again on the murder of the king. Cf. Ch. 7.3. 
2 More on the parodos and the ‘Hymn to Zeus’ in Chs. 4; 6. 
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turned into the object of an interest which extended far beyond the projection of the 
cause of human suffering onto the gods. A growing and more explicit concern with the 
definition and determination of divine nature per se is one of the salient aspects of 
certain works from this period.  
 
In Hesiod’s Theogony, for instance, the evolution of the cosmic constituents and the 
genealogy of the gods form a close-knit explanatory system for both the origin of the 
universe and Zeus’ power and grandeur. But if Aeschylus moved within the same 
mythological panorama therein developed, he also wrote from within a culture in which 
early philosophical speculations appeared to have absorbed important features of these 
poetical cosmogonies. In particular, their tendency to systematise and their propensity to 
present the divide between cosmic and divine reality as inexorably blurred.  
 
However, with regard to theology, the thoroughly innovative import of certain 
philosophers can be scarcely denied. It is only through the intellectual enterprise of 
some of the so-called Presocratic philosophers that the theological debates acquire a 
more explicit dimension: the archetype established by the poets is attacked, and the 
aspiration to a less ambivalent theology is first adumbrated. Thanks to some of these 
philosophers, most prominently Xenophanes and Heraclitus, the ethical and 
epistemological inconsistencies inherent in the poetic accounts about the gods are 
subjected to a penetrating criticism of conventional religion.  
 
Most poignantly, it is only in some philosophical fragments that we find the very first 
appearance of an explicit theorization of divine nature.3 What had been hitherto an 
implicit theological tension is either rejected or taken to an extreme in the quest for a 
more refined conception of deity.4 By the time Aeschylus wrote his tragedies, discourse 
about the gods had been complicated and nuanced to a novel extent: only through an 
understanding of the import of such intellectual innovations, I believe, can one fully 
appreciate the significance of the ‘universalising tone’ reverberating through the 
utterances pronounced by some tragic characters about divinity. 
                                                
3 Cf. Ch. 1 and Jaeger’s remarks in 1947: 4. 
4 Cf. Int. II. 
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I.1 Philosophical inquiries into the Oresteia 
 
The impetus behind this thesis is the same one which motivated a recent collection: 
Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought. Edited by Professor Cairns, this collection brings 
together the efforts of several scholars united by the belief that ‘the understanding of 
archaic Greek thought is an indispensable aspect of the interpretation of Greek tragedy 
to which researchers must now return’.5 Like the editor and contributors to this volume, 
I firmly believe in the importance of a revival of the question of tragedy’s place in the 
development of Greek thought and that this question has been progressively 
marginalised to the domain of works of intellectual history.6 It is time to restore its 
centrality in interpretative studies of tragedy itself. Old questions, such as those of 
divine justice and its relationship to time, cosmic necessity, and human free will, are far 
from being settled and they can be kept live as long as they are subjected to continuing 
examination and scrutiny.  
 
However, even within this partial renaissance of debates about tragedy’s roots in the 
popular thought of archaic Greece,7 its potential connection to the early philosophical 
tradition remains, with few exceptions, 8 at the periphery of current interest. Seaford has 
recently drawn attention to this deficiency: ‘surprisingly, there has been very little 
research on the relations between tragedy and presocratic philosophy’.9  This thesis is 
an attempt to fill this gap.  
 
The fact itself that tragedies responded to the intellectual movements of his day is 
undisputable. The influence of philosophy can be perceived in several Aeschylean 
fragments and passages, such as those, for instance, which clearly reflect the tragedian’s 
interest in contemporary speculations on the causes of natural and biological 
                                                
5 Cairns 2013: ix. 
6 ‘Over the last decades, neither scholarly works on Greek tragedy, nor the majority of 
productions, have been primarily concerned with the philosophical question it asks’, Hall 2010: 
171-2. 
7 2013 saw the publication of Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought and the conference ‘Path of 
Song’: on the interactions between Greek Lyric and Tragedy (UCL 11-13/04). 
8 Winnington-Ingram’s 1965 and Allan 2005 contain ideas and suggestions begging for further 
development.  
9 2013: 17. 
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phenomena: a fragment from the Suppliants trilogy identifies the cause of nature’s 
growth with the ‘marriage’ of Heaven and Earth (fr. 44);10 fr. 300 and Suppl. 559-61 
present an explanation of the source of the Nile and Suppl. 792-93 one of the origin of 
snow; Xenophanes’ idea that all things come from earth and end in earth seems to be 
echoed in Cho. 127-8; and Anaxagoras’ theory on human reproduction is the most 
probable source of inspiration for Apollo’s argument on the male’s key role in Eum. 
657-61. Moreover, as we shall see in more detail, several scholars accept the influence 
of Xenophanes’ theological monotheism on some of Aeschylus’ descriptions of Zeus 
(fr. 70; Suppl. 91-103; Ag. 160-66; Eum. 650-1).11 
 
The key work on which to base any judgment and which contains the largest collection 
of evidence on this subject is Rösler’s Reflexe vorsokratischen Denkens bei Aischylos 
(1970), in which all the individual passages of Aeschylus’ tragedies which may be 
suspected to reflect Presocratic ideas are put under scrutiny. Some of Rösler’s negative 
and positive conclusions are extremely important. One must for instance recall this 
scholar’s firm rejection of every kind of influence of Pythagoreanism on Aeschylus. It 
is also worth remembering that Rösler recognises in Aeschylus a tendency to move in 
the same theological direction as Xenophanes and Heraclitus. Since that seminal work, a 
few other authors have followed Rösler’s path and have tried to identify further 
passages (or simply returned to the same ones) which may be felt to echo Presocratic 
ideas: Kouremenos analysed a passage from the Agamemnon in the light of Parmenides’ 
vocabulary and ideas, and Zaborowski has explored the connection between the 
epistemological ideas contained in some Presocratic and some Aeschylean passages.12  
 
Unlike Rösler, who excludes the possibility that the subject matter of tragedy is 
dependent on any Presocratic model, both Kouremenos’ and Zaborowski’s studies seem 
to go beyond the scope of a mere presentation of verbal parallelism. Indeed, at the 
outset of his essay, Kouremenos is content to state that ‘the link between Parmenides 
                                                
10 All Aeschylean fragments are numbered as in TrGF. 
11 See Hall 2010: 172-182 for further examples and Sommerstein 2010a: 270-1 for an account 
of Xenophanes’ influence on Aeschylus. 
12  Rösler 1970 (reviewed by Garvie 1972); Kouremenos 1993: 259-65. Zaborowski 
(unpublished paper presented at the conference Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought, Edinburgh 
14/06/2008). Cf. Severino 2005. 
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and Aeschylus is the distinction between seeming and being, the cornerstone of 
Parmenides’ metaphysics and theory of knowledge’, 13 and although he appears to judge 
sufficient the backing up of such a claim with the limited evidence of two verses from 
the Agamemnon (788-89), his argument certainly entails that what may be seen as traces 
of intertextuality between Aeschylus and Parmenides must also be taken as proof of 
conceptual overlapping. However, both approaches still share with Rösler the 
hermeneutic feature of limiting their analysis to individual passages. 
 
Seaford, by contrast, by reading the Oresteia through the idea of ‘the unity of 
opposites’, interprets the tragedy as advocating the replacement of a Heraclitean model 
with a Pythagorean model (thus rejecting Rösler’s conclusion). By comparing what he 
calls ‘tragic cosmology’ and the cosmology of Heraclitus, Seaford attempts to establish 
parallels in structure between the works of these authors.14 In a recent monograph, he 
focuses on the correlation between social process and philosophical cosmology as well 
as what he defines as ‘confrontational and aetiological space in Aeschylus’.15Although, 
as illustrated below, his understanding of Heraclitus’ philosophy differs partially from 
mine, and the Pythagoreans are not part of my agenda, Seaford is the only scholar who 
has voiced the urgency of an alternative approach:  
 
[…] almost all the research so far is based on the wrong question, namely 
‘is the tragedian here alluding to (or influenced by) this fragment of 
presocratic philosophy? Even an unequivocal ‘yes’ to this question, which 
in fact is never possible, would not take us very far. Much clearer and more 
interesting is that certain basic structures are shared by tragedy and 
presocratic cosmology.16  
 
Besides the dauntingly fragmentary nature of much archaic philosophical material, one 
can diagnose a profound prejudice as the main cause for such scholarly negligence: 
namely the still widespread assumption of what is thought to be an unbridgeable rift 
between philosophical and poetic thought. It is time to override this paradigm.  
                                                
13 1993: 259. 
14 Seaford 2003: 148. 
15 2004; 2012. 
16 Seaford 2013: 17. 
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The kind of research undertaken in this thesis presupposes a deep belief in the benefits 
deriving from cross-generic approaches. But let us be clear from the start: this is not an 
attempt to argue in favour of the dependence of Aeschylus on any particular Presocratic 
model, for I agree with Rösler that the very subject matter of tragedy should discourage 
any attempt of this sort. To quote Seaford once more: ‘the point is not that the tragedian 
has read a particular philosopher, possible though that is’.17 Rather, my enquiry is 
concerned with exploring the relationship between certain philosophical theories and the 
Oresteia’s tragic world-view in its widest sense. 
 
I.2 Themes and Aims 
 
Given the strong connection between Zeus and dikê – established from the very 
beginning of the Agamemnon18 – it should be no surprise that the majority of scholars 
who have focused on Zeus in the Oresteia have generally concentrated their attention on 
the issue of divine justice.19  Yet, as much as the meaning of dikê in the Oresteia cannot 
be simply reduced to that of ‘divine justice’, it would be altogether wrong to regard 
Zeus as a mere champion of justice. While many scholars have tackled the complexity 
of dikê and its development within the plays’ dramatic narrative, many have focused on 
the confusing aspects of Zeus’ role. The elusive nature of the supreme god in the trilogy 
has engendered lively debates concerning the god’s function, his relation to the other 
gods and to human actions, indeed, his very essence.20  
 
The thematic centrality of justice, particularly the ‘justice of the gods’, in the Oresteia is 
unquestionable and universally accepted. Sommerstein writes that if one were 
compelled to answer the perhaps not very sensible ‘question “what is the Oresteia 
about”, […] one would certainly wish to say that […] it is about […] dikê in its three 
senses of “right and wrong”, “punishment” and “judicial proceeding”’.21 As Mitchell-
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 See below Ch. 4. 
19 Martina 2007; Cohen 1986; Lloyd-Jones 1971, 1956; Grube 1970; Golden 1962. 
20 Cf. Int. II. 1; Ch. 4. 
21 2010a: 193. 
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Boyask more recently restated, ‘justice is the great theme of the Oresteia, which is 
largely preoccupied with deciding what, exactly, “justice” means’.22 Sensible studies 
have also shown how dikê is not presented by Aeschylus as a monolithic entity. 
Goldhill, who has devoted a whole chapter to an in-depth analysis of the ‘shifts and 
plays of meaning’ of the word in the three plays showed how the centrality of dikê in 
the trilogy is something ‘enacted’: it is conveyed through its dynamics and 
developments. As the tragedy advances through the slow unfolding of the hypothesis of 
a disjunction between legal and retributive justice, the self-perpetuating nature of 
retributive justice is put into question. This disjunction is developed and maintained 
through the constant dialectical interplay of the various meanings of dikê, ranging from 
the personified ‘Justice’ and the abstract ‘right’, through ‘retribution’ and ‘punishment’ 
to the particular and concrete legal senses of ‘law-case’.23 Indeed, to borrow Vickers’ 
definition: ‘ “justice” is one of the most Protean concepts’. 24 
 
The nuanced complexity with which one of the central themes of the trilogy is depicted 
has led to the obvious consequence: although much agreement can be found with regard 
to which kind of questions the Oresteia asks, surprisingly, very little agreement can be 
found with regard to which answers the Oresteia gives. This is especially true in the 
case of dikê. The multifarious interpretations the Oresteia has received could loosely be 
grouped as almost invariably belonging to either one or the other of two overarching 
and mutually exclusive critical positions. The first one, which has been correctly 
defined as a ‘commonplace of the interpretation of the textual dynamics of dikê’,25 
asserts that the trilogy dramatizes a movement by means of which dikê as legal justice 
replaces in a definite way dikê as a retributive justice.26 The amalgam of views 
purporting this basic interpretation, in which Aeschylus is seen as a ‘prophet of Zeus’, 
Zeus as a ‘champion of Dike’,27 and the Oresteia as a tragedy with an ‘happy ending’, 
has been firmly rejected and moderated in various ways, especially by those who laid 
                                                
22 2009: 98.  
23 Goldhill 1986: 33-56. 
24 Vickers 1973: 27. This is a small selection from many authoritative voices (Cf. Ch. 6: n. 497). 
25 Goldhill 1986: 37. 
26 Cf.: Lloyd-Jones, 1971: 86-7; 90; Winnington-Ingram, 1954: 23, 1983: 155; and Kitto, 1961: 
92, Stanford 1977:13; Seaford 2003: 161, 2011: 273. 
27 Lloyd-Jones 1956: 67. 
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emphasis on the ‘tyrannical aspects’ of Zeus’ governance.28 No doubt, ‘whether the 
problem of defining dikê has been resolved at the end remains a matter of scholarly 
controversy’,29 and Seaford is perhaps right in suggesting together with Goldhill that 
the choice of whether to read for closure or ambiguity may be determined – at the very 
end – by the basic theoretical and political orientation of the interpreter.30   
 
This thesis offers an interpretation of the Oresteia in the light of Presocratic philosophy. 
By focusing on the theological and ontological dimension of this trilogy, my aim is to 
bring to relief those aspects of the Oresteia which I believe will benefit from a 
comparison with some ideas, or modes of thought, which circulated among the 
Presocratic philosophers. I explore how reading some of this trilogy’s themes in relation 
to Presocratic debates about theology and cosmic justice may affect and enhance our 
understanding of the theological ‘tension’ and metaphysical assumptions in Aeschylus’ 
work. In particular, it is my contention that Aeschylus’ explicit theology, which has 
often been misinterpreted as a form of theodicy where the justice of heaven is praised 
and a faith in the rule of the gods is encouraged, is presented in these terms only to 
create a stronger collision with the painful reality dramatized from a human perspective. 
Thus, Vlastos is right in writing that ‘Aeschylus here labour[s] in the same cause as 
Xenophanes and Heraclitus’, but such labour consisted not – as he also claims - in an 
attempt ‘to moralize divinity’.31 
 
By setting these premises, it is my intention to confer on Greek tragedy a prominent 
position in the history of early Greek philosophical thought. So if, as stated above, the 
exclusion of Presocratic material from debates about tragedy runs the risk of obscuring 
a thorough understanding of the broader cultural backdrop against which tragedy was 
born, the opposite is also true. Greek tragedy represents, in its own dramatic language, a 
fundamental contribution to early philosophical speculation about the divine, human 
                                                
28 Cf. Fraenkel 1962: 111; Cohen 1986: 131; Goldhill 1984: 56; 51; Martina, 2007. 
29 Mitchell-Boyask 2009: 100. 
30 Seaford 2003: 163. Di Benedetto 2011, although recognising a ‘lieto fine’ (p. 128) in the 
trilogy, also attributes to the expectations of the reader the capability of determining his critical 
judgment (p. 111).  
31 1952: 116. 
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attitudes towards it, indeed, the human place in relation to the cosmic forces which 
govern the universe. 
 
I.3 Some objections to Seaford’s argument 
 
 The ostensible overlaps between Seaford’s approach and mine require that I carefully 
present and discuss what are instead our points of divergence. However, since Seaford 
has developed his complex theory over more than ten years and deploys the most 
disparate concepts – such as those of Norden’s Satzparallelismus, Bakhtin’s 
chronotope, collective ritual, and monetised exchange – a detailed criticism of every 
aspect of his theory is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, I focus on what I 
consider to be the main differences between Seaford and my own position with regard 
to our interpretation of the Oresteia. In particular I will concentrate my efforts on 
rejecting two of Seaford’s major points: first, his understanding of Aeschylus’ Zeus and 
Presocratic ideas of the divine as the products of the influence of abstract monetary 
value; second his interpretation of the action in the Oresteia as a movement ‘from the 
Heraclitean unity of opposites to their Pythagorean reconciliation’.32  
 
Seaford’s interpretation of the Oresteia in relation to Heraclitean and Pythagorean 
thought relies on two overarching assumptions, both of which I cannot espouse. First, I 
find myself at odds with the overly optimistic belief that one could unequivocally 
account for the genesis of certain tendencies of thought at any point in history. Indeed, 
one of the cornerstones of Seaford’s theory is his interpretation of the abstract 
characteristics of the Aeschylean Zeus and of some of the ultimate principles of 
Presocratic thought as the cosmic projection of the ‘near-omnipotence of abstract 
monetary value’.33 Second, I would reject Seaford’s progressive interpretation of the 
action of the Oresteia as a movement from a previous state of conflict to a ‘final 
settlement in which the opposites are definitely differentiated and reconciled’. 34 Let’s 
put each argument under closer scrutiny. 
 
                                                
32 2010: 17. 
33 2010: 184. 
34 2003: 162. 
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Given the highly speculative content of Seaford’s ‘marxising’ theory I am not set here 
upon disproving it. My intent is rather to highlight the most questionable assumptions 
underpinning his argument. Based on the historical observation that the development of 
Presocratic ideas of an all-pervasive, semi-abstract, notion of the divine paralleled the 
development of a monetised society, the theory infers a unidirectional relation of 
causality. According to it, technological and material developments related to the 
diffusion of money preceded, and caused, the development of new notions of the divine.  
 
Whereas the tendency of certain Presocratic thinkers to postulate abstract philosophical 
principles can indeed be brought into relation with the genesis of social developments 
underpinned by mobilization of value through the use of monetary technologies, 
establishing unidirectional causal links between these two parallel developments seems 
a quite unlikely achievement. Correlation does not equate to causation. Yet, Seaford 
seems determined to read the philosophical and literary tendency towards abstract 
conceptions as the unidirectional product of social development, as his definition of a 
‘monetised Zeus’ in Aeschylus or the statement that Heraclitus’ logos ‘reflects the very 
same […] combination of features of the power of money’ testify.35  
 
My contention is that Seaford's argument is not able to demonstrate its ambitious goal. 
The granularity at which the historical and literary evidence supports the argumentation 
is not sufficient to establish what would be the actual causal direction between the two 
events discussed, let alone to demonstrate that there is a causal link at all.  The notion of 
an abstract divine and of abstract monetary value can indeed be related, but it is 
impossible to establish what came first and, more importantly, which intellectual 
process influenced the other. For instance, we can imagine there might have been a 
bidirectional relation of causality, namely, a reciprocal influence between philosophical 
speculations and economical developments. Or even, the social developments related to 
money may have themselves originated from philosophical and intellectual 
speculations. In conclusion to this point, Seaford’s theory has the merit of bringing to 
the fore a correlation between intellectual and social developments which is worth 
considering, and for this it must be praised. However, I do not think that a direct relation 
                                                
35 2012: 256; 250; italics mine. 
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of causality has been demonstrated by his argument, and I would therefore reject 
Seaford’s hypothesis that Aeschylus’ ‘conception of Zeus has been consciously or 
unconsciously influenced by the perceived omnipotence of abstract monetary value’.36  
 
Let’s turn now to Seaford’s progressivist interpretation of the Oresteia. As previously 
mentioned, Seaford interprets the action of the Oresteia as a movement from the 
Heraclitean unity of opposites to their Pythagorean reconciliation. 37  This overall 
interpretation of the trilogy is itself based on two different and intertwining 
assumptions. First, the cosmos of Heraclitus is envisaged as a place in which ‘opposites 
are’ always either ‘identical with each other, or ceaselessly transformed into each other’, 
and his model is juxtaposed to the ‘cosmos constructed by fifth-century 
Pythagoreanism’, in which ‘we can detect the idea that opposites retain their identities 
in being combined into a stable whole’.38 Second, the final disposition of the forces in 
Eumenides represents an ultimate form of differentiation of these opposites: a release 
and resolution in which ‘well-being is achieved by differentiation of the opposites with 
one prevailing over the other’.39 I will thereby proceed by illustrating in a concise form 
my reservations with regard to both of Seaford’s arguments. 
 
To begin with, it must be said that Seaford’s theory is based on the fundamental 
observation that the interplay of opposites has a key role in the style and dramatic 
development of the Oresteia. The pervasive tension between opposites is indeed a 
noteworthy feature of this trilogy; it is a theme which invests the drama at various levels 
of its unfolding, and a theme which I myself set out to explore in depth later in this 
study. However, although Seaford and I share this premise, our interpretative approach 
differs quite substantially. In particular, I would reject both his account of the 
Heraclitean notion of the unity of opposites and of the dramatic development of the 
Oresteia as inaccurate and slightly oversimplified.  
 
                                                
36 2010: 187. 
37 2013; 2003. 
38 2013: 20. 
39 2013: 22.  
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Indeed, in portraying the Heraclitean unity of opposites as either an inescapable 
conflation or an unceasing cycle of transformation, Seaford does not cover the whole 
range of modes of unity of opposites available in the fragments of the philosopher. On 
the contrary, if we rely on the study of Kirk, 40 it may be argued that there are at least 
three modes in which this essential unity is manifested: a relativistic unity, in which the 
same object is regarded in opposite ways by different observers (e.g. frr. 61, 13, 9) or in 
which the same observer ascribes different attributes to the same object (e.g. 58, 59, 60, 
103, 48, 23, 111); a cyclical unity, in which opposites are the same because they 
perpetually succeed one another (e.g. 88, 126, 57, 99); and an organic unity, in which 
opposites are connected as antithetical poles of the same nexus (e.g. 10, 51, 67). Instead, 
in Seaford’s argument, the notion of a harmonious unity, in which the opposites are 
different, yet conjunct by the same nexus, is removed from the cosmos of Heraclitus to 
be exclusively attributed to the Pythagorean cosmos. The outcome is a rather reductive 
and impoverished representation of the ‘tautly vital, twangingly alive, strainingly static 
cosmos’ of the philosopher, whose obscure and subtle thinking could hardly be 
constricted within a simple model.41  
 
What is more, the whole action of the Oresteia is presented by Seaford as a movement 
from the unity of opposites, as it can be perceived especially in Agamemnon and 
Choephori, to a differentiation of the opposites in which one prevails over the other, as 
can be perceived in Eumenides. In my opinion, this account does not properly describe 
the progression of the last play’s action. While the beginning of Eumenides – in which 
the Olympians face the Chthonian Erinyes – does indeed depict a differentiation of 
opposing divine powers which were previously perceived and addressed by the 
characters as uniting their force, yet the final stage of the trilogy offers a further 
dramatic shift. After Orestes’ acquittal and the Olympians’ attempt to overpower the 
Erinyes, the latter threaten to perpetrate the cycle of vendetta by unleashing plague on 
Attica. This perpetration of violence is avoided thanks to a further reconfiguration of 
divine roles: the Olympians and the Chthonians join forces in the new institution of the 
Areopagus and the trilogy concludes thus with a new ‘unity of opposites’. 
                                                
40 1954: 72-258; K.R.S. 2007: 188-193. 
41 Brann 2011: 90. 
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This all-embracing interpretation of Eumenides, about which Seaford and I disagree, 
could be broken further into three smaller points for the sake of clarification. To begin 
with, Seaford thinks – together with Hester, Winnington-Ingram, Conacher and 
Podlecki – that in the trial of Orestes the votes of the human jurors are equal and that 
the tie is broken only by Athena’s casting vote.42 Conversely, following Gagarin, Kitto, 
Goldhill and Sommerstein among others, I believe that Athena votes as a member of the 
jury (at 735) and that it is her vote which brings about the tie. The exact number of the 
jurors as well as the exact effect of Athena’s vote is a much-disputed issue. While a 
good summary of arguments and counter-arguments on this problem can be found in 
Sommerstein’s commentary,43 I want to focus here on the significance of adopting one 
view or the other. Whereas according to Seaford’s interpretation, the vote of Athena – 
who is envisaged as a divine authority operating apart from the human jury – resolves a 
‘potentially disastrous unity of opposites’,44 the interpretation adopted by me suggests 
that at the end of the play the question of matricide remains unanswered and the tension 
remains unsolved.45  
 
It should also be recalled how, at Eum. 470-2, Athena declares the question of matricide 
to be a matter both too great for mortals to judge by themselves and too delicate for her 
to judge alone (470-2), implying thus that the case can only be properly handled by 
Athena and the people working in conjunction. Hence, I believe that Seaford’s 
interpretation of Athena as a separate divine judge would undermine ‘the spirit of a play 
which narrows to an extraordinary extent the gulf in power between men and gods’, 46 
                                                
42 1995; 2003. Cf. Winnington-Ingram 1983: 125, n. 110, for a list of important – although not 
decisive – points regarding why it must be so. 
43 1989: 221ff; cf. Podlecki 1989: 182; 211-3 and Sommerstein 2010c. 
44 2003: 154. 
45 Cf. especially Goldhill 1986: 29-31, 37-51; 2004: 26-37 and Cairns 2005: 306-7. 
46  Sommerstein 1989: 224-5. Cf. Mitchell-Boyask 2009: 107. Cf. Plato’s Protagoras: ñ 
\nqrwpoj qeíaj metésce moíraj (322a). According to the myth recounted, the fact that 
humans were made partakers of divine portion is at the origin of their civic evolution following 
which they will acquire their most distinctive skill: Ó politikÕ técnh (322b). Just as in Eum. 
the divine origins of civic virtue in the myth contrast with their purely secular origins in the 
logos. Since all human beings have right and respect (díkh kaì aêdÍj, 322c-d), the Athenians, 
with their democratic system, are justified in letting all citizens deliberate. 
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and which emphasises the importance of solidarity and persuasion in the face of an 
otherwise indissoluble tragic circumstance.  
 
Seaford also recognises in both the figure of Athena and the final settlement of 
Olympians and Chthonic forces after the trial two examples illustrating the ultimate 
differentiation of the opposites: indeed, with regard to Athena, Seaford claims that she 
is ‘female endorsement […] of a universal asymmetrical relationship between male and 
female’; with regard to the second question, he claims that ‘the gods of the upper and 
lower world are emphatically differentiated so as to enable the incorporation of the 
latter into a new order controlled by the former’.47 Yet, Seaford’s thesis could be 
counter-argued by reading the same evidence as an endorsement of precisely the 
opposite view. Indeed, far from symbolising ‘a differentiation of opposites’, I take each 
example as evidence in support of the idea that the finale of the Oresteia should be read 
in the light of an ultimate reconnection of opposed forces into a single unity. 48 
To sum up, Seaford’s theory has the merit of introducing and exploring at length the 
notion that Aeschylean tragedy and the Oresteia in particular share certain basic 
structures with Presocratic philosophy. However, some of his basic hypotheses are 
questionable and lead to what I regard as unsatisfactory conclusions.  
 
From the next chapter onwards I will provide my own interpretation of the Oresteia. As 
I am convinced that a thesis which sets out to explore the interactions between 
Presocratic philosophy and Greek tragedy requires the development of a new model of 
interpretation, the next chapter is dedicated to consolidating my methodological 
premises regarding issues of interpretation of the text of the Oresteia, its relationship to 
the preceding poetic tradition, and the relationship between archaic poetry and early 
philosophical fragments. As I hope will emerge from next chapter and the whole thesis, 
such a hermeneutical effort can make a substantial contribution to current trends of 
research on generic interaction between tragedy and archaic Greek thought.  
 
 
                                                
47 2003: 161. 
48 Cf. Ch. 8.4. 
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II 
 
Aeschylus and the Early Greek Philosophical Tradition: Methodology 
 
II.1 The violent grace of divine justice in the Oresteia 
 
During the parodos of the Agamemnon, after having illustrated a specific sort of 
disposition among those dispensed by Zeus for mortals, the Chorus complete their line 
of thought by describing the intervention of the gods (daímonej) in human affairs as a 
cárij bíaioj: a ‘violent grace’.49 Through the compressed force of this oxymoronic 
expression, the Argive Elders convey, most poignantly, the kernel of a complex 
religious attitude. Indeed, if Greek tragedy contains an unyielding tension between the 
alternating projection of both tyrannical force and divine benevolence onto the gods, 
then the gods’ cárij bíaioj may be taken as a quintessential expression of this 
tension.50 
 
The contradictory essence of this religious attitude, which Greek tragedy largely inherits 
from the preceding poetic tradition, may be interpreted as an oscillation between two 
opposite and mutually exclusive ways of envisioning the interaction of Zeus and the 
other gods with mortals.51 The characters of Greek epic and tragedy are made to voice 
both conceptions: utterances expressing blind faith in the gods’ ethical awareness 
                                                
49 Ag. 176-83. This intentionally loose translation is mine.  
50  Fraenkel 1962: 111 and Lloyd-Jones 1993: 26 are antithetical examples of alternative 
readings to the one I offer. I tend to reject those readings which reflect utterly negative or 
positive theological understandings of the Oresteia. Some important contributions I disagree 
with are, on the side of Fraenkel: Martina 2007; Cohen 1986: 134; Pope 1974 criticised by 
Conacher 1976. On the side of Lloyd-Jones: Smith 1980 also criticised by Conacher 1983. 
Recent interpretations more attuned to mine are: Raeburn and Thomas 2011: 84-8; Schenker 
1994; Conacher 1987. Schenker 1994 and Bollack 1981 contain a more thorough survey of 
opinions. For more on the ‘Hymn’ cf. Ch. 4. 
51  Cf. what Winnington-Ingram defined – adopting Murray’s term – as ‘the Inherited 
Conglomerate’: that two-fold tradition which ‘included both the jealousy and the justice of 
heaven’, 1965: 39.  
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coexist with those expressing despair over finding a convincing explanation for divine 
behaviour and design; utterances expressing faith in divine vigilance over human 
existence coexist with those expressing scepticism about the seriousness of the gods’ 
commitment to justice.  
 
This unresolved tension is long-lived: not only it can be found in antiquity, but is also 
reflected and perpetuated by modern scholarship. Re-enacting this ancient oscillation, 
today’s criticism swings often between mutually exclusive theological readings of these 
texts: some, by attributing to Zeus and the gods a regime of pure caprice, tyranny and 
injustice, reject the view of those who look in these texts for the pledge of a supreme 
theodicy. A third group of critics argue instead that Greek epic poetry, tragedy, or both, 
attain no final certainty, but that they are instead open to as wide a multiplicity of 
readings as those expressed by the fictional figures who inhabit them.52 This is neither 
the place to enter the specificities of the debate nor the place to do justice to the 
subtleties of each specific approach. By means of the preceding outline I simply mean 
to sketch the critical panorama on the question of ‘divine justice’ and to site my work 
against it: throughout this thesis, I maintain that the Oresteia provides no definite 
resolution nor should it be read according to either of the extreme hermeneutics just 
delineated.  
 
In this chapter, however, I will return to the question obliquely and focus on one aspect 
of this debate which has received little attention. It is my aim here to illustrate one of 
the most fundamental assumptions behind my thesis as a whole. I argue that the 
constant tension between opposite religious attitudes which pervades the Oresteia may 
be read as a self-aware response to some of the ideas and the theological debates of the 
time. Through the variegated voices of its characters and choruses, the Oresteia seems 
to constantly create the lure of a comprehensive theology only to frustrate the desire it 
instils. The pervasive sense of the presence of the divine in the trilogy reveals an 
unmistakable reference to the need of those who experience or witness the constant 
                                                
52 The secondary literature is vast. For the first view see Martina 2007 and Cohen 1986 
(Sommerstein 2010b: 164-70 restricts it to the Agamemnon); for the second view see Seaford 
2012; 2003; Lloyd-Jones 1970; 1956; Winnington-Ingram 1983; 1954 and Allan 2006; 2005: 
75-77; for the third view see Vernant 1988 Goldhill 2004; 1986 and Halliwell 2004; 1990. 
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cycle of action and suffering to find reassurance in a level of significance beyond that of 
human existence. Yet at each step of this process – from the specific instances of 
isolated odes to the larger scheme of each play and the whole trilogy – this need is 
instigated only to be thwarted. The hope of reading a final horizon of meaning is 
repeatedly invited only to be repeatedly defied.  
 
Indeed, various laudable efforts have been made to illustrate the depths of this ‘tragic 
religion’, and the tension originating from the alliance of opposite moods and 
perspectives has been detected and underlined at various levels of the drama. Some 
scholars have focused on Aeschylus’ wide-ranging exploitation of choral voice in all its 
possible modulations;53 others have chosen to focus on Aeschylus’s exploitation of the 
polysemy of certain vocabulary such as, most notably, in the language of dikê;54 and 
others again have insisted on the open-ended nature of the Oresteia’ finale in order to 
point out how the dilemma of justice receives, in fact, no conclusive resolution. 55  
These approaches, the results of which I share and adopt as the foundations of my own 
work, all fail, however, to account for one specific question, namely, why is this tension 
so subtly and carefully insisted upon? In other words, why does the Oresteia constantly 
offer such alluring and carefully constructed prospects of significance, only to then 
reveal the illusory nature of such mirages?  
 
There is, of course, a logic that is intrinsic to the genre, and those with the sensibility to 
reach the depths of this tragedy have already offered partial answers to the questions 
posed. However, in this thesis I intend to explore a path that has scarcely been followed 
before: I offer an interpretation of the Oresteia in the light of some of the ideas, or 
modes of thought, which circulated among the Presocratic philosophers. In this chapter, 
I will focus on refining my working hypothesis: I will do this by underscoring the 
weight which pre-existing debates about the nature and role of the gods may have had in 
influencing the shape of the Oresteia’s theological concerns. 
                                                
53 Fletcher 1999; Athanassaki 1994. For choral polyphony in Greek tragedy see Calame 2013: 
35-57 and in genral Gagné and Hopman 2013; for a study of oratio recta in Classical Greek 
Literature see Bers 1997. 
54 Cf. Int. I.2; Ch. 6.1: n. 497. 
55 Cf. n. 45. 
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II.2 Self-reflective statements and ‘metatheological’ discourse  
 
The self-reflective nature of the Oresteia’s theological discourse may be sensed in its 
development at various levels of the drama: whether we focus on specific utterances and 
claims or on the larger framework of the plays, the question of the gods’ relation to 
humans emerges as a prominent concern. Yet, for the most part, the theological 
dimension of this tragedy is construed so as to remain implicit within the narrative 
sequence and the dramatic situations of the plays: the human desire to come to terms 
with divine justice becomes more harrowing when it is aroused as a latent necessity 
rather than an overt demand.  
 
But this constant attention and emphasis laid on theological questions makes them at 
times so highly charged that they must, by necessity, abandon the various dramatic 
disguises under which they lurk and burst into the open. When this happens, then, the 
implicit theological dilemmas of the drama break through the surface of lyrics or 
recitatives to become explicit and, what is more, explicitly self-reflective. The various 
exchanges between the Chorus of Erinyes and the Olympian gods on matters of 
seniority, capacity, and power at the end of the trilogy, may be perhaps a vaguely 
grotesque example of it, but still a case in point: with their direct participation and 
behaviour, the gods in Eumenides seem literally to embody that ‘notion of clashing 
divine personalities’ which ensures ‘that no simple and reassuring scheme of divine 
justice’ is ‘possible’.56 In a sense, the whole culmination of the trilogy with the 
intervention of divine figures previously addressed only abstractly can be taken as a 
final concretization of a previously implicit theological tension, as well as a final 
unmasking of that unremitting longing for a direct confrontation of men with gods.  
 
But long before reaching the final play, in fact, throughout the trilogy, the text is time 
and again interspersed with religious statements in which the discourse about the gods 
                                                
56 Allan 2005: 77. 
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becomes self-aware and self-reflective. When taken cumulatively, these passages create 
a sense of what could be defined as the ‘metatheological’ dimension of the text. Let’s 
begin with the first stasimon of the Agamemnon, in which the Chorus sing: 
 
                    [...] o÷k 1fa tij 
qeoùj brotÏn ;axioûsqai mélein, 
8soij ;aqíktwn cárij 
patoîq’< ñ d’ o÷k e÷sebÔj.  (369-72) 
 
 In the first part of this ode, the Chorus revere the greatness of Zeus, who is seen as the 
executioner of divine retribution, and interpret the capture of Troy as a punishment of 
Paris (362-6). In the passage quoted, the Chorus reject the ‘impious’ claim of a generic 
and indefinite tij, and thereby introduce a self-aware juxtaposition between their 
theological stance and that supposedly represented by this pronoun. Unflinching faith in 
the mechanism of divine retribution is here explicitly opposed to the scepticism of those 
who question the benevolence of the gods.  
 
Two main observations must be made. First, the use of the indefinite pronoun, which is 
widely understood here as a Greek narratorial device for negation and not as an attack 
ad personam, allows the Chorus to present their theological statement against an 
undifferentiated collectiveness.57 Second, the Chorus convey their position through the 
same syncopated iambics deployed in the parodos to describe the sacrifice of Iphigenia 
(192-275). The implications of such metrical choice are perhaps not entirely self evident 
and thus this point requires further elucidation. 
 
Various scholars have already drawn attention to the association of syncopated iambics 
with the theme of divine retribution,58 but there is something particularly interesting 
about the connection between the first stasimon and the last three strophic pairs of the 
parodos which this rhythmic pattern suggests. Pure faith in divine benevolence is here 
uttered in the same metre by means of which the sacrifice of an innocent – epitome of 
                                                
57 De Jong 1987.  For standard Homeric classifications of tis-spechees see also De Jong 2004: 
177-8; and De Jong, Nünlist and Bowie 2004 for a variety of studies on the function of 
anonymous spokesmen. 
58 Raeburn and Thomas 2011: 251; Kitto 1955; Scott 1984. 
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what is most unsettling about divine justice – had previously been described. What is 
more, as the first stasimon progresses in the same rhythm, the Chorus’ reflection on the 
course of retribution shifts the focus from Zeus’ punishment of Paris to the foreboding 
of punishment for overly successful sackers of a city (i.e. Agamemnon). The metrical 
unity works as a homogenous façade behind which lies a hidden tension:  a tension 
inherent in a conception of justice in which the executioner is doomed to become as 
culpable as the sinner.  
 
In other words, metre emphasises here, as it did in the parodos, the unity of two 
contradictory theological conceptions: the Chorus undergo one of their recurrent 
emotional transitions from confidence in their ability to read the purpose of the gods to 
uncertainty and anxiety over finding the foundations for such self-confidence: the initial 
claim of a Chorus ready to denounce the impiety of those who doubt the ethical 
commitment of the gods gives way to ‘an anxiety (mérimna) that waits to hear of 
something happening under cover of night’ (459-60). If then iambic rhythm points to 
the thematic motif of retributive justice, the formal unity deriving from it is the cover of 
a shifting subject matter: divine justice moves from being perceived as a reassuring and 
benevolent mechanism to becoming the source of the Chorus’ anxiety. The initial 
religious statement of the Chorus is therefore corroded from within: its significance 
unfolds in full only when the psychological and emotional pattern in which it is inserted 
is also taken into account. 
 
But another passage captures even better the explicit and self-reflective nature of some 
of the Chorus’ theological statements. As previously mentioned, Aeschylus inherited 
from the Archaic Age both the longing to find justice in the ordering of the universe and 
the incongruities this longing necessarily had to wrestle with. The partial solution of 
interpreting disaster as divine punishment is the most traditional answer to one such 
incongruity. It springs from the attempt to purify the divine from any trace of sheer 
malignity (such as was probably implied in the original idea of the fqónoj tÏn qeÏn) 
and to attribute a consoling causality to the otherwise unbearable meaninglessness of 
human suffering. Indeed, as noticed by Winnington-Ingram, ‘in a famous chorus of the 
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Agamemnon the old idea is rejected that excessive prosperity alone is sufficient to 
account for disaster’.59 The ode reads thus: 
 
palaífatoj d’ æn brotoîj gérwn lógoj 
tétuktai, mégan teles- 
qénta fwtòj 3lbon 
teknoûsqai mhd’ \paida qn'=skein, 
;ek d’ ;agaqâj túcaj génei 
blastánein ;akóreston oêzún. 
díca d’ \llwn monófrwn eê- 
mi< tò dussebèj gàr 1rgon 
metà mèn pleíona tíktei, 
sfetér= d’eêkóta génn=< 
o#ikwn gàr e÷qudíkwn 
kallípaij pótmoj aêeí. (750-62) 
 
With regard to the content of this ode, scholars have long puzzled over what conception 
of the fqónoj qeÏn Aeschylus may have had. 60 What should indeed be noted is that in 
this ode of the Agamemnon, the Chorus explicitly refer to a gérwn lógoj that is – they 
claim – palaífatoj æn brotoîj, in order to place themselves against it. If 
intratextuality and religious terminology remind us of the first stasimon, it is important 
to notice how what was there a generic refusal of a vaguely impious claim acquires 
here, in the second stasimon, a more specific colouring: the Chorus’ reference to an old 
doctrine that is ‘long since spoken among mortals’ is of course a much more substantial 
depiction of the position they set out to refuse.  
 
Whereas in the first stasimon the Chorus rejected what came across as the opinion of a 
minority, here their renewed theological claim is set in opposition with an old and well-
established mode of thought. This said, it seems to me that the traditional belief the 
Chorus self-consciously reject must be the cruder conception of the fqónoj qeÏn, in 
which the gods visit misfortune on the owners of extreme prosperity. Interestingly – a 
further confirmation of the polyphonic nature of this tragedy – Agamemnon appeals 
                                                
59 Winnington-Ingram 1965: 37. 
60 Fraenkel 1962: 349-50. 
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precisely to the religious conception here rejected by the Chorus in the scene 
immediately after this ode. Indeed, as the king resolves to tread on the purple fabrics ‘of 
the gods’ he also voices a concern to avoid the fqónoj which he fears may come upon 
him as a consequence of this arrogant and sacrilegious act.61 This is part of the reason 
why setting a discussion in terms of ‘Aeschylus’ conception’ of fqónoj qeÏn, as was 
done in the past, may not be very profitable. 
 
What is more, coming back to the second stasimon, it should also be noted that although 
the Chorus claim to differ from others and to be single in their thinking (díca d’ 
\llwn monófrwn eêmí, 757-8), as commented by Sommerstein among many others, 
‘there is nothing new’ about the belief they state.62 For, of course, the idea of a 
dussebèj 1rgon that breeds more impious deeds (pleíona tíktei, 758-9), reinforced 
by the gnomic statement, ‘an old act of outrage is wont to give birth to a new young 
outrage’ (fileî dè tíktein 0brij mèn palaià neázousan [...] 0brin, 763-6), 
closely recalls several Solonian fragments.63 Hence, the Chorus’ affirmation and its 
claim of singularity raises the question of the Oresteia’s relation to the preceding poetic 
tradition. In the next section I will continue my introductory presentation of the self-
reflective religious aspects of this tragedy in the light of contemporary and preceding 
theological debates.  
 
II.3 Archaic poetry: towards an explicit theology? 
 
Several poets before Aeschylus had already sensed the incongruities deriving from the 
reading of divine punishment as a manifestation of divine justice. Most of the problems 
presented by the Oresteia in association with it had already been developed during the 
                                                
61 Sommerstein 2008: 110-11 rejects the transmitted reading qeÏn and the idea of any divine 
fqónoj from this passage, but his argument is not entirely persuasive. As pointed out by 
Fraenkel 1962: 430 ‘the fact that the gods perceive and act próswqen is mentioned several 
times in the Oresteia’, and the antithesis between what is proper for a god and for a man colours 
the scene since 944ff.  In my opinion Agamemnon is here made to voice a concern about human 
jealousy with a phrasing that would have unmistakably evoked in the audience the idea of 
fqónoj qeÏn. Cf. Raeburn and Thomas 2011: 169. 
62 Sommerstein 2008: 89. 
63 4.6-9; 6.3-4 (Cf. Thgn. 153-4.); 13.7-16. All Solon’s fragments are numbered as in W2. For 
more on Solon cf. Ch. 3.2. 
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poetic tradition of the archaic age and had their root, unsurprisingly, in the Greek 
hexametric corpus of Homer, Hesiod, the Epic and the Theban Cycles. Although most 
Aeschylean tragedies probably derived their mythological content directly from the Epic 
Cycle and Theban Cycle – with the Cypria being particularly relevant for the Oresteia – 
which makes it all the more regrettable that they have survived only in fragmentary 
form, already the Iliad and the Odyssey contained in embryo most of the questions with 
which the Oresteia is concerned.64  
 
There are three major sets of disturbing implications attached to the view that the gods 
always punish human wrongs, all of which are alluded to in both the Oresteia and the 
Greek epic corpus. First, the disparity of the punishment. The narrative of the Trojan 
War, which is of course the overarching narrative of the Iliad, draws attention to the 
disproportionate suffering involved for those who must pay for their errors, such as the 
destruction of a city in exchange for the abduction of a woman, or the extension of 
punishment to the innocent, such as in Il. 24.27-30, where Troy, Priam, and his people 
are strongly juxtaposed to the follies of the lone Alexander.65 Of course, the same 
narrative is one of the background narratives of the Oresteia and the anxiety with regard 
to disproportionate human suffering is often voiced in those very passages in which the 
theme of the war emerges more prominently. In particular, the great parodos of the 
Agamemnon - with its remarks on the death of Greeks and Trojans for the sake of ‘a 
woman of many men’ (62-7), and the powerful depiction of the sacrifice of Iphigenia 
(104-59; 185-249) – is infused with many such reflections. The human perspective on 
war leads to questioning the very nature of the divine, as the ‘Hymn to Zeus’ (160-86) 
makes explicit. 
 
Second, both guilt and punishment seem to belong to a larger cosmic order, in which 
various divine forces concur at times and are in discord at others, and in which human 
action seems often triggered – if not fully determined – by superior necessity.66 In a 
universe shown to rest ‘upon a balance of power that is vulnerable to the turbulence of 
                                                
64 Cf. Ehnmark E. 1935; Greene 1944; Allan 2006: 1-35. 
65 kaì Príamoj kaì laòj ;Alexándrou 6nek; \thj (Il. 24.27). Cf. Allan 2006: 12-3. 
66 ‘For’, as nicely put by Greene, ‘there stands behind the gods a shadowy reality, a fixed order 
rather than a power, a divine conscience, at times gathering moral grandeur, at times dreadful 
and oppressive to man, the reality known as Moira’, 1944:13-4; cf. Ehnmark 1935:75. 
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competing divine wills’, 67 guilt seems often divinely dictated as well as punishment, 
with the disturbing implication that human beings have to pay for a crime for which 
they are only partially responsible.68 This theme receives a similar treatment in the 
Oresteia, in which various crimes are prompted by the gods, such as Artemis with 
regard to Agamemnon’s sacrifice of Iphigenia or Apollo with regard to Orestes’ 
matricide, and the final play of which dramatizes the reorganization of conflicting 
deities into a new cosmic order.  
 
Finally, both in the Iliad and the Oresteia divine punishment is not always 
instantaneous and the pattern of deceit and punishment is conceived as potentially 
extendable over more than one generation. Hard to appease, divine anger is conceived 
as something that can remain and mature over a long period of time as in the case of 
Poseidon’s anger against Troy due to Laomedon’s fault in the Iliad (21.441-57), 69 or 
the curse on the House of Atreus which Cassandra’s visions make manifest in the 
Oresteia (1090-2; 1095-7). In short, Aeschylus’ dramatization of the disturbing nature 
of divine justice in the Oresteia relies upon a series of theological premises that were 
already at work in Homer and emerge clearly from the Iliad: the disproportion of divine 
punishment, Zeus and the Olympians’ relation to destiny, and the longevity of divine 
anger, presented as something which can last through various generations.  
 
 If a scholar like Dodds found ‘no indication in the narrative of the Iliad that Zeus is 
concerned with Justice as such’, this may be, among other things, because the narrative 
of the Iliad is only peripherally concerned with the justice of Zeus.70 Hesiod’s works, by 
contrast, are directly focused on justice. While the very structure of the Theogony, 
culminating in the ascendency of Zeus, expresses the supremacy of his justice and the 
establishment of the present theological order, Works and Days underlines the 
importance of justice, which Zeus has given humans to set them apart from animals 
                                                
67 Allan 2006: 8. 
68 For two illuminating examples see the oath-breaking of Pandarus in Il. 4.64-108 which 
‘serves as a recapitulation of Trojan guilt’ (Allan 2012: 56) and which is prompted by Athena 
and Hera with Zeus’ consent and when Zeus considers sparing Sarpedon even though his death 
is pálai peprwménon a#is+ (16. 441).  
69 Lloyd-Jones 2002: 2; cf. Allan 2006: 6. 
70 Dodds 1951: 32. 
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(278-9).71 This is not to claim that Hesiod’s divine justice is more advanced than 
Homer’s, but simply that his account of its mechanisms in his works is perhaps more 
straightforward. As West wrote: ‘Hesiod’s arguments for Dike and for work are 
essentially of a very simple form. Dike is good because the gods reward it. Hybris is 
bad because the gods punish it’.72 Similarly, Greene is right in claiming that ‘the whole 
poem [W&D] is, among other things, a protest against hybris and a plea for dikê’ in 
which ‘the just flourish and the gods punish injustice. 73  
 
However, in Hesiod just as in Homer, disproportion and blindness mark such retributive 
justice (W&D, 238-247) as well as the idea that divine punishment may extend beyond 
one generation (W&D, 281- 4). Moreover, in Theogony, Hesiod also addresses the 
question of Zeus’ relationship to the fixed order of a superior necessity by means of 
genealogical connections. The idea of an ineluctable cosmic necessity is conveyed 
through those divine guilds or divine pluralities such as Moira(i) and Eriny(e)s.74 
Particularly noteworthy is the ‘double pedigree’75 of the Moirai, first described, along 
with Moros, Thanatos, the Keres, Nemesis, Eris and other powers,  as progeny of Night 
(210-25) and thus underlining their association and affinity with the obscure powers of 
Death, Destiny, and Strife,76 but also identified later, along with the Horai (Eunomia, 
Dikê, and Eirene), as progeny of Zeus. Thus the Moirai move from being powers who 
allot men good and evil and who punish transgression (217-22) to being powers tightly 
connected to Zeus’ new regime of peace, law and order. I do not think, as West seems to 
suggest, that the only significance of the Moirai’s novel mention in relation to Zeus is 
merely ‘to make it plain that in critical cases their power is subordinate to his’.77 Rather, 
their double mention has a twofold purpose: first, that of underlying their indefeasible 
role within any divine order, whether old or new; second, that of underlining the 
flexibility of their connection: the Moirai appear here as forces that are susceptible to 
the divine order’s alteration, and have the capacity to adapt and adjust their function to 
                                                
71 […] æpeì o÷ díkh æstì met’ a÷toîj< | ;anqrÍpoisi d’ 1dwke díkhn. Allan 2006: 27-28; 
West 1966: 1. 
72 West 1978: 47. 
73 Greene 1944: 29; cf. W&D, 213. 
74 West 1966: 32. 
75 Greene 1944: 29. 
76 Similarly West 1966: 36. 
77 West 1966: 37. 
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the new balance of powers.  At the end of the Oresteia, the Erinyes are persuaded to 
abandon their stubborn avenging anger, thus altering the role allotted to them by Moira 
(333-40), and to accept their new residence with Athena, Zeus and Ares in order to 
preside over human affairs and cherish their prosperity. And it is thus perhaps no 
negligible detail that Aeschylus deliberately adapts the Hesiodic tradition in order to 
make the Erinyes daughters of Night, born ‘to be a punishment (poinÔ) for the blind 
and for those who see’ (321-3), and thereby turns them into the sisters of the Moirai 
(415-7). 
 
The legacy of this set of problems can be recognised in the extant fragments of the 6th 
century’s poets, in particular in Solon and the poets of the Theognidea. Since Solon’s 
attention is mainly directed towards the promotion of his political role in Athens – his 
archonship, his reforms and his ideas78 – his considerations of divine retributive justice 
fall within a narrower range.  His work does not have the cosmic breadth of his epic 
predecessor: Solon’s poetry does not purport to account for the order of the universe 
and for the place of men and gods in this order, but rather for the order of his city-state 
and the meaning of justice in relation to this order. Solon’s reflections on justice are 
chiefly reflections on economic and political justice and, like those in Hesiod’s W&D, 
they revolve around a central concern: the just acquisition of wealth and stability in 
conjunction with the poet’s personal apprehension for his own reputation: 
 
Mnhmosúnhj kaì Zhnòj ’Olumpíou ;aglaà tékna, 
Moûsai Pierídej, klûté moi e÷comén_< 
3lbon moi pròj qeÏn makárwn dóte kaì pròj ßpántwn 
;anqrÍpwn aêeì dóxan 1cein ;agaqÔn. (13W2.1-4).79 
 
 However, since like Homer and Hesiod before him Solon recognises in the gods the 
guarantors of human justice, several of his fragments appear to raise the same set of 
problems to which I referred above. 
 
                                                
78 Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 19-44; Gerber 1999: 6. 
79 All translations of Solon are from Gerber 1999. 
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Although this is not the place for an in-depth analysis of the whole of Solon’s work, it 
should nonetheless be acknowledged that there is what has been defined as a 
‘bifurcation’ in his conception of justice.80 Following Jaeger, Vlastos argues that in 4W2 
Solon describes the operation of justice through the ‘observable consequences of human 
acts within the social order’, thus presenting the ‘rational dikê of the polis’ as a natural, 
self-regulative and dynamic principle acting within the poet’s reconstruction of Athenian 
institutions.81 This original way of presenting justice has been contrasted with Solon’s 
traditional account of the role of the gods and inscrutable reality of Moira in 13W2, in 
which ‘his sense of justice’ seems to ‘resolve, like Hesiod’s, into the pious faith that 
justice will triumph over hybris in the end’.82 This attempt to bring together and contrast 
various conceptions of justice, especially the social dimension of the polis against the 
cosmic dimension of divine retribution, represents of course a noteworthy precedent for 
the Oresteia and I shall return to it in due course.83  Here, I limit myself to a few remarks 
about the more conservative strand of Solon’s thought and his personal adaptation of 
traditional problems around the central issue of the acquisition of wealth in 13W2. 
 
Throughout the first part of the ‘Prayer to the Muses’ (13.1-32), divine justice is equated 
with retribution, which strikes those who acquire wealth unjustly: 
 
crÔmata d’ ëmeírw mèn 1cein, ;adíkwj dè pepâsqai 
o÷k æqélw. pántwj 0steron %hlqe díkh (7-8). 
 
Thus, the vengeance of Zeus (tísij, 25) is inevitable, although it may not always strike 
immediately (;all’ :o mèn a÷tík’ 1teisen, :o d’0steron 29), and as in Homer and 
Hesiod, if the culpable man himself escapes and the ‘pursuing destiny of the gods’ 
(qeÏn moîr’ æpioûsa) does not reach him in time, then ‘the innocent pay the penalty, 
either the children or a later progeny’ (31-2). Thus far Solon’s account seems to repeat 
the simple scheme of Hesiod’s logic: it is acceptable to pursue 3lboj but not at the cost 
of acting hubristically and unjustly, for that leads, sooner or later to ruin (\th, 13). 
                                                
80 Vlastos 1946:75. 
81 1946: 65-8; 82. Cf. Greene 1944: 38: ‘here is an explanation of human good and evil in purely 
human terms.’ 
82 Vlastos 1946: 77; Cf. 1944: 36-9. 
83 Cf. Ch. 3.2. 
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‘Zeus oversees every outcome (;allà Zeùj pántwn æforÙ téloj, 17)’ and preserves 
the order of things by punishing those who have a ‘sinful heart’ (27-8).  
 
However, as the movement of thought progresses through the elegy, the justice of the 
gods seems almost to be doubted. In this elegy which Lattimore has defined as ‘self-
generating series of connected ideas’,84 Solon explores the extreme implications of the 
thought that even the innocent person is at times struck by the gods:  
 
Moîra dé toi qnhtoîsi kakòn férei Òdè kaì æsqlón 
dÏra d’\fukta qeÏn gígnetai ;aqanátwn (63-4).85 
 
This is the human perspective (qnhtoí, 33) on divine justice, which unlike that of Zeus 
does not oversee every téloj but is confined to the frustrating contemplation of the 
irrational immediate,86 in which: 
 
;all’ ñ mèn e%u 1rdein peirÍmenoj o÷ pronoÔsaj 
æj megálhn \thn kaì calepÕn 1pesen,  
t^_ dè kakÏj 1rdonti qeòj perì pánta dídwsin 
suntucíhn ;agaqÔn, 1klusin ;afrosúnhj (67-70). 
 
While the elegy progresses in what could be considered the second part of the poem 
(33-76), Solon ‘emphasises the uncertainty of man’s lot’,87 for whom both good and evil 
come from Moira, a power so inscrutable that at times even he who strives to act rightly 
appears to fall into a great calamity. As the inadequacy of human understanding is 
contrasted with divine omniscience, the poet’s emphasis shifts from divine retribution to 
the uncertainty of human life in relation to the pursuit of wealth. Contrary to Vlastos’ 
interpretation, even within his most traditional strand of thought Solon’s ‘sense of 
justice’ seems far from being resolved into the ‘pious faith’. Instead, the juxtaposition of 
a human perspective with divine omniscience seems to determine a further bifurcation 
in his thought or, rather, an oscillation between two gnomic and antithetical half-truths: 
                                                
84 Lattimore 1947: 162. 
85 Cf. Raeburn and Thomas 2011: xl. 
86 Similarly Lattimore 1947: 166. 
87 Greene 1944: 36. 
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one which regards the gods as the infallible guarantors of retribution, the other which 
regards the gods as inscrutable and almost ill-willed potencies. The whole poem ends as 
it begins on the note of divine retribution (75-7). 
 
The corpus of the late 6th century Theognidea takes Solon’s bifurcations of thought to 
an extreme breadth. Human beings are at times presented as fully responsible for their 
condition (833-6), at others they are depicted as puppets of the gods (e.g. 133-42; 157-8; 
169-78, 585-90). The oscillation between the views that gods punish malefactors while 
rewarding those who act rightly and that the gods act in an inscrutable and capricious 
way is more palpable than ever. Moreover, as reflections on the human condition reach 
the pessimistic commonplace of the mÕ fûnai \riston (425-28; 179-81), those on the 
nature of divine justice acquire at times the tone of a bewildered protest and earnest 
resentment (373-92) and the very nature of divine justice is called into question: pÏj 
æsti díkaion [...]> (743). 
 
Thus the Theognidea offers a complex scenario. Even those fragments containing a 
reflection on divine retribution present traditional problems with a new fervour and 
urgency. There is evidence of the usual concern with the belatedness of divine 
punishment (203-8; 731-52), but also of a bolder attitude.  At times, this traditional 
concern seems to amount to a certainty that even a ‘timely prayer’ (kaírioj e÷cÔ, 341) 
will most certainly fail to lead to a timely ‘retribution’ (tísij, 345); at others, it reaches 
the virulence of an explicit longing for an alternative system of justice (731-40). There 
is also evidence of a concern – like the one voiced by the Iliadic Hera with regard to 
Zeus sparing Sarpedon’s death – with the relation of divine justice with other 
compulsive forces which shape human existence:  
                                           
                    […]   doíhn d’;ant’ ;aniÏn ;aníaj<  
a%isa gàr o0twj æsti (344-5) 
 
poll^_ toi pléonaj limoû kóroj 4lesen 2dh 
\ndraj, 8soi moírhj pleíon’ 1cein 1qelon. (605-6) 
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And the human condition is often depicted as if determined by a combination of 
psychological and cosmic binding limitations:  
 
frontídej ;anqrÍpwn 1lacon, pterà poikíl’ 1cousai, 
murómenai yucÖj e!ineka kaì biótou. (729-30) 
 
 […]  1mphj d’ 8 ti moîra paqeîn o÷k 1sq’ øpaluxai.  
8tti dè moîra paqeîn, o5ti dédoika paqeîn (817-18). 
 
As Greene aptly put it, the content of several fragments of the Theognidea is truly ‘stuff 
for tragedy’.88 Indeed, Aeschylus inherits that bifurcation in the conception of divine 
justice, those paradoxes, and dilemmas, which were present in the poetic tradition from 
Homer and Hesiod onwards but that had acquired a more explicit and urgent dimension 
in the poets of the 6th century.  
 
In a sense then when the Chorus of the second stasimon of the Agamemnon claim to 
differ from others in their belief, and they do so by using a language that is highly 
reminiscent of Solon’s fragments, their statement is metaliterary as much as it is 
metatheological. It is not only an assertion of self-reflective theology but it is also an 
assertion of self-reflective poetics. Through implicit verbal affiliation Aeschylus places 
the figures of the Argive Elders within the debate conducted by the preceding poetic 
tradition. But he does so in a way that invites his audience to simultaneously read the 
Elders’ claim as acknowledging a fair degree of indebtedness to that tradition as well 
as suggesting an aspiration to rival it. The metaliterary quality of such a passage may 
prompt us to recognise that the whole of the Oresteia may be read as highly dependent 
on the mythological material and the archaic thought of the poetic tradition as well as 
sufficiently complex to rival the scope of the theology therein developed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
88 Greene 1944: 42. 
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II.4 A world teeming with gods: 
philosophical theology and theistic philosophy 
 
Various components which unite the early philosophical tradition to the early poetic 
tradition – especially with regard to intellectual content, poetic form and 
comprehensive aspirations – have been brought to the foreground in recent years and 
sensitively studied.89 Here I confine myself to some issues pertaining the theology of 
early Greek philosophy.  
 
If on the one hand one may regard cosmogonic poems such as Hesiod’s Theogony as 
early quasi-rationalistic theories of everything and as an inevitable prelude to 
philosophical cosmologies,90 on the other hand one cannot fail to observe how the 
world depicted by early philosophical accounts remained, as Thales seems to have said, 
‘full of gods’: […] pánta plÔrh qeÏn e%inai.91  
 
Jaeger’s Gifford Lectures, delivered in St Andrews in 1936, have been regarded by 
some as a turning point in the study of the early Greek Philosophy.92 No doubt, they 
consolidate the kind of approach which in the English speaking world had been 
promulgated by Cornford93 and which pays due attention to the elements of continuity 
between religious and philosophical thought. 94  Since the time of Jaeger, the 
philosophical poignancy of the theology of early Greek thinkers has been underlined 
                                                
89 Curd and McKirahan 2011: 2-7; K.R.S. 2007: 7-74; Most 2006: 332-362; Allan 2005: 71-81; 
Algra 1999: 45-65; Vlastos 1952: 97-123. 
90 Cornford 1912: 17-9; Jaeger 1947: 10-17; K.R.S. 2007: 34-46; 71. 
91 Aristot. De An. A5, 411a7-8. 
92 These lectures were subsequently (1947) collected in a volume entitled The Theology of Early 
Greek Philosophers, which received numerous reviews: some which insist on its almost 
paradigm-shifting role (Tait 1953, Marcus 1949, Vlastos 1952: 101), some more neutral 
(Callahan 1947, Allen 1949, Frank 1950, Crahay 1968); others which minimise its importance 
(Morrison 1949 and Hamilton 1950: 106: ‘it does not really add very much to what has for some 
time been established as the orthodox view’ in England).  
93 Cornford 1912. 
94 Contra to the ‘positivistic’ approach from the previous generation: cf. Burnet 1945, Tannery 
1930, and Gomperz 1912, who treated the Presocratics as forerunners of modern scientists. 
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by several scholars who have enriched our understanding of this difficult topic with 
numerous and subtle insights.95 
 
Presocratic inquiries into cosmology, physical, and ontological realities are often 
characterised by religious terminology, so that it is not always entirely clear where once 
should draw the line.96 The most obvious examples are perhaps those represented by 
cosmological or physical descriptions which take advantage of the connotations and 
suggestiveness of divine names such as Heraclitus’ Zeus (32) and Erinyes (94), 
Parmenides’ Eros (13) and the names of gods conferred by Empedocles on the four 
roots (B6). Not to mention that, as Vlastos reminds us, ‘few words occur more 
frequently in their fragments than the term “god” ’, a fact which can be easily verified 
upon a quick glance at the word-index contained in the DK edition, where the term 
theos is followed by eight columns of listing against – for instance – that of physis 
followed by six columns only. 97 Maybe due to a sense of continuity with the poetic 
tradition,98 maybe due to the need to justify the scope of their enterprise through the 
aggrandising lexis of the religious discourse, or maybe due to a genuine perception of 
some aspects of nature as divine, the early Greek philosophers marked their accounts 
with a subtle, yet undeniable, overlap between the descriptions of divine realities and 
those of the natural world. 99 
  
Yet, ‘divine’ terminology cannot be considered simply as a hollow involucre for a new 
enterprise struggling to find a new identity and new forms of expression. Conversely, as 
Broadie said, ‘there can be no doubt that the identity at some level of description 
between divine reality and the subject matter of natural science shaped the course of 
                                                
95 Cf. Vlastos 1952 and Broadie 2006. Other important discussions: Guthrie 1966: 131-144, 
Adomenas 1999; Most 2007 and Sassi 2009: 80ff. See also Betegh 2006 and Mikalson 2007, 
although their focus is not on the Presocratics. Drozdek 2007, seemingly ignoring the debate 
which developed around Jaeger’s thesis, presents an interpretation too extreme to be accepted 
(i.e. the investigation of the arché coincides with a meditation on divine essence). 
96 That is, if such a line could be drawn at all. Indeed, some scholars maintain that Presocratic 
philosophy should be studied ‘as an indivisible organism, never considering the theological 
components apart from the physical or ontological’, Jaeger 1947: 7. 
97 Vlastos 1952: 97; DK 1964. 
98 Cf. Most 2006: 332-362. 
99 ‘To think of them as mere naturalists, bracketing off their speculations from religious belief 
and feeling, would be to take a very anachronistic view of their thought’, Vlastos 1952: 98. 
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early Greek philosophy in fundamental ways’.100 Caught in between the demand of a 
long-established poetic tradition and the drive towards a revolutionary way of thinking, 
the theology of early Greek philosophy is an interesting amalgam of intermingling 
discursive tendencies. 
 
It may therefore prove methodologically useful to distinguish between those texts that 
deploy a religious terminology or which feature concepts of divinity from those which 
theologise in a more systematic manner. As pointed out by Broadie: ‘To theologise is 
not simply to theorize using such concepts in a nonincidental way. Rather, it is, for 
instance, to reflect upon the divine nature, or to rest an argument or explanation on the 
idea of divinity as such, or to discuss the question of the existence of gods, and to 
speculate on the grounds or causes of theistic belief’.101 And although I would not go as 
far as Broadie in claiming that by these criteria, ‘Hesiod’s Theogony is not a work of 
theology’,102 I would certainly argue that by these criteria Hesiod’s Theogony is an 
hexametric poem about the origin and the role of the gods in the universe, which relies 
on a series of implicit and unreflective theological suppositions. Indeed, ‘in such a 
context, speaking about the cosmos meant speaking about the gods, and theories about 
the origin of the cosmos (cosmogonies) were actually the genealogy of the gods 
(theogonies)’.103   
 
With regard to Aeschylus’ relation to Presocratic theological ideas, a further 
methodological premise is necessary. The distinction between implicit and explicit 
modes of theological discourse, so insistently pursued here, was – most likely – of little 
concern to him.  A divide that is difficult for us to draw, must have been even less clear 
for an author whose primary agenda was not that of entering a philosophical debate as 
such but that of writing a powerful tragedy. Rather, it is probable that Aeschylus had 
been influenced in his depiction of the gods of the Oresteia not only by the explicit 
challenges offered by the Presocratic philosophers but also by the ideas which took 
shape in Presocratics’ cosmological and rational inquiry, especially considering the 
                                                
100 Broadie 2006: 206; Cf. Guthrie 1966: 131-2; 144. 
101 Broadie 2006: 205. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Algra 1999: 46. 
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idiosyncratic religious language by means of which they were presented. And if the 
power of this tragedy relies – in large measure – on a reflection over the inter-
penetration of the function of gods with the suffering of men, one may expect that such 
prominent theme would be treated so as to match the gravity imposed by the demands 
of its author’s times.  These demands had been set, in many ways, by the Presocratic 
philosophers, who, through their explicitly theological charges attacked that poetic 
tradition on which Aeschylus’ works were so dependent, and who, through their highly 
‘religious’ description of the ‘basic principles’ of reality, opened a whole new vista on 
the working of the cosmos and the role of ‘the divine’ within it. 
 
In this thesis, I focus on a restricted group of thinkers: namely those whose inclination 
has – arguably – been that of developing the notion of a single metaphysical principle 
and who can be therefore set apart from the material monists on the one side, and the 
pluralists on the other. Thus, I deal with Anaximander, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and 
Parmenides. In dealing with the fragments of these thinkers I adopt a thematic approach 
and I concentrate on three levels of their discourse. First, I focus on the explicit 
assertions about the nature of god. Second, I discuss religious language which does not 
necessarily involve an explicit theological concern. Last, I concentrate on descriptions 
which although focusing on an object of enquiry which is not declared ‘divine’ 
nonetheless make use of attributes and concepts traditionally associated with god(s). 
This thematic approach seems to me the only viable method to do justice to the 
irreducible complexity of this material, in which not every statement containing 
concepts of divinity can be classified as theological nor can the theology of early Greek 
philosophers be reduced only to those sentences that deploy an explicit theological 
language. 	
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Philosophical Theology and Cosmic Justice in Presocratic Philosophy 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Explicit Theological Innovations: Xenophanes’ God 
 
1.1 Theology is separate from nature 
 
In presenting his theology, Xenophanes shows a remarkable awareness of the 
separateness of such inquiry from that about other matters: 
 
kaì tò mèn o%un safèj o#utij ;anÕr #iden o÷dé tij #estai 
eêdÎj ;amfì qeÏn te kaì !assa légw perì pántwn< 
eê gàr kaì tà málista túcoi tetelesménon eêpÍn, 
a÷tòj 8mwj o÷k o%ide. dókoj d’æpì pâsi tétuktai. (B34)104 
 
In this fragment, widely discussed for its bold epistemological claims,105 besides 
offering some remarks about human knowledge, Xenophanes also makes a reference to 
his own teachings: […] ;amfì qeÏn te kaì !assa légw perì pántwn.  In the same 
fashion of Heraclitus (B1) and Parmenides (B7), the poet himself provides here some 
guidance on how his writings must be treated in order to achieve whatever knowledge is 
available to mortals. Because of this, scholars concur that fragment 34 implies a poem 
of some magnitude and that it must come from an important juncture of that poem, 
covering either a proemial or conclusive position.106 Yet in referring to his teachings as 
he does here in line 2 Xenophanes is both somewhat reticent and elaborate and only a 
close analysis of the text can lead to a proper understanding of its implications, which 
can be regarded as problematic and revelatory at the same time. 
 
The first question to be understood concerns the definition and the relationship between 
;amfì qeÏn and  !assa légw perì pántwn. Whereas the first element ( ;amfì qeÏn), 
                                                
104 The critical edition for fragments and testimonials used in this chapter is Graham 2010. 
105 Often in conjunction with B35, B36, B18, and B38. The epistemological content of this B34 
is discussed in Ch. 5.1, cf. in particular n. 444. 
106 Cf. Barnes 2002: 83 for the former view; Lesher for the latter, 1992: 160. 
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as Kirk states, can be simply understood as ‘about the gods’ (i.e. ‘about theology’),107 
the second element is perhaps a bit more problematic. Based on a comparison with 
Alcmaeon’s fragment 1 and the treatise On Ancient Medicine, Barnes suggests that 
!assa légw perì pántwn refers specifically to Xenophanes’ natural inquiry.108 Lesher 
endorses this view by pointing out how fragments 27 and 29 also describe Xenophanes’ 
‘accounts of nature […] in the form of generalizations about panta’.109 In this way line 
2 is taken to mean ‘the discourse about the gods (in general) and what I say about the 
whole of nature’. Although neither of this can be conclusive, I am inclined to read the 
fragment as I have just paraphrased for an additional reason. 
 
Since we know from Xenophanes’ other fragments that the gods are indeed among the 
matters debated by him, the broader reading ‘about the gods and the things I say about 
everything’ would undoubtedly strike us as peculiar. Instead, the separate mention of 
;amfì qeÏn from !assa légw perì pántwn underlies Xenophanes’ desire to state his 
understanding of the gods as complementary yet  separate objects of enquiry from that 
on nature. A similar spirit emerges from the different atmosphere of B32: 
 
!hn t’ % Irin kaléousi, néfoj kaì toûto péfuke, 
porfúreon kaì foiníkeon kaì clwròn êdésqai 
 
in which Xenophanes offers a naturalistic explanation of the phenomenon of the 
rainbow. Hence, as neatly put by Lesher ‘The demythologized naturalism of his 
scientific outlook neatly complements his denaturalized theology’.110 Xenophanes is 
wary not to merge the two separate objects of human understanding and of his own 
inquiry: gods and nature. 
 
From the few fragments we have, it is clear that Xenophanes thought methodically 
about theology (B10-17, 23-26) and about the physical world (B27-31, 37), yet it is 
difficult to establish how these areas were connected. An important fact to bear in mind 
                                                
107 Cf. K.R.S. 2007: 180 against the particularistic reading ‘about the gods of conventional 
religion’ advanced in the past (e.g Deichgräber 1938: 1-31).  
108 Barnes 2002: 139-40. 
109 Lesher 1992: 168. 
110 Lesher 1992: 5. 
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in relation to this issue is that, as Broadie already observed, it seems that Xenophanes 
‘never in solemn metaphysical style spoke of the basic substance as all-encompassing or 
running through all’.111 This is to say that, surprisingly, the descriptions of natural 
phenomena and of divine nature never overlap.112 Because of this and because of what 
has been said before concerning Xenophanes’ self-aware distinction between the 
theological and scientific discourse, it is methodologically possible to treat each topic in 
disjunction from the other (something, as it will become progressively evident during 
this chapter, which is rather exceptional for early Greek philosophy).113 I shall therefore 
proceed by limiting my discussion to Xenophanes’ fragments about the gods. 
 
1.2 Proper speech and moral behaviour 
 
As recently stated by Lesher ‘Xenophanes was the first Greek thinker to offer a complex 
and at least partially systematic account of the divine nature’.114 Undoubtedly, he was 
the first Greek thinker we know of to apply philosophical reasoning to the topic of the 
gods. The fragments containing Xenophanes’ thought on this theme can be conveniently 
divided and grouped under two heads: a destructive criticism (B16-21) and a 
constructive theology (23-6). Although the fragments vary highly in terms of tone and 
content - where the critical ones are more chiding and caustic as opposed to those 
announcing god’s properties that are loftier and solemner - they often all denote a deep 
concern with ‘what is proper’ for us to do and say. The preoccupation with pious 
utterance and moral behaviour is a fil rouge running through the whole of Xenophanes’ 
writing and a disposition that seems to have influenced his theological thought in 
important ways. The following two excerpts from this philosopher’s longest fragment 
exemplify such concern with piety and moral behaviour: 
 
 
                                                
111 Broadie 2006: 209. 
112 At least not in Xenophanes’ fragments. The situation is very different in his testimonia: cf. 
Aristotle’s account in A28, 30, and other accounts which assimilate his thought to Parmenides’, 
such as Palto (A28) and Simplicius (A31). By this I am not arguing in favour of a form of 
secularization: the point is not that statements about the greatest god are not about nature, but 
that they are about it at a deeper-than-phenomenal level. 
113 Cf. Jaeger 1947: 40-1 for an interesting depiction of the sui generis character of Xenophanes. 
114 Lesher 2013: n. 3. 
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crÕ dè prÏton mèn qeòn ømneîn e#ufronaj \ndraj 
 e÷fÔmoij múqoij kaì kaqaroîsi lógoij< (B1, 13-14) 
 
;andrÏn d’ aêneîn toûton 8j æsqlà piÎn ;anafaínei, 
9j oë mnhmosúnh kaì tónoj ;amf’ ;;aretÖj, 
o#uti mácaj diépwn TitÔnwn o÷dè Gigántwn, 
o÷dé “te” Kentaúrwn, plásmata tÏn protérwn, 
$h stásiaj sfedanáj, toîs’ o÷dèn crhstòn 1nesti< 
QeÏn “dè” promhqeíhn aêèn 1cein ;agaqón. (19-24) 
 
The broader context of Xenophanes’ fragment 1 is that of an appropriate sympotic 
experience. The poet describes a merry atmosphere and an opulent banquet scene where 
everything is clean and fragrant (1-12). Following such descriptions, the first remark 
about how to hymn to the gods (13-14) picks up some of the general features of this 
setting: the two adjectives e#ufrwn115 and kaqarój employed here to describe the 
attitude of men and the quality of their speech recall the kaqarón zápedon (1) and 
the kratÕr [...] mestòj æüfrosúnhj (4) of the opening lines. The uncommon tone of 
wholesomeness of this poem is thus granted by the parallel description of the physical 
setting and the moral injunction that follow at 13-14.  
 
The verse that comes immediately after the poet’s instruction on how to honour god 
shifts the focus from piety in speech to moral action (tà díkaia [...] / prÔssein, 15-
16) and its novelty and poignancy has been noted by several commentators.116 With 
regard to this point, it is difficult to resist the temptation to recall that scene from 
Aeschylus’ Choephori in which Electra asks the Chorus for advice on what words she 
should utter in her prayer to the gods (tí fÏ> 87; 118; pÏj e5fron’ e#ipw; 88) during 
the libation on the tomb of Agamemnon. The Chorus-leader, after having heard 
Electra’s doubts about the two possibilities of either conventional and, given the 
circumstances, hypocritical words on the one hand, or total silence on the other, 
encourages her to follow a third path: namely to pray for the murderer to be killed in 
                                                
115 See Halliwell 2008: 109-10 for a discussion of æüfrosúnh (elation or exhilaration of 
subjective well-being) as a defining emotion for the atmosphere of the symposium in archaic 
and classical Greek literature. 
116 Reinhardt 1959: 128ff; Fränkel 1975: 327; Marcovich 1978: 8; Lesher 1992: 52. Conversely, 
Graham underlines the conventionality of Xenophanes’ approach to piety, 2010: 130. 
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return (121). In this way, this stichomythia presents a dramatic shift from a concern 
with proper speech to a concern with proper action (120-1) which culminates with 
Electra’ final prayer at 124ff. Here, most significantly, after having asked for justice to 
be made for her father, Electra adds a demand for herself: to be both wiser and more 
reverent in deed than her mother (a÷t^+ te moi dòj swfronestéran polù / mhtròj 
genésqai ceîrá t’e÷sebestéran, 140-1).117 Although the atmosphere of these two 
poetic passages is very different, in each of them the poet underlines the connection 
between proper speech, divine intervention, and the potential for righteous action. 
Xenophanes’ constructive instructions to the symposiasts in the first half of this 
fragment contrast sharply with the criticisms contained in its second half (see above 19-
24). 
 
Xenophanes’ fragment 1 combines a conventional call for moderation in drinking (cf. 
Thgn.467-96, 503-8; Anacreont. 356a 5-6; eleg. 2) with a rejection of traditional 
myths. 118  Unlike in the second elegiac fragment of Anacreon, 119  conflict - here 
described by Xenophanes both as mácaj [...] of Titans, Giants, Centaurs, and as 
stásiaj sfedanáj- is not rejected in the light of its juxtaposition with the preferable 
tales of love, but rather because it is improper and worthless (toîs’ o÷dèn crhstòn 
1nesti) for a man’s ‘striving for virtue’ (tónoj ;amf’ ;;aretÖj). To talk about divine 
warfare in the manner of ‘men of former times’ (tÏn protérwn), would not match the 
demand for reverent words and pure speech of line 14, it would not allow, as the closing 
line of the fragment suggests, to always hold the gods in high esteem: QeÏn “dè” 
promhqeíhn aêèn 1cein ;agaqón. 
 
Thus this fragment introduces in a nutshell some of the tenets of Xenophanes’ theology: 
constructive directives are combined with a demolishing charge against traditional 
behaviour and a deep preoccupation with the pedagogical impact of divine storytelling 
infiltrates its sympotic atmosphere. Indeed, without any reference to Xenophanes’ other 
                                                
117 Cf. Goldhill 1984a. 
118 The theme of moderation in drinking in connection to an intellectually uplifting sympotic 
experience will be further elaborated in Plato’s Symposium. Cf.176aff. 
119 o÷ filéw 8j krhtÖri parà plé_ oênopotázwn | neíkea kaì pólemon dakruóenta 
légei, | ;all’ 8stij Mouséwn te kaì ;aglaà dÏr’ ;Afrodíthj | summísgwn æratÖj 
mnÔsketai e÷frosúnhj, Campbell 1988: 146. 
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fragments, it would be harder to determine the precise rationale behind the poet’s 
rejection of old fictions about divine conflict. Yet fragments 10-12, in which 
Xenophanes’ critical targets are made explicit, may help to shed some light on the issue: 
Homer, from whom ‘all have learnt since the beginning’ (æx ;arcÖj kaq’ ! Omhron 
æpeì memaqÔkasi pántej B10), together with Hesiod have attributed to the gods all 
things that are ‘blameworthy and disgraceful for men’ (8ssa par’ ;anqrÍpoisin 
;oneídea kaì yógoj æstín, B11, 2; cf. B12). The characterization of Homer and 
Hesiod as pillars of Greek education and of the content of their teaching as 
blameworthy and disgraceful betrays Xenophanes’ intrinsic concern with moral 
education.120 
 
In this light, it is easy to agree with Marcovich’s understanding of the rationale behind 
Xenophanes’ rebuke at B1, 19-24 as theological in nature:121 these old fictions are 
mendacious and, what is more, they may instigate immoral behaviours in the listeners. 
Most commentators have already drawn a comparison with Plato’s treatment of poetry 
in Rep. 2.377b ff. where stories of divine illicit deeds are condemned on the basis that 
they could be used to legitimise human misconduct.122 Similarly to Xenophanes’ 
fragment 1, Plato’ Socrates too is willing to save hymns and praises to the gods: 
0mnouj qeoîj kaì ægkÍmia toîj ;agaqoîj, (Rep. 10.607a) and the extensive points 
of contacts between both authors’ treatment of poetry may shed light on the seriousness 
of Xenophanes’ enterprise. The plásmata tÏn protérwn – which Socrates by using 
the same ‘moulding’ metaphor will more scornfully define as toùj æpitucóntaj øpò 
æpitucóntwn múqouj plasqéntaj (Rep. 2.377b) 123 – must be rejected not simply 
‘because they introduce an element of discord into a harmonious occasion’124 but 
because of the dangers inherent in poetry’s immoral depiction of divine activity. It is 
                                                
120 Cf. Babut 1974: 83-117: ‘c’est lui qui a inauguré la grande querelle entre  philosophie et 
poésie qui s’est poursuive à travers tout l’histoire de la littérature grecque’, p. 117. 
121 1978: 13. 
122 Sassi 2013: 286; Warren 2007: 46; Broadie 2006: 209; Most 2006: 336-337; Lesher 1992: 
53; Marcovich 1978: 26ff; Eisenstadt 1974: 145ff. 
123 Eisenstadt suggests that the whole metaphor of the moulding of children may owe its origin 
to the Xenophanean plásmata tÏn protérwn, 1974: 145. Cf. Pl. Tim. 26e4-5. 
124 Bowra 1953: 10. 
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thus in the light of this overarching concern with pious utterance and moral behaviour 
that the rest of Xenophanes’ theological fragments must be analysed.125   
 
1.3 On the nature of god(s) 
 
For the sake of clarity, I present together all the fragments I intend to assess next. 
Although some will be singled out for special attention, it is important to bear in mind 
the complete picture at all times. This choice will also enable me to organise the 
fragments in a coherent whole and to make cross-references when necessary. Unlike the 
majority of commentators I will invert the order in which Xenophanes’ theological 
fragments are customarily presented, for I believe this disposition can offer various 
interpretative advantages.  Thus, I shall begin with four famous fragments conveying 
traces of a ‘constructive theology’: 
 
e*ij qeój, 1n te qeoîsi kaì ;anqrÍpoisi mégistoj, 
o5ti démaj qnhtoîsin ñmoíioj o÷dè nóhma. (B23) 
 
aêeì d’ æn ta÷t^_ mímnei kinoúmenoj o÷dén 
o÷dè metércesqaí min æpiprépei \llote \ll+. (B26) 
 
;all’ ;;;apáneuqe pónoio nóou frenì pánta kradaínei. (B25) 
 
o%uloj ñr^=, o%uloj dè noeî, o%uloj dé t’ ;akoúei. (B24) 
 
 
In this first set of fragments Xenophanes claims the existence and describes some traits 
of one god of exceptional physical and mental power, a god who is ‘unlike mortals in 
body and thought’ (23, 2). Yet mortals seem not to recognise the profound dissimilarity 
                                                
125 Xenophanes’ critique of traditional myths was referred to by Aristotle as the epitome of 
philosophical complaints about the theological incorrectness of poetry in book 25 of the Poetics 
(1460b35). This represents further evidence in support of the centrality and seriousness of 
Xenophanes’ concern with poetry’s theological misrepresentation. Cf. Halliwell 1998: 11-13; 
15-7; 231-3 and 2011: 215; 220-1. 
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between this god and themselves and they persevere in projecting some of their most 
defining characteristics onto the gods:  
 
 ;all’ oë brotoì dokéousi gennâsqai qeoúj, 
tÕn sfetérhn d’ æsqÖta 1cein fwnÔn te démaj te. (B14) 
 
Aêqíopéj te “qeoùj sfetérouj” simoùj mélanáj te 
Qr^+kéj te glaukoùj kaì purroúj “fasi pélesqai” (B16) 
 
;all’ eê ceîraj 1con bóej “!ippoi t’” Òè léontej 
$h gráyai ceíressi kaì 1rga teleîn –per \ndrej, 
!ippoi mén q’ !ippoisi bóej dé te bousìn ñmoíaj 
kaí “ke” qeÏn êdéaj 1grafon kaì sÍmat’ æpoíoun 
toiaûq’ o*ion per ka÷toì démaj e%icon “6kastoi”. (B15) 
 
In this second set of fragments it is thus possible to identify one of Xenophanes’ central 
concerns and the cornerstone of his ‘destructive’ theology, namely, mortals’ 
conceptions of the gods. 
 
Taken as a whole, these fragments undoubtedly give the impression of being an attempt 
on Xenophanes’ part to theologise in novel terms and to apply unprecedented 
argumentative strategies to the question of divine nature (see for instance the repetitive 
use of adversative constructions in 14,1;15,1; 25,1; 26,1). However, the extent of his 
originality is hard to measure and scholars still struggle to find an agreement even on 
the most fundamental issues. In order to adhere to the broader scope of this chapter, I 
will limit my discussion to two central themes of his constructive theology: the question 
of god’s power and the related question of god’s physicality/abstraction.  
 
From the extant fragments, it does not seem that Xenophanes espoused monotheism, 
although this theory has been foisted upon him by ancient and modern commentators 
alike. Ancient doxography is soaked in Eleatic language and logic (e.g. Plato, A29; 
Aristotle, A28, 30; Simplicius, A31)126 and the notion of oneness is often conflated with 
                                                
126 See Barnes 2002: 89 for an alternative list. 
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that of unity. Of course, this makes it hard to assess the reliability of what is reported. 
Our only direct evidence for a potential notion of ‘one single god’ is our fragment B23 
(e*ij qeój) and even so the very next phrase, with its jarring ‘gods’ in the plural 
(qeoîsi), produces serious difficulties for the supporters of this theory. Nonetheless, 
various scholars have attempted a defence of Xenophanes’ monotheism by dismissing 
the poet’s references to the gods as inconsequential allowances. Thus, for instance, in 
K.R.S it is argued that the expression ‘greatest among gods and men’ must be taken as a 
‘polar’ usage of the kind used in Heraclitus’ fragment B30 (kósmoj tónde [...] o5te 
tij qeÏn o5te ;anqrÍpwn æpoíhsen [...]) bearing no polytheistic implications.127 
Attention has also been placed on the emphatic position of the opening e*ij and further 
references to the gods in other fragments (e.g. B1; B14; B34) discounted as petty 
concessions made while speaking of the gods of popular superstition.128 Finally, Barnes 
argued that Xenophanes was an ‘a priori monotheist’ and that the expression ‘greatest 
among gods and men’ should be regarded as ‘highly concise epitome’ of a logical 
argument against the possibility of a plurality of gods.129 
 
Personally, I do not regard the above interpretations compelling enough to make a solid 
case in favour of monotheism. I halve already analysed the seriousness in tone of 
fragments 1 and 34, and considering the emphasis on true utterance about the gods 
given by the poet in those fragments, it would have been an astonishing carelessness on 
Xenophanes’ part to argue here for the existence of one single god by mentioning his 
superiority among a plurality of gods. Indeed, a slack handling of religious terminology 
in fragment 23 would be inconsistent with his preoccupation with pious utterance 
elsewhere declared. Moreover, considering the potentially revolutionary import of such 
conception, one may wonder along with Stokes, ‘whether a convinced monotheist in an 
unreceptive polytheistic society would cloud the issue by a mention of plural gods 
which is at best ambiguous, in the very context where he is firmly stating his 
revolutionary view’.130 In conclusion to this point, I do not think that Xenophanes’ 
                                                
127 K.R.S. 2007: 170. Cf. Barnes 2002: 603 n. 13, for further examples of polar expressions. 
128 Fränkel 1973: 331; Guthrie 1981: 1, 360-402. 
129 Barnes 2002: 92.  
130 Stokes 1971: 76. 
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mention of ‘gods’ in the plural can be dismissed a negligible oversight and that the 
notion of monotheism was not among his innovations. 
 
Still, line 1 of B23 seems to suggest the existence of a single god of unsurpassable 
power: a divine entity incapable of being subjected by any other god or mortal. Because 
of it some scholars131 have chosen to describe the theological relation between the e*ij 
qeój and the other gods of B23 through the formula of ‘henotheism’, ‘a monotheism of 
perspective’ according to which there is only ‘one god on which everything else 
(including the other gods) depends’.132 The suggestion is no doubt seductive. However, 
insofar as this term was first coined to describe the early stages of Christianity, it 
inherits from that debate an emphasis on the numerical issue which is misplaced. In 
applying the term ‘henotheism’ to Xenophanes’ doctrine some caution must be called 
for. 
 
Considering the fragments presented above, it should become immediately apparent 
how the numerical issue was not as much a concern of Xenophanes as it is ours. In 
particular, I fail to see any preoccupation with the question of whom to worship: instead 
a clear prominence is given to the question of how to develop an appropriate discourse 
about divinity. The language of B26, in which it is said that it is not ‘fitting’ (æpiprépei, 
26, 2) for a god to move here and there, picks up the same normative way of thinking 
about divinity of fragment 1. 133 Additionally, although this thinker’s line of 
argumentation can hardly be reconstructed with any precision, it seems clear that no 
fragment contains anything one could count as a defence of god’s singleness.134 It must 
hence be assumed that – within his explicit programme of moralization – Xenophanes’ 
                                                
131 Bonazzi 2016: 21, n. 58; Sassi 2013: 285; Warren 2007: 48. Cf. Gemelli Marciano, who in 
2005: 118-34 and 2007: 348-9 argues that Xenophanes may have been inspired by the 
distinctively aniconic tradition of Persian religion. See Sassi 2013: 293ff. for a rejection of this 
nonetheless interesting theory. 
132 Assmann 2004: 23. 
133 For this connotation of the verb cf. Lesher 1992: 111-2. 
134 Barnes 2002 attempts to show the logical and inferential connections between several divine 
attributes which he all see as deriving from Xenophanes’ initial monotheistic assumption. 
However I follow Lesher in believing that ‘The most serious difficulty with these 
reconstructions is that there is not a single instance within Xenophanes’ explicit comments on 
this subject, of that systematic, inferential, or logical point of view’, 1992: 116.  
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interest in the divine was qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. My following 
analysis will hopefully lend some support to this thesis.  
 
Where then does the originality of Xenophanes’ constructive theology lie? The answer 
to this question may be summarised as following: Xenophanes’ theological innovation 
consists in having conceived of a ‘single god of unusual power, consciousness, and 
cosmic influence’ (B23-6),135 whose grandeur required it to be ingenerated (B14), 
motionless (B26), and incapable of being subjected by any other force, or of being 
compared to mortals in either body, mind (B14; 23) or moral stand (which could be 
inferred from B11; 12).136 Rather than focusing on the question of one or many, 
Xenophanes seems devoted to introducing a novel ethical notion according to which the 
divine should not be conceived as conflicting with the divine and according to which 
several theological properties must inevitably follow. In order to appreciate these 
properties’ innovative value it is important to analyse the language in which they are 
couched and to contrast them directly with those ascribed to the gods of the Homeric-
Hesiodic pantheon. 
 
Of course, exceptional power and exceptional knowledge had already been associated 
with the gods, especially with Zeus, of the hexametric corpus: 
 
ZÖna qeÏn tòn \riston ;aeísomai Òdè mégiston, 
e÷rúopa, kreíonta, telesfóron, 8ste Qémisti 
ægklidòn çzomén+ pukinoùj ;;oárouj ;oarízei. 
!ilhq’, e÷rúopa Kronídh, kúdiste mégiste. (HH. 23) 
 
 Similarly to the god of Xenophanes’ B23, who is said to be mégistoj among gods and 
mortals (1n te qeoîsi kaì ;anqrÍpoisi), in this Homeric Hymn, Zeus’ grandeur is 
described in analogous terms: first, two superlative adjectives (with mégistoj in the 
same metrical position as in B23) indicate his supremacy over the other gods (ZÖna 
qeÏn tòn \riston […] Òdè mégiston, then a sequence of three adjectives emphasise 
his exceptional awareness, authority and power (e÷rúopa, kreíonta, telesfóron). 
                                                
135 Lesher 1992: 99. 
136 Cf. Barnes’ discussion in 2002: 84-99. 
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Although the first two verses convey already by themselves the impression that this god 
must be not ‘like mortals in body or thought’, his wisdom is further emphasised by what 
represents the key-note of the composition: we are offered a picture of Zeus whispering 
words of wisdom (pukinoùj ;oárouj) in Themis’ ears as she leans over to listen. The 
composition with the internal object (;;oárouj ;oarízei) underlines both the physical 
utterance and the importance of this element: Zeus is a god who can speak words of 
wisdom to other gods. 137  
 
 A similar conception of Zeus emerges from the epic poems and is echoed in Solon’ 
elegiac poems (Zeùj pántwn æfor^= téloj, 13.17). His far-seeing perspective and 
synoptic view (e÷rúopa) is described by both Homer and Hesiod (Il. 8.51-2; W&D 
267) and is probably a direct cause of his formidable knowledge of everything (e%u 
o%iden –panta, Od. 20.75). Similarly, Zeus’ power to accomplish things (telesfóroj) 
is famously epitomised by the Homeric depiction of a god who is capable of shaking 
great Olympus with a single nod (Il. 1.525-30) and to ensure thus fulfilment of a 
promise (o÷d’ ;ateleúthton, 8 tí ken kefal^+ kataneúsw, Il 1.527). Is then 
Xenophanes’ critique of the Homeric-Hesiodic portrayal of the gods (B10-12) aimed 
only against its immoral content? Or does it also entail a reform of the way humans 
conceive of the supreme god in both the form of his body and the manner of his 
thinking?  
 
With regard to this latter question, the second set of fragments (B14-16) is particularly 
revealing. Writing through the moralising humour of a genre later called sillos, 
Xenophanes condemns human conception of divinity by claiming that different races 
credit the gods with their own distinctive characteristics (B16) and, through a reductio 
ad absurdum, he couches the same point by saying that animals would do the same if 
they possessed humans’ means of representation (B15). The isomorphic fallacy is then 
extended beyond the relativistic conceptions of Ethiopians and Thracian to the whole of 
humanity in B14, in which oë brotoí are criticised for believing the gods to be born, to 
wear clothes, and to have a voice and a body. Recent and extensive studies, by focusing 
                                                
137 And to Themis in particular. On the Homeric Hymns: Faulkner 2011; Richardson 2010; 
Rayor 2004; West 2003a; Crudden 2001; Zanetto 1996; Cassola 1991.  
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on B14 in connection to divine epiphanies, have convincingly interpreted it as a 
condensed critique of physical anthropomorphism of the kind which emerges from the 
Homeric poems.138 In particular, the nowhere else mentioned ‘genetic fallacy’ has been 
related to the notion of the gods as those ‘who always are’ expressed by the traditional 
epithet aêèn æóntej (Il. 1.290; Theog. 21, 33, 105). In this way Xenophanes can be 
understood as ‘drawing out in an explicit fashion a latent contradiction’139 in the poets’ 
conception of divine eternality, according to which gods are immortal but are also 
described as having been born in successive generations.140 What is more, it should be 
noticed how, due to its mention of divine démaj, B14 can be directly linked to B23: in 
this way the fragment can be read as a partial expansion of the notion that god is not 
like mortals with regards to its physical form (B23). However, it should also be noticed 
how its content is still expressed in negative terms, and nothing at all is added about the 
god’s nóhma. For further clues on how god’s mind differs from that of humans, one 
must turn to fragments 24-6 in which god’ s properties are also avowed through a 
language that is affirmative.  
 
Only from a close reading of these fragments is it possible to appreciate in full how 
drastically does Xenophanes depart from a Homeric/Hesiodic depiction of god’s body 
and thought. To begin with, as opposed to the Zeus of the epics, who is seen entering 
his abode, driving his chariot, sitting on his throne (Il. 1. 533; 8. 438-9; 8. 443) and all 
sorts of actions involving physical motion, Xenophanes’ god aêeì d’ æn ta÷t^_ mímnei 
kinoúmenoj o÷dén (B26). Commentators have offered disparate interpretations of the 
reasoning that may have led Xenophanes to this idea,141 and it is particularly difficult to 
establish whether the notion of divine immobility sprang from a process of critical 
reflection on the Homeric/Hesiodic depictions of the gods or from a process of logical 
inference.142 All Xenophanes has to say about it is simply that movement is not ‘fitting’ 
(æpiprépei) for a god, and whatever opinion one may form about what reasoning 
                                                
138 Sassi 2013: 286ff; Lesher 1992: 86-9. 
139 Lesher 1992: 87, Heitsch 1983: 128. 
140 This seems confirmed by Rhet. 1399b where Aristotle reports that Xenophanes would have 
equated the impiety of those who say that gods die to that of those who say that gods are born, 
for both imply a time when gods were not. 
141 See Lesher 1992: 112 for a discussion of the relevant literature. 
142 See K.R.S. 2007: 170 and Barnes 2002: 85 for antithetical views on this point. 
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brought him to such conclusion is bound to remain a matter of speculation. One way or 
the other, it is evident that this conjunction of omnipotence and restfulness in 
Xenophanes’ depiction of his god sharply departs from the Homeric tradition, in which 
divine swiftness was often singled out as a privileged indication of divine power. 
 
Xenophanes’ god is also endowed with telekinetic mental power: from his immovable 
position, and ‘completely without effort’  (;;apáneuqe pónoio), he can ‘shake all things 
by the thought of his mind’ (nóou frenì pánta kradaínei, B25). Now, two chief 
considerations must be made in relation to this fragment: one regards the choice of the 
words noûj and frÔn, the other regards the subtlety by which this fragment challenges 
the imaginary of the poetic tradition. In combining the words noûj and frÔn 
Xenophanes seems to suggest a cognitive relationship between these two entities which 
is difficult to establish and yet seems too emphatic to be dismissed as perfunctory. To 
begin with, in choosing two terms often deployed to designate a mental faculty, 
Xenophanes wants to stress here, no doubt, what Lesher defined as the ‘god’s sheer 
intellectuality’.143 However, as demonstrated by Heraclitus’ fragment B104 (tíj a÷tÏn 
nóoj $h frÔn;), a distinction in meaning between the two terms does exist and most 
commentators have attempted to preserve it in their translations.144 As recently pointed 
out by Pelliccia, the Homeric noûj resembles ‘our word “insight” in doing duty as both 
a faculty or process and its product; functionally sometimes opposed to the others as 
reason to emotion’.145 Most importantly, noûj, as opposed to frÔn which is generally 
located in the chest (or near the diaphragm),146 seems to lack a physical seat and tends 
to have an abstract meaning ranging across a wide spectrum: ‘idea, thought, scheme, 
plan or other product of thought’.147 Hence, if taken –as I think it should be– as a 
genitive of source,148 I believe its meaning comes close to that of ‘intentional thinking’ 
                                                
143 1992: 107; Cf. Fränkel 1973: 331. 
144 See Lesher 1992: 107 for a list of examples. With regard to Heraclitus’ fragment however, 
Diano has argued that: ‘le due parole non hanno valore tecnico: si potrebbe anzi dire che la 
disgiunzione eraclitea nóoj $h frÔn vale quanto la congiunzione in Archiloco […] ;allà soû 
gastÕr nóon te kaì frénaj parÔgagen’, in D.S. 2001: 169-70.  
145 Cf. entry ‘Mental Organs’ in Finkelberg 2011: 509-10; similarly Webster: ‘Nous, however, is 
a verbal abstract and verbal abstracts in Greek mean not only a process but also the agent or the 
result of the process’, 1957: 149. The most important work on the organ words is Jahn 1987. 
146 e.g. ænì fresì karteròn %htor (Solon, 4c). 
147 Lesher 1992: 108. 
148 As opposed to a possessive genitive. 
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which would be appropriate to describe the origin of a cosmic shaking actuated by the 
mental activity of a god. However, insofar as frÔn is in principle the name of an 
organ,149 the construction nóou frení represents an inversion of the relationship one 
would generally expect: even when the noun frÔn is used as a metonymy its meaning 
would shift from physical to abstract (i.e. ‘brain’ to ‘mind’) and for this reason, one 
would expect the relationship of these two terms to be the opposite: ‘the thought (noûj) 
of his mind (frÔn)’. Now, there are two possible explanations for Xenophanes’ choice: 
either frÔn has been subjected to a double metonymic shift (i.e. from ‘midriff’ to 
‘mind’ to ‘thought’) as it begins to happen in post-Homeric poetry (e.g. qeÏn frénaj 
in Solon 4. 2) where it sometimes came to mean ‘intention’, or Xenophanes wanted the 
reader to perceive a certain degree of physicality in his description. In both cases, the 
general meaning would be ‘by the active thinking originating from his mind’, but the 
second reading has the advantage of introducing a semantic shade that would be rather 
in keeping with the notion of a thought capable of ‘shaking’ the whole of things. Seen 
against the tradition of the Homeric Zeus, who was capable of shaking great Olympus 
by a simple nod of his brow, Xenophanes’ fragment seems to be creating and playing 
with two important points of contrast: first, the sheer intellectuality of his god, his 
contrasted against the rudimentary conception of Homer’ anthropomorphic Zeus, and 
second, the horizon of what the god can reach is extended from mount Olympus to ‘the 
whole of things’, so as to remove any suggestion of the god’s locability and at the same 
time restate the god’s ubiquitous immediacy.  
 
Finally, fragment 24 seems to round out this conception: if B25 describes the quasi-
physical properties of god’s powerful thinking, B24 describes the god’s body in terms 
of pure awareness. In fact, following Lesher and Kirk I understand o%uloj as meaning 
‘the whole complete in all its parts’,150 and to read the fragment as conveying the notion 
that this divinity ‘has no separate organs of sense or thought’: thus, as Kirk tranlates, 
‘All of him sees, all thinks, and all hears’.151 Indeed, the notion of an omnisentient  and 
omnicogitant being clashes with the notion of a separate noûj, and B25’s nóou frenì 
must be then understood in the light of B24 as a thought originating from the ‘whole’ 
                                                
149 Pelliccia 2011: 509; Jahn 1987; Webster 1957: 149. 
150 Lesher 1992: 103. 
151 Kirk 2007: 170. 
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thinking being of the greatest god. Certainly such god can be claimed to be o5ti démaj 
qnhtoîsi ñmoíioj o÷dè nóhma (B23). 
 
I shall close this section with some concluding remarks. It must be observed how 
Xenophanes’ effort to conceive of the gods beyond the fallacy of physical 
anthropomorphism and in terms of moral excellence and cognitive superiority results in 
a curious blend of abstract and corporeal properties. The question of god’s body 
(démaj) and thought (nóhma) seems to engender several tensions (which had already 
been noticed by Aristotle, A30).152 This becomes evident when one considers some of 
his fragments together: whereas fragment 14 seems to suggest that god should be 
conceived entirely without a body, fragment 23 points rather to the notion that god does 
have a body, although unlike those of mortals. The same tension can be equally 
perceived in the remaining fragments: if god has a body, he does not, however, use it to 
move, for this would prevent him to act everywhere with the same immediacy (B26); 
moreover, god is bestowed with a synoptic awareness and mental power (B24; B25) 
which could hardly be available to normal organs, yet Xenophanes conveys it 
nonetheless through the language of sense-perception (ñr^=/;akoúei).  
 
The tension between corporeal and non-corporeal elements in Xenophanes’ description 
of the god is bound to be present in an account that, like this one, is caught between a 
tradition whose myths taught one to conceive of the gods in anthropomorphic form and 
the agenda to introduce a new way of thinking about divinity. It has been noted how in 
combining the idea of a motionless entity which shakes all things, Xenophanes ‘seems 
to approach the Aristotelian concept of the unmoved mover’;153 however, the emphasis 
on god’s superiority among other gods together with Xenophanes’ lingering inclination 
to conceive of some aspects of his god in bodily terms, pull his conception 
simultaneously back towards the Homeric Zeus ‘who sees from afar’.154 In chapter 5.3, 
                                                
152 On this point see Kirk’s remark in K.R.S. 2007: 171. 
153 Broadie 2006: 211. 
154 When with Xenophanes philosophical theology began to be seduced by the idea of god’s 
perfection, the very notion of perfection had yet to be detached from the realm of physicality. 
So, for instance, in order to provide a visual handhold within his highly abstract thought, 
Parmenides compares his notion of a perfect Being to a ‘well-rounded sphere’, offering thus a 
sense-based account of something otherwise highly abstract (B8.42-4). Cf. K.R.S.: ‘Once again 
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I show how a similar alternation between abstract and corporeal depictions of the god 
can be found in Aeschylus’ representation of Zeus. But first I must turn to the fragments 
of other Presocratic thinkers, whose reflection about the divine reached an entirely new 
extent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
we face a puzzling choice between a literal and metaphorical interpretation of “limit”. […] 
Parmenides […] in making all reality a finite sphere introduces a notion whose own logical 
coherence must in turn be doubted’, 2007: 253. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
God and the Unity of Opposites: Heraclitus 
 
This chapter treats the two themes of god and unity and their relationship in Heraclitus’ 
fragments. In focusing on these aspects of Heraclitus’ thought, this chapter is inevitably 
indebted to a long and solid scholarly tradition, and has particularly benefited from the 
works of authors such as Fränkel, Kirk, Vlastos and Kahn.155 However, the choice of 
these themes, which will prove especially fruitful in my study of Zeus, dikê and the 
unity of opposites in Aeschylus’ Oresteia, must not be misinterpreted: it is not an 
attempt on my part to claim that Heraclitus was, after all, a pure theologian and 
metaphysician.156 Due to the cryptic language of his style and the dearth of authentic 
evidence, Heraclitus is among those thinkers who have been subjected to the most 
deforming type of extreme interpretations.157 No doubt, past scholars interested in the 
theme of the divine in Heraclitus had to claim a right to its study against reductivist 
views of the kind that depicted him as a pure ancient logician158 or physicist.159  
 
However, much work has been done since then to restore a certain balance of 
interpretation and, although some scholars persist in claiming that ‘Heraclitus 
constructed […] a physical science of a standard Milesian type’,160 it is nowadays 
possible to pay due attention to the ontological and theological aspects of his thought 
whilst preventing the pendulum from swinging too high in its reactionary sway.161 
                                                
155 Fränkel 1938: 230-44; Kirk 1951: 35-42; 1954; Vlastos 1952: 97- 123; 1955: 337-68; Kahn 
1964: 189-203; 1979. 
156 Cf. Vlastos: ‘In any case, it is clear that the ‘divinity’ of his World Order is seriously meant 
as a genuine religious object which could be worshipped by the enlightened’, 1952: 99; Burkert 
‘Heraclitus […] combines radical criticism with the claim for a deeper piety to be derived from 
insight into the essence of being’, 1985: 309 (partially rejected by Adomenas 1999); Fränkel: 
‘The paramount concern of the early Greek philosophers was metaphysics’, 1938: 230 (later 
criticised by Kirk 1954: 197); Drozdek 2007 (criticised by Sassi 2009: 81). 
157 ‘The truth is that Heraclitus attracts exegetes as an empty jampot wasps; and each new wasp 
discerns traces of his own favourite flavour’, Barnes 2002: 57. 
158 Calogero 2012. 
159 In particular the ‘positivistic’ tradition (cf. Int. II. 4: n. 94.)  
160 Barnes 2002: 61.  
161 Cf. Int. II. 4. Brann’s recent volume (2011) represents a level-headed and most engaging 
presentation of Heraclitus’ thought for the general public.  
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Heraclitus’ enquiry was a far-reaching attempt to explain the workings of the universe 
in both its hidden ‘nature’ and its multifarious manifestations. As such, the content of 
his remarks – which ranges from the political to the ontological, from the natural to the 
cosmological, from the ethical to the psychological – is irreducible. All these aspects, I 
believe, converge within a single comprehensive framework. His theological fragments 
are themselves essential tesserae of this grand mosaic.  
 
Just as Xenophanes does, Heraclitus too inveighs against Homer (B56; B42; B105) and 
Hesiod (B40; B57), rejecting their authority and mocking their supposed intelligence. It 
is therefore a twist of the knife when Heraclitus, in criticising Xenophanes as a 
‘polymath without insight’,162 groups him together with Pythagoras and Hesiod: two 
figures severely criticised by Xenophanes himself. The fragment runs thus: 
 
polumaqíh nóon 1cein o÷ didáskei< „Hsíodon gàr $an ædídaxe kaì 
Puqagórhn a%utíj te Xenofáneá te kaì „Ekataîon (B40)163 
 
But what might Heraclitus’ allegation be? Whereas, as shown above, Xenophanes 
refuted Hesiod’s mythological account on the basis of its immoral portrait of the gods, 
and mocked the Pythagorean doctrine of the reincarnation of the soul (B7),164 Heraclitus 
seems to focus on another target. At least, the notion of divine conflict, which much 
troubled Xenophanes about Hesiod and Homer, seems clearly to be accepted and even 
preached by Heraclitus himself, and it rather represents a fundamental point of contrast 
between the two.165  
 
The fragment is composed of two parts: the first one claiming that what we may 
translate as ‘much learning’ does not teach ‘nóon’, the second part being explanatory 
(gár) of the first one. With regard to the content, in the light of Heraclitus’ positive 
                                                
162 Broadie 2006: 213. 
163 DK edition (1964) unless otherwise stated. 
164 For a detailed commentary see Lesher 1992: 79-81. 
165 See Broadie 2006: 213. According to Aristotle in Eud. Eth.1235a25, Heraclitus reprimanded 
Homer for wishing that conflict would vanish among gods and men, for this would prevent that 
harmony resulting from contrariety and opposition. Cf. B67; B53; B80.  
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remark about the practice of inquiring into many things (B35),166 it must be inferred that 
‘much-learnedness’ itself is not the problem. 167 Indeed, the fragment does not condemn 
polumaqía per se; it simply claims that savoir nombreux alone does not guarantee 
either ‘insight’ or, depending on one’s reading of the object-noun, a ‘learned mind’. It is 
rather the virtue of nóoj, or rather the lack thereof, in Hesiod, Pythagoras, Hecataeus 
and Xenophanes, that triggers Heraclitus to attack them as well as elsewhere to attack 
those who follow their teachings (B57; B104). We must therefore attempt to gain a 
deeper understanding of the significance of such a notion – so salient in Heraclitus’ 
assessment of past and present authorities – in both this fragment and in the broader 
context of Heraclitus’ thought. 
 
With regard to B40 the Greek allows for nóon to mean either ‘mind’ or – taking it as a 
kind of proleptic accusative of result – ‘insight’. However, the latter translation is more 
suitable and more attuned with the rest of the fragments. Apart from B40 and B140, in 
which the term is used to point out what other people’s knowledge falls short of, nóoj 
also features in another revelatory fragment. In B114, 1, Heraclitus discloses the real 
sine qua non of every insight: 
 
xùn nó_ légontaj êscurízesqai crÕ t^_ xun^_ pántwn […] 
 
Through a masterly deployment of homonyms, the Ephesian reveals what one must by 
necessity (crÔ) rely on (êscurízesqai) in order to speak with insight (xùn nó_ 
légontaj): insight depends on ‘what is common to all’ (t^_ xun^_ pántwn), where 
‘the word “all” can be taken to mean simply “all mankind” or “all things” (including 
mankind)’.168 Most cunningly, the present punning enables Heraclitus to establish both 
an internal link as well as an external link with other fragments. If on the one hand the 
paronomasia xùn nó_/t^_ xun^_ works as a powerful stylistic device to emphasise the 
                                                
166 B40, as suggested by Kahn 1979: 105, could perhaps be read in conjunction with B22, in 
which the painstaking work of the gold miner could be held as a paragon for the hard work of 
the inquirer. 
167 Although, some scholars seem to think so: Kahn 1964: 191. Heraclitus’ attitudes towards 
‘polymathy’ and historia remains controversial: although the majority of scholars agree that 
‘polymathy’ should be regarded as a necessary but not sufficient condition to develop insight 
(Hussey 2006), there are still some dissenting voices (Granger 2004: 235-61). 
168 Robinson 1987: 155. 
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internal connection between the two concepts of ‘insight’ and ‘commonality’, at the 
same time it seems meant to resonate with several other fragments ( ;axúnetoi, 1,1; 
34,1; xunón, 103, 113; t^_ xun^_, 2,1; xunoû, 2, 2).  
 
Indeed, each of these fragments adds important nuances to the twofold message 
conveyed by B114, namely that ‘everyone’ or ‘all things’ are linked together in some 
important way and that human insight must be based on such understanding. Since, 
once juxtaposed, fragments 2 and 113 seem to restate the message of 114 with 
remarkable force and clarity, they can be selected here for special attention: 
 
diò deî 6pesqai t^_ xun^_. toû lógou d’ æóntoj xunoû zÍousin oë 
polloì Ìj êdían 1contej frónhsin. B2 
  
xunón æsti pâsi tò fronéein B113 
 
Once again the two main ideas of B114 are repeated: the necessity of following ‘what is 
common’ (crÕ t^_ xun^_/deî t^_ xun^_) as well as the epistemological claim that 
humankind possess a common faculty that, when properly exercised, would put them in 
contact with ‘that which is common’. However both notions are presented here enriched 
by further details as well as bonded by an even stronger tie. Heraclitus adds that 
‘although (the) logos is common’, the majority of people live as if they had a ‘private 
understanding’ (êdían frónhsin); they live as such although thinking (tò fronéein) 
is common (xunón) to all. 
 
Similarly, the same notion can be glimpsed in B1, in which, in order to express the fact 
that humans are uncomprehending of the logos, Heraclitus calls them ;axúnetoi, that is, 
deprived of that ‘collective’ faculty that is at the core of every cum-prehensio. In this 
sense, being ;axúnetoi neatly corresponds here to having an êdían frónhsin; what is 
common (the logos) can only be grasped by what is common to all (tò fronéein), and 
in order to speak mindfully, to use the logos (légontaj) with insight (xùn nó_), one 
has to follow what is common (t^_ xun^_) and eschew what is private (êdían). 
 
 57 
Returning now to fragment B40 from which we started and in which Heraclitus claims 
that much-learnedness does not teach insight (nóon), it is possible to advance the 
hypothesis that Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus have been grouped 
together because of their (alleged) inability to follow ‘that which is common’. 169 
Heraclitus probably does not deem their knowledge to draw strength from that which is 
xunój, and which in the fragments I quoted thus far is sometimes defined as the logos 
(B2), sometimes as a certain way of thinking (B113), and that in the rest of B114 is 
most noticeably compared to the law of a city-state (8kwsper nóm_ pólij) that like 
‘every human law’ (pántej oë ;anqrÍpeioi nómoi) is nourished by ‘one divine law’ 
(øpò çnòj toû qeíou). 
 
The selection of these four names, far from being random seems to include only 
authoritative names who represent various attempts to provide exhaustive accounts of 
reality and who undeniably share a pronounced interest in divinity: the mythological 
approach of Hesiod’s Theogony is coupled with – the ‘other face’ of Greek religion – 
Pythagoras’ mystical wisdom, and the duo is then followed by two embodiments of the 
contemporary critical attitude: Xenophanes and his theological innovations are paired 
with Hecataeus and the demythologising spirit of his genealogy. As suggested by 
Broadie, then, we may suppose that, among other things, ‘Heraclitus saw himself as 
theologising, and as doing it better than these others’.170  
 
But what may then be the relationship between Heraclitus’ discourse about the divine 
and his recommendation to heed ‘that which is common’? This question cannot be 
answered before a clearer understanding of what ‘that which is common’ is has been 
achieved. During my analysis of B40, I have been led to touch upon the theme of       ñ 
xunój in several fragments and I have lingered in particular on B114, B2, and B113. 
However I have deliberately refrained from defining ‘that which is common’– this 
theme will be further investigated next. 
 
                                                
169 A a survey of this debated topic is beyond the scope of this chapter. Cf. Gomperz 1912, and 
more recently: Robinson 1987: 107; Kahn 1964: 191; Dupont-Roc 1971: 5-14; Burkert 1972: 
210; Babut 1976: 464-496; Marcovich 2001: 64ff; Broadie 2006: 213; Hussey 2006: 89-90. 
170 Broadie 2006: 213. 
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2.1 That which is common 
 
There are two chief observations to be made regarding what Vlastos sees as Heraclitus’ 
peculiar doctrine.171 First, Heraclitus claims several things to be common: besides B2, 
B113, and B114 (quoted above), in which the logos, thinking, and the law are defined as 
xunój, in B80 and B89 the same adjective is attributed to conflict (pólemoj) and the 
world (kósmoj) respectively. 172  The sweeping resonance of this adjective bears 
philosophical significance: the connection between spheres usually thought as separate 
– such as the personal, the political, and the universal – is marked through style before 
being declared in content. Second, the notion of commonality is linked, through the 
notion of logos, to that of unity:  
 
Toû dè lógou toûde æóntoj aêeì ;axúnetoi gínontai \nqrwpoi kaì prósqen $h 
;akoûsai kaì ;akoúsantej tò prÏton< ginoménwn gàr pántwn katà tòn lógon 
tónde ;apeíroisin æoíkasi [...] B1.1-4 
 
diò deî 6pesqai t^_ xun^_. toû lógou d’ æóntoj xunoû zÍousin oë 
polloì Ìj êdían 1contej frónhsin. B2 
  
o÷k æmoû, ;allà toû lógou ;akoúsantaj ñmologeîn sofón æstin &en 
pánta e%inai. B50 
 
The shift from the notion of commonality to that of unity can be sensed most strikingly 
in the comparison of B2 with B50. If in B2 Heraclitus claims that logos is common and 
therefore it should be followed, in B50 he reveals what can be achieved by following 
the lógoj xunój. Once again, a poignant pun (lógou/ñmologeîn) emphasises – and 
creates – a significant connection between two elements of the sentence, and the action 
described in B2 as ‘following that which is common’ is here more specifically described 
as an act of ‘agreement’. It is not sufficient to have listened ( ;akoúsantaj) to the logos, 
                                                
171 Vlastos 1947: 166. 
172 Although B89 employs its variant koinój. For this and other linguistic reasons the fragment 
has been doubted (Diels, Reinhardt, Walzer and Kirk). However, I believe the philosophical 
content of the fragment to reflect Heraclitus’ genuine thought. Cf. Robinson 1987: 138 and D.S. 
2001: 112 for arguments in favour and against the authenticity of B89. 
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one has to be ñmólogoj with it, lining up one’s own logos to the general logos that 
Heraclitus encourages everyone to follow. Thus, like the pun on the words xunój/ 
;axúnetoi which links B2 to B1 and the way they deal with the question of proper 
understanding, B50 is in turn related to the same question by means of another jeu de 
mots.   
 
The incipit of B50 with its stark contrast between Heraclitus-the-speaker and a more 
impersonal spoken-logos  (o÷k æmoû, ;allà toû lógou)  is particularly noteworthy. 
Because of it, B50 – together with B1 and B2 – has been at the heart of the heated 
controversy over the meaning of logos.173 According to Kirk, since ‘a contrast between 
a speaker and his lógoj is too bizarre’, this fragment perfectly exemplifies his theory 
that logos cannot be assimilated to Heraclitus’ word and it must mean ‘something 
outside himself’.174 By contrast, those who identify lógoj with Heraclitus’ account see 
no large difficulty in distinguishing between Heraclitus as an individual and Heraclitus 
as the spokesman of a universally valid and objective message.175 The next word of the 
fragment, the aorist participle  ;akoúsantaj, which of course tightens the bond 
between B50 and B1, is also relevant for this controversy. A great many times the point 
has been made in the scholarship about this fragment that the verb ‘to hear’ is perhaps 
more suited for a discourse than for a ‘pattern’ or ‘formula’, and equally numerous have 
been the responses arguing that the verb can also mean ‘to obey’ or ‘pay attention to’.176  
 
                                                
173 There are three main schools of thought: first, those like Kirk 1954: 38 who deny that ‘there 
is any reference implied by the word lógoj in B1 or any other extant fragment to the actual 
words or teaching of Heraclitus. Cf. also Marcovich 1975: 326; 2001: 8; Fattal 2005: 61, 67-8; 
and Guthrie 1952: 96, although the latter is willing to accept that logos is first of all the message 
Heraclitus brings. Second, those who argue the opposite: lógoj in B1 cannot mean anything 
else except Heraclitus’ word. (Burnet 1945: 133; West 1971: 124-29; Robinson 1987: 114; 
Dilcher 1995: 12-13; D.S. 2001: 111; cf. Hussey 2006: 92-3, who writes that ‘at the most basic 
level, Heraclitus’ logos coincides with what Heraclitus is saying: it is the story about the way 
things are’ […] yet its authority ‘can be none other than the impersonal kind of authority that is 
intrinsic to reason or rationality’. Third, those who argue in favour of a mixed interpretation (cf. 
n. 177). 
174 1954: 67 
175 E.g. West 1971: 127; Robinson 1987: 114; D.S. 2001: 111. 
176 Brann 2011: 16-17. Indeed against Robinson’s point that ‘one does not listen to patterns, or 
structures’,1987: 114, it can be argued that one does not listen only ‘to persons, and the things 
they say’. 
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The question is thorny and I do not suggest that a straightforward answer can be given. 
However, I am inclined to join those scholars who think that no reductive interpretation 
of Heraclitus’ logos can – and should – be provided. 177 My main reason for thinking 
this is the deliberate complexity of Heraclitus’ style. 178 B1 is a case in point. The length 
of every commentary ad loc. testifies to the extreme ambiguity and richness of 
Heraclitus’ verbal construction.179 Even more than Xenophanes, Heraclitus displays a 
preoccupation with careful utterance and unremitting faith in the inexhaustible resources 
of language that is perhaps only matched by Aeschylus: both excelled not in 
‘shimmering ambiguity but in fixed equivocation: clear meanings, but two’ – or more – 
‘at once’.180 Because of my firm belief in the intentionality of Heraclitus’ ambiguous 
formulation, I am inclined to think that by lógoj he intended both his own account as 
well as the (intelligible) expression in language of the cosmic structure according to 
which all things are one. 
 
                                                
177 Cf. Kahn in 1964: 192: ‘from the very first sentence of his book, Heraclitus’ use of the word 
logos reflects the fundamental ambiguity of the term: on the one hand, a specific utterance, on 
the other hand, an orderly relationship between things which is reflected in discourse, including 
the quantitative relationship reflected in a calculation or ratio’; (Cf. also 1979: 98-100). This 
position is shared by Diels, Kranz, Busse, Gigon, Minar (see surveys indicated below), and 
more recently by Robinson 1987: 77; 114; Sassi 2009: 152; Graham 2010:186-7; and Brann 
2011. One could add those interpretations who add/substitute the meaning of ‘Truth’ to that of 
‘discourse’: Gigon 1935: 4ff.; Mazzantini 1945; Marcovich 2001: 8. This conception is rejected 
by both Kirk 1954: 40 and D.S. 2001: 102. For a good survey cf.: Kirk 1954: 33-47; Z.M. 1961: 
24; 151-61; D.S. 2001: 90-108 and p. 101 n. 1-2 in particular. For studies on the polyvalence of 
the term lógoj at Heraclitus’ time and the intentional ambiguity of the philosopher’s style: 
Minar 1939: 323; Kahn 1964: 191; 1979: 87-100; Fattal 2005: 58-69; Brann 2011: 10-13. More 
on the use of logos in Heraclitus: Guthrie 1981: 420-24, Calogero 2012; Verdenius 1967; Fattal 
2005; Johnstone 2009; Brann 2011.  
178 For word-puns see Snell 1926: 369-73. For the use of formulae see Fränkel 1938: 309. For 
two details analysis of the structure of B1 see Kirk 1954: 46-7 and D.S. 2001: 105. 
179 E.g.: fourteen pages in Kirk and twenty in D.S. In the following translation I try to convey 
part of this ambiguity: Of this logos that (always) is (true) humans are (always) 
uncomprehending both before and after they have heard it. Although everything happens 
according to this logos they are like people of no experience. 
180 Brann 2011: 23. Cf. Kahn 1979: 87-95 who argues that Heraclitus uses resonance and 
linguistic density to convey philosophical meanings. By resonance Kahn refers to the way 
passages are stylistically linked together, by density he refers to the multiplicity of ideas 
expressed by a single word or phrase. See also Emlyn-Jones 1976: 96 who speaks of ‘elliptical 
mode of utterance’ and ‘deliberately paradoxical’ language, and Sassi 2009: 155ff. who speaks 
of ‘costruzione intenzionale di un testo polisemico’ (p. 159). The comparison with Aeschylus is 
not new: cf. Kahn 1964: 193 and 1979: 7: ‘The literary effect he aimed at may be compared to 
that of Aeschylus’ Oresteia: the solemn and dramatic unfolding of a great truth, step by step, 
where the sense of what has gone before is continually enriched by its echo in what follows’. 
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Thus, with katà tòn lógon in B1, I believe that what is being said is both that 
everything happens ‘as explained in this account’ but also ‘according to an ordered, 
reasonable, and harmonious pattern’. Moreover, as conveyed through the energetic 
protreptic tone of B2 and B50, Heraclitus insists that his message should not be 
passively assimilated, since everyone must actively comprehend it (refer also to B114 
above). Heraclitus’ lógoj is a proper formulation derived from a correct agreement – a 
correct ñmologeîn – with ‘that which is common’, yet everyone possesses the 
epistemological faculty to recognise the content of the lógoj. It should be added here 
that it is precisely due to the lógoj manifesting itself in discursive terms that reality’s 
latent harmony is accessible to each human being; it can be heard and followed and 
eventually Heraclitus’ own voice can be put to rest (B50).181 But what wisdom (sofón 
æstin) does one gather from following that which is common? Here is the lógoj’s 
announcement: &en pánta e%inai. 
 
2.2 Everything is one 
 
[...] ñmologeîn sofón æstin &en pánta e%inai. B50 
 
sulláyiej 8la kaì o÷k 8la, sumferómenon diaferómenon, sun^=don 
di^=don [kaì]182 æk pántwn &en kaì æx çnòj pánta. B10 
 
&en tò sofón, æpístasqai gnÍmhn, ñtéhi kubernâtai 183  pánta dià 
pántwn B41 
 
 
So, if in the last part of B50 Heraclitus declares that it is wise to agree that &en pánta 
e%inai, it is perhaps also wise to question the meaning of such a declaration: what kind 
of unity is this? Kahn has gone as far as to declare that the proposition  &en pánta 
e%inai ‘is the earliest extant statement of systematic monism […] ever made in 
                                                
181 ‘Heraclitus likens the possession of real knowledge to the comprehension of language, and 
the structure of the world to the structure of language’, Curd 1991: 531. 
182 kaì Graham. 
183 ñtéh ækubérnhse DK. Cf. n. 233. 
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Greece’. 184  Kirk and Marcovich, crediting Heraclitus with the same primacy of 
intellectual achievement, talk instead of a unity that lies under all existing things. 185 
Both definitions reflect their authors’ lopsided emphasis on unity and distort Heraclitus’ 
meaning through the anachronistic lenses of post-Eleatic (Kahn) and post-Aristotelic 
(Kirk) language and concepts. In particular, the widespread habit of describing the 
Heraclitean notion of unity as a ‘substratum’ or as something ‘underlying’ and 
‘essential’ betrays an understanding of the relationship between unity and diversity as a 
relationship envisaged in hierarchical terms. According to this view, the separateness of 
things in the world is regarded as apparent and superficial and its unity as something 
more essential.186 This dichotomy cannot be right, and some fragments seem indeed to 
suggest that the opposite may also be true. For instance in B48, B60, and B61 it seems 
rather that a fundamental diversity or contrariety is concealed under an apparent unity. 
Hence, I believe that Heraclitus regarded unity and diversity as having an equal 
ontological status. Since a full defence of this position has already been offered by 
Emlyn-Jones,187 I will limit myself here to a few textual observations.  
 
Taken together, these fragments display a remarkable feature: each deploys a different 
combination of the adjective nexus eõj/pánta to express the notion of unity. Once 
again, an important philosophical point is conveyed through careful formulation: there 
is unity, yes, but a unity made out of a plurality. Indeed, the plural form pánta, in 
keeping with the general tendency of the archaic Greek language to use the plural for 
abstract concepts, was a standard way to denote the whole of reality.188 Yet, it may be 
presumed that Heraclitus perceived in this linguistic tendency another instance of the 
lógoj’s capacity to mirror the basic structure of reality. Thus the plural form pánta, 
used as a collective singular, reflects the plurality of the apparently disconnected 
                                                
184 Kahn 1979: 131, emphasis mine. 
185 Kirk 1954: 70; Marcovich 2001:106, emphasis mine. The notion of an ‘essential unity’ or a 
‘substratum’ is widely shared and is suspiciously akin to Aristotle’s o÷sía. 
186  ‘Heraclitus […] stresses the first or synthetic view against the second, conventional, 
analytical approach. […] he considered that wisdom lay in being able to regard them 
synthetically’, Kirk in 1954: 176 (emphasis mine). 
187 1976. 
188 Cf. Ch. 1.1. Also, see Mourelatos 1973, where he argues that the notion of the world as a 
collection of discrete and unconnected things underlies much archaic Greek literature.  
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phenomenological world, about which the veridical lógoj, imposing the yoke of the 
numeral adjective, also declares the simultaneous unity.  
 
Moreover, the accusative-plus-infinitive construction of B50 allows for a certain 
ambiguity to persist: in between !en and pánta it is not clear which one must be taken 
as the subject and which as the predicate. Thus, syntax conveys that equal reality is to 
be attributed to both elements: ‘everything is one as well as one is everything’ expresses 
an identity which works both ways round.189 This back and forth from a synthetic and 
analytic perspective on the notion of unity is best exemplified by B10 and the last part 
of the fragment in particular, æk pántwn &en kaì æx çnòj pánta, where the difference 
between the two segments separated by kaí is, as Hackforth describes it, that in the 
former ‘the world is a differentiated unity’ whereas in the latter ‘the world is a 
differentiated unity’.190 A temporal reading 191 of the preposition æk would not be in 
keeping with the first part of the fragment, in which the same concept is anticipated in 
alternative terms. Rather, æk should be understood as marking the theoretical shifts of 
perspective192 from differentiation to unity and vice versa. 
 
The first part of B10 allows us to introduce another key-notion in this philosopher’s 
thought: namely, that unity is, above all, a unity of opposites. Eschewing any uniformity 
of expression, a substantial number of fragments describe opposites (or engender 
oppositions) of various kinds, and although scholarly opinion is divided on what kind of 
unity they each time involve, the fact that they represent a basic pattern in Heraclitean 
thought is undisputable.193 B10 falls into this pattern, yet not as squarely as it is 
sometimes assumed.194 Already Kirk chose to locate this fragment after those he 
believes display concrete examples of the opposites’ different modes of unity, and 
following Snell, argued that those B10 contains are not characteristically Heraclitean 
                                                
189 Cf. Dilcher 1995: 101. 
190 Cited in Kirk 1954: 179. 
191 See Gigon 1935: 20ff and 40ff and Kirk’s rejection of it in 1954: 172ff. 
192 Or ‘dialectical movement of thinking’, Adoménas 1999: 112. 
193 For a variety of opinions on Heraclitus’ opposites cf. Kirk 1954: 166-201; Emlyn-Jones 
1976; Kahn 1979: 185-204; Mackenzie 1988: 1-37; Dilcher 1995:103. 
194 Contra Gigon  
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pairs of opposites. 195 The noun sulláyiej (Lorimer, Snell, Kirk, Marcovich, Kahn, 
D.S.), which is preferable to sunáyiej (DK, Burnet, Gigon) because the corruption 
from the former to latter is more likely than the converse,196 is enigmatic and most 
commentators have assigned it a sense, like that of Snell’s Zusammensetzungen, that is 
supposed to be exemplified by the three pairs of opposites that follow.197 Kahn, adding 
a further nuance, translates it instead as graspings to be understood ‘both in the physical 
and the cognitive sense’.198  
 
Translation problems aside, the most important points to be made here are two on which 
most commentators concur: first, sulláyiej is clearly subject rather than predicate; 
second, 8la kaì o÷k 8la, sumferómenon diaferómenon, sun^=don di^=don differ 
from the more concrete and specific pairs of opposites deployed in other fragments (e.g. 
B88), in that they are raised from the particular to the universal. Whereas opposite like 
day and night, waking and sleeping, etc. are directly instantiated in nature in a way that 
humans can concretely experience, the three pairs of opposites of B10 are conceptual 
antitheses reached though a binary logic of the kind of ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Thus, as the 
products of basic affirmation and denial, conceptual antitheses like those described by 
‘whole and not whole’ could hypothetically be applied to any subject.  
 
In virtue of these characteristics, it has rightly been observed that B10 can be taken as a 
sort of summary of Heraclitus’ doctrine of opposites.199 Hence, once agreed that &en 
pánta e%inai, it is also wise to agree that the comprehensive reality described by the 
nexus &en pánta is a unity-plurality pervaded by opposites. The impression of this 
pervasiveness may be strongly sensed in the last fragment quoted above (B41), in which 
pánta dià pántwn is another powerful linguistic artifice expressing the notion of a 
pluralized totality. This fragment, strongly linked to B50 by means of verbal parallels 
(sofón æstin &en pánta e%inai, B50, &en tò sofón [...] pánta dià pántwn B41), 
will be more thoroughly analysed in the following sections in which I will show, among 
                                                
195 1954: 72; 202. 
196 D.S. 2001: 126. 
197 1941: 84-7. See Kahn 1979: 281 for a survey of translations. 
198 1979: 282. 
199 Kahn 1979: 283. 
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other things, that pánta dià pántwn can be fully understood only in the light of 
Heraclitus’ doctrine of the ‘divinised’ opposites. 
 
2.3 God and the unity of opposites 
 
In Heraclitus, ‘god’ is one of the names employed to address the unapparent unity in 
which opposites find themselves combined: 
 
ñ qeòj Ómérh e÷frónh, ceimÎn qéroj, pólemoj eêrÔnh, kóroj limój. 
;;alloioûtai dè 8kwsper “?”,200 ñkótan summig^+ quÍmasin, ;onomázetai 
kaq’ÓdonÕn çkástou. B67 
 
Echoing the stylistic structure of B10, ñ qeój is here placed in apposition with four 
pairs of eight nouns in the nominative. This list of nouns, together with the comparative 
clause that follows, amounts to the only explicit definition of deity in Heraclitus’ extant 
text201 and thus deserves careful consideration.  
 
Obviously, the importance of this fragment has not gone unnoticed and its content, 
style, and philosophical significance have been the object of special attention by 
Fränkel, Kirk, Deichgräber, and Kahn.202 Other fragments dealing with the divine 
sphere can be divided into two groups: those which deal with it explicitly and those 
which refer to an ultimate power or entity transcending traditional anthropomorphic 
conceptions of god(s) but that would have been nonetheless perceived as retaining 
divine properties. Among those containing explicit mention of the divine sphere, three 
major sub-groups can be identified: a first group refers to specific gods in mythical 
terms (B15, B23; B28; B94),203 a second  refers to generic ‘gods’ in order to restate the 
traditional divide between divine and human knowledge (B78, B79, B83, B102),204 and 
a third creates a mysterious equivalence between mortals and immortals as an instance 
                                                
200 “pûr” DK. 
201 Kahn 1979: 277; Robinson 1987: 127. 
202 Fränkel 1938: 230-44; Kirk 1954: 184-201, Deichgräber 1963: 490-6 (a summary of which 
can be found in Marcovich 1965: 305) and Kahn 1979: 276-81.  
203 Although almost never in a traditional sense. 
204 Few other fragments (B5, B24, B30) refer to gods and human in parallel terms. Cf. n. 254. 
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of the coincidentia oppositorum (B62). However, some fragments (e.g. B30, B53, B80, 
B90) seem to invoke supreme principles. In two instances, these are overtly contrasted 
with the notion of ‘god’ as traditionally understood: B30, in which ever-living fire is 
said not to have been made by either gods or men and B53, in which war is said to 
render some gods and other men.  
 
Hence, B67 stands out as a unique theological dictum, in that it conflates traits from 
both sets of fragments: it refers to a single god but without using a specific name or 
recognisable mythical attributes, and this god is described as a higher entity akin to 
those like war, justice and fire. Most importantly, as will become apparent through 
careful textual analysis, Heraclitus’ configuration of unity and oppositions in B67 is 
elevated, by means of vigorous stylistic synthesis, to the rank of divine matter. 
 
The fragment is formally divisible into two sentences whose syntactical peculiarity has 
been effectively brought out by Kahn’s commentary.205 Connected by the particle dé, 
these two sentences are characterised by a sharp formal contrast: the first amounts to a 
list of nine nouns in the nominative lacking any verbal connection, the second, however, 
is introduced by the verb ;;alloioûtai, and develops in a complex comparative clause 
containing a temporal subordinate (8kwsper ñkótan) and lacking (unless we provide 
one) any subject noun. It is in this ‘formal asymmetry’ that Kahn finds a ‘prima facie 
reason for resisting the editorial temptation to introduce a subject noun into the 
sentence’.206 This issue is much debated and most editors, finding that no sense could 
otherwise be restored, print some noun after 8kwsper. Although ‘fire’ (DK) has 
perhaps been the most popular, other suggestions such as ‘air’ (Zeller), ‘myrrh’ (Heidel) 
and ‘olive oil’ (Fränkel) have been attempted.207 However, since as admitted by Kirk 
‘the implication of the image is the same’,208 the real question is whether a subject 
should or should not be provided. Leaving this question temporarily open, I shall next 
consider each portion of the fragment individually. I will return to this problem later in 
                                                
205 Kahn 1979: 276-7. 
206 1979: 277. 
207 Cf. Kirk 1954:191ff who himself prints pûr. 
208 1954: 197. 
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the course of my analysis, after more light has been shed on the content of this 
important saying. 
 
It is crucial to note that the four pairs of opposites are organised in chiastic order209 AB-
BA CD-DC that can be divided into two parts: Ómérh e÷frónh and ceimÎn qéroj 
are derived from the natural sphere and pólemoj eêrÔnh and kóroj limój are 
derived from the human and social sphere.210 The chiasmus establishes a strong sense of 
interconnectedness between the two parts. Moreover, as already recognised by 
Hippolytus – whose comment on this sequence was: t;anantía •panta, o*utoj ñ 
noûj – the formal symmetry according to which these four pairs of opposites are 
organised suggests that they stand for all other contraries in the universe.211 
 
In light of this, B67 seems to share a unique feature with B10 and scholars often study 
them in conjunction.212 Just as in B10, opposites are elevated from the particular to the 
universal in B67, yet each fragment achieves this through a different method. Whereas 
B10 focuses on the modes of unity and contrariety between opposites rather than on 
concrete examples, B67 employs concrete and (probably) emblematic specimens of 
opposites213 only to assert the unity of all pairs of opposites in the figure of god. 
Nevertheless, some of the conclusions reached at the end of my analysis of B10 will 
bear on my evaluation of the nature of this identification and, as a consequence, of the 
nature of ñ qeój. 
 
As already partially anticipated, the impression of fixity created by a definition 
composed of a list of nouns without any verbal connection is shaken by a series of 
circular conceptual movements: the cyclic alternation Ómérh e÷frónh and ceimÎn 
qéroj, applied by means of stylistic symmetry to some aspects of the human condition 
pólemoj eêrÔnh and kóroj limój, as well as the universal value of oppositions 
                                                
209 Day (warmth-light = +) night (cold-darkness = –) winter (cold-darkness = –) summer 
(warmth-light = +) | war (hardship = –) peace (comfort = +) satiety (comfort = +) hunger 
(hardship = –). 
210 Marcovich 2001: 415. 
211 A point on which most commentators since Fränkel 1938: 231-2 concur. 
212 Kirk 1954: 166; Emlyn-Jones 1976: 107 and Kahn 1979: 276-86. 
213 See Emlyn-Jones 1976: 106 and Kahn 1979: 279. 
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conveyed through chiastic disposition. Now, it is interesting to notice how the chiasmus 
generally highlighted by scholars – one based on a negative-positive alternation AB-BA 
CD-DC – is contained within a larger chiastic figure. Night and day can in fact be 
interpreted as a daily expression of the yearly opposition of winter and summer: a 
smaller cycle within a larger cycle. Similarly, hunger and satiety can be related to war 
and peace through a causal link (war causes hunger, peace brings satiety) and as 
individual consequences of larger socio-political premises. In this way, AB can be 
perceived as being contained in BA and CD as containing DC, so that the whole 
sequence ab-BA CD-dc is enclosed within the larger chiasmus x-X Y-y (contained-
containing containing-contained).  
 
This device bears on our reading of the fragment in several ways. To begin with, it 
reinforces the thesis that this list must be taken as standing for ‘all opposites’.  It can be 
read metonymically as ‘concrete for abstract’. Then, the chiasmus x-X Y-y, focusing 
more on the relationship between the various ‘unities’, emphasises their role as 
inseparable nexuses (the inseparability of day from night, winter from summer etc.) and 
interlocking pieces of a harmonious whole (days within seasons, seasons within years, 
etc.). The hidden, yet fundamental, harmony produced by the unity of opposites that is 
alluded to here through style is more explicitly addressed in other fragments. For 
example, it is seen in the palíntropoj :armoníh of the bow and the lyre (B51b) or by 
the :armoníh ;afanÔj being better than one fanerÔ  (B54) and echoes of it can be 
probably heard in the equation between díkh and 1rij (B80).214 
 
In virtue of their juxtaposition with the only unpaired noun ñ qeój, these unities-in-
opposites find a place of identity or coincidentia in the notion of god. The importance of 
the difference between unity (&en) and identity (tò a÷tó) has been thoroughly explored 
by Emlyn-Jones with whom I fully concur.215 Indeed, a major distinction between the 
various modes of the unity of opposites in Heraclitus is that between unity envisaged in 
terms of unavoidable succession – such as day and night – and unity envisaged as 
coincidentia. By coincidentia I mean the kind of simultaneous unity which can be 
                                                
214 B80 is analysed in Ch. 3.3. 
215 Emlyn-Jones 1976. 
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recognised in things like the way up and the way down (B60), the bow-life whose job is 
death (B48), and the straight and crooked way of writing (B59); or which can be 
recognised in actions like living and dying (62), being and not being, entering and not 
entering (B49), wanting and not wanting (B32).216 
 
Hence, the first half of B67 appears to be very dense in meaning and to contain allusive 
references to all levels of Heraclitus’ thinking about opposites: their all-pervasiveness, 
their unity, the way their unity resolves at times in paradoxical identity.217 Now some 
observations must be added with regard to the god/unities-in-opposites identity. First, it 
must be emphasised that this fragment claims that god is the unity of opposites as much 
as that the unity of opposites is god. It follows that an innovative representation of god 
depicted in terms of universal principle is counterbalanced by a characterisation of the 
unity-in-opposites in divinised terms.  
 
A further circularity can be identified between ñ qeój and the four pairs of opposites. 
God coincides with the unity of opposites as the unity of opposites coincides with god:  
æk pántwn 6n kaì æx çnòj pánta. Like in B10 the focus is simultaneously on the 6n 
of god as much as on the pánta of the united opposites. Moreover, just as the 
sulláyiej can be perceived as being defined by each pair of opposites in turn – 8la 
kaì o÷k 8la, sumferómenon diaferómenon, sun^=don di^=don – as well as by all 
three pairs and the kind of oppositions they stand for taken together, in a similar 
manner, ñ qeój is each pair of opposites that follows as well as the fundamental pattern 
they represent when they are taken as a whole. This is where the second part of the 
fragment adds an interesting nuance to the picture. 
 
Whereas the first part of the fragment contains a definition of the relationship between 
god and the unity of opposites which is open to a multiplicity of perspectives, the 
second part of the fragment seems to adopt a more restricted outlook. The synoptic 
perspective of god as the sum of every unity of opposites recedes into the background 
while the specific identification of god with each pair of opposites gains prospective 
                                                
216 For important precautions on the use of this formula see Dilcher 1995: 103ff. 
217 On Heraclitus’ paradoxes see Mackenzie 1988: 1-37. 
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prominence. The circular notion of god as each pair of opposites and of each pair as an 
unmistakable manifestation of the divine is thus explored through the idea of change 
and naming. The idea of ‘alteration’ is introduced by the first verb of the fragment 
;;alloioûtai, while the idea of name-acquisition by the corresponding indicative 
;onomázetai, so that a formal link is estabished between the two verbs. While the 
subject of  ;alloioûtai is clearly  ñ qeój, as mentioned above, the question of whether 
‘god’ should be considered as well the subject of ;onomázetai is controversial and 
most editors resolve to provide a different subject-noun after  8kwsper. 
 
Kahn’s idea of holding ñ qeój as the only subject of the sentence is attractive to the 
extent that it blocks out every possibility of interpreting ‘god’ as some form of 
unchanging substratum: god actually becomes other in kind ( ;;alloîoj). The simile 
introducing another term of comparison (whether fire, oil or whatever it might be) may 
induce us instead to conceive of change as something only apparent. However, 
notwithstanding Kahn’s shrewd argument in favour of it,218 I still think, together with 
Kirk, that the idea of either god or any of the pairs of opposites ‘being mixed with 
spices’219 is intolerable. Perhaps then fire, considering its centrality in Heraclitus’ 
fragments relating to change (B30, B31a, B90) and its treatment as divinised element 
(B66, B90),220 remains the best guess, provided that some fundamental points of 
interpretation are clearly stated.221  
 
The first point to be made regards the aforementioned link between ;;alloioûtai and  
;onomázetai. Those critics who hold the view that god must be understood as some sort 
of underlying substance tend to interpret ;alloioûtai in connection with ;onomázetai 
as describing a superficial change: the sort of alteration involved in the acquisition of a 
                                                
218 1979: 279-81. 
219 1954: 191. 
220 In Graham’s words: ‘the substance that is not a substance, the substance that is a process’, 
1997: 37. Lack of space prevents a longer discussion. In brief, I believe that fire was a 
privileged element for Heraclitus for it allowed him to express through an apparently Milesian 
category the notion of ‘unchanging change’ (see below). The resonance between the two 
expressions æk pántwn 6n kaì æx çnòj pánta (B10) and purój te ;antamoibÕ tà pánta 
kaì  pûr ßpántwn (B90) is indeed worthy of notice. 
221 This philological problem is extremely difficult and I feel inclined to suspend any definite 
judgment – some important philosophical problems related to this part of B67 can be discussed 
regardless of the textual solution adopted. 
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different name. Yet, this reading does not do justice to Heraclitus’ attitude towards 
language and names, which are regarded as having the same ontological status as 
reality.222 Only by assuming that names represent something real about the object they 
are attached to can the bow mentioned in B48 be understood as such a stark 
instantiation of the paradoxical unity of life and death. Indeed, the opposition between 
name and function presupposes that the two hold the same degree of reality; according 
to any other interpretation B48 would read as saying something extremely banal or 
unworthy of mention. Instead, we know that elsewhere (B51b) the bow has earned 
together with the lyre the status of object-token of that palíntropoj ::armoníh on 
which the cosmos rests. Hence ;onomázetai, if anything, reinforces the notion of 
change introduced by ;;alloioûtai, instead of watering it down. 
 
In my opinion then, B67 states that ñ qeój undergoes real change. What sort of change 
is this? The first part of the fragment suggests, most likely, a change from one pair of 
opposites to the next, although the fact that ;;alloioûtai may also apply to change 
between opposites themselves cannot be entirely ruled out.223 Meanwhile, circularity of 
style makes clear that god cannot be identified with any of its specific alterations per se. 
God is not an underlying and unchanging substance,224 but ceaseless alteration; as such, 
it can be compared to the back-turning harmony mentioned in B51b. Whereas the bow 
and the lyre owe their function to the ‘back turning harmony’ produced by the tension 
between their opposed extremities, god is the ultimate unity in which all pairs of 
opposites can meet in harmonious tension. The fragment expresses thus in theological 
language one of Heraclitus’s fundamental principles: the notion of unceasing change. 
The interminable dialectical movement produced by the careful disposition of words in 
B67 shows that only a skilfully arranged lógoj could capture and convey the ever-
eluding definition of ñ qeój.225 
 
 
 
                                                
222 Calogero 2012: 88ff, Kirk 1954: 198ff. 
223 Kirk 1954: 198; Marcovich 2001: 417. 
224 E.g. contra Robinson 1987: 128. 
225 For a similar point about ‘change itself’ being ‘unchanging’cf. Nehamas 2002: 50.  
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2.4 Wisdom, immanence, separation and governing plan 
 
The theme of god and naming is also central to fragment B32, which, together with 
B41, can be used to endorse some of the conclusions reached above in my analysis of 
B67.  
 
&en tò sofòn moûnon légesqai o÷k æqélei kaì æqélei Zhnòj 3noma (B32)         
 
&en tò sofón, æpístasqai gnÍmhn, ñtéhi kubernâtai pánta dià pántwn (B41)     
 
 
Both fragments begin with the same subject-group  &en tò sofòn and are therefore 
strongly linked together through the common theme of wisdom. Whereas in the former, 
&en tò sofòn seems to establish a link between the two spheres of wisdom and the 
divine, in the latter it immeditely harks back to the teachings of the lógoj, according to 
which it is wise (sofón æstin) to agree that everything is one (&en pánta e%inai, 
B50).226 Next I will analyse each of these two fragments in turn. 
 
The beginning of B32, &en tò sofòn moûnon, yields innumerable readings, the most 
exhaustive survey of which can be found in Kirk.227 To begin with, I believe that 
moûnon should be read with the subject rather than with what follows.228 Kirk and 
Marcovich, adopting the same punctuation (two commas: one after &en, another after 
moûnon), translate ‘One thing, the only truly wise’229 and ‘One (being), the only (truly) 
wise’230 respectively. Thus, following DK, they interpret moûnon as limiting the 
attribution of sofón, even though moûnon does not occupy in this sentence an actual 
attributive position (i.e. &en tò moûnon sofón).  
 
                                                
226 sofón has a forth occurrence in B108, another controversial fragment which, due to space 
restrictions, regrettably cannot be discussed. 
227 1954: 393.  
228 So, for instance, by reading moûnon together with the noun at the end of the phrase: ‘to be 
called by the name of Zeus only (or ‘alone’). For this most unnatural position cf. Hoelscher and 
West, reviewed in D.S. 2001: 164. 
229 Kirk 1954: 392 
230 Marcovich 2001: 445. 
 73 
However, reading moûnon together with  &en has its disadvantages too: primarily that of 
having to allow a very weak meaning of moûnon. This is the problem, for instance, in 
Diano’s solution   – ‘One thing only, wisdom’231 – in which  &en is the subject and tò 
sofón its apposition. Kahn’s solution has the same and yet a further formal problem: 
leaving the whole devoid of punctuation, he translates &en as predicate, ‘The wise is one 
alone’. This reading results in broken syntax between the first and the second part of the 
fragment. No doubt, the fragment is difficult and (I believe) intentionally ambiguous, so 
that the effort to reduce its meaning to one exclusive reading is probably misplaced. 
Rather, it seems more sensible to assume that stylistic ambiguity may testify here for 
Heraclitus’ effort to appropriate, as we shall see, the term tò sofón to a new use.  
 
To turn away from details of textual interpretation, it is clear how in this fragment 
Heraclitus playfully interacts with traditional ideas and definitions of god and divine 
wisdom. In the previous chapter, I discussed Xenophanes’ fragment 23, in which ‘one 
god’ is said to be ‘unlike mortals in body or thought’, as well as several other fragments 
in which god’s sheer intellectuality and mental power is further stressed and developed 
(B25). Although in other Heraclitean fragments, the superiority of divine knowledge to 
human knowledge is expressed in comparable terms to Xenophanes’ B23 (e.g.: %%hqoj 
gàr ;anqrÍpeion mèn o÷k 1cei gnÍmaj, qeîon dè 1cei, B78), Heraclitus’ B32, 
together with B67, begins to give shape to a profoundly new conception of deity and 
wisdom.  
 
Read in close connection to Xenophanes’ 23, Heraclitus’ 32 presents a reversed 
disposition of its elements; whereas the former begins with the notion of a single 
supreme god (e*ij qeój) and ends with a remark about its intellectual superiority 
(nóhma), the latter begins with the notion of a single wise thing or wisdom ( &en tò 
sofòn moûnon) at the same time accepting and refusing a nominal identity with the 
supreme god of traditional mythology (Zhnòj 3noma). The impersonal neuter &en, as 
opposed to the Xenophanean masculine e*ij, marks an even more dramatic break with 
the anthropomorphic conception of god. The transpersonal representation of deity 
conveyed by the subject &en tò sofòn moûnon reminds us of the highly non-
                                                
231 ‘Una sola cosa, la sapienza’, in D.S. 2001: 33. Kahn 1979: 267. 
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anthropomorphic god of B67 and its identity with a sequence of united pairs of 
opposites. Indeed, the very first determination of this &en tò sofón is precisely 
provided by its paradoxical will: o÷k æqélei kaì æqélei must be understood – just like 
æk pántwn &en kaì æx çnòj pánta in B10 – as a simultaneous rather than temporal 
process. The uniqueness of this wisdom is prima facie expressed through a further 
tension of opposites: it is a wise thing (or wisdom) that ‘wants and does not want’ 
something at the same time.  
 
What is wanted and not wanted is of course the name of Zeus: a further playful rebuke 
against traditional mythology. Just like Xenophanes’ e*ij qeój who retains some of the 
characteristics that poets often attribute to the chief Olympian, Heraclitus’ god may be 
understood as retaining some of Zeus’ qualities while rejecting others. However, as 
most commentators remark, the choice of using Zhnój instead of Diój (used in B120) 
points perhaps to a deeper reading. The play on the words Zhnój-zÖn, through which 
the name of Zeus is linked to the verb ‘to live’, was in fact a popular one at the time and 
employed, for instance, by Aeschylus (Suppl. 584ff) and Plato (Crat. 396aff). In the 
context of Heraclitus’ fragments, names and etymologies must of course be taken 
seriously, so that the connection between Zeus and the principle of life, after which  &en 
tò sofòn moûnon accepts and refuses to be named, allows us to suggest a tentative 
link between B32 and other fragments. Similarly to  B48, in which the name of the bow 
is ‘life’ in spite of its function of bringing death, the antithetical will of  &en tò sofòn 
moûnon to be called by the name of ‘life’ may point to the fundamental antithesis of 
life and death so present in Heraclitus’ thought.  
 
Hence, especially when examined in the light of B67, B32 can be seen as partially 
reaffirming – by means of puns and subtle formulations – a notion of deity envisaged in 
terms of the unity of opposites. The two fragments not only share the important themes 
of identity and names, but also those of antithesis and paradox. Of course, B32 contains 
an important additional element, for it establishes a significant link between the two 
notions of deity and wisdom. This link is reiterated in the next fragment we shall 
discuss (B41), the opening words of which entirely match, with the exclusion of 
moûnon, those of B32.   
 75 
Already cited above in connection with other fragments which describe the whole of 
reality in terms of a pluralised unity, this fragment brings our enquiry full circle. Indeed, 
as previously shown, the expression pánta dià pántwn is best understood in light of 
B10 as an interlocking plurality of opposites. That conclusion can now be brought 
together with some of those reached more recently.  Thus the discussion will develop 
through two major points: first, I shall argue that B41 must be also understood in close 
relation to B67 and B32 as a further development of the theme of the divinised 
opposites; second, I will argue – against extreme transcendent interpretations 232 – that 
Heraclitus’ attempt to appropriate the notions of wisdom and god to a new use contains 
a tension between the two conceptions of immanence and separateness.  
 
The text as we have it is corrupt and of the current emendations suggested, I am 
tentatively inclined to follow, together with Marcovich among others, that which 
assigns gnÍmh the meaning of ‘plan/ordinance’ and prints the feminine form of 8stij 
in the dative (ñtéhi) together with the present kubernâtai.233 The central point is that 
there is only one kind of wisdom: the knowledge (æpístasqai) of that gnÍmh which 
governs the whole of reality.234 What does gnÍmh mean here? Is it related to the 
gnÏmai of B78, which Heraclitus claims to be exclusive ownership of the divine? 
Indeed a gnÍmh that governs the whole of reality seems to retain divine associations. 
But are we to understand it as an independent entity, some form of consciousness, that, 
similarly to Anaxagoras’ noûj, is separate from the cosmos about which it has full 
knowledge (gnÍmhn ge perì pantòj pâsan #iscei, B12. 9)?235 In the context of this 
and other fragments, I believe that this transcendent interpretation should be rejected. 
Rather, as a divine principle, gnÍmh is best understood as a plan, ordinance, or the like, 
which acts on reality through reality itself: pánta dià pántwn. Once again, I think 
                                                
232 Reinhardt 1959: 205. 
233 This solution was conjectured by Deichgräber 1938: 14 n. 5 and accepted by Vlastos 1955: 
352ff. and Marcovich 2001: 449ff. For extensive discussions and alternative choices: Robinson 
1987:108 (ñtéh ækubérnhse); Kirk 1954: 386 (8kh kubernâtai); Kahn 1979:170ff (8kh 
kubernÖsai).  
234 I reject a reading of gnÍmhn as an internal accusative to æpístasqai (Heidel, Reinhardt, 
Gigon and Kirk) as highly unusual. Kirk argues in favour of it in 1954: 388ff. This 
interpretation is criticised by Vlastos 1955: 352ff, Guthrie 1981: 429, Marcovich 2001: 451 and 
D.S. 2001: 114. 
235 On the topic of ‘mind’ in Anaxagoras’ B12 cf. Lesher 1995: 125-42 and Laks 1993: 19-38, 
2002: 7-31. 
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that Heraclitus is referring here to the divine principle of the unity of opposites, a 
principle inherent in the world.  
 
Both the imagery evoked through the verb kubernân and the formulation pánta dià 
pántwn point to this inherent conception. If Anaximander’s \peiron was similarly 
described by Aristotle as all-governing, it was indeed also described as all-embracing 
(kaì periécein !apanta kaì pánta kubernân, A15+B3). In Heraclitus’ B41 the 
expression dià pántwn represents an important point of contrast with the notion of 
periécein. Far from operating from outside the universe as an all-embracing principle, 
Heraclitus’ gnÍmh is that immanent principle according to which everything is 
governed through everything else. Although the primary meaning of the preposition diá 
is probably causal, the beautiful nautical metaphor allows for the expression dià 
pántwn to be read in a locative sense as well.236 This vivid imagery has poetic force: 
by following the divine ordinance of a cosmic helm, everything is steered through the 
ocean of everything. 
  
The divine in Heraclitus coincides with this ‘ocean’ and the ordinance that regulates the 
movements of everything through this harmonious whole: to realise that is to have 
gained the one and only wisdom there is. But if ñ qeój is one thing with the whole 
universe, this universe must be conceived as a collection of united opposites (B67).  
Heraclitus’ conception of deity is as far as it could get from anthropomorphic 
depictions, yet in his theology there is no room for ‘absolute transcendentalism’.237 In 
other words, god is the plan, the wisdom, and the principle according to which æk 
pántwn &en kaì æx çnòj pánta (B10): to hold on to the metaphor of B41 a bit longer, 
it is the pluralised unity of reality which is stirred by its own internal governing 
principle (pánta dià pántwn). 
 
However some scholars, especially those who, as discussed above,238 are inclined to lay 
special emphasis on unity to the disadvantage of plurality, seem to recognise ‘one being, 
                                                
236 Kirk 1954: 390. 
237 Kirk 1954: 399. 
238 § 2. 
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the only truly one’ as ‘a transcendent metaphysical principle’.239 Two fragments in 
particular could offer some ground for this kind of perspective: 
   
tà dè pánta oêakízei Keraunój B64 
 
:okóswn lógouj #hkousa o÷dèij ;afikneîtai æj toûto 9ste ginÍskein 8 ti 240 
sofón æsti, pántwn kecwrisménon B108 
 
In B64 the idea of a ‘thunderbolt that steers all things’ may suggest governance from 
afar. The employment of the keraunój, Zeus’ traditional weapon, may also be taken as 
a metonymy for divine agency. Moreover, because its verb oêakízein recalls  
kubernân, B64 is often read in conjunction with B41, and the transcendent 
interpretation extended from one to the other or vice versa. 
 
The second fragment, B108, is one out of four – the remaining three we all saw above 
(B32, B41, B50) – which contain the neuter form of sofój. The first half of the 
fragment ‘Of all those whose accounts I have heard, none has got so far as this:’241 
makes it clear that its primary context is within Heraclitus’ polemics against 
polumaqía.242 A possible reading of kecwrisménon is, as recently pointed out by 
Nehamas, that of ‘different’, in the sense that what Heraclitus reveals is ‘radically 
different from what ordinary views of the world suggest’.243 Yet a stronger sense of the 
fragment could perhaps be that which reads sofón, usually in conjunction with B32, as 
referring not to wisdom but to a Wise Being244 ‘set apart’ (kecwrisménon) from 
everything else.245 In this way, the fragment could convey the notion of what Reinhardt 
defined ‘an intelligence beyond all things’.246  
 
                                                
239 Marcovich 2001: 446. 
240 8ti Graham. 
241 Tran. by Kahn 1979: 114. 
242 E.g. Kahn 1979: 114; D.S. 2001: 170. 
243 Nehamas 2002: 47. See also Marcovich 2001: 441, Mackenzie 1988: 11 n. 24, and Kirk 
1954: 399. 
244 So Marcovich in 2001: 441, although he then argues that this being must be understood not 
as separated but as different from ‘traditional ideas of god’. 
245 Robinson 1987: 152; 
246 1959: 205. 
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These objections can be easily dismissed. With regard to B64, it is obvious that 
Heraclitus is engaging with the traditional concept of Zeus’ weapon to turn it into 
something new. Just as in B32, in which  &en tò sofòn moûnon is willing and 
unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus, the thunderbolt of B64 is and is not Zeus’ 
traditional weapon. As most commentators have already supposed, the thunderbolt 
should perhaps be associated with the notion of (divinised) fire,247 and it seems to me 
yet another vivid symbol expressing the notion of a divine principle that is immanent in 
the world. With regard to B108, even if one wanted to insist on the (unlikely) notion of 
a wise being or wisdom set apart from everything, it must be immediately clarified that 
separation does not necessarily imply transcendence.  
 
As explained above with reference to the expression æk pántwn &en kaì æx çnòj 
pánta, Heraclitus often uses figurative movements to describe conceptual shifts of 
perspective. Similarly, if sofón were to be conceived as the divine being of B67 and 
B32, I think that its separateness (kecwrisménon) should be taken as another 
conceptual shift. The following statement by Curd can be contrasted with that of 
Reinhardt: ‘Heraclitus presumes that the object of knowledge is something real, unified 
and apart; this assumption is itself a part of a metaphysics of things’.248 Just as the 
discourse (lógoj) about things is common to them, yet it can be conceived of separately 
(cwríj), so god is one with the whole of the universe, yet may be conceived as ñ qeój. 
 
To sum up, both B32 and B41 are key to our understanding of the theological aspects of 
Heraclitus’ philosophy. Each of them picks up and develops in a specific direction some 
of the ideas contained in B67 (and other fragments) concerning the divine sphere. In 
particular, they explore the notions of divine names and divine immanence further as 
well as containing more allusions to the theme of the unity of opposites. Most notably, 
these two fragments have in common the theme of wisdom and are important for an 
understanding of Heraclitus’ effort to appropriate this concept to a new use. Only now, 
after each fragment has been individually discussed, can I conclude my analysis with a 
general remark about the connection between human and divine wisdom. 
                                                
247 Lesher 2006: 233; Marcovich 2001: 424-5; Kahn 1979: 271ff. 
248 Curd 1991: 538. 
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Apart from some remarks on the epistemological divide between gods and humans, 
Heraclitus seems to hold that all human beings share the capacity to understand (B113, 
B116).249 Most poignantly, when humans come close to that which is sofón they 
automatically seem to come closer to the divine sphere in its broader sense. Or, to use 
Lesher’s words, they seem to gain ‘cosmic insight’.250 Let us finally bring together the 
four relevant fragments for a brief collective examination: 
 
[...] 9ste ginÍskein 8 ti sofón æsti pántwn kecwrisménon B108 
 
[...] ñmologeîn sofón æstin &en pánta e%inai. B50 
 
&&en tò sofón, æpístasqai gnÍmhn, ñtéhi kubernâtai pánta dià pántwn 
B41 
 
&en tò sofòn moûnon légesqai o÷k æqélei kaì æqélei Zhnòj 3noma B32 
 
Since the general meaning of these sayings has already been explored, I can here direct 
my attention to the striking resonance and peculiar use of the neuter sofón. In each 
case the presence of this word announces a special kind of knowledge, one deriving 
from the xunòj lógoj and leading to the understanding that everything is one (B50) 
and that everything is stirred through everything (B41). 
 
Whereas the majority of interpreters agree that in B108, B50, and B41 sofón must 
refer to human knowledge while B32 to divine knowledge,251 nevertheless Heraclitus’ 
curious choice of &en tò sofón in B32 and B41 has engendered some disagreement. 
For instance, according to Robinson,  &en tò sofón in B41 is equivalent to that in B32 
and must be taken as referring to ‘some transcendental, divine principle of wisdom’.252 
                                                
249 Hussey 2006:104ff. 
250 Lesher 1983: 160. 
251 Cf. Lesher 2006: 233: ‘Not surprisingly the Zeus-like power that sets the limits for all natural 
processes and transformations is said to be supremely wise […] while wisdom (presumably in 
us) consists in understanding how it operates’. 
252 Robinson 1987: 107. 
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Or, according to Kahn the sofón of B108 and B41 admits both ‘human and cosmic 
readings’.253 Similarly to Kahn, I agree that these texts contain a deliberate ambiguity 
and converge into a unitary conception in which divine and human boundaries are 
blurred.254 
 
Accordingly, B32 may, among other readings, also be regarded as the apex of 
Heraclitus’ attempt to narrow the distance between the human and the divine domains: 
it is not only the notion of deity that through paradoxes and antitheses is mysteriously 
brought to designate some form of higher wisdom, but also that of wisdom that is 
elevated from the human sphere to the divine one. Is this convergence of the divine and 
the human spheres a further manifestation of opposites united?  
 
;aqánatoi qnhtoí, qnhtoì ;aqánatoi, zÏntej tòn ækeínwn qánaton, tòn 
dè ækeínwn bíon teqneÏtej. B62 
 
That Heraclitus conceived of mortals and immortals as another manifestation of the 
unity of opposites emerges clearly from this doubly chiastic dictum. Indeed, there is a 
certain allure to the idea that Heraclitus might have conceived of wisdom as that place 
in which humans reached their own unity-in-opposites.  
 
In conclusion, Heraclitus encouraged his fellowmen, against the polymathic knowledge 
of poets, to pursue an entirely new epistemological horizon. Endowed as they are with 
the common faculty of lógoj, humans are naturally predisposed towards an 
understanding of the cosmos’ latent structure, and as such they must reach for it. Not 
least, because in the attainment of wisdom lies humans’ chance to approach the divine. 
Indeed, in striving to gain a novel insight into the workings of the universe, Heraclitus 
might well have seen himself as theologising, and as doing it better than those who 
came before him. 
 
 
                                                
253 Kahn 1979: 171. 
254 For a range of perspectives on human and divine knowledge cf. Kahn 1979: 171; Curd 1991; 
Dilcher 1995: 148-57 (a curious existential perspective); Lesher 2006: 232ff. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Cosmic Justice and the Metaphysics of Opposites: Anaximander, 
Heraclitus and Parmenides 
 
In his companion to Eumenides, Mitchell-Boyask writes: ‘It is important to keep in 
mind that the Greek word for justice, dikê, involves not just the redressing of injuries 
but also the natural order. It is a term that, in Aeschylus especially, has cosmic 
implications.’255 But what does it mean exactly for justice to have cosmic implications 
and whence has Aeschylus derived this notion? The purpose of this chapter is to lay the 
grounds for my study of cosmic justice in the Oresteia. 
 
In the introduction I focused on the retaliatory nature of dikê. The idea of retributive 
justice, as the Chorus in Choephori say, is an ancient one (trigérwn mûqoj, 314) and 
one that was certainly familiar to the preceding poetic corpus. There, I argued that 
Aeschylus inherited from the tradition what I defined as a ‘bifurcated’ conception of 
divine justice. In particular, I focused on the notion of retributive justice in Homer, 
Hesiod, Solon and the Theognidea as well as the question of Zeus’ relationship to a 
fixed order of superior necessity. I maintained that the paradoxical coexistence in the 
Oresteia of two antithetical poetic attitudes towards divine justice – one projecting 
benevolence onto the gods, one projecting tyrannical force – may be interpreted as a 
further dramatic development of paradoxes and dilemmas already raised by the poets of 
the archaic period.  
 
However, there is something innovative about the way in which Aeschylus weaves the 
idea of retributive justice into the fabric of the trilogy. The confinement of this ‘basic 
pattern’ – as Gagarin calls it – of ‘action followed by reciprocal reaction’, 256 within the 
boundaries of the family allows the idea of retributive justice not only to be presented in 
an intensified form,257 but also to acquire an unprecedented contour: as pointed out by 
                                                
255 2009: 106. Deforge 1986 adds very little to this topic, cf. Comber 1988. 
256 1976: 60. 
257 Cf. Vickers 1973: 347. 
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Garvie, what is new is the way in which Aeschylus uses it ‘to connect the successive 
tragic events in a seemingly endless chain of crime and vengeance’.258 A chain that in 
its inexorable recurrence nearly comes across as a self-regulating mechanism in which a 
crime is always the direct result of a similar crime and is therefore its punishment as 
well as its perpetuation. 
 
Now, whence has Aeschylus derived this notion of justice? Why is it portrayed with 
those exact contours and not others? Why did Aeschylus elect a notion of justice 
resembling a self-regulating mechanism for his tragic purposes? This set of questions 
leads the present inquiry. It is my contention that the innovative conception of justice 
developed within the philosophical speculations of the period has important analogues 
in the dialectical structure of the Oresteia. But what was so innovative about dikê in 
Presocratic thought? The purpose of this chapter is precisely to provide an exposition of 
the broadened significance acquired by dikê in the writing of some of Aeschylus’ near-
contemporary thinkers. 
 
3.1 Dikê in the archaic period 
 
Thanks to his survey of dikê-related words in the archaic period,259 Gagarin was able to 
point out the genuine contribution of Presocratic speculation for the expansion of dikê’s 
semantic scope. Whereas one can find only few non-legal uses of dikê-words in the 
archaic period, Gagarin maintains that dikê as law in its broadest sense is expanded into 
a universal force by the Presocratics.260 Havelock’s study of The Greek Concept of 
Justice also reaches similar conclusions: namely that the application of the term is – 
thanks to early philosophical speculations –  ‘extended operationally to cover the 
behaviour of the external world’.261  
 
In the Homeric poems, dikê-words rarely transcend a fundamentally behavioural and 
judicial meaning: its use is particular and situational and it signifies for the most part a 
                                                
258 1986: 125. 
259 See in particular 1973: 81-94; 1974: 186-97.  
260 1974: 187. 
261 1978: 271. 
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principle of correctness in settling disputes.262  Although in some passages dikê includes 
a sense of general righteousness (e.g. Il. 16. 388),263 ‘justice’ as an abstract normative 
principle does not appear.264 It might be helpful to recall a few key-examples. The 
description of the city at peace on the shield of Achilles in Iliad 18.490ff represents 
perhaps the most powerful poetic representation of this archaic conception of dikê. Most 
poignantly, Homer includes among the blessings of an ordered communal life (such as 
weddings) a description of the legal proceedings conducted by the city’s judicial 
institutions in the case of homicide. It is a solemn scene: the dispute takes place before a 
gathering of elders who, sitting on polished stones in a sacred circle, strive to give ‘the 
most righteous judgment’ (díkhn êqúntata, 18.508).265 Dikê is also given a similar 
meaning in the context of Homer’s ironic description of a property dispute in the Hymn 
to Hermes. In the quarrel between Hermes and Apollo over Apollo’s cattle, following 
Apollo’s suggestion each party pleads his case before Zeus (dòj dè díkhn kaì déxo 
parà Zhnì Kroníwni, 312). In both Iliad 18 and HyHerm, dikê carries a technical and 
judicial meaning: it is used to settle legal disputes among both men and gods and plays 
a fundamental role in the maintenance of social order and peace. Dikê as conservation 
of exiting mores is best described as a form of public negotiation that replaces physical 
conflict. 
 
With Hesiod and Solon, we undoubtedly witness the increased importance of dikê as a 
theme: dikê-words occur primarily in connection with concepts of social well-being, 
righteous acquisition of wealth, and prosperity (3lboj, crÔmata, kérdoj, ploûtoj 
ktl.), and although the semantic scope of the term remains for the most part attached to 
the socio-political sphere,266 the term ‘as compared to Homer, mirrors an increased level 
                                                
262 Gagarin 1974. Although his articles represent still key studies of dikê in the Archaic period, I 
do not believe that what Gagarin identifies as two separate senses of dikê, the legalistic one and 
the behavioural one, can be regarded as strictly separate. Gagarin 1973: 82-6 argues that the 
legalistic sense of dikê is confined to the Iliad while its behavioural sense to the Odyssey. 
However, both Dickie 1978 and Cairns 1993: 152-6 (see in particular n. 21 at p. 153) have 
persuasively demonstrated the rigidity of such distinction to be unwarranted.  
263 Dickie 1978; Cairns 1993: 152-6; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 149. 
264 Havelock 1978: 13-4. 
265 A much debated scene: disputes still remain over the exact nature of the legal issue at stake, 
the role played by the #istwr, the gérontej, and the talents displayed. Cf. Edwards 1991: 213ff. 
Relying on Edwards’ commentary (p. 218), I here assume that metà toîsi refers to the elders. 
266 Solmsen 1949: 107-123; Pearson 1962: 46; Gagarin 1973; 1974. 
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of abstraction and the rise of an internal moral compass’.267 However, even when it is 
brought about by Zeus’ will, such as when Hesiod says that a whole community can 
suffer as a consequence of one man’s evil deeds (W&D, 238-47),268 dikê operates in an 
economic context with political implications.269 And while it is undoubtedly true that 
with Hesiod the concept of dikê is first isolated as a specific topic (it is first ‘brought 
into the realm of discourse’),270 it is also true that the author seemed more preoccupied 
with what dikê did rather than with was dikê was. In this sense Havelock is accurate in 
describing Hesiod as ‘proto-conceptual’.271  
 
Within the context of Solon’s political and legal measures, dikê is conceived as that 
which stops the excess of citizens and creates equilibrium in Athens (4W2; 13W2).272 It 
is difficult to assess whether and at what point dikê becomes a sort of immanent socio-
economic principle of balance,273 or whether, by describing dikê as such, Solon’s 
departure from Hesiod would be exaggerated.274 It is indeed true that Solon’s linguistic 
coherence in speaking about dikê  – she is often introduced through gnomic aorists 
(4.16; 13.8) – and his emphasis on the unavoidable fixity of her role in preserving 
political order 275 represent a shift from the Hesiodic model. It is probably best to 
assume that various attitudes towards dikê, all revolving around the poet’s socio-
political concern with his city, coexist within the Solonian corpus. However, it must be 
also remarked that Solon’s faith in the consistency of dikê’s intervention denotes a 
vigorous certainty that is quite distinct from the hopeful attitude expressed instead by 
Hesiod (Op. 217ff.). Just as I will argue is the case for Aeschylus, some of the new 
                                                
267 Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 149. 
268 See Int. II: 18. 
269 Gagarin 1974: 192. 
270 Havelock 1978: 249. 
271 1978: 232. 
272 Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 138. 
273 Jaeger 1966: 89-3; Vlastos 1946; 1947. For a radically different perspective: Wolf 1972 
(1953): 146ff. and Lloyd-Jones 1983: 44ff. who stress the theological character of dikê in both 
Hesiod and Solon.  
274 Balot 2001: 86ff who follows to a certain extent Gagarin 1974; Havelock 1978: 256-62, 
according to whom Solon is merely the didactical organizer of ideas of justice already scattered 
in the Hesiodic poems. 
275 Notice the frequency of the adverb pántwj (‘assuredly’, ‘at any rate’, 4.16; 13.28, 31, 42, 
55)   
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layers of meaning acquired by dikê in Solon are best understood in the light of the 
Presocratic developments of the notion of cosmic justice to which we shall now turn. 
 
3.2 Dikê as a metaphor of cosmic order 
 
The development of the notion of dikê into a cosmic force is a subtle and fascinating 
process. Evidence is of course scant, but we are lucky enough to possess a few pivotal 
fragments that, when closely examined, may help us shed light on the essential steps 
which must have led to this intellectual achievement. Let’s examine first two fragments 
which are rarely brought together: 
 
æx ὧν dè Ó génesíj æsti toîj o%usi, kaì tÕn fqoràn eêj taûta gínesqai 
katà tò creÍn< didónai gàr a÷tà díkhn kaì tísin ;allÔloij 
t ^hj ;adikíaj katà tÕn toû crónou táxin [...]. (Anaximander DKA9, 
B1) 276 
 
æx ;anémwn dè qálassa tarássetai< $hn dé tij a÷tÕn  
   mÕ kin^+, pántwn æstì dikaiotáth. (Solon 12W.2) 
 
The ‘seductive ease’ – as Vlastos has it – with which the early Greek notion of justice is 
applied to contexts that transcended its original meaning is here particularly evident. 277 
Both fragments in question unmistakably apply the language of dikê to spheres of 
meaning well beyond the most immediate legal connotations of the term. Borrowing the 
poetic and legalistic language of dikê, Anaximander and Solon seem here to have turned 
dikê into some ‘law of measure’ imposing restrictions in nature not to be overstepped.  
  
                                                
276 ‘and out of those things whence is the coming-to-be of existing things, into these things again 
their destruction takes place according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to each 
other for their injustice according to the assessment of time.’ For this translation, here provided 
for the sake of clarity, I borrowed Kirk’s felicitous ‘coming-to-be’ for génesij (K.R.S. 2007: 
108). 
277 ‘The early Greek notion of justice lends itself with seductive ease to applications far beyond 
the bounds of politics and morals’, Vlastos 1947: 156. 
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The metaphors introduced by the two fragments stand to each other in a relationship of 
inversion. Whereas Anaximander forged through the notion of dikê a complex metaphor 
to account for the phenomenon of physical change in the natural world, Solon borrowed 
a naturalistic image in order to apply it to a political situation.278 In this much debated 
distich, the sea is said to be the most ‘just’ of all other elements when it is undisturbed 
by the winds, in that, when calm, it is not itself a source of disruption for anything else. 
The trope of the sea-storm as an allegory for socio-political turmoil had antecedents 
(Alcae. 208; Archil. 105) and finds perhaps an important point of comparison with 
another Solonian fragment: 9W2. Here, the force of snow and hail coming from a single 
cloud (æk nefélhj) is compared to the power of the tyrant (i.e. mónarcoj, ‘the single 
man in power’). As pointed out by Noussia-Fantuzzi, the use of the preposition æk in 
12W.2 (æx ;anémwn) for provenance instead of the more commonly used øpó for the 
agent points to a parallel between the two fragments.279  
 
The parallel would then suggest the equivalence between æx ;anémwn and  ;andrÏn d’ 
æk megálwn on the one hand, and between qálassa and the pólij on the other. As 
convincingly argued by Mülke qálassa is a best understood as a comparandum for 
pólij (9. 3) rather than the subsequent dÖmoj (9. 4) because the implication of the 
comparison are less likely to offend the class to which Solon belonged.280 In fact calling 
‘juster’ the masses when not disturbed by the arrogance of the nobles would have 
created a disparity of judgment higlhy insulting for the aristocratic class. If however the 
sea corresponds, as I think it does, more generally to the pólij in its entirety, its state 
of calmness can be understood as the harmonious socio-political equilibrium deriving 
from a righteous administration – Noussia-Fantuzzi compares it to the flourishing peace 
deriving from díkaj [...] êqeíaj in Op. 225-9.281 
 
What is interesting about these verses is that, even as a political metaphor, they betray a 
way of thinking about nature already charged with a notion of balance and reciprocity. 
                                                
278  Even though Plutarch cites the verses after the inadequate introduction: æn dè toîj 
fusikoîj :aploûj æsti lían kaì ;arcaîoj. Cf. Gerber 1999: 127. That the image is meant to 
be taken as a political metaphor has been convincingly argued by Gentili 1975: 159-62. 
279 2010: 319. 
280 2002: 228. Cf. Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 320. 
281 2010: 320. 
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The calmness of the sea stands out as a paradigm of justice and the suggestion that its 
tumultuous state should be conceived as a reaction against exterior disturbance conveys 
the idea of an element endowed with a self-spontaneous energy ready to work for the 
restoration of its ‘natural state’. Such a notion of an intrinsically harmonious universe, 
self regulated by a cosmic law of nature, is probably one of the most distinctive features 
of archaic philosophical speculations. Indeed, they provided Solon with the conceptual 
basis for deeming ‘just’ the state of a natural element – perhaps – it is hard to say – they 
would have even provided Solon with a metaphorical model against which to measure 
his own political ideas. Next I shall examine the development of the notion of cosmic 
justice and its specific application in the thought of three Presocratic philosophers: 
Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides. 
 
In that which has been defined as ‘the oldest and most controversial text in pre-Socratic 
philosophy’ (quoted above),282 Anaximander conveys a crucial point of his cosmology 
and he does so through what is a noticeably magniloquent phrasing, a stylistic feature 
which did not fail to catch Theophrastus’ attention who judged the sentence as being 
expressed ‘in rather poetical terms’ (poihtikwtéroij o!utwj ;onómasin a÷tà légwn). 
Indeed, as shown by Kahn, all expressions such as katà tò creÍn, didónai díkhn 
kaì tísin and táxij toû crónou, can be found in archaic poetry and seem to have 
represented a stirring contrast with the otherwise plain prose style of the philosopher.283 
 
While the extent of the fragment has been generally agreed on,284 its ultimate meaning 
is still the object of high controversy. This should be no surprise considering the nature 
of this sentence effectively captured by Barnes’ three adjectives: ‘short, dark, and 
attractive’.285 It is therefore worth stating at the outset of this section that the scarcity of 
the material precludes the very possibility of finding a definitive answer about how 
‘Anaximander meant’ his account to be taken. Instead, I focus on the importance of this 
                                                
282 Vlastos 1947: 168. 
283 1960: 168-78, although Kahn also argues that the expression didónai díkhn can only be 
found with the acceptation of ‘rendering judgments’ rather than ‘pay penalty’.  
284 For the most detailed analysis see Kahn 1960: 166-183; for a comparative table of the 
sources see K.R.S. 2007: 106-8, for a further discussion of the extent see p. 118, which 
summarizes Kirk 1955: 22-38. 
285 Barnes 2002: 28. 
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fragment for the development of the notion of cosmic justice: how it borrowed the 
language of dikê to forge a complex metaphor and how the power of such a metaphor 
may have to a certain extent shaped subsequent ways of thinking about the cosmos. 
 
The legalistic ‘origin’ of Anaximander’s phrasing has been thoroughly studied by Sassi, 
who after having examined a series of juridical texts reached the conclusion that B1’s 
formulation is based on a series of borrowings from legislative texts.286 This inference 
may seem at first to contradict what Theophrastus himself thought of Anaximander’s 
expression when he described it as ‘rather poetical’. In support of Sassi’s procedure I 
want to recall Most’s explanation of Theophrastus’s aesthetic judgment:  
 
So too, Anaximander’s and Anaximenes’ fondness for using striking and 
unexpected comparisons and similes in order to explain various natural phenomena 
is a philosophical adaptation of a love for explanatory analogies whose origin is 
probably to be found in the celebrated epic similes, so frequent in Homer, which 
explain what the audience does not know by a vividly worked out comparison to 
what it does know.287 
 
The poeticism of the fragment lies in its conforming to a preceding epic tradition of bold 
similes and analogies rather than in its specific lexicon.  
 
The legalistic comparison which Anaximander worked out in B1 is indeed particularly 
vivid in that each of its elements — except tísin didónai — can be perceived as 
retaining a technical colouring. 288 Whereas the verbs tínein and tínesqai and their 
compounds ;apotínein and ;apotínesqai are very frequent, 289 the abstract tísij –  
which can be found in various Homeric passages with the slightly vaguer connotation of 
‘punishment’ and ‘vengeance’ – is more appropriate for elevated literary contexts and 
marks a stylistic shift from the original juridical model. The poeticism of tísij connects 
the legalistic expression to the preceding katà tò creÍn, which ‘retained a marked 
                                                
286 2006: 3-26. For more on Greek law and the Presocratics cf. Gagarin 1986; 2002. 
287 2006: 351. 
288 ‘Now the words díkh and tísij are both known to old epic language, but neither appears 
there with the verb didónai in the sense required here’, Kahn 1960: 169.  Cf. Sassi 2006b: 10-2. 
289 In particular they often recur to indicate the due payment in retribution for a given offence, 
see Sassi 2006b: 11-2 for a list of examples.  
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poetical colouring’,290 and the iteration of the preposition katá establishes a link 
between the themes of existential necessity and that of the timely payment of 
retribution. However, one must turn to the philosophical content of the fragment in 
order to establish whether Anaximander thought of dikê as anything more than a 
metaphorical settlement of penalty among the elements and in particular whether he 
thought of it in its broadest sense as a universal law. 
To begin with, a note about the context: the immediately preceding words æx ὧν [...] eêj 
taûta gínesqai, although much disputed, have been generally accepted to be a rather 
faithful paraphrase of Anaximander’s original idea. Kahn, after an elaborate discussion, 
concludes that ‘Anaximander’s original word has perhaps been replaced here by the 
canonical fqorá; but the idea has scarcely been distorted’.291 If this is the case, then B1 
has the main purpose of explaining the birth (génesij) and death (fqorá) of tà 3nta 
which we can provisionally translate, following Graham, as the ‘existing objects’.292 
The explanatory nature of B1 is grammatically confirmed by the conjunction gár. 
 
The nature of tà 3nta has been difficult to define and there is still very little 
agreement concerning either the process by means of which the díkhn didónai is 
supposed to take place, or the relationship of this process of justice with other aspects of 
Anaximander’s cosmology. That tà 3nta should qualify as ‘the opposites’ is a widely 
accepted assumption.293  This assumption rests on the fact that the production of 
something that could be described as ‘opposites’ – be it contrasting masses, qualities, or 
elements – was an essential part of Anaximander’s cosmology.294 Yet, it is also 
common to most scholarly interpretation that Simplicius (and most likely Theophrastus) 
did not intend to create in this passage any sharp distinction between ‘elements’ and 
‘existing things’. In fact, it is not supposed that Anaximander had any word 
                                                
290 K.R.S. 2007: 118. 
291 Kahn 1960: 174. Cf. Kirk 1955: 33 and Barnes 2002: 32-3. 
292 2010: 67. 
293 ‘We can think of nothing but the “opposites” mentioned in our sources’, Heidel 1912: 234. 
294 Kahn dedicates an entire chapter to this topic in 1960: 119-166; cf. Algra 1999: 57; K.R.S. 
2007: 119-20, 128-30.  
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corresponding to stoiceîon, whereas it is supposed that he might have used equivalent 
words of tà 3nta such as the corresponding pánta/pánta crÔmata.295 
 
Also, scholars mostly agree that Anaximander had probably in mind, as a general 
empirical picture, meteorological phenomena such as the alternation of seasons and the 
variations which the world undergoes at each given time.296 One possible meaning of tà 
3nta (most likely a faithful paraphrase of the original) – which is that of ‘existing 
things’ and of ‘the whole of reality’ – supports this cautionary position. If then 
Anaximander was not referring to anything like ‘elements’ or ‘opposing qualities’ for 
themselves, but to ‘existing things’, he presented a picture of physical reality as a whole 
animated by movement, change and conflict.297 Moreover, if he did not conceive this 
conflict in terms of detachable contrasting qualities but in terms of phenomenal 
alterations, he may have envisaged a world in which existing things themselves were 
characterised by an intrinsic belligerent nature. Now, whether this conflict is animated 
by an immanent, inner-worldly principle, or by the intervention of an external 
metaphysical entity, remains an object of controversy.  
 
Any interpretation of Anaximander B1 needs eventually to explain its content in 
relation to the notion of the Boundless, ‘perhaps’ – as Finkelberg described it – ‘the 
most obscure notion in Greek philosophy’.298 There are three main tendencies: first, one 
that excludes any connection at all between the Boundless and the process of justice 
among existing things; second, one that conceives the Boundless as having control over 
the process of justice but that excludes that it may exercise such control through direct 
intervention; third, one that depicts the Boundless as continuously and actively involved 
                                                
295 Thus for instance Kirk 1955: 340-1 and Kahn 1960: 174-5 alike recommend caution about 
taking Anaximander’s opposites to mean exactly the abstract qualitative categories of Hot-Cold, 
Dry-Wet and so on, used by the Peripatetics (cf. Engmann 1991: 4 and McKirahan 1994). It 
could be that Anaximander referred to substances possessing contrasting qualities, but that he 
may not have formally described them as ‘opposites’. 
296 E.g. McKirahan 1994: 72. For a study of the possible influence of folk metereolgy on 
Anaximander see Shelley, with whom I disagree concerning the idea that he ‘may not have used 
a legal metaphor but […] expressed himself literally, 2000: 17. 
297 Although some, such as Classen 1977: 98 denied that Anaximander could have had a theory 
of change at all. 
298 1993: 229. 
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in the process of justice. Although very popular in the past,299 the idea that the very 
coming-into-being of tà 3nta represents itself an injustice against the Boundless, to be 
atoned by reabsorption into it, has been, to the best of my knowledge, entirely 
abandoned. This has been mainly due to the restoration of ;allÔloij in the second 
clause, which can hardly mean anything other than that tà 3nta render justice and 
reparation ‘to one another’. But what does this process entail?  
 
A rather popular suggestion is that the ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ of the second part are 
somewhat related to the ‘birth’ and ‘destruction’ of the first part. This assumption can 
be sensed as underlying Vlastos’ question ‘how can things “render justice and 
reparation to one another” in a process which destroys their very existence?’ and it has 
been spelled out by various scholars ever since.300 Although the interpretation that the 
‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ of the second clause must be, in one way or the other, related to 
the ‘birth’ and ‘destruction’ of the first clause, has found little opposition, there is still 
controversy concerning whether the birth and destruction (especially the destruction) of 
tà 3nta took place in the Boundless or in tà 3nta themselves.  
 
One view is that both that into which destruction takes place and that which perishes are 
tà 3nta. This is the view of Heidel, Kirk, Kahn, and Barnes among others, and is 
generally matched by an overall interpretation of B1 that reads it as an expression of a 
law of justice that presents nature as a self-regulating and self-sustaining system.301 
Kahn is probably the strongest advocate of the argument in favour of tà 3nta’s 
independence from the Boundless. By taking all of the elements æx ὧν, eêj taûta, 
a÷tá, and ;allÔloij, as referring to the ‘opposing principles’, he interprets the first 
clause as stating the necessary return of mortal elements back into the opposite powers 
from which they are generated and the second clause as explaining this necessity as a 
legitimate compensation for the damage done at birth.  Moreover, he excludes any 
                                                
299 Diels 1923: 69; Mondolfo 1937: 14-30. 
300 Vlastos 1947: 170. Kahn 1960: 177 claims that ‘the génesij and fqorá of the first member 
must somehow correspond to the díkh and ;adikía of the second’; Engmann 1991: 1 claims 
that ‘the preceding clause in Simplicius indicates that the process of redress is one of perishing 
or passing away’; according to McKirahan 1994: 43 ‘comings-to-be and destructions are acts of 
injustice that one thing commits against another.  
301 Heidel 1912: 233ff; Kirk 1955:32ff; Kahn 1960: 167ff; Barnes 2002: 28ff.  
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connection between B1 and the idea of the generation from and destruction into the 
Boundless, for which, he claims ‘there is no place in the text of Anaximander’s 
fragment’. 302  
 
Similarly, Kirk thinks that Theophrastus, in applying the whole sentence æx ὧν […] 
taûta gínesqai together with B1 to the birth and destruction of the previously 
mentioned ‘heavens and worlds’ from and into the Boundless, ‘mistook the proper 
application of Anaximander’s dictum’.303 In this way, Kirk excludes the idea that the 
Boundless should be thought of as interpenetrating the differentiated world and he 
suggests that it should be understood as the ultimate source of dikê between opposites. 
According to Kirk, justice is maintained by the sheer enclosing of the world by the 
Boundless, which, by this measure, would prevent the world from expounding, for ‘if 
Anaximander thought of the Boundless as divine’ (as Aristotle seems to imply in Phys. 
III 4, 203b7 with the expression tò qeîon)  ‘he automatically gave it control, without 
determining precisely how this control was to take effect’.304 
 
Kirk also specifies what kind of justice is at stake. After drawing a distinction between 
Dikê as a personification who regulates the behaviour of man to man, but also of man to 
gods, and mutual dikê as an established reciprocal relation operating among members of 
the same social group, Kirk claims that only the latter – namely mutual dikê – is the sort 
of justice that operates among Anaximander’s tà 3nta.305 In this way B1 describes ‘the 
constant interchange between opposed substances’ in which the prevalence of one 
substance at the expense of its contrary is ‘injustice’, whereas the infliction of 
punishment is that reaction leading to the wrong-doer being deprived of part of its 
original substance. This is then given to the former victim in addition to what was its 
original portion. Thus, the former victim is now itself led to a condition of surfeit 
(kóroj), committing in turn injustice against the former aggressor. Anaximander B1 
                                                
302 1960: 182-5. 
303 K.R.S. 2007: 119; Kirk 1955: 37; Cf. McDiarmid 1953:98. Both are heavily criticised by 
Finkelberg, 1993: 247. 
304 1955: 35. 
305 Even though the idea that justice and retribution must apply to more or less equal partners, 
which besides Heidel is also shared by Cherniss and Vlastos, has been defined by Kirk as an 
‘over-simplification’, 1955: 33. 
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needs then to be understood as a legalistic and anthropomorphic metaphor explaining 
both the continuity and stability of natural change. 306  
 
Contrary to the idea that tà 3nta perish into one another, Vlastos, who  – following 
Cherniss307 – thinks that æx ὧν must refer to the Boundless and that justice must occur 
by reabsorption into it, makes explicitly clear that the Boundless ‘governs the world’, 
but that it does not do so by ‘direct action’. Rather, the Boundless governs the world by 
‘encompassing’ and ‘safeguarding’ the balance between the opposites that, according to 
Vlastos, consists in the ‘original equality of the opposites with one another’. 308 
According to this interpretation, the damages that tà 3nta inflict on each other are still 
not paid to the Boundless, but accounts are settled by means of reabsorption into the 
Boundless, which is a ‘state of dynamic equilibrium’. 309 This view has been variously 
rejected.   
 
Freudenthal opposes the notion of a self-regulative and immanent natural order on the 
basis that it ‘leaves the Boundless with a remarkably undistinguished function’.310  He 
maintains that only the static equilibrium can be self-regulative, whereas dynamic 
equilibrium can only be maintained through external intervention. This must be 
preserved by the Boundless, the role of which can be reduced to the ‘minimal directive 
action’ to ‘swing the opposites to and fro’.311 Engmann instead, by arguing in favour of 
an ‘ongoing material interaction between the world and the infinite’, 312  opposes 
altogether the idea of a perishing world. In Engmann’s view, Kahn’s equation of justice 
and injustice with birth and destruction is not convincing: whereas ‘payment of justice’ 
corresponds to perishing into the infinite, the act of ‘committing injustice’ relates to the 
                                                
306 K.R.S. 2007: 119-20. 
307 Vlastos declares his affiliation in 1947: 170 n. 135. 
308 1947: 173. 
309 1947: 172.  
310 1986: 200. 
311 1982: 208. A position stating that ‘in Anaximander as well as in Aristotelian philosophy of 
nature, natural order has to be sustained and upheld by external factors’ is thoroughly opposed 
to Algra’s exposition of the beginning of Greek cosmology: ‘the Milesians indeed appear to 
have assumed that matter had an intrinsic principle of change’. In Algra’s account, the obvious 
shortcomings of this sort of spontaneous Milesian hylozoïsm are precisely what, according to 
Aristotle, led the subsequent thinker to discover ‘the moving cause’, 1999: 54. 
312 1991: 2.  
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behaviour of existing things after they have come into being out of the Boundless. 
Genesis itself is not connected to injustice, but rather injustice consists in the change of 
elements into one another. However, Engmann claims: ‘while the elements change into 
one another, they do not come from or perish into one another’, whereby she sets herself 
in strong opposition to Kahn.313  
 
Finkelberg, although critical of Engmann, whose interpretation he thinks ‘disregards – 
and is hardly compatible with ;allÔloij’314 – follows a similar line of thought in 
suggesting that whereas the chain-like rendering of justice refers to the reciprocal action 
of tà 3nta against each other, this does not necessarily imply their destruction but only 
their transformation. Thus the idea of destruction contained in the sentence preceding 
B1 must be taken as referring to the destruction of the world into the Boundless as a 
consequence of a series of penalties paid by things.315 In this interpretation, æx ὧν is 
plural because ‘it formulates the general principle that in the physikoi the arche of the 
generated things is also their teleute’, whereby Finkelberg implies that the plural 
pronoun refers to the accounts just reported.316  
 
Finally, Vernant, approaching the fragment from a different angle, pursued further the 
study of Anaximander’s cosmology by focusing on its relationship to political thought. 
According to Vernant too, ‘the great law that rules the universe is immanent in physis’, 
but this law is granted by the Boundless through its mediating function of a meson. 
Thus, by enveloping, governing and dominating all things, the apeiron is ‘sovereign in 
                                                
313 Engmann 1991: 12-21 believes that genesis and perishing should not be taken as purely 
primordial and eschatological, but rather as ongoing processes which took place when, over a 
period of time, one opposite forfeited its gains by resolving them back into the Boundless.   
314 1993: 250. 
315 Finkelberg 1993: 247-51. 
316 The inconclusive nature of this debate is reflected by the plurality of interpretations that æx 
ὧν has received. Acording to Kahn, being plural, the pronoun cannot be taken as referring to tò 
#apeiron. Cherniss and Vlastos take the plural æx ὧν as revelatory of the fact that the 
Boundless, ‘the matrix from which all things arise and to which they all return’ (Vlastos 
1947:170), is explicitly thought as a plurality, in which the opposites are thoroughly mixed in an 
homogenous blend. This is an argument in turn criticized by Kirk 1955:35, McDiarmid 
1953:141 and Gottschalk 1965: 44 n. 33 on the grounds of the collective sense that the neuter 
plural can have in Greek. Engmann, on her part, thinks that ‘it is indifferent whether the singular 
or the plural is selected’, 1991: 8-9; given the broader context of the quotation in which the 
main focus is the Boundless, she thinks that æx ὧν should be taken as referring to it as well. 
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the manner of a common law that imposes the same dikê on each individual’. In other 
words, according to Vernant, the immanent balance of the forces and the 
interchangeability of position on which Anaximander’s universe is founded, are made 
possible by the role he assigned to the Boundless: that of mediator among different 
elements.317 
 
The second part of the B1 is also controversial. Interestingly, just as each interpretation 
of the role played by the Boundless in the process of justice described in B1 bears 
differently on the way we read the first words of the report (æx ὧν), likewise they have a 
different impact on the way we interpret the last words of the fragment. The sentence 
katà tÕn toû crónou táxin lends itself to two valid interpretations. On a mere 
grammatical level the genitive toû crónou could be read as either a subjective 
genitive, and thus the sentence may be translated ‘according to the assessment of Time’ 
(in which Time would act, in a personified way, as the judge imposing his order), or as 
an objective genitive, thus meaning the equivalent of the English ‘in due time’.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the first view is generally defended by those who have argued in favour 
of a break of sense between B1 and the preceding summary by Simplicius, namely, by 
those who have argued against a direct involvement of the Boundless in the process of 
justice among the tà 3nta and in favour of the notion of a self-regulative and 
immanent natural order.318 Indeed, by deriving the subject from the genitive, these 
scholars can supply some sort of agent by whom the system would be regulated: ‘What 
kind of assessment does Time make? […] Time must presumably control the time-limit 
for payment’.319 Both Kirk and Jaeger320 have cited in support of their argument the 
striking parallel of a fragment of Solon: 
 
ægÎ dè tÏn mèn o0neka xunÔgagon 
dÖmon, tí toútwn prìn tuceîn æpausámhn> 
summarturoíh taût’ $$an æn dík+ crónou 
                                                
317 Vernant 2006b. Cf. McKirahan, who presents Anaximander as the ‘first uniformitarian’, 
1994: 41-47. 
318 Jaeger 1947: 35-6; Kahn, 1960: 167; 183-196; Kirk 1955: 34 and then in K.R.S. 2007: 120-1. 
319 K.R.S. 2007: 120. 
320 Jaeger 1947: 35; 207. 
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mÔthr megísth daimónwn ’Olumpíwn 
#arista, GÖ mélaina, tÖj ægÍ pote 
8rouj ;aneîlon pollacØ pephgótaj< 
prósqen dè douleúousa, nûn æleuqéra. (36. 1-7) 
                                                                     
In this carefully constructed fragment,321 in which, according to Vlastos, Solon uses the 
image of the land enslaved by ward-stones to refer to the subjection of the peasants 
oppressed by agricultural debts,322 black Earth is envisaged as a potential witness in the 
court of time. The ‘verdict of time’ has probably here the double significance of the  
‘lapse of time’ in which Earth has become free,323 and the ‘inevitability of punishment’, 
often stressed elsewhere by Solon.324  
 
Curiously, even with regard to Solon 36W2, scholars have been divided on whether 
‘time’ should be taken as a divine personification or not.325 According to those scholars 
who argue in favour of toû crónou as a subjective genitive in Anaximander, the 
Solonian idea of ‘Time’s trial’ is similar to the Anaximandrian idea of the retribution 
that happens ‘according to the assessment of Time’.326 The inevitability of justice is 
spontaneously associated with the idea of a control exercised within a time-limit which, 
according to the poetic imaginary, is set by the personified figure of Time itself. As 
pointed out by Kirk, this could mean either one or both of these two options: ‘that Time 
on each occasion will make an assessment of the period for repayment’, and/or that 
‘Time has made a general assessment once and for all, to the effect that sooner or later 
in time the compensation must be paid’.327 
 
Against this position and in favour of an interpretation of toû crónou as an objective 
                                                
321 Cf. Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 455-85; for various structural and stylistic analyses see Blaise 
1995; but also van Groningen 1958: 137; García Novo 1979-1980: 201; Magurano 1992; 
Maharam 1993: 451-62; Fernández Delgado 1999. 
322 1946: 73.  
323 K.R.S. 2007:121. 
324 Vlastos 1946; K.R.S. 2007: 121; Kirk 1955: 36-7. 
325 For scholars who think Chronos is here a divine personification, besides Kirk and Jaeger, cf. 
Ziegler 1963: 647-53; for those who think otherwise see Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 466; Rhodes 
1993: 175 (‘when time delivers judgment’); Gagarin 1974: 192 n. 40 (in the court of time’); see 
also 1986: 72-5; Vlastos 1946: 79 (‘judgment of time’). 
326 See also Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 466.  
327 1955: 36. 
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genitive in both authors Noussia-Fantuzzi has recently written that ‘in the frame of the 
materialistic “naturalization” which dikê  undergoes in Anaximander […] and since in 
Solon dikê cannot be a personification (in light of its syntactical function), it seems 
more plausible that “time” is likewise not a divine personification’. 328  As for 
Anaximander more specifically, the interpretation of toû crónou as an objective 
genitive is generally argued by those who conceive of a direct intervention of the 
Boundless in the process of justice among existing things.329 This is only natural: for the 
interpretation of time as a personified entity would imply a redundancy of controlling 
agents. In particular, Sassi’s adherence to this second trend of arguments is supported 
by a thorough and suggestive philological investigation. Through her usual survey of 
parallels with legal texts, Sassi maintains that Anaximander’s katà tÕn toû crónou 
táxin, must certainly be interpreted as an objective genitive,330 and that ‘after all, the 
apeiron suffices  […] in his function as a warrantor of the cosmic decree’.331  
Although it is hard to determine whether Anaximander already conceived of dikê as 
something more than a metaphor and as a universal law specifically, he certainly 
stretched the metaphor a long way to explain natural processes. No doubt, his account 
of the genesis and the functioning of the cosmos differ from poetic works such as 
Hesiod’s Theogony in that it adopts a reductive and naturalistic approach.332 The basic 
explanatory factors of the universe are no longer conceived in terms of a variety of more 
or less anthropomorphic gods, and Anaximander’s conception of dikê and the 
Boundless testified for an increased level of philosophical abstraction. Hence, albeit 
very little could be established about the specificities of Anaximander’s speculations, 
we can safely look upon this thinker as ‘the earliest expression for the Greek view of the 
natural world as a cosmos organized by law’.333 
 
 
                                                
328 2010: 466. 
329 Cf. Sinnige, who claims that Anaximander's Boundless is a successor-concept to the ancient 
mythical notion of Time (Crónoj), construed as an ‘omni-potent and active Ruler, embracing 
the universe’ 1971: 4; and Freudenthal 1986: 210. 
330 2006: 14-5. 
331 Sassi 2006b: 14-6. 
332 Cf. Algra 1999: 48. 
333 Kahn 1960: 8. 
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3.3 Dikê beyond the metaphor: the notion of cosmic justice 
 
Whilst doubts may remain on whether Anaximander conceived of dikê as anything 
more than a metaphorical settlement of penalty among the elements and more 
specifically whether he regarded dikê as a cosmic power, Heraclitus unquestionably did. 
Díkh is for Heraclitus yet another way to address that universal principle which he 
claims governs the whole of reality; in his fragments, díkh stands together with lógoj 
(B1-2; B50) and qeój (B67) as a byword for the cosmic law of ‘the unity in 
opposites’.334  
 
Of the four fragments (B23; B28; B80; B94) in which the word in question actually 
features, B80 is generally interpreted as a methodical amendment of Anaximander’s 
dictum,335and will hence be considered first:  
 
eêdénai crÕ tòn pólemon æónta xunón, kaì díkhn 1rin, kaì ginómena 
pánta kat’ 1rin kaì creÍn. 
 
It is necessary to know that war is common, that justice is strife, and that all things 
happen according to strife and necessity.336 
 
This fragment is particularly poignant in that it conveys a conception of cosmic justice 
which goes well beyond that of Anaximander:  díkh is not merely conceived in its 
opposition to ;adikía as retribution for wrongdoing, but as the total sum of both penalty 
and crime; it is the cosmic all-inclusive pattern followed by change in the order of the 
world.337 This philosophical idea is expressed through a careful disposition of the key-
words and the way they are made to resonate with other fragments.338  
 
                                                
334 Cf. Ch. 2.3. For a similar idea: Gagarin 1974: 195. 
335 Kahn 1979: 207; K.R.S. 2007: 194. 
336 My translation. 
337 Cf. Vlastos 1970: 419ff, Kahn 1979: 206-7. 
338 For the importance of style in the development of Heraclitus’ philosophical discourse cf. Ch. 
2.1: esp. n. 178; 180. 
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The powerful identification of ‘justice’ and ‘strife’ created by the juxtaposition of díkh 
and 1rij is reinforced on a grammatical level by their interchangeable function as 
subject and predicate. The assimilation of the two notions, clearly the keynote of the 
fragment, stands out as the ‘revelation’ splitting the sentence into two halves, each of 
which repeats the same concept in inverted terms: ‘war is common’ and ‘everything 
happens according to strife’. In the latter clause the idea of the centrality of conflict is 
restated, but the perspective adopted in the former clause is reversed; whereas emphasis 
is first placed on the commonality of conflict, the focus is subsequently shifted towards 
the idea that everything happens according to conflicting patterns. 
 
Each of these three segments resonates with various other fragments, thereby acquiring 
and slowly unfolding a broader significance. Both notions of pólemoj and that which is 
xunój echo with a series of fragments such as B53 in which Heraclitus says that war is 
father and king of all (pólemoj pántwn mèn patÔr æsti, pántwn dè basileúj) and 
B2, B113, B114, in which he insists on the importance of relying on that which is 
common.339 In the same way, the phrase ginómena pánta kat’ 1rin at the end of the 
fragment is probably a deliberate allusion to ginómenwn gàr pántwn katà tòn 
lógon in the Proem (B1). These echoes serve the purpose of placing B80 within the 
philosopher’s broader discourse. Most prominently, the notion of warfare and conflict 
emerge, through this web of intratextual references, as intimately connected with the 
two fundamental notions of ‘unity in opposites’ and the ‘common logos’.340 Moreover, 
as perceptively pointed out by Kahn, the word ginómena can also mean ‘come into 
being’ and might be interpreted here as introducing a connection between the notion of 
strife and that of birth. This lurking suggestion is then made explicit in the B53 where 
pólemoj is called the father of all.341 
 
In short, the assimilation of dikê with strife is announced in the context of a fragment in 
which strife itself is in turn indirectly associated with logos and the unity of opposites: 
the common principle of Heraclitus’ universe. Thereby, in what may be an explicit 
rebuke to Anaximander’s notion of dikê as righteous penalty, Heraclitus depicts 
                                                
339 Cf. Ch. 2.1. 
340 ‘Warfare has become a figure for opposition in general’, Kahn 1979: 206. 
341 1979: 207. 
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‘justice’ as a universal principle followed by the whole of reality, a principle of strife 
and conflicting antitheses (ginómena pánta kat’1rin), to which paternity of 
everything is attributed (pólemoj pántwn mèn patÔr æsti). While developing this 
philosophical notion in his own original way, Heraclitus was possibly playing with the 
etymology of díkh, most likely connected with the verb deíknumi and the Sanskrit root 
for ‘indication’ and ‘direction’.342 Hence, Dikê represents here the ‘right direction’ 
followed by things in their conflicting nature and becomes an expression of what Lloyd 
defined a ‘self-regulating cosmological relationship, i.e. an idea of cosmological 
order’.343 
 
A similar conception of ‘justice’ may be implied in another fragment, in which 
Heraclitus arguably claims dikê to be knowable only through an appreciation of 
conflict: 
 
Díkhj 3noma o÷k $$an #+desan eê taûta mÕ %hn (B23) 
 
Were these things not, of dikê the name they would not know. 344  
 
The main difficulty of interpretation with B23 is represented by the pronoun taûta. 
There have been three main suggestions concerning what ‘these things’ may be: ‘laws’, 
‘wrongdoing or injustice’, and ‘the opposites’.345 As for the first hypothesis, it must be 
admitted that the suggestion of ‘laws’ has a certain appeal. The idea of nómoi is of 
course prominent in B114, in which it is used as a term of comparison for ‘that which is 
common’ (i.e. the logos) and where it is described as the human counterpart to the 
‘divine law’ (qeîoj nómoj). What is more, the possible legal overtone of the term dikê 
understood as ‘legal retribution’ may also point in this direction.  
 
                                                
342 Beeks 2010: 335. Chantraine 1968: 284; Palmer 1950: 149ff; Kirk 1954: 127. Jaeger rejects 
the attempt to derive díkh  from dikeîn (‘to throw’) in  Jaeger 1967 (1939): 442 n. 16. 
343 Lloyd 1966: 213. 
344 My translation. 
345 See Marcovich 2001: 229 for a concise summary of positions and Kirk 1954: 124ff. for their 
full discussion. 
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However, although nómoi may well be the meaning assigned to the pronoun by Clement 
in the context of his quotation, I am not persuaded that ‘laws’ would have been the 
referent of taûta in the Heraclitean original. The presence of the key concept díkh 
suggests in fact that taûta must refer to something even more fundamental than ‘laws’ 
in Heraclitus’ thought. The two suggestions of Diels and Kranz in DK, t;antía and 
t\dika respectively, meet this requirement, although an emendation of the text is 
probably unnecessary.346 As emerges clearly from B80, dikê in Heraclitus does not have 
any moral meaning (i.e. it is not the same thing as dikaiosúnh) but is rather a byword 
for ‘the cosmic pattern followed by change in the order of the world’. Whilst it is 
impossible to establish whether to assign dikê in B23 to the same cosmic scale, I think 
its notion must retain the same connection with the idea of conflict. Therefore the 
understanding of taûta as referring to something like t\dika is in my opinion the 
most balanced option. To begin with, that the word to which the pronoun refers was 
really something like tà ;adikÔmata or t\dika can be inferred, as Marcovich points 
out, from the testimony of Chrysippus.347 Moreover, whereas Diels’ t;antía, by linking 
dikê to the notion of ‘conflicting opposites’ gives indeed a very abstract reading of B23, 
Kranz’s t\dika allows the fragment to retain a wider gamut of significance.  
 
Within the legal metaphor t\dika can be understood as acts of injustice and 
infringement of the law,348 with díkh as their consequent punishment. At the same time, 
t\dika may also be understood as ‘acts of injustice’ among existing things in general 
and díkh as the principle of balance which governs them. In keeping with B80, B23 
would thus be claiming that díkh can be known only insofar as there is strife. Two 
additional points in favour of reading something like t\dika as the referent of the 
pronoun are that in this way B23 would represent another example of the fundamental 
connexion of apparently opposite things349 and, what is more, it would restate the 
importance of such opposition in language. This is shown by the word 3noma. On a 
cognitive level, the concept of díkh could not exist without its linguistic opposite. In 
                                                
346 See Kirk 1954: 125; 129. 
347 Marcovich 2001: 229. 
348 Kahn in 1979: 185. 
349 Cf. Kirk 1954: 129. 
 102 
this sense B23 could be interpreted as stating on an epistemological level (dikê can be 
known only in the light of strife) what B80 states on an ontological level (dikê is strife). 
 
In relation to Anaximander’s worldview and dikê as a key notion within it, Heraclitus 
seems hence to have developed quite a different picture. Dikê is no longer a legalistic 
metaphor to describe the re-establishment of order among elements cyclically at war 
with each other, but it is the very ontological principle at the heart of a universe shaped 
by constant change and conflict. Like lógoj, qeój, and pólemoj, díkh is yet another 
name (3noma, B23) by means of which Heraclitus calls that essential cosmic force 
which governs reality through antitheses and oppositions. However, besides these major 
elements of divergence from the Anaximandrian conception, some elements of 
continuity can also be found. In the last fragment we shall examine, Heraclitus plays 
with a notion of justice much more in keeping with that developed by his predecessor: 
 
…Hlioj o÷c øperbÔsetai métra< eê dè mÔ, ŒErinúej min Díkhj æpíkouroi 
æxeurÔsousin. (B94) 
 
The sun will not overstep his measures. Otherwise, the Erinyes, vicars of Justice, 
will find him out. 
 
Just as Solon in his political metaphor uses the imagery of a calm sea which is ‘justest’ 
when not stirred by the winds, Heraclitus describes the sun’s abiding by his natural 
measures as an imposition of Justice. Following Jaeger, one could say that ‘here Dikê 
serves as an embodiment of the inviolable order of nature’.350 As an expression of ‘the 
way things are’, Dikê guarantees ‘normality’, i.e., the regular course of events. 
Moreover, the choice of mentioning the Erinyes adds a strong poetic colouring to the 
fragment. Their presence carries unmistakable connotations: as primitive forces of 
vengeance against transgressions they may be taken in the context of this fragment as 
the personified equivalent of the philosophical notion of katà tò creÍn featuring in 
both Anaximander B1 and Heraclitus B80.351 To quote Jaeger once more: ‘the Erinyes 
                                                
350 1947: 116. 
351  The last word of Heraclitus’ B80, creÍmena, is corrupt. Most editors (with a few 
exceptions, e.g. Kahn 1979) print Diels’ creÍn. Philological considerations aside, it seems safe 
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avenge every violation of what we should call the natural laws of life’,352 and, through 
association with them, the notion of ‘justice’ gains in this fragment the specific 
connotation of ‘what prevents things from transgressing their natural measure or given 
allotment’. In this sense, just as the Erinyes’ function often overlaps or is 
interchangeable with that of the Moirai, we could say that díkh acquires here a meaning 
that is comparable to that of moîra: i.e. the given allotment of things.353 
 
3.4 Dikê, necessity, and the opposites in Parmenides’ poem 
 
 In Parmenides’ poem about truth, Being, and mortal opinions, Dikê plays indeed a 
cosmic role, but her familiar universal function is exploited within the space of 
innovative thought. An important role is assigned to her in each of the three parts into 
which the poem is traditionally divided: not only does she feature in the Proem, where 
the most dense stock of allusions to the traditional corpus of poetic phraseology and 
religious imagery is concentrated, but she also plays an important role in the two 
remaining sections. Dikê’s traditional role is bent to aid Parmenides’ abstract logic and 
metaphysical arguments in the central philosophical part of the poem, and she is 
bestowed an important role in the final section dedicated to cosmological speculations. 
Closely associated with the idea of compulsion, allotment, and necessity, dikê is above 
all in this poem an important divine power; so much so that Aëtius would have 
subsequently identified her with the creator of the cosmos in the following manner: 
 
Parmenídhj kaì Dhmókritoj pánta kat’ ;anágkhn< tÕn a÷tÕn dè eônai 
eëmarménhn kaí díkhn kaì prónoian kaì kosmopoión. (A32DK) 
 
Parmenides and Democritus [held that] all things are by necessity and that fate, 
justice, providence and the creator of the cosmos are the same.354 
 
                                                                                                                                          
to assume that the fragment expressed in one way or another the notion of ‘necessary ordinance’ 
presently under discussion.  
352 1947: 229, n. 31. 
353 In Aeschylus in particular personified Moira ‘is closely tied to retribution’, Raeburn and 
Thomas 2011: xxxviii.  
354 Coxon 2009: 146. Given the difficulty of this text, translations (by Coxon unless otherwise 
stated) are provided.  
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While treating with due caution the Stocising terminology of the last part of this 
testimonial, there is no reason not to read Aëtius’ words as a revealing testimony of the 
prominence of certain themes in Parmenides’ poem. The idea that everything is kat’ 
;anágkhn, just as in Anaximander and Heraclitus important processes were described as 
happening katà tò creÍn,  seems very much in keeping with the commonly shared 
philosophical impression of a cosmos  organised around an intrinsic necessity. Likewise, 
the assimilation (tÕn a÷tÔn) of eëmarménh (‘the received portion’ from the verb 
meíromai from which derives also moîra) with díkh is equally telling and points out 
what was indeed a prominent feature of Parmenides’ poem. As will shortly be shown, 
díkh pervasively operates in the world of Parmenides as an inviolable force of 
compulsion.  
 
Of the three overt mentions of the word (1.14; 1.28; 8.14), the first one is to be found 
early in the Proem: 
1nqa púlai nuktój te kaì #hmatój eêsi keleúqwn, 
kaí sfaj øpérquron ;amfìj 1cei kaì láinoj o÷dój, 
a÷taì d’ aêqériai plÖntai megáloisi qurétroij< 
tÏn dè Díkh355 polúpoinoj 1cei klhîdaj ;amoiboúj  
                                                  (B1.11-14) 
 
There stand the gates between the journeys of night and day, enclosed at top and 
bottom by a lintel and threshold of stone, and themselves fitting closely to a 
great architrave in the aether. The keys, which allow to open first one gate then 
the other, retributive Justice holds.356 
 
In the much-debated prologue to his poem, Parmenides tells the story of a journey. 
Although the overall significance of this journey as well as some specific points of 
interpretation remain controversial,357 the principal purpose of these lines seems to me 
                                                
355 Díkh Coxon. 
356 The capitalization of ‘Justice’ is mine. 
357  Some of the main points of dispute are whether the journey should be taken as an 
epistemological allegory or a mystical experience (for a review positions on this topic cf. Palmer 
2009: 52ff), whether it should be taken a an upwards or downwards journey (cf. Pellikaan-Engel 
1974: 104-9 and Owens 1979: 25, n.1, 11, 12.), and what the precise meaning of the symbolism 
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undisputedly clear: with his Proem Parmenides lays claim to knowledge of a truth 
unattainable to those unwilling to diverge from the ordinary route of mortals.358 In his 
capacity of a ‘knowing man’ (eêdóta fÏta, 1.3), and with the aid of immortal 
charioteers, Parmenides is led to travel a road which indeed ‘lies far from the steps of 
humans’ (;ap’ ;anqrÍpwn æktòj pátou æstín, 1. 27); escorted in a chariot drawn by 
swift mares, he journeys towards the gates of Night and Day. Beyond these impressive 
barriers, Parmenides is awaited by an anonymous goddess who will instruct him on the 
two subjects of truth and human opinions.359 Dikê makes her first appearance in the 
poem as the gatekeeper of these doors. 
Parmenides’ poetic qualities have often been deplored,360 yet this passage is nonetheless 
skilfully constructed: the painstaking description of the púlai allows for a pause in the 
narrative and emphasizes the awesomeness of the hindrance they represent, 361 whereas 
the depiction of Dikê as the key-holder is all contained in a single forceful verse: 
tÏn dè Díkh polúpoinoj 1cei klhîdaj ;amoiboúj (1. 14) 
 ‘Of those’ – and now the previous description is elegantly compressed in a single 
pronoun – ‘much-avenging Justice holds the keys of interchange’.362 Why is Dikê the 
gatekeeper of the doors of Night and Day? The passage must be placed in the context of 
the tradition with which Parmenides skilfully interacts.  
The Homeric and Hesiodic passages which form the background to Parmenides’ Proem 
have been easily identified. Many scholars have studied the significant elements of 
intertextuality and other parallels between the Proem and its hexametric models, while 
                                                                                                                                          
of light and dark is (cf. Vlastos 1993: 159 and Bowra 1937: 102 for two different takes on this 
issue). For a variety of interpretations: Cornford 1939: 30; Schwabl 1963; Deichgräber 1958; 
Mansfeld 1964; Reinhardt 1966; Burkert 1969; Fränkel 1970 (1930); 1973; Furley 1973; 
Pellikaan-Engel 1974; Owens 1979; Feyerabend 1984; Gallop 1984; Sassi 1988; Conche 1996; 
Kingsley 1999; Steele 2002; Slaveva-Griffin 2003; Miller 2006, Sedley 2006: 113; Mourelatos 
2008: 16-25; Coxon 2009: 269ff; Palmer 2009; 2012. 
358 Cf. Most 2006: 354; K.R.S. 2007: 244; Graham 2010: 235.  
359 On the identity of the goddess there have been a number of different suggestions: cf. review 
in Palmer 2009: 58, n. 27.  
360 Cf. K.R.S. 2007: 241. 
361 For more about ancient doors and locks, cf. Diels 2003; Coxon 2009: 277. 
362 My translation. 
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others have focused on the Proem’s echo in subsequent philosophical works.363 As 
pointed out by Coxon,364 in one of the passages that inspired Parmenides’ description of 
the gateway, the Iliad’s description of the gates of Tartarus (5. 749-51; 8.393-5),365 the 
doors of heaven are controlled by the Horae, one of whom according to Hesiod (Theog. 
901-2) was Dikê. For the purpose of this analysis, it should also be underscored how 
Hesiod has made Dikê sister to the Moirai (Theog. 904). Parmenides appropriates this 
mythical genealogical connection in important ways and invests it in his poem with a 
deep philosophical significance. Most importantly, however, through his overt allusions 
to Hesiod’s depiction of the underworld (Theog. 740-57),366 in which Night and Day are 
depicted as strictly alternating, Parmenides appears to be seeking to establish a 
connection with the mythological imaginary of alternating opposites. The Hesiodic 
passage, with its specific mythopoeic force, ‘makes all the more remarkable the keen 
sense of the logic of opposites that it expresses’.367 By employing the similar imaginary 
of the gates of Night and Day, Parmenides seems indeed to anticipate in archetypical 
poetic terms what he subsequently expresses in logico-metaphysical terms as the 
mutually exclusive ways of inquiry of Being and Not-Being (2B), and in cosmological 
terms as the indissoluble combination of light and darkness (9B). 368 
Whereas the imagery of the gates resonates most prominently with the Hesiodic 
passage, the characterization of Dikê resonates with the philosophical notion of cosmic 
justice explored previously in this chapter. Emphatically compressed in a single verse at 
the end of the gates passage, the carefully arranged description of Dikê involves two 
striking choices of vocabulary: first, she is characterised as much-avenging (díkh 
polúpoinoj); second she is said to hold the keys of interchange (;amoiboúj). The term 
;amoiboúj recalls of course Hesiod’s ;ameibómenai (Theog. 749), but the notion of 
                                                
363 Morrison 1955: 59-60; Dolin 1962; Schwabl 1963; Burkert 1969: 8-13; Furley 1973: 3-4; 
Pellikaan-Engel 1974: Tulli 2000; Miller 2006: 7-9; Coxon 2009: 9ff; Palmer 2009: 54-61. 
364 2009: 9ff; 277. 
365 But see also Theog. 740-57. 
366 Hesiod structures his descriptions through anaphoric 1nqa (729; 734; 736; 758, 767, 775, 
807) which Parmenides clearly picks up in 1. 11. 
367 Miller 2006: 8. My present analysis is greatly indebted to his shrewd contribution, although I 
disagree that Anaximander’s ‘justice’ should be understood in the light of a  ‘moral necessity 
that governs the cosmos’, 2006: 9. 
368 Cf. Lesher: ‘Since Night and Day are subsequently identified as the basis for all distinctions 
drawn by mortals (8.53-9; 9.1-4), this feature of the Proem appears to anticipate Parmenides’ 
account of “what is” as a single undifferentiated unity’, 2006: 237. 
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interchange, used by Hesiod to describe the alternating actions of Day and Night as they 
‘exchange places’, is here applied to the description of the keys held by Dikê. Thereby, 
Justice is here depicted as that entity which presides over the fundamental succession of 
Day and Night and the mutual exclusiveness of the opposites they embody. She is no 
longer simply one of the Horae who keeps guard over the doors: she alone administers 
the very interchange itself. 
The adjective polúpoinoj – a very Aeschylean type of adjective indeed – 369 also 
reinforces the association with Anaximander and Heraclitus. With its legal undertone 
and its emphasis on the idea of requital  – a rather isolated idea that has per se no further 
resonance in the Proem – Parmenides diverges from the Hesiodic model in important 
ways. The theme of a peaceful ‘greeting’ and the sharing of an abode is replaced in 
Parmenides with the theme of crime and punishment. The characterization of Dikê as 
‘much-avenging’ underlines the harshness of a justice involved in the interplay of 
opposites. Thus polúpoinoj fits together with the concept of ;amoiboúj to evoke the 
notion of a universal dikê involved by strict necessity in the cyclical patterns of cosmic 
alterations and fundamental oppositions.  
Without lingering on the status of and problematic relationship between the different 
parts of Parmenides’ poem,370 it must be observed how this portion of the Proem is 
clearly echoed at various points of the ‘cosmological’ section (8.50ff). 371  The 
fundamental complementarity and interplay between day and night, light and darkness, 
is deeply rooted in the structure of third part of the poem and represents a constant 
                                                
369 Although Aeschylus does not use this compound specifically, adjectives ending with – 
poinoj are characteristic of Aeschylus, cf. Coxon 2009: 277. 
370 On the epistemological status of Parmenides’ cosmogony, three main trends of interpretation 
can be discerned: the theory is not Parmenides’ but a systemised composite of contemporary 
accounts; the doxa presents mortal opinions as they might be at best and it has therefore a 
certain degree of plausibility or even accuracy; Parmenides is supplying a completely false 
cosmology. I personally lean towards the second type of explanation (cf. Lesher 2006: 241 for 
the useful distinction between ‘true trust’ and ‘likelihood’ and an interpretation of Parmenides’ 
theory of knowledge as a ‘pioneering attempt to distinguish a priori from empirical 
knowledge’), and together I believe that the first and third type of interpretation ‘can now be 
recognized as responses to a […] problem that arises only due to basic misunderstanding of 
Parmenides metaphysics’, Palmer 2009: 163. For a variety of interpretations: Cornford 1933: 
97-111; Chalmers 1960: 5-22; Owen 1970 (1960): 84-102; Long 1963: 90-107; Guthrie 1965: 
52; Tarrant 1983: 74ff; Cherubin 2005: 1-23; Lesher 2006: 240ff; Sedley 2006: 123ff; K.R.S. 
2007: 254ff; Mourelatos 2008: 194-221; Palmer 2009: 106-136; 159-175. 
371 Lesher 2006: 237. 
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thread in its embroidery.372 Not only does it keep recurring in a variety of forms at 
various junctures of the Goddess’ narrative (8.56-9; 9; 12.1-2; 14),373 but it carries with 
it the same wider network of associations: it is linked with the idea of complementary 
opposites (;antía, 8.55; in particular: sun/moon 10.2-4; female/male 12. 5; 18), dikê, 
and necessity.   
Regarding the ideas of dikê and necessity, fragments 10 and 12 can be singled out for 
special attention. In terms of subject matter, both fragments deal with the structure of 
the universe (the diákosmoj promised by the Goddess at 8.60): its layout of heavens, 
orbits, and rings. Also, in both fragments features a cosmic divine-like entity: in one 
necessity, who led and chained (#agous’ æpédhsen ;anágkh, 10.6) heaven to control the 
stars; in the other a female divinity who, from her privileged central position, is said to 
governs all things  (æn dè més_ toútwn daímwn, !h pánta kubern^=, 12. 3). Now, 
whether this goddess should be identified with Dikê in the Proem, as Aëtius firmly 
maintained (A37DK), or with a personification of aether,374it is clear in any case that by 
characterizing her as a goddess who pánta kubern^= Parmenides intends to place his 
daímwn firmly within the Ionian tradition of supreme cosmic principles. As recalled in 
the previous chapter, both Anaximander and Heraclitus used the same verb to convey 
the idea of an all-controlling principle (Heraclitus: kunernâtai 375  pánta dià 
pántwn, B41; Anaximander: periécein !apanta kaì pánta kubernân, A15+B3).376 
While linking his daímwn back to the Ionian tradition, Parmenides sensibly alters the 
nautical metaphor so as to meet the requirements of his cosmology: if in Anaximander 
the action of steering is paired with that of enfolding (periécein) and in Heraclitus with 
that of movement,377 in Parmenides 12.3 the goddess is said to exercise her all-
governing influence from a central static position: æn dè més_ toútwn daímwn. 
Situated in ‘the middle’ of a complex of rings of fire and night, she is the source of birth 
and union between the male and female (12.4-6). From within the heart of a complex 
                                                
372 So Lesher speaks of a ‘combined light-night based cosmology’, 2006: 240. 
373 For ‘[…] all things described in the cosmology are supposed somehow to consist of these 
two principles, light and night’, Palmer 2009: 170. 
374 Coxon 2009: 371 
375 For this textual choice cf. Ch. 2.4: n. 233. 
376 Cf. Ch. 2.4. 
377 For an interpretation of the preposition diá in a locative sense see Ch. 2.4. 
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cosmic structure, which depends on the varying mixture of basic opposites, the daímwn 
is the cause of union between opposite sexes. Life is hence presented as the instantiation 
of that very principle of interplay of opposites which characterise the nature (fúsij, 10. 
1) of the whole universe and the importance of which the Goddess stresses at the outset 
of her cosmological account (8.54-5).378 
Given the similar subject matter of fragment 10 and 12 – the origin of celestial objects 
and the structure of the cosmos  – it is only natural to perceive a strong association 
between the two divine entities therein referred to: ;anágkh and the daímwn.379 What is 
more, Parmenides’ choice of light and night as cosmological principles suggests a link 
between this part of the poem and the Proem, where díkh polúpoinoj stands guard 
over the gates of Day and Night. It should hence be no surprise if Aëtius understood 
these divine figures to somewhat overlap in function: 
tÏn dè summigÏn tÕn mesaitáthn :apásaj º te kaì º páshj kinÔsewj kaì 
genésewj øpárcein, 7ntina (335, 15) kaì daímona kubernÖtin kaì 
kl+doûcon æponomázei díkhn te kaì ;anágkhn. (Dox. 335, 10-16) 
The one at the centre is the cause of motion and generation of all the [rings] that 
contain mixtures. This is what (335, 15) he gives the names  “goddess”, “she who 
steers”, “keeper of the keys”, “justice”, and “necessity”. 
Whereas it is hard to establish once and for all whether this is also how Parmenides 
intended the relation among these figures to be, Aëtius’ testimony captures nonetheless 
something of great interest:380 Parmenides conceives of a deity who, situated in the 
middle of the universe, appears to be the cause of cosmogonic mixture,381 and whose 
portrayal seems to overlap to a certain degree with that of divine retribution and 
necessity.382 This complex system of associations, by means of which the Eleatic poet 
joins together notions of order, punishment, and compulsion, generates the picture of a 
                                                
378 ‘The diákosmoj which mortals posit is a dualism of reified contraries’, Mourelatos 2008: 
221; on the concept of fúsij in Parmenides see also Ibid.: 62-3. 
379 For more speculation on the relation between the daimon and Necessity cf. Tarrant 1983: 73. 
380  For an interesting attempt to reconcile Aëtius’ report with Parmenides’ fragments cf. 
Finkelberg 1986: 303-17. 
381 K.R.S. 2007: 259. Mourelatos speaks of a ‘cosmic efficient cause’, 2008: 26. 
382 Mourelatos goes as far as to speak of a ‘polymorph deity’ and suggests that we are dealing 
with different ‘hypostases of one and the same deity’, 2008: 26. 
 110 
strictly organised universe. This manifold principle of universal order, we may as well 
regard as Parmenides’ version of cosmic dikê. 
The function exploited by dikê at a cosmic level reflects her role at an epistemological 
and ontological level. This can be observed from the two remaining overt mentions of 
the word (1.28; 8.14): 
%w koûr’ ;aqanát+si sunÔoroj Óniócoisin 
!ippoij q’, a!i se férousin, ëkánwn Óméteron dÏ 
caîr’, æpeì o5 tí se moîra kakÕ pro#upempe néesqai 
tÔnd’ ñdón, %h gàr ;ap’ ;anqrÍpwn æktòj pátou æstín, 
;allà qémij te díkh te< (1.25-8) 
 
Welcome, O youth, arriving at our dwelling as consort of immortal charioteers 
and mares which carry you; no ill fate sent you forth to travel on this way, which 
is far removed indeed from the step of men, but right and justice. 
 
                        toû e!ineken o5te genésqai 
o5te #ollusqai ;anÖke díkh calásasa péd+sin 
;all’ 1cei, Ó dè krísij perì toútwn æn t^_d’ æstin, 
1stin $h o÷k 1stin. (8. 13-16) 
 
Therefore justice did not loosen it in her fetters and move it either to come to be 
or to be perishing but holds it fast, and the decision regarding these things 
depends on that of the issue, is or is not. 
 
In her greeting of Parmenides, the Goddess is careful to specify that indeed no ill moîra 
sent him to learn her lesson, but right and justice. The association between justice and 
fate (a specific form of compulsion) lurks here in the words of the Goddess who 
chooses in her speech moîra kakÔ as an antonym for the duo qémij/díkh. The choice 
of vocabulary is remarkably strong, considering that Parmenides is there for learning 
purposes. Indeed, the language of compulsion recurs throughout the Goddesses’ 
discourse who, as a point of fact, continues her speech by emphasising its importance 
thus: creÎ dé se pánta puqésqai, ‘you must be informed of everything’ (1.28). The 
language of necessity is echoed in the context of the Goddess’ enunciation of the logical 
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requirements involved in the understanding of Being and Not-Being: in her description 
of the second way that ‘is not and that it must needs not be’ (Ìj o÷k 1stin te kaì Ìj 
creÍn æsti mÕ eônai, 2.5), in her argument in favour of the necessity to ‘assert and 
think that Being is’ (crÕ tò légein te noeîn t’ æòn 1mmenai, 6.1). Finally, in her 
argument that Being is ungenerated and imperishable (second fragment quoted above), 
the idea of restraint and compulsion is evoked through the imagery of fetters. Most 
significantly, in what has been appropriately defined as an ‘extended judicial 
metaphor’,383 she who ‘did not loosen’ Being ‘and move it either to come into being or 
perish’ is díkh. Legal language is also extended to another of Being’s signposts, namely 
that of completeness, in which the Goddess says that ‘it is not lawful’, qémij, (the term 
paired with díkh in the Proem) ‘that Being should be incomplete’ (o0neken o÷k 
;ateleúthton to æòn qémij eônai, 8.32). 
Díkh is thus embedded in the language of compulsion: just as Necessity is said to have 
led and chained (#agous’ æpédhsen ;anágkh, 10.6) the heavens in the cosmological 
section of the poem, díkh is said not to have loosened her fetters (o5te #ollusqai 
;anÖke díkh calásasa péd+sin) around Being.384 Justice holds fast Being ( ;all’ 
1cei, 8. 14-16) as Necessity holds the heavens; justice and necessity are involved in the 
goddess’ true account on Being (8. 16-17), as they are also in her ‘deceptively 
plausible’385 representation of the cosmos. 
Parmenides’ poem – a milestone in the development of Greek philosophy – plays an 
important role in the consolidation of the notion of a universe governed by an intrinsic 
law of nature. He too, in his own poetical terms, conceived of ‘cosmic justice’. He 
shares Anaximander and Heraclitus’ conviction that the whole of reality can be 
explained in terms of basic principles and that such principles are as inexorable as they 
might be unapparent.386 Whereas Anaximander described the process of perishing and 
coming-to-be of the elements in terms of a cosmic reciprocity he called dikê, and 
Heraclitus described conflict itself as dikê, Parmenides developed further the poetic 
                                                
383 Coxon 2009: 320. 
384 Cf. Mourelatos 2008: 26. For an extensive documentation of the close association between 
;anágkh and bonds and fetters cf. Schreckenberg 1964. 
385 K.R.S. 2007: 254. 
386 leûsse d’ 8mwj ;apeónta nó_ pareónta bebaíwj, ‘Gaze on even absent things with 
your mind as present and do so steadily’. 4.1 
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notion of Dikê (in Hesiod one of the Horae) as the gatekeeper of the gates of 
interchange between Day and Night. 
Yet her role extends beyond the limits of her divine personification. Just as in 
Anaximander and Heraclitus, dikê in Parmenides is embedded in a complex web of 
associations: in particular it is closely linked with the notions of necessity and 
fundamental oppositions. Recurring with its intricate entourage of poetic imagery in 
each of the three parts of the poem, dikê in Parmenides lies at the core of an 
interconnected system: she is a logical compulsion for rational thinking, a metaphysical 
constraint by which Being is kept unmoving, and a cosmological entity operating as a 
restriction on nature and presiding over births and unions. As such her nature is 
multifaceted: it is simultaneously epistemological,387 ontological and cosmological.  
The Presocratics broadened the semantic scope of dikê beyond that of a ‘legal 
metaphor’. As a cornerstone of archaic Greek philosophical thought, dikê rests 
fundamentally upon the relation between conflict and harmony among the opposites, 
time, and necessity. By the time Aeschylus inherits it, dikê has no straightforward 
meaning, and in its broadest sense has come to signify the inner structure of the cosmos.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
387 For more on the role of light and darkness in Parmenides’ theory of knowledge see Vlastos 
1993: 153-63; and Lesher 2006: 239. 
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PART 2 
 
The Role of Zeus and Dikê in the Oresteia: between a Metaphysics of 
Harmony and a Metaphysics of Conflict 
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CHAPTER 4 
  
Zeus Whoever He Is 
 
4.1 Zeus and Justice in the parodos of the Oresteia 
 
The remainder of this thesis concentrates on the intertwining questions of Zeus and 
divine justice in the Oresteia, questions whose problematic nature is underlined from 
the very beginning of the trilogy. In the heart of the first play’s parodos, with a 
description which bears a hypnotic visual force, the Chorus of Argive Elders describe 
the sacrifice of Iphigenia. Or, to be more precise, they describe the events leading up to 
it (109-38): the decision-making process, both rational and emotional, that Agamemnon 
has to undergo in order to bring himself to become ‘the sacrificer of his daughter’ (184-
227); and the sequence of actions and gestures by means of which the sacrificial victim 
is prepared (228-47). The slaughtering itself we are left to imagine on our own: we are 
not allowed to see it through the eyes of the Chorus’ memory, nor are we allowed to 
hear it as a direct statement of fact in the Chorus’ words, their song recoiling in 
revulsion (248).  
 
This is the second break in the narrative of the parodos; the Chorus had already 
interrupted the sequence of their story with the so called ‘Hymn to Zeus’ (160-83), 
which takes place after the disquieting interpretation given by Calchas of the omen with 
its implications of ‘another sacrifice’ (150). Iphigenia’s sacrifice itself, a troubling 
memory in the Argive Elders’ heart, is an event they recall with pain (165-66; 179-80). 
It is a vision shrouded in reticence. Yet what they express in the limited space of these 
two pauses, in which the narrative is suspended and the Chorus turn their thoughts away 
from the sacrifice in search of some form of comfort,388 are a series of theological ideas 
                                                
388 I follow here the majority of editors (I read pou as enclitic as opposed to poû interrogative 
and accept Turnebus’ bíaioj for biaíwj at 182). However, the Chorus’ attitude in this passage 
is much disputed (see Int. II.1: n. 50). On this specific issue see Pope 1974, (criticised by 
Conacher 1976 and Winnington-Ingram 1983: 158) and Cohen 1986: 133-4 who emphasises the 
immorality and injustice of a law that punishes the innocent as well as the guilty. A clearer 
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of the most powerful kind: ideas which not only bear on the interpretation of the 
immediate context, but which cast their light on the trilogy as a whole. Indeed, in both 
instances the first word the Elders utter is key to what they say immediately afterwards 
as well as being, separately or in their association, among the most studied subjects of 
the Oresteia: Zeúj and Díkh (160; 250). 
 
A closer reading of the text reveals the tight bond between the figure of Zeus and the 
notion of justice. Let us begin by recalling the words of the ‘Hymn’: 
 
Zeùj 8stij pot’ æstín, eê tód’ a÷- 
t^_ fílon keklhmén_, 
toûtó nin prosennépw< 
o÷k 1cw proseikásai 
pánt’ æpistaqmÍmenoj 
plÕn Diój, eê tò mátan ;apò frontídoj \cqoj 
crÕ baleîn æthtúmwj. 
 
[...] 
ZÖna dé tij profrónwj æpiníkia klázwn 
teúxetai frenÏn tò pân, 
 
tòn froneîn brotoùj :odÍ- 
santa, tòn “páqei máqoj” 
qénta kuríwj 1cein. 
stázei d’ ;anq’ 0pnou prò kardíaj 
mnhsipÔmwn pónoj< kaì par’ !a- 
kontaj %hlqe swfroneîn. 
daimónwn dé pou cárij bíaioj 
sélma semnòn Óménwn. (160-83) 
 
                                                                                                                                          
picture of where I stand on this and others issues relating to the ‘Hymn’ will emerge from the 
present chapter. 
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One of the most controversial aspects of these three much debated strophes lies in their 
relevance to the dramatic context. 389  The ‘Hymn’ is of course a self-contained 
composition: it has a tripartite structure and follows an internal dramatic movement 
which produces a sense of completeness. Yet the ‘Hymn’ remains a constituent part of 
the parodos, despite its veneer of ‘monumental gnÍmh’.390 Embedded in the Elders’ 
narrative of the events before the war, its significance ought to be assessed with 
reference to what the Greeks experience while gathered at Aulis. Hence, when the 
collective mouth of the Chorus gives voice to various utterances of ‘anxiety’, 
‘suffering’, and ‘remembered pain’ (\cqoj; páqei; mnhsipÔmwn pónoj) these refer 
first and foremost to those experiences and the Elders’ response to them.391  
 
Both in metre and content the ‘Hymn’ is construed as an abrupt intermission. While the 
parodos is dominated from 192 by syncopated iambics, the metre associated with the 
leitmotif of retaliatory justice,392 as soon as their thought turns to Zeus the Chorus 
switch to solemn trochees. Trochees, it has been shown, especially in the form of 
lecythia, recur throughout the trilogy at those junctures in which the Chorus seek ‘an 
ultimate significance’ ‘behind the events’ that are ‘being realized in the drama’.393 The 
metrical relationship between the ‘Hymn’ and the parodos suggests therefore that in 
                                                
389 There is a considerable scholarly baggage loaded on this question. See Bollack 1981: 201-48 
for a useful clearinghouse of opinions. See Smith 1980 and Schenker 1994 for examples of 
important contributions with which I cannot fully agree. 
390 Fraenkel 1962: 114 n. 2. 
391 This point is controversial, for the Elders do not define the exact source of their disquiet. In 
general I agree with those who believe that the Elders’ anxiety refer to their own feelings 
(Raeburn and Thomas, 2011: 85; Schenker 1994: 5; Smith 1980: 16 Paley 1879 ad loc. Gagarin 
1976: 140, and Hammond 1965: 45). This view is opposed by Fraenkel 1962: ad 165: ‘the 
content of thought would be too slight and the limitation to the Chorus too narrow for the 
requirements of a passage carrying such religious weight’. Contrary to this position, I agree with 
Knox in believing that even if the Aeschylean Choruses can be profitably treated as ‘the 
unwitting medium of a superior knowledge’ even the most evocative utterance retains always an 
‘immediate dramatic relevance’, 1979: 28. With regard to \cqoj it has been suggested that the 
Elders’ anxiety may be connected to their concern with the expedition (Gagarin 1976: 139-50), 
the memory of the sacrifice (Raeburn and Thomas, 2011: 85; Neitzel 1978: 408-9; Smith 1980: 
16) the punishment that awaits Agamemnon in the future (Denniston and Page 1957 ad loc.). I 
follow Schenker 1994: 5 in believing that no explanation should be chosen at the exclusion of 
the others. With regard to the páqei máqoj I do not agree with the view (Schenker 1994: 6; 
Smith 1980: 21-7) that holds Paris and the Trojans as the main referent of the dictum. 
392 Cf. Int. II.2. 
393 Raeburn and Thomas, 2011: 252. For the use of gnomai as a response to anxiety in the 
choruses of the Agamemnon see also Schenker 1994: 3; 1991: 69-71 and Sienkewicz 1980: 133-
42. 
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160-83 the Elders look for a divine meaning behind the horror they witnessed. How to 
make sense of Iphigenia’s slaughter? What justice is a justice that entails this amount of 
suffering? To a certain extent the whole parodos could be understood as a dramatic 
meditation on divine justice.  
 
The question is sombre and leads the Elders straight into the middle of a reflection on 
the very nature of Zeus himself (160). Their religious attitude can be described as both 
tentative and reverent: the nature of the supreme god is mysterious and nothing 
compares to Zeus except Zeus himself, yet the Elders feel that he still remains the one to 
address ‘if one is truly to cast away the vain burden of anxiety’ (165-6). Perhaps only in 
the third stanza, as elegantly put by Raeburn and Thomas: ‘the Chorus explains the 
theology underpinning its turn to Zeus’.394 Zeus is the source of ‘good sense’ and of the 
law ‘learning through suffering’ (176-8). 
 
Although in citing the dictum páqei máqoj the Elders probably have in mind a series 
of specific applications – the páqoj of Iphigenia, that of the Greeks during the war, and 
that of all the others characters who suffer in the trilogy – the word brotoí (176) makes 
it plain that the principle is laid down with a universal application. Indeed, at the end of 
Eumenides the words of the placated Erinyes suggest that some form of lesson has been 
drawn from suffering: unity in friendship and unanimity in enmity (koinofileî 
dianoí= Ã kaì stugeîn miÙ frení) is the cure given to mortals (æn brotoîj \koj, 
985-7) against the horror of intrafamilial retaliation. Eventually, the Athenians ‘seated 
close to the virgin daughter of Zeus’ (998-9) can be greeted as having learnt to be ‘wise 
in due time’ (1000). 
 
However, here in the ‘Hymn’ the gods are still regarded as the dispensers of a wisdom 
that entails suffering and that is foisted on mortals even against the recipient’s will: 
par’ \kontaj %hlqe swfroneîn (180-1). This is an idea that Socrates’ moral 
intellectualism would have certainly abhorred and that one is inclined to understand 
here as the primary referent of the subsequent cárij bíaioj (182). Indeed, the ‘grace’ 
of swfroneîn comes as a ‘violence’ if those on whom it is bestowed are ‘unwilling’, 
                                                
394 Raeburn and Thomas, 2011: 87. 
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and this way the tension inherent in the oxymoron cárij bíaioj can be seen as 
reinforcing and completing the preceding line.395 In fact, the whole strophe (176-83) 
expresses a complex paradox: the divine cárij of máqoj and swfroneîn is 
counterbalanced by the dark elements of páqoj, pónoj (180) and divine bía.  
 
Most poignantly, the same tension is picked up at the end of the parodos. When after 
their description of the sacrifice the Elders feel the urge to turn again to the divine 
sphere, the words they utter sound like an echo of their earlier meditation. The Chorus 
revert to the theme of páqei máqoj but its function is now strikingly ascribed to 
justice: 
 
Díka dè toîj mèn paqoûsin maqeîn æpirrépei< (250) 
 
The intratextuality between the two passages has a double effect: while restating the 
link between the figure of Zeus and that of Justice, it also underscores a dramatic shift 
from initial tentative hope to utter hopelessness that any good will follow at all. For 
indeed, upon looking at what the Chorus say when they refuse to carry on with their 
account of Iphigenia’s sacrifice, one must always bear in mind the emotional context of 
their words: words uttered in place of a horror which the Elders, with their ‘childlike 
strength’ and ‘immature marrow’ (74-8), struggle to articulate.  
 
Besides the evident verbal echo of the páqei máqoj, another element reinforces the 
connection between Justice and Zeus: the scales-imagery. This image, introduced by the 
verb æpirrépein and reemployed later in the trilogy again in conjunction with Justice 
(:ropà Díkaj, Cho. 61), securely links the latter with Zeus, who in several Homeric 
passages exercise his power through scales. Most famously, Zeus uses a golden scale 
(crúseia tálanta) of life and death in the Iliad to measure the destiny of mortals 
                                                
395 Hence, Smith’s interpretation (who follows Page ad. loc.) according to which cárij bíaioj 
is taken to refer only to Paris and Troy (1980: 27) is untenable. By divorcing the theme of 
cárij bíaioj from the preceding páqei máqoj (72), Smith’s interpretation leads to a very 
abrupt disruption of the natural progression of the Chorus’ thoughts. I am more inclined to 
follow Sommerstein 2008; 30 and Raeburn and Thomas 2011: 94 and read the whole passage as 
presumably referring to both the Trojans and the Greeks (Agamemnon in particular). Since the 
ode is close to its end it seems more plausible that the focus should widen so as to enclose most 
of the themes touched on rather than restricts.  
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(8.69-72; 22.209-19), but the idea is also repeated less vividly in several other passages 
of the poem (16.658; 19.224). Moreover, Zeus and the scales-imagery are associated in 
the Hom. Hymn Herm. (322-4) and twice again in other plays of Aeschylus: first at 
Pers. 345-6, in which a less specific ‘god’ (daímwn tij) is said ‘to have tipped the 
scales with unequal weight of fortune’ (tálanta brísaj o÷k êsorróp_ túc+)396 
and then at Suppl. 402-5, in which Zeus is called çterorrepÔj (403, ‘he who makes 
the scale lean now on one side now on another’, i.e. ‘impartial’).397 
 
However, Aeschylus exploits the Homeric tradition to engender dramatic tension. After 
their beseeching appeal to Zeus, the Chorus’ song reverts to wishful thinking about the 
future: 
 
tò méllon d’ æpei génoit’ 
$an klúoij< prò cairétw< 
#ison dè t^_ prosténein< (251-3) 
 
This change in attitude is underlined by the accumulation of optatives and the alarming 
equivalence that the Elders establish between prò caírein and prosténein. This 
antithesis introduces a disquieting note in the Chorus’ assessment of divine justice. 
Díkh will indeed ensure that for those who suffer now there will be learning but to greet 
the future in advance corresponds, in the light of this justice, to lamenting it in 
advance.398 After all, what good outcome can the sacrifice of an innocent victim 
produce?  
 
                                                
396 Commentators are not agreed on either the nature of the daímwn or on what he had 
weighted. See Broadhead 1960 and Garvie 2009 ad loc. 
397 Cf. Johansen and Whittle 1980: 320. Ironically, the scales-imagery and the verb  :répein 
(1393) recur even within the framework of a poetic contest in Ar. Frogs 1382ff, in which the 
reluctant Dionysus (1368-9), prompted by Aeschylus (1365), uses the scales to express his 
‘measurement’ of the poetic value of the latter’s and Euripides’ verses. More on Zeus’ scales in 
Aeschylus can be found in Seaford 2010: 184-6 and 2013: 21-2. 
398 This interpretation matches Fraenkel 1962: 142; Conacher 1987: 15; and Raeburn and 
Thomas 2011: 95 but others approaches have been attempted: Page, for instance, waters down 
the antithesis by reading prò cairétw with its meaning ‘beforehand, dismiss it from your 
thoughts’, in Denniston and Page 1960: 92). I think the two verbs stand rather in a relation of 
antithesis.  
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These final lines of the parodos have a retrospective effect; several preceding passages 
of the ode reverberate under their revealing light. The paradox of a prò caírein that is 
simultaneously a prosténein recalls the cárij bíaioj of the ‘Hymn to Zeus’: that 
‘violent grace’ by means of which the Chorus defined there the intervention of gods in 
human affairs. If the sentence Díka dè toîj mèn paqoûsin maqeîn æpirrépei, as 
Fraenkel wrote, ‘impresses on us once again the fundamental theme of the Hymn to 
Zeus’, the idea of a future that is to be greeted (prò caírein) as well as lamented 
(prosténein) also impresses on us another fundamental notion, namely, the paradoxical 
nature of the norm páqei máqoj. By the end of the parodos, one is eventually left with 
the ultimate impression that the tension inherent in the Chorus’ conception of divine 
justice remains unresolved.  
 
This system of stark antitheses, of conflicting gnomic utterances, and disturbing 
consequences, is the framework within which the human and the divine sphere intersect 
in this trilogy. The paradoxical essence contained in the notions of páqei máqoj, cárij 
bíaioj, and in the idea of a simultaneously desirable and lamentable future, conveys 
the tension inherent in the Elders’ attempt to make sense of divine will in the face of the 
sacrifice. This tension, which in the ‘Hymn to Zeus’ becomes simply tauter, is 
nonetheless expressed during the whole parodos through the refrain a#ilinon a#ilinon  
eêpé, tó d’ e%u nikátw (121; 138; 159). ‘Thus the uncommon attitude of the hymn is 
rooted in the peculiar conditions of this chorus-song as a whole’.399 Moreover, the 
theme of cárij bíaioj introduces what could be regarded as a leitmotif of the play: 
when the Coryphaeus comments on Clytemnestra’s news about the sack of Troy with 
his cárij gàr o÷k \timoj e#irgastai pónwn (354), or when the Herald says that 
cárij timÔsetai | Diòj tód’ ækpráxasa (581), the ‘Hymn to Zeus’ will inevitably 
echo in their words. 
 
The parodos of the Agamemnon is, no doubt, a powerfully poetic beginning for a 
drama, but it is also a powerfully philosophical beginning. As expressed by Kitto, ‘it 
lays down, as firmly as can be, the intellectual foundation of the whole trilogy’,400 and 
                                                
399 Fraenkel 1962: 113. 
400 1961: 65 
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as Peradotto says ‘just how important this passage is can be assessed in some measure 
by the fact that in most cases a critic’s interpretation […] turns out to be a capsule-
version of his total view of Aeschylean moral and religious thought’.401 Indeed, the 
question it sets, with the Elders’ ambiguous meditation on divine nature in connection 
to the sacrifice of Iphigenia, has a long intellectual history reaching far into the heart of 
continental philosophy and modern literature. The parable of the Grand Inquisitor told 
by Ivan to Alyosha in Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov may be a sufficient reminder 
of the legacy of the kind of dilemma set here by Aeschylus.  
 
Neither entirely devoid of hope nor exclusively emboldened by faith, the Elders face the 
dilemma of evil posited by the death of an innocent victim with a tentative religious 
attitude. Via the juxtaposition of the ‘Hymn to Zeus’ – a coherent composition which is 
lucid and powerful in structure – and the Elders’ account of the events at Aulis – a 
narrative that is dense, detailed and moving – Aeschylus sets a series of problems the 
remainder of the trilogy will develop.402 Among those are indeed present the issues of 
justice and the nature of the divine, as well as the question of human understanding of 
these problems and of their own place in relation to them.  This is how the Oresteia 
begins.  
 
4.2 The role of Zeus in the Oresteia: a brief note on the history of 
interpretation 
 
The elusive nature of Zeus and his confusing role in the Oresteia have engendered 
lively debates. Generation after generation of scholars have recognised and attempted to 
account for what appears to be a bifurcation in Aeschylus’ conception of the supreme 
god. Indeed, a strong polarization between his benevolent and his tyrannical features 
runs through the whole Aeschylean corpus as well as being encapsulated in the 
development of the Oresteia. Compressed within short and incisive expressions such as 
                                                
401 1960: 237; Cf. Fraenkel: ‘is a corner-stone not only of this play but of the whole trilogy’, 
1962:114. 
402 Although not necessarily ‘develop a solution’, Peradotto 1969a: 237.  
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the oxymoronic cárij bíaioj, this tension is also reproduced within the larger 
framework of each individual play and the trilogy as a whole.  
 
Indeed, it is towards a Zeus of partial reassurance – the Zeus of ‘supreme remedy’ (pân 
mÖcar) addressed in the Suppliants 403 – that the Chorus of Argive Elders turn in order 
to cast away from their mind the ‘burden of anxiety’ (\cqoj, Ag. 165). Yet, later in the 
play the Chorus seem to turn to the same god in a completely different spirit: 
 
êÎ êÔ, diaì Diòj 
panaitíou panergéta< 
tí gàr brotoîj \neu Diòj teleîtai; 
tí tÏnd’ o÷ qeókrantón æstin; (Ag. 1485-8) 
 
The thought of Zeus, who was in the ‘Hymn’ the foundation for self-assurance and 
comfort, is now very much associated with ‘grievous wrath’ (barúmhnij, 1482) and 
suffering (êÎ êÎ basileû basileû,| pÏj se dakrúsw> 1489-90). If ‘nothing is 
accomplished for mortals without Zeus’ and if Zeus is the ‘Cause-of-all’, then 
Agamemnon’s death is the result of Zeus’ will too. When the Argive Elders, near the 
end of the first play, turn to Zeus imbued with terror, they cry of his divine capacity of 
force and tyranny. Indeed, the Zeus of the Agamemnon is a dispenser of violence as well 
as a dispenser of grace. 
 
The cosmos emerging from the dramatic development of the trilogy seems to provide a 
metaphysical grounding for the ambivalent utterances of human characters with regard 
to the divine sphere. In his chapter ‘Zeus and the Erinyes’, Winnington-Ingram traces 
Zeus’ ambiguous relationship with these powers of vengeance, and indeed he provides 
an eloquent and compelling account of the transformation which this relationship 
undergoes in the Oresteia. It is precisely in the relationship between the supernal and 
infernal worlds that Winnington-Ingram sees ‘the basic metaphysical problem of the 
trilogy’.404 The terms of this problem can be briefly illustrated as following: whereas the 
first two plays are characterised by a convergence of divine powers – where the Eriniyes 
                                                
403 524-6; 590-1; 594. 
404 1983: 127 n. 118. 
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are seen as the very executioners of Zeus’ will and justice (Ag. 40-62; Cho. 382-5) – 
later in Eumenides the same powers are represented as divergent (385-6) and Zeus is 
even said to be repelled by their company (365-6). 
  
However, whereas such an account represents an accurate depiction of Zeus’ dynamic 
relationship with the Erinyes, the difference in Zeus’ role between the first two plays 
and Eumenides is perhaps not as clear-cut as Winnington-Ingram’s study may lead us to 
think. Indeed, Zeus is often associated in Agamemnon and Choephori with the dark 
powers of vengeance and within several passages, as Lebeck put it, ‘prayers to the 
infernal gods alternate with appeals to Zeus’.405 Besides the Erinyes, Zeus is associated 
with other dark powers: Night (Ag. 355), Wrath (702), Moirai (Cho. 306), Earth (399), 
the Curses of the dead (406). Yet, the context of these passages is chiefly one of 
revenge and appeals to Zeus’ authority underline the characters’ wish to claim justice 
for their action as well as their wish to make such action more effective. The tone is 
certainly different when Zeus’ name is uttered for alternative reasons. Several passages 
from the Agamemnon establish a positive association of Zeus with wealth and 
abundance (503-15; 970; 1014-16), 406 Zeus is also invoked in ‘his capacity as protector 
of household possessions’407 during Clytemnestra’s speech to Cassandra (1035-8). The 
same ambivalence is also present in Eumenides, in which Zeus’ positive aspects are 
constantly invoked by Apollo and Athena (91-3; 717-8; 797, 850; 973-5) as opposed to 
the negative aspects underlined by the Erinyes: first promoter of the disrespectful and 
tyrannical behaviour of the younger gods (162; 229-30), father of a thief (149) and 
imprisoner of his own father (640-3).  
 
Hence, no doubt, there seems to be a bifurcation in Zeus’ portrayal in the Oresteia. 
Indeed, depending on the context, he may be regarded as benevolent god or as 
tyrannical ruler: in this trilogy he is both a god of light (e.g. Ag. 508-9), ‘Zeus the Most 
High’ (0yistoj Zeúj, Eum. 28) ‘father of the Olympians’ (Zeùj ŒOlumpíwn patÔr, 
618), and also a god of shadow, who can be addressed on occasion as ‘Zeus of the 
Underworld’ (toû kata cqonòj | Diój, Ag. 1386-7). Now, thanks to Golden’s and 
                                                
405 Lebeck 1971: 96. 
406 Cf. W&D 379, 483, where Zeus is associated with successful crops. 
407 Sommerstein 2008: 121. 
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Kitto’s effective protest against Lloyd-Jones’ and Page’s anti-intellectualist stance, their 
accusation of primitive anthromorphism has been put to rest. Therefore, it is over fifty 
years that the ambiguity of Aeschylus’ portrayal of Zeus in the Oresteia has been 
recognised as the product of careful dramatic design rather than inconsistency of 
thought. 408   
 
Although several theories have been developed to account for such ambiguity, it is 
possible to identify two main interpretative trends.  One the one hand the tendency to 
conceive of Zeus as being subjected to change and development,409 on the other hand 
the tendency to preserve the contradictory aspects of Zeus’ behaviour.410 Hence, if the 
‘evolutionary theory’ could be taken as an attempt to reconcile the antithetical aspects 
of the supreme god, some scholars have argued instead in favour of an irreconcilable 
bifurcation in Aeschylus’ overall conception of Zeus. Next I shall discuss these theories 
and their bearing on the text of the Oresteia. 
 
When applied to the Oresteia, the evolutionary approach relies on the two following 
assumptions: first, the Zeus of the fifth-century poets differs from an eternal and 
unchanging god by being within time, i.e. having a birth, a youth, etc.;411 second, the 
Aeschylean trilogy follows a progressive pattern along which Zeus and the Erinyes 
change their character. If before Sommerstein, the evolutionary theory had been 
attacked – most notably by Lloyd-Jones and Golden – on the grounds that its exponents 
failed to cite any convincing evidence in support of it,412 after Sommerstein, I believe, 
                                                
408 For the most compelling refutations of their view cf. Golden 1961: 20-6; Kitto 1966: 33-115, 
and Grube 1970: 43-51. 
409  Sommerstein 2010a: 202. Since Dissen 1824 (cf. Dodds 2001: 42), believers in the 
development theory have been as numerous as their opponents: adopted by Wilamowitz, 
Nilsson, Festugière and Dodds, it was rejected by Schmid, Farnell and Reinhardt (cf. Lloyd-
Jones for a summary for the early stage of this debate in 1956: 56-7). To these names should be 
added: in favour of a change in the Zeus of the Prometheus, Smyth 1969 (1924): 120-1, 
Thomson 1932, Solmsen 1949: 164, de Romilly 1958: 106 and Fitton-Brown 1959: 52-60; and 
in favour of a change in the Zeus of the Oresteia, Murray 1962 (1940): 108. While this debate 
was re-enacted by Golden 1962, Kitto 1966: 59-64 and Grube 1970 (esp: 43-51), the 
evolutionary theory finds nowadays its most representative exponent in Sommerstein 2010a: 
202 (1989: 22-3). 
410 Golden 1962: 24. 
411 Cf. Dodds in an unpublished article quoted by Lloyd-Jones 1956: 57; Sommerstein 2010a: 
202. 
412 Lloyd-Jones 1956: 57; Golden 1962: 22. 
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the situation has not improved much. The text of the Oresteia contains very little 
evidence in support of the notion of a progressive divinity. On the contrary, the 
evidence that it does contain rather contradicts the hypothesis of an evolution of Zeus 
and the Erinyes. 
 
Let us focus first on the question of the Erinyes’ transformation. That the closing part of 
Eumenides is marked by a change in attitude of the Erinyes towards the city of Athens 
and the people of Attica is of course beyond dispute. The first sign of such a change is 
represented by that verse with which they break from their raging song ( ;emè paqeîn 
táde | feû, 869-70) into calmer speech (892). During the stichomythia which follows, 
the Erinyes ask Athena three questions through which they seek clarification of the kind 
of honours she is promising to grant them if they accept the abode she offers (Eum. 
894,896,898). Their interest lies in the honour (timÔ) and the might (sqénoj) they will 
acquire and in the duration (crónoj) of this privilege. Only though the lure of reverence 
and power does Athena manage to charm away their anger (900) and indeed, once their 
attitude has changed, the goddess goes as far as to call them e5fronej (992). 
 
But a change in attitude is not the same thing as a change in role and certainly not the 
sort of ‘transformation’ on which the notion of an evolving divinity can be founded. 
Indeed, the Erinyes change their attitude towards the Olympians as the Olympians 
change their attitude towards them; they respond with threats as long as they are 
threatened, they respond with kindness as they are treated kindly. As long as Apollo 
speaks in the language of victory and defeat (721-2) they claim justice for themselves 
and threaten to unleash plague on the Athenian land (719-20; 782-7); by removing the 
prospect of dishonour (o÷k 1st’ \timoi, 824) Athena obtains in turn from the Erinyes 
reverence (892) and collaboration (916).  
 
Yet the fearful nature of the Erinyes remains unaltered and this notion is particularly 
insisted upon. When at 992 they are called ‘kindly minded’ this appellation must be 
considered from within the context of a strict promise of mutual respect, stylistically 
underlined by the polyptoton e5fronaj e5fronej. The duplication and juxtaposition 
of the same adjective to describe the disposition of both parties communicates Athena’s 
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emphasis on the importance of reciprocity: only through mutual benevolence between 
the Erinyes and the Athenian citizens may the city be kept on the ‘straight road of 
justice’ (;orqodíkaion, 994). Moreover, the profit which Athena foresees for the 
citizens of Athens comes literally ‘from these fearsome faces’ (990), their very 
appearance revealing how the Erinyes preserve their original essence.  
 
Indeed, as pointed out in Sommerstein’s commentary, the idea of deriving benefit from 
the goddesses’ fearful faces ‘is only superficially a paradox’.413 If earlier in the play, the 
terror-inspiring Erinyes sing that ‘fear sits high in the souls as its overseer’ (517-21), 
after they agree to stay in Attica as honoured benefactors, fear remains, as emphasised 
by Athena herself, indispensable for the new government (690-1). As pointed out by 
Cohen: ‘there is a new order, that is not to be denied, but its character is the 
question’.414 Undoubtedly, reverence but also fear underlies the new social order, and it 
is perhaps the Erinyes’ very participation into the new government which bestows on 
the institution of the Areopagus such an awe-inspiring function.415 Hence the text offers 
little evidence to support the idea of a progression in the Erinyes’ character. Conversely, 
even after their attitude has changed, the text contains strong signals pointing to the 
continuity of the Erinyes’ most defining feature. The social order is transformed and the 
role of the Erinyes adapts to the new order, but from this it does not necessarily follow 
that the Erinyes themselves transmute: their new identity is never announced.416  
 
With regard to Zeus, the evidence to support the evolutionary theory is even scantier. 
Sommerstein argues that Zeus’ tyrannical behaviour in both P.V. and Ag. (168-75), is 
explained by the fact that he is young. Zeus’ lesson would come with the understanding 
that the inexorable working of the law ‘he who does shall suffer’ threatens to lead to the 
destruction of a morally innocent person (Orestes) and to the royal house under the 
god’s patronage (the house of Atreus).417 Yet this is problematic for two reasons. As 
already objected by Lloyd-Jones ‘No one can deny that the Zeus of Aeschylus’s age 
                                                
413 1989: 271. 
414 1986: 139. 
415 ‘The fearful power they embody is now to be turned to the social benefit of Athens and her 
citizens, but it is not completely eradicated’, Podlecki 1989: 49. Cf. Leão 2010. 
416 Cf. Mitchell-Boyask 2009: 94. 
417 2010a: 203. 
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was within time; but one may question whether it follows from this that his character 
develop’. 418  Not once is any reference to the evolving character of Zeus made 
throughout the trilogy. Where does the text say that Zeus has learnt something? Had 
there been such transformation in the figure of Zeus, one would expect to find some 
reference to it. What is more, as already discussed earlier, the tyrannical aspects of Zeus 
are not the only aspects projected by the characters of this trilogy onto the god; on the 
contrary, they coexist with projections of divine benevolence which come closer to 
those expressed in the Suppliants. The hermeneutics behind Sommerstein’s parallel with 
Zeus’ characteristics in the Promethean trilogy is therefore in itself questionable. 
 
Sommerstein also finds a case in support of his theory in those passages in Eumenides 
which imply the notion that the gods have duties towards mortals. On the contrary, this 
represents, once again, an element of continuity with the preceding plays. Gods are 
addressed as responsible towards humans during the various characters’ invocations 
(e.g. Ag. 993-4) and in the parodos Zeus is even said to have laid down ‘for mortals’ the 
law of ‘learning through suffering’. Finally, one passage seriously invalidates 
Sommerstein’s idea that the responsibility that Zeus shows towards Orestes in the last 
play should be interpreted as a sign of evolution: 
 
                 [...], Palládoj kaì Loxíou 
6kati kaì toû pánta kraínontoj trítou 
SwtÖroj. 8j patr^_on aêdesqeìj móron 
s'_zei me                                         (758-60) 
 
The verb aêdesqeíj suggests the noteworthy implication that Zeus felt aêdÍj for the 
mortal fate of Agamemnon (patr^_on móron) and implies that already at the time of 
the events recounted in the first play of the trilogy Zeus was capable of feeling a sense 
of responsibility towards mortals. It is remarkable that in his words of gratitude toward 
the gods Orestes connects Zeus’ aêdÍj for his father’s death with his own acquittal 
(s'_zei me): a connection which shows Orestes’ retrospective projection of a sense of 
responsibility towards mortals onto the supreme god. Therefore, the theme of divine 
responsibility should not be divorced from the context in which it appears: as it can be 
                                                
418 1956: 57. 
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often found in prayers or in expressions of gratitude paid by humans to the gods, it 
should be taken to reveal, if anything, the human need to feel that their suffering may be 
of concern to the divine sphere. Certainly, never during the Oresteia do these 
expressions contain a human reading of divine behaviour as something that evolves 
during time, as the example of Orestes’ speech shows all too well. 
 
 No notion of an evolving Zeus can be found in the words uttered by the other divinities 
either. Not once do the Erinyes lament what the evolutionists interpret as a change of 
allegiance on Zeus’ part. Considering that during the first two plays they worked as 
Zeus’ agents, had they found a change in Zeus’ behaviour one would expect them to 
comment on it. In their protests against Zeus’ attitude (e.g. 365-6; 622-43) not once do 
they complain about a change in the nature of Zeus: on the contrary, they seem to attack 
what they regard to be a potentially inherent immorality in the government of the 
younger gods (727-33; 778-822). Finally, Apollo’s evoking of the Ixion episode (717-8) 
should settle this dispute for good: although Sommerstein points out the incongruity of 
the argument – indeed those who remember Ixion’s attempt at seducing Hera after 
Zeus’ purification might as well reply ‘with a disconcerting “yes”’419 to Apollo’s 
question – the passage nonetheless disproves the idea of an evolving Zeus. Apparently, 
he had precedents for granting purification to murderers: no ‘divine progression’ lies 
beneath his oracle in favour of Orestes’ discharge. 
 
Still, Sommerstein’s question ‘Is there any alternative to supposing that there has been a 
change in Zeus?’ deserves to be answered.420 Are we supposed to regard the strong 
polarization between Zeus’ luminous aspects and Zeus’ darker side as an irreconcilable 
bifurcation in the nature of the supreme god? How is it possible to reconcile the notion 
of that chthonian Zeus421 to whom Clytemnestra dedicates the third stroke inflicted on 
                                                
419 1989 ad 717-18. See also 2008: 413; 445. 
420 2010a: 202. 
421 Some scholars take it as a periphrasis for Hades (Medda 2011: 342; Raeburn and Thomas 
2011: 214; Sommerstein 2008: 169) with reference to Suppl. 156-7. Although this option cannot 
be entirely dismissed, I believe it undermines the continual association of Zeus and the Erinyes 
since the beginning of the trilogy. In addition, during the whole of the Agamemnon the noun 
!Aidhj is exclusively employed as a synonym for death (667; 1115; 1235; 1291; 1528). The only 
occurrence in which the noun is used to refer to the god Hades is in Eum. 273. Cf. West’s note 
about Zeus Chthonios in W&D (465): ‘The passage illustrates the ambivalence of Zeus Chtonios 
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Agamemnon (1386) with the notion of a Zeus of the thunderbolt to whom Athena refers 
later in the trilogy (Eum. 826-29)? In so far as the supernal world and the nether world 
were to be taken as antithetical areas of the world, the ambivalence of Zeus in the 
trilogy is, no doubt, problematic. My contention is that it would be inaccurate to assume 
that the ordinances emanating from the Olympian and the chthonic powers are 
irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. 422 Much more intriguing is the hypothesis of 
Zeus as the unity of opposites. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
perfectly: he can be conceived as an extension of Zeus, or as a chthonic counterpart of Zeus’, 
1978: 276. 
422 Cf. Winnington- Ingram 1983: 164: ‘The two world cannot be kept apart […]. Certainly 
Aeschylus could not tolerate a bifurcated Zeus or a bifurcated world’.  
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CHAPTER 5  
 
Zeus as the Ultimate Principle behind Reality 
 
Although adumbrated in the works of other scholars, 423 the interpretation of the 
Aeschylean Zeus as an impersonal and universal force embracing reality’s 
contradictions finds in Golden and Seaford its most devoted advocates. 424  The 
cornerstone of this approach consists in a criticism of the widespread assumption that 
the Aeschylean Zeus of the Oresteia should retain the same anthropomorphic 
characteristics as the Homeric god. By attempting to dismantle the anthropomorphic 
interpretation, these scholars aim to free the Aeschylean Zeus from the imputation of 
primitivism and contradictory behaviour and to argue in favour of a sophisticated and 
advanced conception of deity.425 
 
My overall interpretation of Zeus in the Oresteia can be seen as an attempt to lend 
further support to this thesis. Thus far, I have underscored some of the hermeneutic 
problems attached to the figure of Zeus in the trilogy. First, I confronted the question 
from a textual perspective: I showed how Aeschylus framed and thematized the 
problem of divine nature from the outset of the first play. Second, I reviewed some of 
the positions adopted by modern scholars on the subject. In particular, I argued against 
what I called the ‘evolutionary theory’. Next I will join the debate by discussing the 
nature of Zeus and his role in the Oresteia in the light of my earlier analysis of the 
Presocratic material.  
 
In the present section I try to show how the theological and metaphysical dimensions of 
this trilogy can be profitably studied in connection with the philosophical ideas 
                                                
423 Cf. Kitto1966: 70-1: ‘Aeschylus was contemplating our world as it is, with its problems and 
apparent contradictions, sometimes finding their solutions, sometimes not, but always in the 
faith that there is an ultimate unity which […] we might as well call Zeus’; and Rosenmeyer 
1982: 277, 279: ‘Aeschylus’ most powerful symbol for the matrix of forces within which the 
dramatic agent is placed is that of Zeus. […] Zeus is all there is, and he is therefore the norm 
against which all should be measured’. 
424 Golden 1961; Seaford 2003; 2010; 2012; 2013. 
425 Golden 1961: 165; Seaford 2010: 181ff. 
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contained in some of the fragments. These ideas will be integrated with the basic 
assumption – which I illustrated in the introduction – that the Aeschylean texts should 
be read as containing two interlocking theological discourses. I identified an explicit 
dimension, represented by those passages in which discourse about the gods becomes 
self-aware and self-reflective, and an implicit dimension, in which the context and 
dramatic development cooperate to counteract and problematize such discourse.  
Different and contrasting lights are simultaneously shed on the figure of Zeus and the 
nature of divine justice when these two dimensions are considered together. However, 
in treating them separately, I wish to show how the philosophical ideas explored above 
have different effects on different levels of the text.  
 
5.1 Epistemological prudence 
 
From the Chorus of the Agamemnon to that of Choephori, from the outbursts of 
individual human characters to the divine dispute between the Olympians and the 
Erinyes in Eumenides, the nature and role of the divine emerges as a primary concern of 
this trilogy. More often than not, the divine sphere is what characters instantaneously 
turn to in moments of distress or when in search of legitimacy. God’s nature and 
motives are always explored in conjunction with the characters’ deeply felt need for 
causal explanation or their urgency to claim justice for their actions. However, as that 
frame of reference which humans most immediately and spontaneously rely on for a 
deeper level of meaning, the divine world is mostly approached with caution, perplexity 
and, awe – in short, a questioning attitude that is as startling as it is revealing. Always 
flashing in intermittent epiphanies of significance, the divine is presented as the 
unavoidable – yet unreliable – destination for human understanding. 
 
It has been said that the Presocratics shared a common concern with language and with 
the human ability to grasp through language a deeper level of significance. Xenophanes’ 
fragments denote a deep preoccupation with ‘pious utterance’ and focus on how to 
develop a suitable discourse about the divine.  Heraclitus invests language itself with 
the ability to encapsulate and reproduce reality’s perpetual contradictions and describes 
god itself through a series of oxymora (i.e. language’s unity of opposites). Parmenides 
 132 
presents his poem as a divine revelation and, after having equated thought, language, 
and Being, presents his ways of inquiry first and foremost as linguistic and logical 
alternatives. It seems that in each of these philosophical investigations there is a point 
where, almost inevitably, epistemology and theology meet. 
 
Against the backdrop of Presocratic philosophy, it is possible to cast light on the 
epistemological aspects of theological discourse in the Oresteia. Human reflections on 
the divine contain a multidimensional concern with knowledge: a preoccupation with 
how to develop a discourse about divinity intersects with the issue of whether any 
knowledge about the divine is available to humans in the first place; the question of 
human knowledge is in turn linked to the question of the gods’ role in directing man 
towards its acquisition.  
 
As in Xenophanes’ longest fragment the philosopher sets out to reject traditional myths 
in order to be able to ‘always hold the gods in high esteem’ (QeÏn “dè” promhqeíhn 
aêèn 1cein ;agaqón, 1.24), the Elders’ preoccupation with pious utterance (ñ d’ o÷k 
e÷sebÔj, 372) in the first stasimon of the Agamemnon reflects a similar attitude.426 The 
antagonistic attitude towards the masters of the past, which Xenophanes declines in the 
form of a moral criticism and Heraclitus in the form of an intellectual criticism (i.e. lack 
of ‘insight’, B40),427 is picked up by the Aeschylean Chorus who voice it according to 
their own personal concerns. God’s commitment to justice is not to be doubted and the 
Chorus oppose their blind faith in ‘the blow struck by Zeus’ (Diòj plagán, 369) to the 
scepticism of those who say that ‘the gods did not deign to concern themselves with 
mortals’ (o÷k [...]| qeoùj brotÏn ;axioûsqai mélein, 369-70). 
 
Moreover, as shown above, Xenophanes creates, in the same fragment (1.15-6), a 
remarkable link between piety in speech and moral action. The characters of the 
Oresteia are often preoccupied with finding the right words with which to address the 
gods. Proper speech seems often the non-renounceable prerequisite for requesting 
divine intervention and the potential for righteous action. If Electra’s desire for the right 
                                                
426 Cf. Ch. 1 and Int. II respectively. See also Rösler 1970: 11, for the similarity between 
Xenophanes’ and Aeschylus’ emphasis on e÷sébeia. 
427 Cf. Ch. 2. 
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word in Cho. 87ff has already been recalled,428 many other characters express a 
similarly cautious attitude with regard to the language they use. The initial prayer of the 
watchman, who in the prologue opens his speech with an invocation to the gods (qeoùj 
mèn aêtÏ), contains an alternating pattern of hope and despair culminating in reticence. 
Initially he bids the gods to free him from fatigue and suffering (1) while fear prevents 
him from sleeping (14); subsequently the initial joy produced at the sight of the beacon 
(22) leaves room for anxieties which he dares not express in the open (36-40).429   
 
If Electra’s desire for the right word in her prayer at Agamemnon’s tomb echoes the 
Elders’ desire to please Zeus in the ‘Hymn’ (eê tód’ a÷-|t^_ fílon keklhmén_,| 
toûtó nin prosennépw, 160-2), the Elders’ preoccupation with the power of language 
to affect reality and promote divine intervention is picked up during the first stasimon. 
Their anxiety to hear ‘something shrouded in murk’ (tí moi mérimna nukthreféj, 
460), echoing the burden (\cqoj, 165) of the Hymn and the atmosphere of the 
prologue, is voiced within a context of deep preoccupation with utterance that reminds 
us of the reticence of the watchman. First the Chorus give warning against the danger of 
angry words (bareîa d’ ;astÏn fátij sùn kót_, | dhmokrántou d’ ;arâj tínei 
créoj, 456-7), then they claim that to be excessively praised is also dangerous, for it 
leads to a ‘thunderbolt being launched from the eyes of Zeus’ (bálletai gàr 3s|soij 
Dióqen keraunój, 469-70).  
 
As in Heraclitus, words are perceived as a powerful means of communication: when 
carefully chosen they are capable of affecting reality; when carefully interpreted they 
can be revelatory of deeper levels of significance. 430 So Orestes is preoccupied with 
hitting on the apt word (tí nin proseipÎn $an túcoim’ $an e÷stomÏn; Cho. 997) 
                                                
428 Ch. 1.2. Cf. Goldhill 1984a: 110. 
429 For an incisive characterization of the watchman cf. Rutherford 2012: 296-7. 
430 For striking example of this attitude cf. the second stasimon of the Agamemnon (681-781) 
where the Chorus, by connecting the name of Helen (‘Elénh) to the destructions she caused 
(çlénauj, 6landroj, çléptolij, 688-9), express their belief in the existence of a profound 
link between the etymon of Helen’s name and her destiny as a destroyer of ships, men, and 
cities. This is a powerful poetic idea: for its relevance in Heraclitus cf. Ch. 2.4. In relation to this 
Aeschylean passage see: Calogero 2012: 206; 1967: 75; Fraenkel 1962: 329; Kirk 1954: 119; 
Peradotto 1969b: 5ff.; Goldhill 1984a: 59ff.; D.S. 2001: 153; Medda 2011: 284.  For the 
importance of this subject in tragedy see also Wilamowitz 1895: 18-9, and for the importance of 
names in mythical thinking see Cassirer 1953-7, II, 40ff. 
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when describing the robe431 in which Agamemnon was killed in the eyes of Zeus (‘who 
has been watching over all these events’, ñ pánt’ æpopteúwn táde, 985), for 
choosing the right description for it (999-1000) will reveal something about the man 
who used it (1001ff.) and support Orestes in his claim for justice (987ff.) The link 
between right words and righteous actions is also underlined in Clytemnestra’s oath 
after the murder, which she swears by the three divine figures of Dikê, Atê, and Erinys 
(Ag. 1431-3). Finally, the Chorus of Slave Women open their appeal to Zeus at Cho. 
855ff. with a rather lengthy self-aware reflection on their speech: 
 
 Zeû Zeû, tí légw> póqen \rxwmai 
tád’ æpeucoménh k;apiqeázous’, 
øpò d’ e÷noíaj 
pÏj #ison eêpoûs’ ßnúswmai> 
 
Most importantly however, the voices of some characters disclose an interest in ‘right 
phrasing’ that transcends the moral sphere. In grappling with the question of the divine, 
they often express a hesitation extending well beyond a concern with the intervention of 
the gods. More often than not, the uncertainty voiced regards rather these characters’ 
ability to be able to understand, from their own limited human perspective, the very 
essence of divine nature and thought. The imagery of a famous passage from another 
Aeschylean tragedy illustrates particularly well this sentiment: 
 
e#iq’ e#ih “’k” Diòj e%u panalh- 
qÏj. Diòj !imeroj o÷k  
e÷qÔratoj ætúcqh< 
dauloì gàr prapídwn 
dáskioí te teínou- 
sin póroi katideîn \frastoi.  
                   (Suppl. 86-7; 93-95)432 
 
                                                
431 A vexed passage, cf. Garvie 1986: 326-7. Following Sommerstein’s edition I take nin to 
refer to the robe. 
432 Text as in Johansen and Whittle 1980: Vol. I 84. 
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Within the dramatic climax of the ode, (æ)k Diój —  where Diój is also emphatically 
repeated in the next colon — has the function of narrowing down the focus from the 
qeoì genétai (77) of the preceding antistrophe.433 However, as the Chorus refer to Zeus 
as their ultimate resort, they simultaneously envisage his mind as something inscrutable. 
The image evoked is that of groves and thickets which afford hiding alcoves for a beast: 
the ever-elusive desire of the god runs in the convoluted pathways of his mind like a 
prey ‘hard to catch’ (o÷k e÷qÔratoj). The choice of vocabulary is significant: the 
word !imeroj is probably chosen to convey the super-rational quality of the god’s 
motives and although much more could be said on the relationship between Zeus’ 
!imeroj434 and his prapídej,435 the evocative power of this imagery can be appreciated 
as it stands. The human desire for divine benevolence and ultimate reassurance (e#iq’ e#ih 
“’k” Diòj e%u panalhqÏj) is frustrated by the nature of divine desire itself: an 
uncatchable and irrational animal prowling in a dark maze of overgrown paths.  
 
The following antistrophe develops the image in a new direction: 
 
píptei d’ ;asfalèj o÷d’ æpì nÍ- 
twi, korufâi Diòj eê 
kranqÖi prâgma téleion< 
pántai toi flegéqei 
k;an skótwi melaínai 
xùn túcai merópessi laoîj.  
                            (91-92; 88-90) 
 
What was a divine desire (!imeroj) in the strophe finds concretization in the antistrophe 
as an accomplished fact (prâgma téleion) that ‘falls unstumbling’ (píptei d’ 
;asfaléj) and finally makes direct contact with human beings, here defined by the epic 
phrase merópessi laoîj.436 Interestingly, although both the zoological metaphor and 
the atmosphere of darkness437 are picked up from the previous strophe, their poetic force 
                                                
433 Johansen and Whittle 1980: Vol. II 81. Cf. Papadopoulou 2011: 39ff.  
434 Cf. Cho. 299, where !imeroi is used to describe Orestes’ ‘motives’, cf. Garvie 1986: 120.  
435 Johansen and Whittle 1980: Vol. II 83. 
436 merópessi brotoîsin (Il. 2.285) merópwn ;anqrÍpwn (W&D 109). 
437 Notice a possible etymological interplay between skótwi and dáskioi. 
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carries out a reversed function. While the image of an animal438 is re-evoked through the 
description of the prâgma originating from Zeus’ nod as ‘landing on its feet and not on 
its back’, a landscape of darkness, similar to that of the woodland, is re-created with the 
main purpose of bringing out the ubiquitous blaze of such a prâgma. In this way strophe 
and antistrophe share a similar atmosphere but only in order to describe two sides of the 
same coin: when human kind attempts to make sense of divine desire they are bound to 
grope in the dark of Zeus’ mind;439 when divine deed befalls a man, human secrecy is 
ineffectual and no darkness can save man from the blackness of his fortune (melaínai 
xùn túcai). 
 
The concluding references to mankind as well as to the all-pervasiveness of Zeus’ 
power are then picked up and further developed as the ode continues:  
 
êáptei d’ ælpídwn 
;af’ øyipúrgwn panÍleij brotoúj, 
bían d’ o5tin’ æxoplízei< 
pân \ponon daimónion< 
!hmenoj &on frónhmá pwj 
a÷tóqen æxépraxen 1m- 
paj çdránwn ;af’ :agnÏn. 
                              (96-103) 
 
Here, the contrast between the divine and human conditions is brought to an extreme: 
the greatness of Zeus’ power is juxtaposed to the misery of humankind, a juxtaposition 
that is marked in style as well as in content. The correspondence between the initial 
verbs píptei and êáptei underpins a transition from the more passive action of ‘falling’ 
to the more active one of ‘throwing’, and thereby the violence of god’s intervention is 
announced from the start.  Moreover, the wretchedness of humankind is finally spelled 
out (panÍleij brotoúj) together with the height of their ‘towering hopes’ (ælpídwn 
;af’ øyipúrgwn) which are in turn contrasted with the effortlessness of divine action 
(bían d’ o5tin’ æxoplízei< | pân \ponon daimónion<). The last sentence enlarges 
                                                
438 Which at 91-2 overlaps with that of a wrestler, cf. Johansen and Whittle 1980: Vol. II ad loc. 
439 Also compared to an inscrutable abyss at 1057-9. 
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the notion of the ‘unarmed’ god who equips no violence in realising his purpose while 
remaining seated. This imagery reminds us of our analysis of the ‘Hymn’: there too a 
‘violent grace’ emanates from the gods who – just like here – are evoked as they ‘sit on 
the august bench of command’ (daimónwn dé pou cárij bíaioj | sélma semnòn 
Óménwn, Ag. 182-3).440 
 
Thus Aeschylus shares with Xenophanes (B18; B34) and Heraclitus (B78; B79; B82-3; 
B86)441 the theme of the limitations of human knowledge, which cannot compare to 
divine knowledge and whose full insight into divine design is precluded. In their 
reflections surrounding the divine sphere, some Aeschylean choruses adopt the same 
sort of epistemological prudence that, in the wake of the Presocratics, develops in 
various directions throughout the fifth century. From Protagoras’ bold claim of 
agnosticism to Plato’s reverent acknowledgment of the difficulties that occur when one 
tries to understand the nature of the divine, 442 in one way or the other each of these 
authors can be seen as drawing on the Presocratics for the terms of the issue.443 For it is 
only with the rational theology of the Presocratics that the question of divine nature is 
linked with the broader question of human knowledge and its shortcomings. It is only 
through their speculation and their demythologising attitude that the non-perceptibility 
of the divine is perceived as a fundamental cognitive puzzle. Two fragments in 
particular can be recalled as special memoranda:  
 
kaì tò mèn o%un safèj o#utij ;anÕr #iden o÷dé tij #estai 
eêdÎj ;amfì qeÏn te kaì !assa légw perì pántwn< 
eê gàr kaì tà málista túcoi tetelesménon eêpÍn, 
a÷tòj 8mwj o÷k o%ide. dókoj d’æpì pâsi tétuktai. 
                                         (Xenophanes B34.1-4) 444 
                                                
440 For the striking similarities between this passage and Xenophanes’ B25 Cf. § 3. 
441 Regarding B86 cf. n. 453. 
442 perì mèn qeÏn o÷k 1cw eêdénai, o5q’ Ìj eêsìn o5q’ Ìj o÷k eêsìn o5q’ ñpoîoí tinej 
êdéan< pollà gàr tà kwlúonta eêdénai !!h t’ ;adhlóthj kaì bracùj $wn ñ bíoj toû 
;anqrÍpou (Protagoras B4). tòn mèn o%un poihtÕn kaì patéra toûde toû pantòj eøreîn 
te 1rgon kaì eørónta eêj pántaj ;adúnaton légein (Tim. 28c-29).  
443 Herodotus’ observation that until Homer’s and Hesiod’s descriptions of divine features the 
Greeks did not know who the gods were and what they looked like (Hist. 2. 53) may be read 
along the same lines. The point is that the gods cannot be directly seen.  
444 B34 was cited in Ch. 1.1 for other reasons. Often discussed in conjunction with B35, B36, 
B18, and B38, its bold epistemological claims have inspired lively debates. Cf. Sassi 2013: 
 138 
 
o÷k 1stin pelásasqai æn ;ofqalmoîsin æfiktón 
Ómetéroij $h cersì labeîn, *+pér te megísth 
peiqoûj ;anqrÍpoisin ßmaxitòj eêj fréna píptei. 
                                           (Empedocles B133) 
 
Both Xenophanes’ and Empedocles’ fragments deny the possibility of obtaining 
cognitive clarity about the gods, for they belong to that realm of things that escapes the 
direct grasp of our senses.445 Since it is impossible to bring the gods within the reach of 
our vision and touch – primary roads, according to Empedocles, of persuasion ‘entering 
the mind’ (eêj fréna) of man – no unerring belief about them can be attained. 
Particularly noteworthy is the juxtaposition – indeed one that is reemployed in reversed 
terms by many subsequent thinkers – that Xenophanes establishes between the 
clarity/certainty (tò saféj) which no man can attain through his limited experience and 
the opinion (dókoj) allotted to all. In presenting the divine sphere and the rest of reality 
as different yet complementary objects of knowledge ( ;amfì qeÏn te kaì !assa légw 
perì pántwn),446 the fragment places discourse about the gods within the restricted 
horizon of human cognitive limitations: the gods, as well as the ultimate causes of 
natural phenomena, do not reveal themselves and cannot therefore be fully grasped even 
in their téloj. For being able to talk about what is brought to pass does not equate to 
knowing its ultimate causes,447 just as in the Aeschylean ode the prâgma téleion of the 
god does not equate to knowing his original !imeroj. 
                                                                                                                                          
294ff; Graham 2010: 126-7; 132-3; K.R.S. 2007: 179-80; Barnes 2002: 138-43 and especially 
Lesher’s extensive discussion of what he identifies as six different modern trends of 
interpretation of Xenophanes’ epistemology, 1992: 149-86. For a discussion of this fragment in 
relation to Aeschylus see Rösler 1970: 19ff. 
445 On the use of #iden as a perceptual verb in Xenophanes B34 see Fränkel 1974: 123 (criticised 
by Lesher in 1992: 157); for the role of vision more in general in Xenophanes see Sassi 2013: 
295ff. Without any need to exaggerate the ‘perceptual orientation’ (Lesher 1992: 162) of the 
verbs of knowledge in the fragment, one must recognise the importance laid by Xenophanes on 
sense perception as something necessary for reliable knowledge. I am inclined to follow an 
interpretation of B34 as a claim primarily regarding the ‘natural limitations imposed on human 
knowledge by the small circle of human experience’, Lesher 1992: 166, but see also Heitsch 
1983: 174; Ioli 2003; Sassi 2009: 212. 
446 Cf. Ch. 1.1. 
447 tetelesménon eêpÍn has been variously translated as ‘saying what is true’ (Guthrie 1981), 
‘saying something that is the case’ (Barnes 2002), ‘to speak of what has been brought to pass’ 
(Lesher 1992), ‘saying the complete truth’ (K.R.S. 2007). If tetelesménon means literally 
something that has been brought to fulfilment (i.e. it is therefore undisputable), Xenophanes’ 
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It is important, however, to draw a distinction between the two notions of the 
unknowable and the hidden.448 Xenophanes’ cognitive cautiousness, which in B34 has 
led some to interpret his attitude as one of harsh scepticism,449 clearly does not prevent 
him from speculating about the nature of god as if it were indeed something knowable 
(B23-6).  Beautifully encapsulated in Heraclitus’ saying fúsij krúptesqai fileî 
(B123), 450 the idea that the ultimate constitution of things ‘loves to hide’ is probably the 
single most emphasised tenet in Presocratic epistemologies. The cryptic constitution of 
nature makes the process of knowing – as powerfully expressed in Parmenides’ 
allegorical Proem – a difficult journey. However, it is precisely with Heraclitus and 
Parmenides that the focus of philosophical interest in knowledge is overtly shifted away 
from what is available to sense perception 451 and redirected toward a theoretical 
understanding of the hidden nature of things.452  
 
Within this framework it follows that divine nature, as one of the imperceptible 
constituents of the cosmos, is approached through the same attitude and set of 
epistemological premises as reality in general: 
 
                                                                                                                                          
line of thought might be here that being able to talk about what happens does not mean having 
full knowledge about it (i.e. to know the causes behind phenomena?) 
448 Cf Broadie 2006: 213: ‘Xenophanes had spoken as if there is a plain truth about the gods, 
only mortals cannot rise to clear knowledge of it; for Heraclitus, that is because no truth is 
plain’.  
449 Kirk 1954: 231; but see also other scholars mentioned in Lesher 1992: 161. 
450 On the difficulty of determining the exact meaning of fúsij in B123 cf. Kirk 1954: 227ff. I 
follow Kirk (p. 228) in understanding fúsij in its broadest sense as ‘the way a thing is made’ 
i.e. its ‘essence’ or ‘nature’. 
451 Regarding Heraclitus, caution is needed. By ‘away from sense perception’ I do not mean that 
Heraclitus deemed the realm of the senses as utterly unreliable or useless for the acquisition of 
knowledge (cf. B55; B107), but that he insisted on the importance of recognizing the unitary 
function of the hidden lógoj. For a good evaluation of Heraclitus’ ‘rationalism’ cf. Curd 2002: 
120-4. 
452 This is where the meeting point of epistemology and theology becomes most vibrant. It is 
difficult to determine whether these thinkers applied to god the set of epistemological problems 
they encountered in their natural inquiry or, vice-versa, whether they projected onto the hidden 
nature of things their reverential attitude towards the divine. Whilst god is regarded as one of the 
fundamental hidden constituents of the cosmos, so is every hidden component of the cosmos 
perceived as divine. What really emerges from this intricate philosophical panorama is that the 
question of god’s nature is turned in this period into a central epistemological dilemma. 
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tÏn mèn qeíwn tà pollà ;apistí+ diafuggánei mÕ gignÍskesqai                                                      
(Heraclitus B86) 453 
 
æàn mÕ 1lphtai ;anélpiston o÷k æxeurÔsei, ;anexereúnhton æòn 
kaì \poron.                                            (Heraclitus B18) 
 
Just as the fúsij of things loves to hide, so :armoníh ;afanÔj is better than one 
fanerÔ  (B54), and the lógoj xunój escapes those who think as though they had a 
‘private understanding’ (êdían frónhsin, B2), so the divine sphere spurns the 
understanding of those who approach it in disbelief ( ;apistí+). Together with B18, B86 
seem to imply that with ‘confidence’ a part of what is hidden can be discovered.454 As 
various other Heraclitean fragments suggest (B67; B32; B41), God’s nature, especially 
when considered in association with the lógoj and the hidden harmony of the cosmos, 
can be at least partially apprehended.455  
 
5.2 Light in darkness: following the beacon 
 
The same landscape of light and darkness that in the Suppliants’ ode was evoked to 
describe Zeus’ mind becomes the fundamental symbolic setting of the Oresteia. The 
trilogy opens with a watchman stargazing from a roof. He has come to know – he tells 
us (Ag. 4-7) – the stars and the way time and the succession of seasons can be marked 
through them.456 However the nocturnal sky does not contain the signal he is after and 
the man keeps alert for a different type of gleam and different type of message 
(lampádoj tò xúmbolon, 8). He prays the gods for it. He prays to them for ‘a happy 
release from misery, by the appearance in the darkness of the fire that brings good 
news’ (20-1). At the end of the trilogy the people of the city are said to have learnt some 
                                                
453 Although the tÏn mèn qeíwn tà pollá are most likely Plutarch’s words (DK 1964, 
Ramnoux 1968, Marcovich 2001), like Fränkel 1975 and D.S. 2001 (see esp. p. 165) I believe 
the subject of the verb can be understood as belonging to the ‘divine sphere’ in its broadest 
sense.  
454 Kirk 1954: 231. 
455  Cf. Ch. 2.3. For the association of the four Heraclitean concepts of lógoj, fúsij, 
;anélpiston, to which I add  :armoníh ;afanÔj, cf. Marcovich 2001: 43. 
456  For a curious discussion of this passage and Aeschylus’ astronomical knowledge cf. 
Pfundstein 2003: 400ff. 
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form of lesson (996-1000) and a great procession of ‘torches devoured by fire’ (Eum. 
1041-2) leads them together with the ‘childless children of Night’ (1034) into the city. 
Like many of his near-contemporary thinkers, Aeschylus links his theological discourse 
with questions of human knowledge, its origin and drive, its potential and limitation.  
 
A powerful visual externalization of the many polarities inherent in the fabric of the 
play,457 the polarity between light and darkness – which recalls its usage in Parmenides’ 
Proem and Pindar458 – can be regarded among other things as a metaphor for knowledge 
and ignorance. Although projected on a larger scale, the extent of the chiaroscuro 
remains the same as in the Suppliants’ ode: still a general darkness only temporarily lit 
by soft luminescence. This imagery reflects the alternating attitudes of the characters of 
the plays: more pessimistic when fixated on god’s inscrutable mystery, more hopeful 
when oriented towards dim manifestations of significance. It also reflects the stark 
antithesis between early Greek poetic and philosophical attitudes towards the same 
issue. 
 
We have already encountered, in some of the passages previously analysed, several 
instances in which the point of view of certain characters is turned away from the 
specificity of their circumstances and is redirected instead towards a contemplation of 
the human condition as a whole. The characters’ repeated and despairing lack of 
understanding and control over the events at hand often prompts them to voice their 
discomfort through laments which have a universal applicability. Such are Cassandra’s 
last words before she enters the palace to face her death: 
 
êÎ bróteia prágmat’< e÷tucoûnta mèn 
ski^= tij $an préyeien< eê dè dustucØ, 
bolaîj øgrÍsswn spóggoj 4lesen grafÔn. (Ag. 1327-9) 
 
This beautiful trope, which likens human affairs to the instability of shadows and 
drawings, echoes a long poetic tradition. The most immediate association is probably 
with Pindar’s Pythian 8 in which humans are deemed as ‘ephemeral beings’ and are 
                                                
457 Cf. Ch. 10. 
458 Bowra 1937: 99ff. 
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compared to ‘the dream of a shadow’ (skiâj 3nar \nqrwpoj, 8.96).459 The key word 
æpámeroj (8.95) reoccurs in its various forms (æpÔmeroj, æfÔmeroj, æfhmérioj) in 
several poetic passages from the archaic period to connote a specific attitude towards 
the human condition. A centripetal term around which revolve highly nuanced 
reflections on humankind and its place in the universe, the Archaic Greek notion of 
human ‘ephemerality’ conveys both existential and cognitive meanings.460  
 This is particularly evident when passages such as Cassandra’s speech or Pindar’s 
Pythian 8 are read in conjunction with passages such as Odyssey 18. 130-140, Pindar’s 
Nemean 6. 3-6, or Semonides 1W2, where the term æfÔmeroj is deployed to convey the 
instability of human understanding (noûj). In each of theses instances the emphasis laid 
on human ignorance and its limited perspective springs from a comparison with the 
divine sphere since like Semonides says: ‘humans know nothing (o÷dèn eêdótej) of 
how the god will bring each thing to an end (ækteleutÔsei qeój, 4-5)’. The step 
between short life and short-sightedness is a quick one to take: humans are not 
ephemeroi simply because they are short-lived, but also because the instability of their 
existence prevents them from gaining any worthwhile insight into the future.  
This is why the theme of human ‘ephemerality’ often intersects – especially in early 
Greek elegy and iambus – with that of human ‘amechanía’: the impotence of 
humankind in the face of their destiny.461 In so far as some tragic characters speak from 
within the framework of an order which their humanity cannot comprehend, they often 
speak as the perfect embodiment of the poetic attitude just delineated. The Argive 
Elders at Ag.1530ff are a clear case in point. Whilst made to helplessly watch the divine 
scheme of Moira and Dikê unfold (1535-6), they declare their lack of mental resources 
thus: ;amhcanÏ frontídoj sterhqeìj | e÷pálamon mérimnan | 8p= trápwmai 
                                                
459 For humans’ aleatory existence in Pindar cf. Romeyer-Dherby 1999: 5-13. 
460 The meaning of the term ἐφήµερος is much debated. For two partially contrasting positions 
see Fränkel 1946 and Dickie 1976. On ἐφήµερος see also Babut 1971: 21, and Gerber 1984: 
127. These various interpretations, with their emphasis on different semantic aspects of the term 
(‘short-lived’; ‘inconsistent’; ‘variable’; etc.) are not in my opinion mutually exclusive. They 
should be rather understood as proof of the subtle polysemy of a term charged with task of 
expressing a worldview made of multiple perspectives.  
461 Sassi 2009: 200. 
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(Ag. 1530-2).462 
However, this is not the only voice we hear in the Oresteia: for this is the very same 
Chorus who earlier in the play turned to Zeus in the hope of saving their mind 
(frontídoj) from the burden of impairing anguish (\cqoj, 165). The context is 
similar: in both instances (207; 1526) the Elders are reminded of the sacrifice of 
Iphigenia and feel bewilderment in the face of divine justice. Yet their attitudes towards 
the possibility of gaining some form of understanding vary profoundly. In the parodos, 
the Elders react to the event they recall with a meditation on divine nature (160-66) and 
on Zeus’ role in directing human understanding (174-8).  
 
As a speculation on the nature of things, the inquisitive approach of early Greek 
philosophers may be regarded as the obvious counterpart to the pessimistic reflections 
of poets on human existence. Although various philosophers restate the gap between 
human and divine knowledge,463 many also lay emphasis on the human potential to 
improve on their cognitive condition and to broaden their understanding of nature 
through the correct deployment of the means they possess. So both Alcmaeon and 
Xenophanes juxtapose the human ability to conjecture, search, and form opinions 
(tekmaíresqai, Alcmaeon B1; zhtoûntej, dókoj, Xenophanes B18, B34) with divine 
sapheneia. In particular in B18, 464 Xenophanes seems to insist on some form of 
philosophical emancipation from god-imparted knowledge.  
Others, such as Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, opted – each in his own 
characteristic fashion – to present their philosophical enterprise as itself a way to narrow 
the gap between the human and divine spheres. In launching his enterprise of 
metaphysics, Parmenides depicts the Way of Truth applying a method of pure logic – 
his poem is an untraditional attempt to break free of any physical assumption which he 
chooses to present in the form of divine revelation. Within Heraclitus’ configuration of 
unity and opposites, theology becomes a way to describe the immanent harmony of 
                                                
462 For an analysis of amechanía as a formative basis for Greek tragedy and the continuing 
effect of certain aspects of the Archaic attitude on tragedy’s worldview cf. Segal 1963: 19-53. 
463 e.g. Xenophanes 23-6; Heraclitus 78; 79; 82. 
464  O5toi ;ap’ ;arcÖj pánta qeoì qnhtoîj øpédeixan, ;allà crón_ zhtoûntej 
æfeurískousin \meinon. The fragment is much debated. For a good summary and the 
interpretation I follow cf. Lesher 1992: 149-55. 
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nature, cosmology a way to overcome traditional conceptions of deity (B67). Hard to 
disentangle, the discourses about nature and about divinity converge in a single picture 
where the divine and the human are united by the grasp of a comprehensive principle. 
 
Against this complex and diverse backdrop, Aeschylus’ Oresteia stands as a powerful 
dramatic contribution to the debates of its time. Two intermingling voices resound in 
the complex fabric of the ‘epistemological theology’ of the trilogy: depending on the 
context, an initial mind-set of cognitive prudence might lead to either attitudes of utter 
scepticism or attitudes of hopeful openness. Claims of desperate epistemic pessimism – 
such as those uttered by the Elders at the end of the parodos of Agamemnon or those 
uttered by the Slave Women at the end of Choephori 465 – coexist with claims of veiled 
optimism regarding the fact that some form of knowledge may eventually be attained. 
While the former can be traced back to the traditional poetic pessimism contained in 
verses such as those of Semonides 1W2, the latter can be traced back to the Presocratics. 
It is in the synthesis of the two that Tragedy can be seen as contributing to the 
development of a discourse on god and knowledge in fundamental ways. From now on 
we shall leave darkness behind and follow the light of the beacon: we shall wholly and 
only focus on what can be gathered about Zeus in the Oresteia. 
 
5.3 Zeus cause and effector of all 
 
êÕ êÔ, diaì Diòj 
panaitíou panergéta (Ag. 1485-6) 
 
It is indeed revealing to consider the Zeus of Aeschylus in the light of the four core 
fragments of Xenophanes’ constructive theology (B23-6). 466  Not only because – 
through such comparison – he comes across as a sort of dramatic embodiment of the 
divine attributes which the philosopher confers on his god, but also because the set of 
questions raised during our analysis of the Xenophanean fragments can thereby be 
                                                
465 tò méllon d’ æpei génoit’| $an klúoij< prò cairétw< | #ison dè t^_ prosténein< (Ag. 
251-3, cf. Ch. 4.1 for a contextual analysis of this passage) poî dÖta kraneî, poî katalÔxei 
| metakoimisqèn ménoj #athj> Cho. 1075-6). 
466 Cf. Ch. 1. 3. 
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transposed to the Aeschylean texts. In this section I discuss the question of henotheism 
in Aeschylus and the tension between corporeal and non-corporeal representations of 
the supreme god.  
 
There is an undeniable emphasis on Zeus in the plays of Aeschylus. In the Persians and 
the Seven, in which there are no reflective passages regarding his nature, the references 
to Zeus are nonetheless overwhelmingly more numerous than those to the rest of the 
pantheon. 467  When other gods are called upon, no one receives the epithets of 
supremacy bestowed on Zeus (basileû, Pers. 532 #anax, 762; páter panteléj, Seven 
116; pagkratéj, 255). In the Suppliants, ‘Zeus’ is the first word of the play. As 
protector of suppliants (1; 211; 347; 641; 814) and ancestor (gennÔtwr, 206) of the 
Danaids through Io, Zeus has a prominent role in this tragedy. He is described as an 
impartial invigilator (360; 403), promoter of divine vengeance (646) all-powerful god 
(pagkratéj, 816) and absolute sovereign: 
 
#anax ;anáktwn, makárwn 
makártate kaì teléwn 
teleiótaton krátoj, #olbie Zeû (Suppl. 524-6) 
 
 Similarly, in the Oresteia, Zeus has the most disparate functions468 and receives 
epithets such as panaítioj (‘cause of all’) and panergéthj (‘all-effecting’, 1486). 
Indeed, one can say that Xenophanes’ B23 would be an apt description of Zeus as he is 
depicted in the Aeschylean corpus:  
 
e*ij qeój, 1n te qeoîsi kaì ;anqrÍpoisi mégistoj, 
o5ti démaj qnhtoîsin ñmoíioj o÷dè nóhma. 
 
But in what way would the Aeschylean Zeus be ‘not at all like mortals in body or in 
thought’? In other words, what do we know of Zeus’ mental and corporeal faculties? 
Most interestingly, in the Suppliants and the Oresteia, not only is Zeus the primary 
divine referent, but he is also the only god whose nature and purposes are openly 
                                                
467 Pers. 740, 762, 827, 915; Seven. 8, 69, 116, 485, 512, 517, 520, 630. 
468 Cf. Ch. 4.2. 
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questioned through reflective passages of some length. As shown above, the Suppliants 
contains an important ode describing his extraordinary mental powers. The similarities 
between this Aeschylean passage and Xenophanes’ B25-6 are indeed worthy of notice: 
 
bían d’ o5tin’ æxoplízei< 
pân \ponon daimónion  
!hmenoj &on frónhmá pwj 
a÷tóqen æxépraxen 1m- 
paj çdránwn ;af’ :agnÏn. (Suppl. 98-103) 
 
;all’ ;;;apáneuqe pónoio nóou frenì pánta kradaínei. (B25) 
 
aêeì d’ æn ta÷t^_ mímnei kinoúmenoj o÷dén 
o÷dè metércesqaí min æpiprépei \llote \ll+. (B26) 
 
The three fundamental points made in B25-6 echo powerfully in the stanza: the idea of 
effortlessness (pân \ponon / ;apáneuqe pónoio); the idea of immobility (!hmenoj / æn 
ta÷t^_ mímnei); and the idea of telekinetic mental power (&on frónhmá [...] æxépraxen 
/ nóou frenì pánta kradaínei).  
 
In the light of my previous discussion of Xenophanes’ fragments and the Homeric 
imagery of Zeus capable of shaking Olympus by a ‘nod of his brow’, 469 it is possible to 
see how Aeschylus seems to have embraced Xenophanes’ fundamental points of contrast 
with the tradition. Just like in Xenophanes, in Aeschylus too the sheer intellectuality of 
the god (frónhma) is contrasted with the anthropomorphic conception of the Homeric 
god and the horizon of what the god can reach is extended from mount Olympus to the 
whole of reality in which humans build their ‘towering hopes’ (Suppl. 97). In the 
Oresteia a similar conception of Zeus is at play. For instance, in Eumenides Apollo 
describes the all-pervasive action of his father as an effortless force:470 
 
 
                                                
469 Il. 1.525-30. Cf. Ch. 1.3. Cf. Seaford 2012: 252, although I disagree with his point that 
Xenophanes developed such a conception ‘under the influence of monetisation’. 
470 Literally: ‘not panting at all’. 
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[...] tà d’ \lla pánt’ \nw te kaì kátw 
stréfwn tíqhsin o÷dèn ;asqmaínwn ménei. (650-1) 
 
In the ‘Hymn to Zeus’ in the Agamemnon, in which the Argive Elders seem to repeat 
almost verbatim the words of the Danaids (daimónion | [...] !hmenoj, Suppl. 99-100 / 
daimónwn | [...] Óménwn, Ag. 182-3), the imagery of a seated god is picked up. From 
the same position of immobility, Zeus is able to ‘set mortals on the road to 
understanding’. His ‘grace’ is not ‘violent’ because it requires any effort on his part, but 
because it befalls men ‘even against their will’. As in the ode of the Suppliants, Zeus 
requires no ‘armed support’: his ordinance subjects mortals from afar. It could almost 
be said that the law of ‘learning by suffering’ is as much a violent grace as it is a 
graceful violence.471 
 
But would it be appropriate to talk of some form of Aeschylean henotheism?472 The 
conclusions reached in the chapter on Xenophanes are once again relevant and must be 
taken into account. At a purely explicit level of the text – that is, when merely looking 
at the words of choruses and characters outside their dramatic context –Aeschylus plays 
with the moralising attitude of some of his characters. We have already observed how 
through the choral voice of passages such as Ag. 369-72 and 750-62,473 the playwright 
interacts with and rivals the preceding ‘impious’ conceptions of the gods. At this level 
of the text, from within the hypothetical framework of a moralising programme,474 the 
emphasis on the divine – just like in Xenophanes – is qualitative rather than quantitative 
in nature. When in the ‘Hymn’ the Chorus struggle to find any term of comparison for 
Zeus, their focus seem to be directed towards the nature of the god and its relation to 
human suffering. The outcome of individuating Zeus himself as the only possible term 
of comparison for Zeus (Zeúj [...] plÕn Diój, Ag. 160-5) has more to do with the 
difficulty they encounter while trying to develop an appropriate discourse about his 
unfathomable nature than with an emphasis on the god’s singleness. Hence, just as in 
                                                
471 Contra Sommerstein 2010b: 168-9. 
472 Cf. Ch. 1.3. 
473 Cf. Ch. Int. II.2.  
474 I argue later that this is not the Oresteia’s ultimate representation of Zeus which is instead 
best understood as an amoral force. 
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the case of Xenophanes, the notion of an Aeschylean henotheism may be adopeted 
provided that a certain caution is employed.  
 
Those studies which interpret the emphasis on Zeus’ supremacy as some sort of 
Aeschylean monotheism475 are in my opinion misinformed in both their premises and 
conclusions. To set the issue in these terms inevitably entails a moral evaluation of Zeus 
which is misconstrued – Aeschylus was no ‘monotheistic thinker’.476 It is indeed true 
that at the outset of the Agamemnon the Chorus posits the question of divine justice in 
the face of the sacrifice of an innocent victim, but those who read the Oresteia as some 
form of theodicy mistake the point of view of human characters for that of the author.477 
On the contrary, I believe that the various characters’ attempts at making definite sense 
of god’s justice are constantly frustrated, that the whole trilogy offers no absolute 
resolution to the problem of matricide478 and – most importantly – that Zeus is 
cumulatively portrayed as an amoral and almost impersonal force.  
 
Just as the non-anthropomorphic god of Xenophanes, who shakes all things by his 
thought, nonetheless retains traces of corporeal representations (B23-4),479 so does the 
Aeschylean Zeus present a similar ambivalence. Indeed, mention is made throughout 
the Oresteia of Zeus’ corporeal attributes: he ‘perceives’ the cries of the birds (Ag. 55-
6), he has eyes or is asked to ‘look down’ (Ag. 469-70; Cho. 245), and Electra mentions 
his hand (Cho. 395). Also, his power and influence are still at times imagined as 
personal and physical actions: his fight with Cronus is described through a wrestling 
metaphor (Ag. 171-2), he is said to have bent his bow at Alexander (Ag. 364),480 he is 
said to make wine (Ag. 970) and at Ag. 1563-4, we are told that the law of paqeîn tòn 
1rxanta will remain in force as long as Zeus remains firm on his throne. When 
references are made to his mythological past, an anthropomorphic patina is attached to 
the human emotions projected onto him (365; 717-8). However, as already argued by 
                                                
475  Grube 1970: 47. 
476 Contra Grube 1970: 47: ‘At the same time, he [Aeschylus] is longing to believe in a just and 
ordered world. He is then faced with a problem which every monotheistic thinker has to face, 
how to reconcile omnipotence with benevolence or at least with justice’. 
477 This is the typical approach of the Evolutionists (cf. Ch. 4.2) 
478 Cf. Int. I.3 and Ch. 8.4. 
479 Cf. Ch. 1.3. 
480 Cf. Ag. 510 for another reference to the bow. 
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Golden,481 most of these ‘actions’ and attributes can be read metaphorically, and – given 
the nature of the imageries – we are certainly entitled to register the eyes, the throne, the 
bow, and the hand, as anthropomorphic symbols only. Nothing whatever is stated about 
Zeus’ human form: nothing is stated about his mode of travel, his use of actual 
weapons, what he wears and, whether he appears to human sight. 
 
The majority of references to Zeus simply portray him as an abstract force that 
accomplishes all the visible effects in the universe.482 In the first two plays he seems to 
be regarded as the ultimate source of every punishment, he is honoured as the source of 
royal power, defender of the hearth, and protector of the rights of hospitality (Ag. 43, 
704, 748). Thus he is considered responsible for the arrival of Helen at Troy (Ag. 748-
9), the subsequent punishment of Alexander and the city (Ag. 59; 62; 355-71; 526; 582), 
and the reason behind the safe return of Agamemnon and the Herald (Ag. 508). In his 
capacity as source of punishment, sender of ruin, and defender of honour, he is invoked 
by Orestes and Electra against Clytemnestra (Cho.19, 246, 382, 395, 409). In the 
trilogy, he is also the power by means of which humans might extricate themselves 
from danger (Ag. 677; Cho. 775), fortunes and misfortunes are traced back to Zeus (Ag. 
367, 1036, 1424; Cho. 784-7), who is also responsible for the ripening of grapes and 
abundance of the earth (Ag. 970. 1014). He is also regarded as the power that prevents 
the dead from resurrecting (Ag. 1024; Eum. 647-50) and the ultimate source of oracles 
(Ag. 135; Eum. 616-21).483 
 
Zeus ‘all-seeing’ (pantóptaj, Eum. 1045) is endowed in the Oresteia with a synoptic 
awareness closely resembling that of Xenophanes’ god in B24: some sort of invisible 
sensorial and mental ubiquity (‘whole he sees, whole he thinks, whole he hears’), which 
could hardly be available to normal organs. As the primary accomplishing force in the 
universe, he receives epithets such as téleioj (‘the fulfiller’, Ag. 973), pagkratÔj 
(‘almighty’, Eum. 918), panaítioj, and panergéthj (‘cause and effector of all’, Ag. 
1486). As a mysterious first cause of every effect his will escapes the grasp of human 
                                                
481 1961: 161-2. 
482 Cf. Rosenmeyer 1982: 277: ‘Zeus is never a dramatic character, […] he is a poetic way of 
talking about the context of human action’. 
483 Cf. Ch. 4.2. 
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understanding. While in Supplices his mind is compared to a dark woodland or an 
inscrutable abyss (Suppl. 86-95; 1057-9), in the Agamemnon the Chorus abandon every 
attempt at defining his nature through the employment of terms of comparison other 
than Zeus himself:  
 
Zeùj 8stij pot’ æstín, eê tód’ a÷- 
t^_ fílon keklhmén_, 
toûtó nin prosennépw (Ag. 160-3) 
 
The Chorus refer to Zeus as ‘Zeus’ with the hesitation of those who are not too sure 
whether his traditional name is the best they can employ. As the dispenser and origin of 
a superior knowledge and wisdom – emphasised by the significant accumulation of 
*frn related words in the Hymn (frontídoj, 165; profrónwj, 174; frenÏn, 175; 
froneîn, 176; swfroneîn, 181) – Zeus can no longer be simply regarded as ‘Zeus’, 
nor can he, however, be satisfactorily addressed in any other way (plÕn Diój, 165). It 
is impossible, in relation to this, not to think of the Heraclitean fragment: 
 
&en tò sofòn moûnon légesqai o÷k æqélei kaì æqélei Zhnòj 3noma 
(Heraclitus B32) 
 
in which &en tò sofòn moûnon – however we may want to understand this 
problematic subject 484 – accepts and simultaneously refuses a nominal identity with 
the supreme god of traditional mythology. 
 
The comparison can be expounded further. Just as the Heraclitean god is responsible for 
the stirring of everything through everything: 
 
&en tò sofón, æpístasqai gnÍmhn, ñtéhi kubernâtai pánta dià pántwn 
B41 
 
so the Aeschylean Zeus ‘disposes of all existing things485 by turning them this way and 
that’:  
                                                
484 Cf. Ch. 2.4. 
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[...] tà d’ \lla pánt’ \nw te kaì kátw 
stréfwn tíqhsin (Eum. 650-1) 
 
What is more, at a deeper level, the Zeus of the Oresteia lends himself to being read as 
the hidden principle behind a reality largely conceived in terms of opposites. The whole 
trilogy rests on a series of more or less explicit polarities: light/darkness, hope/despair, 
joy/grief, masculine/feminine. The process of initial collaboration, subsequent rift, and 
final reconciliation of Olympian and Chthonic forces underpins the development of 
human affairs. It represents, so to speak, the cosmic background of this trilogy’s 
dramatic development.486 Being constantly invoked by both sides, Zeus is the unitary 
principle behind these cosmic antithetical powers. As promoter and guarantor of every 
justice he can emanate contrasting justices. A good example is the great kommos of 
Choephori where the justice of matricide and the justice of uxoricide are perceived in 
their collision by Orestes: #Arhj #Arei xumbaleî, Dík= Díka (‘Violence will clash 
with violence, justice with justice’, Cho. 461). A statement, this one, which is certainly 
suggestive to read in conjunction with Heraclitus’ B80 in which the philosopher 
declares that ‘it is necessary to know that war is common, that justice is strife, and that 
all things happen according to strife and necessity’ (eêdénai crÕ tòn pólemon æónta 
xunón, kaì díkhn 1rin, kaì ginómena pánta kat’ 1rin kaì creÍn).487 In the next 
chapters – in which the topics of justice and the unity of opposites is expanded – we 
shall see how this necessary strife is absorbed in the synthesis of opposites at the end of 
Eumenides and thereby made more bearable for the citizens of the new government. 
 
The Zeus of the Oresteia is therefore beyond morality: an abstract principle behind 
reality, ‘unapparent harmony’ (:armoníh ;afanÔj) as Heraclitus would call it, ‘violent 
grace’ as the Elders say. While for Heraclitus wisdom equates to knowing the ordinance 
which governs the whole of reality (B41), in the Oresteia Zeus is the  supreme source of 
                                                                                                                                          
485 tà d’ \lla is in opposition to the preceeding line in which Apollo declares that Zeus has 
created no charm against death. 
486 Cf. Chs. 4.2; 8. 
487 Cf. Ch. 3.3. On this parallel I return in Ch. 7.4 where a full analysis of the kommos is 
provided.  
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knowledge and ultimate cause behind all human affairs and events in the world. As the 
Elders cry in despair: 
 
tí gàr brotoîj \neu Diòj teleîtai> 
tí tÏnd’ o÷ qeókrantón æstin> (Ag. 1487-8)488 
 
Returning once again to the Hymn, it is now truly possible to appreciate the complexity 
and profundity of certain formulations. The Chorus call Zeus ‘Zeus’ only after having 
carefully weighed the whole of reality in the balance (pánt’ æpistaqmÍmenoj, 164). 
Nothing specific compares with the god because the god is everything in its totality. As 
declared in a fragment of the lost Aeschylean play the Heliades: 
 
Zeúj  æstin aêqÔr, Zeùj dè gÖ, Zeùj d' o÷ranój,   
Zeúj toi tá pánta c4 ti tÏnd' øpérteron (fr. 70) 
 
In the idea that ‘Zeus is the aether, Zeus is earth, Zeus is heaven, yes, Zeus is 
everything, and whatever there mey be beyond that’489 one cannot fail to recognize a 
parallel with the Heraclitean god who is ‘day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety 
hunger’: 
 
ñ qeòj Ómérh e÷frónh, ceimÎn qéroj, pólemoj eêrÔnh, kóroj limój. (B67, 1) 
 
by means of which Heraclitus powerfully conveys the notion of a god-ultimate-unity – a 
divine gathering point where all pairs of opposites meet in harmonious tension.490 The 
Aeschylean Zeus, just like the Heraclitean qeój, is a divine principle of unity behind a 
contradictory reality. As such, humans can investigate his nature by measuring it against 
everything (pánt’ æpistaqmÍmenoj) and find no specific term of comparison in the 
balance except himself, or, alternatively, in the totality of things (Zeúj toi tà pánta). 
Both the Heraclitean and Aeschylean gods must be primarily understood as divine 
principles that are immanent in reality, but that can and must be at the same time 
                                                
488 Cf. the outset of Int. I. and Ch. 4.2. 
489 Sommerstein 2009: 73. 
490 Cf. Ch. 2.3. 
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thought separately (kecwrisménon, B108; Zeùj 8stij pot’ æstín [...] Ag. 160) as 
syntheses of the totality of things and ultimate principles containing the contradictory 
essence of reality.  
 
The conclusion reached here may be put in relation with those reached by the Hungarian 
philologist and historian of religions Károly Kerényi in his illuminating essay on the 
notion of qeój in Ancient Greek thought.491 As argued by this scholar, the Greek notion 
of qeój was only partially equivalent to that of ‘god’. Essentially a predicate,492 it seems 
that originally Greek speakers would not describe qeój as something, but rather 
something as qeój. This seminal sense of the word can be powerfully sensed in the 
fragment of Heraclitus we just recalled (B67, 1),493 in which a strong circularity 
between subject and predicates is potentially at play: i.e. we are inclined to read it as 
saying that ñ qeój is the whole of reality as much as that the whole of reality is ñ qeój. 
The same applies of course to Aeschylus fr. 70, where Zeus is the aether, earth, and 
heaven as much as their sum amounts to Zeus. In these cases the gap between qeój and 
tò qeîon is probably not too wide: god is ‘the divine’ in its absolute manifestation. It 
could almost be said that, in this sense, qeój is something that ‘occurs’, it is an event 
and the sum of every event rather than their effector – an act and a state of things such 
as the eather, earth, and heaven, rather than an agent itself.  
 
In the parodos of the Agamemnon, what looks like an invocation of Zeus is instead a 
meditation on the god’s nature. In the ‘Hymn’ the Chorus do not say Zeû in the 
vocative, but Zeúj in the nominative. In this way the Elders choose not to place 
themselves in what Burkert called an ‘I-Thou relation’. It is worth recalling this 
scholar’s passage in full: ‘The word theos does not lead into an I-Thou relation, it is 
declaratory of a third, objective power, even if it often arises from a state of confusion 
and overwhelming impressions.’ 494 Zeus in Aeschylus covers a similar function to that 
of a more abstract qeój, absolute divine and ultimate principle indispensible for 
speculation. Zeus, the god who, by setting ‘man on the road to understanding’ (Ag. 176-
                                                
491 2001: 205-14. 
492 Wilamowitz 1931: 17-18; Kirk 1954: 185; Burkert 1985: 271-2. 
493 Kirk 1954: 185. 
494 1985: 272. 
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7), emanates a violent grace, is regarded as the supreme source of the only viable form 
of knowledge which can derive from a contradictory reality: the knowledge of the 
páqei máqoj. 
 
In conclusion to this chapter, it has been shown how, in the light of the comparison with 
some fragments of the Presocratics, the Aeschylean Zeus has abandoned the 
anthropomorphic characteristics of the traditional god of the pantheon. At an explicit 
level of the text, in the reflective theological passages of the Oresteia and the 
Aeschylean corpus, the characters of these tragedies openly declare their programmatic 
effort to represent the god in different terms from the tradition. Having cautiously 
introduced the term henotheism, we saw how, when scrutinised in connection with 
Xenophanes’ theological fragments, the Zeus of Aeschylus shares many characteristics 
with those of  Xenophanes’ god:  extraordinary mental powers and ubiquitous influence. 
 
What should however be truly emphasised is how at a more subterranean level and 
through cumulative evidence, the Zeus of the Oresteia is slowly assimilated to an 
abstract force on which everything depends. In this sense it is no longer useful to 
conceive the issue in terms of the ‘justice of the god’, rather, it is more intriguing to 
conceive, in the light of a comparison with Heraclitus, of the ‘god as justice’. Not 
anymore a god dispenser of díkh, but a god cosmic díkh: a retributive principle in the 
grace of which all the elements of the universe, among them humankind, are subjugated 
within a perpetual conflict. From the point of view of humans, this reality cannot be 
experienced in any other way except as páqoj. Precisely in this lies one of the most 
innovative contributions of tragedy to archaic Greek thought: the suggestion that human 
wisdom is experience of the alternating succession of contradictory events, its premises 
reside in man’s necessity to contrive human answers in the face of divine impasses. 
 
Paralleling certain lines of thought of the philosophical speculations which perceived 
their own epistemological efforts as a way to bridge the gap between the human and 
divine spheres, in the Oresteia the development of human knowledge is directly linked 
with the divine principle. This is because what governs the world is itself motive for 
knowledge. Just as in Heraclitus the lógoj is at the same time both a cognitive and 
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cosmic principle, so from the Aeschylean Zeus derives for man a type of wisdom that 
contains the divine essence of the ‘violent grace’: the páqei máqoj — itself the 
ultimate reason behind human attempts at grasping the nature of the god. In this way, 
Aeschylus bestows on the experience of suffering the status of a profound form of 
knowledge: a meeting point between the human and the divine. In this way, Aeschylus 
bestows on tragedy the status of a literary genre capable of grasping and representing 
the essence of human nature as it is given in the contradictory multiplicity of the world. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Time, Necessity, and the Inextricability of Justice and Injustice 
 
The first two plays of the Oresteia dramatize a vicious cycle of blood-vengeance, in 
which a chain of vindictive and murderous acts culminates on matricide. This cycle is 
presented as an intricate knot of interrelated deeds, each somewhat determined by a 
previous act and begetting the next one, each determined by a multiplicity of causes 
both human and divine, and each accompanied by a complex apparatus of comments, 
attempted explanations and uncontainable emotions. The central narrative-line, 
represented by the three family murders of Agamemnon’s killing of Iphigenia, 
Clytemnestra’s killing of Agamemnon and Orestes’ killing of Clytemnestra, constantly 
intersects other narratives of vengeance: the punitive expedition of the Atreidae against 
Troy caused by Helen’s elopement with Paris, Artemis’ demand for Iphigenia’s 
sacrifice as a requital for the killing of innocent lives, Apollo’s curse on Cassandra for 
having cheated him, Aegisthus’ killing of Agamemnon as revenge against Atreus for 
having served Thyestes his children’s flesh.  
 
In the Oresteia – especially in the first two plays – díkh is not defined: it is acted.495 
Like theos it has more the value of a predicate (with each character claiming his action 
to be an act of justice). As a personification, justice is not acted, but acts. Two of the 
most powerful impressions one may gain from this trilogy are that human beings are 
caught in an exorable web of actions each called ‘justice’, but also extendible to a view 
of the process in its entirety. The aim of this study is to explore what Mitchell-Boyask 
has broadly defined as the ‘cosmic implications’496 of díkh in the Oresteia, and to do so 
in the light of Presocratic ideas. Considering the deluge of secondary scholarship on the 
subject,497 this study has been conceived so as to emphasise and expand upon only a 
                                                
495 Cf. Havelock 1978: 295: ‘Nowhere in the drama of Aeschylus can we yet find out “what 
justice is”’.  
496 2009: 106. Cf. the beginning of Ch. 3.  
497 An exhaustive survey of the bibliography on the subject is beyond the scope of this study; for 
key-readings: Goldhill 1986: Ch. 2; McHardy 2008: Chs. 1; 2; 5; Mitchell-Boyask 2009: Ch. 5; 
and Sommerstein 2010a: Chs. 7.9; 13.3. For its religious dimension: Winnington-Ingram 1983: 
Ch. 8; Raeburn and Thomas 2011: Ch. 4.2; Parker 2011: xiiff.; Severino 2015. 
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few very specific díkh-related themes. A brief explanatory premise regarding the 
approach hereby adopted is therefore required.  
 
6.1 Short premise 
 
It is astonishing how little in-depth study there has been of the relation between díkh in 
the Oresteia and díkh in archaic philosophical thought. Even Lloyd-Jones, who writes 
that ‘dikê means not only “justice” but the “order of the universe”’,498 and Kitto, who 
formulates díkh in tragedy as a ‘proper order in the nature of things’ or as an act for the 
restoration of a balance broken by the ;adikía of some act of violence,499 both do so in 
order to explain the Sophoclean conception of justice. Kitto in particular draws an 
analogy with Anaximander in order to explain díkh in the Electra as opposed to díkh in 
the Oresteia, but he spends little more than two pages on this analogy, in which he 
offers no discussion of Anaximander’s fragment itself but makes instead several 
generalizing assumptions about Aeschylus and Sophocles leading to artificial and 
ready-made distinctions between the two.  
 
More recently, various efforts have been made to dismantle this type of categorizing 
and to nuance the premises which may lead to it. In particular, Vickers and Goldhill 
have openly rejected some of Kitto’s arguments in order to restore a less ‘metaphysical’ 
and more ‘humanistic’ understanding of the Oresteia and of Greek tragedy in general.500 
However, as it is often the case with interpretative approaches which originate as a 
reaction against previous ones, the pendulum has swung too far in the opposite 
direction. The attempt to move away from a ‘metaphysical’ reading of Greek tragedy 
has engendered, at times, the production of extreme anti-types:  
 
The first question to ask is whether the Greeks indeed had such a generally agreed 
concept of cosmic justice? There seems little evidence that they had. […] For dikê 
both as a socially agreed and as a personal, therefore relative, concept of justice, I 
                                                
4981971: 128. 
4991961: 133-35. 
500 Goldhill 1986: 33ff; Vickers 1973: 3-43. 
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find much evidence in Greek literature; for dikê as an effective agent of cosmic 
harmony I find none at all.501 
 
In his resolve to purge any cosmic dimension from Greek tragedy Vickers went as far as 
to deny the existence of any form of ‘cosmic justice’ from Greek thought as a whole. 
This, of course, is in our eyes an untenable view. Studies such as those already 
mentioned in chapter 3.3 have shown the relevance and aptness of this notion for the 
interpretation of Presocratic philosophies, in which díkh expresses an idea of 
cosmological order. 
 
Finally, even those who have recognised the importance of Greek archaic philosophical 
thought for the interpretation of Greek tragedy have barely given any attention to the 
possible connection between retributive justice in the Oresteia and retributive justice in 
Presocratic philosophy. Of course, authors like Goldhill and Seaford have underlined 
the connections between the widest sense of díkh as a world order and the behaviour of 
individuals, and how such connections may be emphasised in various ways by taking 
account of the Presocratic philosophers.502 However, their remarks fall within the 
specific context of their discussion of matters of rhetorical manipulation (Goldhill) or 
chronotope and monetisation (Seaford) and do not focus specifically on the significance 
of these connections or how they affect our perception of the Oresteia’s theological 
discourse. In this way, the treatment of ‘cosmic justice’ as a theme of the Oresteia 
remains predominantly relegated to those studies which have argued in favour of a 
benign or providential vision, a sort of Aeschylean theodicy and monotheism. The 
hypothesis that Aeschylus may have used the notion of cosmic retribution as it had been 
conceived by some Presocratic thinkers in order to problematize the terms of the 
relationship between the human and the divine spheres has hitherto never been 
advanced.  
 
To be concise we can say that here we predominantly focus on díkh beyond the moral 
sphere. As paradoxical as this may sound in connection to the Oresteia, such approach 
is in line with the conclusions reached in our study on Zeus, which can be recapitulated 
                                                
501 Vickers 1973: 25-9. 
502 Goldhill 1986: 36ff; Seaford 2012; 2013. 
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as following: Zeus is what characters constantly turn to when looking for an ultimate 
causal explanation; through the cumulative evidence of varied utterances and complex 
choral meditations, the nature of the god emerges as something fundamentally elusive 
and contradictory; yet despite – or rather because of – this, he remains the supreme 
source of human understanding and wisdom. Almost a ‘way’ to describe the 
incongruous pattern of self-defeating actions, Zeus’ role in the trilogy as a whole is best 
understood as an amoral force embracing reality’s contradictions.  
 
Now, the name of Zeus is employed in two revealing puns. By linking the name of the 
god to the causal preposition ‘because of’ (Di-ój/di-aí, Ag. 1485) and to that of his 
daughter Justice (Di-ój/Dí-ka, Cho. 948-9), Aeschylus creates a web of significance: 
everything happens ‘because of Zeus’; everything that happens is, in the widest sense of 
the term, ‘justice’. The connection between Zeus and díkh in the first two plays of the 
trilogy is firmly set. The point is not only that ‘Díkh really is Zeus’ daughter because 
she does his work’,503 but also that every act of Zeus is an act of díkh and, vice-versa, 
that every act of díkh is an emanation of Zeus’ power. Thus as already recalled,504 in 
Ag. 250 Díkh takes the place of Zeus as the enforcer of the law of ‘learning though 
suffering’.  
 
Similarly, at the end of the second stasimon (681-781), the initial question regarding 
Helen’s name tíj pot’ Ënómazen *wd’ æj tò pân æthtúmwj [...] glÏssan æn túc= 
némwn; seems to find an answer in the divine figure of Díkh who, just like her father 
‘the accomplisher’, pân d’ æpì térma nwmÙ (781). In their function of ultimate causal 
explanations of every event, the roles of Zeus and Díkh is often interchangeable. If 
then, as previously said, it is no longer a question of assessing the ‘justice of the god’, 
but rather of assessing the ‘god as justice’, the terms of this ‘justice’ must be considered 
ontologically rather than ethically. In other words, the following chapters evaluate the 
workings of díkh as a metaphysical principle rather than as a moral concept.505  
                                                
503 Garvie 1986: 310. 
504 Ch. 4.1. 
505 In so doing it is not my intention to deny the  ‘ethical’ dimension of the Oresteia tout court: 
its sophistication has already been extensively explored (e.g. Peradotto 1969a: 237-63; 
Nussbaum 1986; 1985: 233-67; Lawrence 2013). However, the question of díkh cannot be 
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The notion of díkh as a metaphysical principle and cosmic power was slowly 
developed at the time of the first philosophical speculations. In chapter 5, I traced the 
steps of these developments. Beyond the subtleties and specificities of each individual 
treatment, it can be said that the cosmic justice of these philosophers has three 
fundamental characteristics. First, the idea of cosmic regularity is naturally preceded by 
the implied premise of inherent cosmic limitations. In Anaximander, this idea stands out 
by contrast with the notion of the #apeiron and its limitless embrace (periécein 
!apanta, A15+B3): whereas the boundless nature506 of this ultimate principle prevents 
it to come into conflict with the elements it contains, tà 3nta instead, by usurping their 
reciprocal boundaries, constantly commit injustice to each other.507 In Heraclitus’ B94, 
díkh represents a cosmic imposition on the sun: an inviolable order of nature due to 
which the sun is compelled to abide by his natural measures.508 This is the aspect of 
díkh which takes over in Parmenides’ poem, where the idea of ‘justice’ is constantly 
associated to notions of constraint and restriction on nature.509 Second, when díkh is 
not equated to the notion of constraint per se than it is, as we have already recalled, that 
process of retribution among elements alternatively injured and injuring. In this case, 
whether designating each specific act or the overall process, díkh operates according to 
strict rules of time and necessity. Thus cosmic díkh is the following things all together: 
the imposition of limits, the penalty paid for transgressing such limits, and the overall 
mechanism which regulates such transgression into a cyclical process. Third, such 
conception(s) exist within a universe largely conceived in terms of opposites.   
 
 My study of justice in the Oresteia follows a tripartite structure. In the present chapter I 
show how the notion of an inherent limitations in the nature of the universe is 
                                                                                                                                          
regarded as an ethical concept only and its centrality in the Oresteia cannot be fully appreciated 
unless other dimensions of the text are also taken into account. 
506 The exact meaning of Anaximander’s  #apeiron is still object of controversy. Scholars argue 
whether it derives from the noun peîrar, péraj, meaning literally the one without peírata, 
or rather from the verbal root represented in verbs such as peírw, peráw, and peraínw, thus 
meaning ‘which cannot be passed through to an end’ (Kahn 1960: 231ff). In either way it is 
clear how this idea has been conceived in opposition to a reality perceived as fundamentally 
shaped by limitations. 
507 Cf. Ch. 3.2. 
508 Cf. Ch. 3.3. 
509 Cf. Ch. 3.4. 
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profoundly rooted in this text: I predominantly focus on díkh in its associations to 
notions of time and necessity. In the penultimate chapter, I focus on the notion of 
retributive justice (díkh as poinÔ) and discuss how, in moments of dramatic climax, 
justice is brought into the awareness of characters as a due process rather than a single 
act. Lastly, in the concluding chapter, I concentrate on the theme of opposites and its 
relevance for the overall dramatic movement of the trilogy. This conceptual structure 
roughly overlaps with the chronological progress of the text: in this chapter I analyse 
passages from the beginning of the Agamemnon; in the next one I focus on the two 
longest odes from Agamemnon and Choephori; and in the last chapter prominence is 
given to Eumenides. 
 
6.2 Time and necessity 
  
Dík= d’ æp’ \llo prâgma qhgánei blábaj 
pròj \llaij qhgánaisi Moîra. (Ag. 1535-6) 
 
Díkaj d’ æreídetai puqmÔn, 
procalkeúei d’ A%isa fasganourgój. (Cho. 648-9) 
 
%w Díka, 
%w qrónoi t’ ŒErinúwn […] 
eêj tò pân soi légw< 
bwmòn a#idesai Díkaj. (Eum.511-12; 537-8) 
 
The above passages are here gathered to recall how the mechanism of díkh in the 
Oresteia operates from within a world that is inhabited by all these figures, such as 
Aisa, Moirai, and Erinyes, and other kindred forces conditioning human existence in a 
necessary and inexorable manner. 510 Their existence – indeed the very existence of a 
                                                
510 For an interesting hypothesis of how Fate is conceived in Homer on the analogy of a bond 
tied around mortal subjects see Onians 1988: 310ff; 378ff; and Lloyd 1966: 192, for a study of 
the system of kindred imageries of binding and compulsion in the Oresteia see Lebeck 1971: 
63-8. 
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notion of compulsion511 – could not be imagined without the dimension of time.  
Anaximander, in describing his cosmic retaliation as a process carried out katà tò 
creÍn and katà tÕn toû crónou táxin already had such metaphysical insight 
crystal clear. Similarly, in the Oresteia, the three notions of díkh, time, and necessity 
are firmly interconnected and interdependent.  
While the concise style of the mottos quoted is particularly effective in conveying 
gnomic sounding truths, one must turn to longer passages to experience their meaning 
in its dramatic concretization. If various outlooks on the causes and consequences of 
retaliation coexist like interwoven threads running through the tragic fabric of the 
Oresteia, as it is often the case, this fabric acquires a particularly rich texture in the 
choral odes. They are a privileged locus in which to look for evidence of the complexity 
of the concept of retributive justice because – as I hope to bring to the fore – the 
Chorus’ perspective on the events often has a multifocal quality. It is chiefly through the 
voice of the Chorus and their swings of moods and change of attitudes that the poet 
succeeds in making gnomic wisdom and human suffering meet and interact in a single 
concoction. Choral songs are the place par excellence in which the question of 
retributive justice is made to bear on the nature of tragic experience and human ‘action 
is exhibited as the vehicle of a universal law’.512  
6.3 Agamemnon 40-257: time and necessity 
 
A good starting point is the great parodos of the Agamemnon in which a variegated 
assemblage of mythological figures and cryptic poetic expressions cooperate to convey 
the idea of time and necessity.513 Upon reading it, one is inevitably left with a 
distinctive impression that a sense of compulsion hovers over the events narrated. The 
war of Troy was necessary; Paris’s penalty needed be exacted at one time or another; 
for Zeus Xenios has sent the Atreiadae as a ‘late avenging’ Fury against the 
                                                
511 One of the most complex notions in the field. For key-readings: Edwards 1977; Gantz 1982; 
Rosenmeyer 1982: Chs. 9-10; Lesky 1983; Parker 1983: 198-206; Winnington-Ingram 1983; 
Furley 1986; Williams 1993: Ch. 3; Sewell-Rutter 2007; Markovits 2009; Sommerstein 2010a: 
Chs. 11.1-11.3. Cairns’s study of the OT in 2013: 119-172 also offers interesting reflections of 
wider applicability. In this thesis I only focus on its connections to Presocratic thought. 
512 Greene 1944: 106.  
513 This narration contains a subtle manipulation of temporal elements, cf. Barret 2007: 260ff. 
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transgressor (58-61). The idea of the inexorability of punishment contained in the 
forceful personification of the Fury, also defined by Fraenkel ‘the Curse and the Spirit 
of Vengeance’,514 is completed and emphasised by the adjective østerópoinon,515 by 
means of which the intervention of this avenging power is immediately connected to 
some notion of time.516 Although the adjective østerópoinon has been variously 
translated as ‘late-following atonement’, ‘later punishment’, and ‘belated 
punishment’,517 with translations that emphasise the belatedness of the requital, I 
believe that it should be understood in connection with the more general idea of ‘even if 
late nonetheless inevitably’. The same compound-adjective is in fact repeated later in 
Choephori in the context of an exactly corresponding expression, by means of which 
Orestes addresses Zeus ‘who sends up (;ampémpwn) from below østerópoinon #atan 
(382-3). The same adjective employed here to connote the punishment of atê, ‘ruin’,518 
is better understood in the context of a prayer addressed to Zeus, in its gnomic 
connotation of ‘soon or late’519 or ‘that comes late but comes at last’. 520 	
 
As the analeptic and compressed narration of the Chorus moves forward from that point 
in the past, ten years ago (40), in which the cry for war from the heart of the Atreidae 
(47-8) was heard by Zeus, to the present time of their song, the inevitability of the war 
in course is restated: ‘it is now where it is, and is being fulfilled according to destiny’ 
(1sti d’ 8p+ nûn æsti, teleîtai d’ æj tò peprwménon, 67-8). The expression is 
deliberately obscure and it requires close analysis. As pointed out by Fraenkel and 
restated by Goldhill, its primary purpose is that of creating a point of transition from the 
events of the past, swiftly sketched hitherto, to the still unknown future (we learn about 
the outcome of the war in the following scene).521 In this way the indefiniteness 
                                                
514 Fraenkel 1962: 38. 
515 Used twice by Aeschylus, the adjective does not recur anywhere in Greek (de Romilly 1968: 
61). 
516 On the connection between time and divine justice and the role played by østerópoinoj cf. 
de Romilly 1968: 61ff. 
517 Fraenkel 1962: 38; Collard 2003: 4; Sommerstein 2008: 9. 
518 Due to its (often simultaneous) semantic duality of cause (atê-folly) and consequence (atê-
disaster), this concept is very hard to render with a univocal translation. See Sommerstein 2013: 
1-12 for an in-depth study of atê’s semantic history from Homer to Aeschylus. 
519 Sommerstein 2008: 260. 
520 Lebeck 1971: 13. 
521 Fraenkel 1962: 42; Goldhill 1984a: 15. 
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introduced by the adjective østerópoinon, which seems to reach a momentary 
fulfilment in the first half of the clause 1sti d’ 8p+ nûn æsti, is picked up by the 
indefiniteness of the second half of the clause teleîtai d’ æj tò peprwménon. By 
‘indefiniteness’, I mean that profound sense of the unknown which is often attached to 
human considerations on destiny, the same sense that is made manifest in a striking 
parallel from the Iliad, in which Priam, with reference to the battle between Paris and 
Menelaus, comments: 
 
Zeùj mén pou tó ge o%ide kaì ;aqánatoi qeoì \lloi 
ñppotér_ qanátoio téloj peprwménon æstín (3. 308-9). 
 
Yet, it should be noted how in both the Homeric téloj peprwménon and the 
Aeschylean teleîtai d’ æj tò peprwménon, the indefiniteness associated with an 
expression of the future is also accompanied by the reassertion of the inevitability of 
what has been appointed. As commented by Goldhill, this sentence ‘joins a sense of 
“end” to its own fated moment’ thus somewhat asserting the teleology of the telos.522  
Hence, in their corresponding tautology, the two halves into which the clause 1sti d’ 
8p+ nûn æsti, teleîtai d’ æj tò peprwménon can be split both assert the 
inevitability of the moment to which they refer: the presentness of the present is 
juxtaposed with the teleology of the future towards its fated moment, and thus the 
causal past, current present, and consequential future of the war of Troy, are presented 
as inevitable.  
 
The introduction of the idea of a telos is subtle and full of significance. Indeed, as 
ingeniously demonstrated by Lebeck, not only does this word resonate in the rest of the 
whole trilogy, but its polysemy is deployed to create a system of literary threads by 
means of which the end of Troy, Agamemnon and Iphigenia have been linked.523 The 
teleîtai of the expression just examined picks up the preceding protéleia,524 a word 
customarily referring to the performance of holy rites and ceremonies previous to the 
                                                
522 Goldhill 1984a: 15. 
523 Lebeck 1971: 68-73. 
524 Goldhill 1984a: 15. 
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marriage ceremony.525 The twofold appearance of protéleia in the parodos connects 
the Trojan War (65) to the sacrifice of Iphigenia (227) and in both cases it involves a 
deviation from its original meaning. In both cases the use of protéleia is ironic: in the 
first case the pre-nuptial rites are the suffering of the ‘Danaans and Trojans alike’ (63-7) 
which look forward to the reunion, the ‘marriage’, of Menelaus and Helen; in the 
second instance, protéleia might have been used with ironic allusion to the pretence 
of the marriage between Achilles and Iphigenia: the treachery by means of which 
Iphigenia was known from the tradition to have been summoned to Aulis (Cypria).526 
 
In a sense, then, the ‘pre-nuptial rites’ of the parodos belong, in both instances, to the 
theme of the ‘corrupted sacrifice’.527 Whereas Zeitlin notes that ‘the punishment of 
Agamemnon […] will also be imaged in the language of sacrifice’,528 Lebeck analyses 
how the four-fold appearance of the word telos characterises Clytemnestra’s utterance 
before the entrance of the king into the palace (972-4).529 Therefore, telos, in its 
polyvalence, is a word evocative of a series of associations. The telos of the protéleia 
is the telos of marriage, but in its subverted form in the parodos, it is also the fulfilment 
of the fleet’s departure that required the sacrifice of Iphigenia among its preliminary 
rites  (227), and the fulfilment of the war (65). In Clytemnestra’s appeal to Zeus téleioj 
(973)530 telos is the fulfilment of her prayer which is also the telos of Agamemnon: 
namely, his death. 
 
Thus, the idea of telos, which first appears in the parodos, evokes through its 
polyvalence a series of associations which link in a subterranean manner, like streams 
of meaning under the surface of the text, events which are apparently separated. Its 
appearance is like spring-water: it brings to the surface a glimpse of these deeper 
connections criss-crossing the soil of the trilogy.531  Within the terms of my interest in 
                                                
525 Headlam 1925; Zeitlin 1965: 465; Lebeck 1971: 70; Goldhill 1984a: 15; Sommerstein 2008: 
10. 
526 Cypr. in Procl. Chr. 8. in West 2003b: 75. For both interpretations: Sommerstein 2008: 10; 
27. 
527 Zeitlin 1965; Lebeck 1971: 70; Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1988: 141-159. 
528 Zeitlin 1965: 465. 
529 Lebeck 1971: 73. 
530 On téleioj as one of Zeus’ principal epithets cf. Rosenmeyer 1982: 278. 
531 Cf. Goldhill 1984b. 
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the conjunction between necessity and time, it could be said that each mention of telos 
seems to enclose the two concepts in a single union. As the fulfilment of what has been 
appointed (teleîtai d’ æj tò peprwménon), it could almost be said that telos is an 
expression of an idea of necessity which must find its fulfilment within the limits of an 
unspecified future; to use Anaximander’s expression: ‘in due time’ ‘katà tÕn toû 
crónou táxin’.  
 
The Chorus return to the association of telos and the necessary course of events at the 
outset of the great cantata that follows the anapaests, in which they say, literally, that 
they have the authority to tell of ‘the auspicious on-the-road command <consisting> of 
men in power’, 8dion krátoj a#ision ;andrÏn ænteléwn (104-5). This formulation is 
full of significance. With regard to the meaning of æntelÔj, Fraenkel follows Kranz in 
his conclusion that this adjective must be interpreted as tÏn æn télei 3ntwn, thus 
meaning ‘men in authority’.532 Here the idea of ‘authority’, ‘bestowed power’, which is 
the first meaning suggested by the context for telos, intermingles with that of ‘end’, 
‘appointed outcome’ which is only indirectly evoked by the proximity of the other 
adjective a#isioj. The latter means here ‘auspicious’, ‘opportune’, but its stem is also 
connected to that of A%isa, a divinity, who, like Moîra, allots to everyone their share 
and destiny.  
 
Moreover, the ‘auspicious command’ of these men in power is also already set on-the-
road (8dion). Hence, there are many subliminal meanings that on closer inspection 
emerge from this sentence: the two commanders have been invested with an authority 
that is characterised as a propulsive power directing things towards an end (æn télei); 
this tension ‘towards’ is confirmed by the adjective 8dioj, their command is already on 
the road and it is a#isioj, auspicious because it has been, perhaps, dispensed as part of 
their lot by a greater power.  In short, the re-formulation of the theme of the departure at 
the outset of the ode ‘puts in a nutshell the main points of 40-62: the movement of the 
powerful force, the justice of the cause, the royal authority of the two leaders’.533 What 
is more, to West’s observation it should be added that the authority of the two leaders is 
                                                
532 Kranz 1919: 303; Fraenkel 1962: 61-2. 
533 West 1979: 2. 
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coloured by a teleological shading: they are the executioners of a war that will be 
teleîtai d’ æj tò peprwménon, ‘fulfilled according to destiny’.  
 
The next association of the idea of necessity with that of time in the parodos is perhaps 
more explicit. They are brought together by the words of Calchas, as the Chorus report 
his interpretation of the omen of the eagles:  
 
crón_ mèn ;agreî Priámou pólin !ade kéleuqoj, 
pánta dè púrgwn 
ktÔnh prósqe tà dhmioplhqéa 
Moîra lapáxei pròj tò bíaion. (126-130) 
 
The association between the two notions of time and necessity is here overt enough to 
require only a brief treatment and to allow for considerations of a different order. Once 
again the two Atreidai are likened to a pair of mighty birds, only this time the 
association is not made through a simile but rather through an omen. Due to his 
prophetic powers, Calchas is able to see that the city of Troy will indeed be conquered. 
Yet he does not specify the ‘when’: he does not say in ‘ten years’ but rather ‘in time’. 
This particular is worth noting, especially when looked at in the light of the tradition, 
which Aeschylus seems to deliberately alter. In both the Iliad and the Cypria, Calchas is 
able to predict the exact year in which Troy would be conquered: from the vision of a 
snake devouring a sparrow with eight chicks and then turning to stone, the prophet 
interprets that the Greeks, after nine years of war, would be victorious in the tenth. 534 
Conversely, here in the parodos of the Agamemnon, Calchas leaves the indication of 
time extremely vague: no doubt this is a good example of those cases in which  ‘the 
lyric imagination, fired by the prophetic vision, merges the before and the after into a 
vivid present’.535 
 
                                                
534 Il. 2. 301-29; Cypr. in Procl. Chr. 6. In West 2003b: 73; cf. West 1979: 2. For the Homeric 
influence on the birds images in the parodos cf.: Peradotto 1969a: 237-63; Janko 1980: 291-93; 
Davies 1981: 248-51; Heath 1999: 396-407. Previously to West see also Peradotto 1969a: 237-
63. 
535 Rosenmeyer 1982: 332. 
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  He also affirms that Moîra will plunder the livestock of the community, using thus a 
personification akin, in its cosmic dimension, to that of the Erinys.536 Just as the Chorus, 
from their point of view ten years after the war of Troy has started, compare the 
Atreiades to a late-avenging Fury, so the words of Calchas which the Chorus remember 
from ten years ago expressed the same vague knowledge: Troy will be taken, the 
transgressor will eventually pay, and the law of retributive justice will come into effect 
within the limits of an indefinite time (crón_). As the two avian presences suggest a 
kinship of imagery between the two passages, so the themes of inevitability and 
indefiniteness go, once again, hand in hand.  Thus, the feeling of inevitability is built 
during the parodos through the cumulative conjunction of various superhuman powers: 
the Chorus tell us that Zeus Xenios is the sender of Agamemnon and Menelaus in the 
role of Erinyes, the words of Calchas, which the Chorus report, reveal how the working 
of this justice is also the working of Moîra. As Hammond put it: ‘Zeus is represented 
as working with Moira’; the Erinyes are ‘the ministrants of Moira’s rights’.537  
 
To recapitulate: the expedition of the Atreiadae against Troy is depicted as an act of 
retributive justice ordered by cosmic forces whose involvement in the matter bestow 
upon the event a sense of ineluctability. Moreover, a certain attention is given to the 
category of time, within the limits of which this act of justice must be consumed. As de 
Romilly wrote, it seems that ‘time is the means through which the gods achieve 
justice’.538 The comparison with the conclusion reached in some literature about the 
Presocratics is noteworthy: ‘The underlying idea is that Time will always discover and 
avenge any act of injustice’.539 However, this is only to the effect of leaving an 
impression of the indefiniteness and limitation of human knowledge: what is known is 
only that that ‘sooner or later in time the compensation must be paid’. Unlike in the 
Iliad and in the Cypria, the inexorability of an impending doom is connected to anxiety 
about the obscure future. To cite, once more, de Romilly: ‘This perpetual and imprecise 
                                                
536 In Eumenides the Chorus of the Erinyes explain this connection to be a familial bond: they 
reveal that both themselves and the Moîrai were born from the womb of Night (962). Cf. Int. 
II. 3; and Chs. 6.5; 8.3. 
537 1965: 54; 52. 
538 1968: 61. For other fundamental contributions on the subject: Rosenmeyer 1982: 311-35; 
Barret in De Jong and Nünlist 2007: 255-74.  
539 Jaeger 1947: 35. 
 169 
threat reflects the twofold nature of time. For man lives in uncertainty, and yet knows he 
is caught in a legitimate and unavoidable process’.540 The parodos, as previously 
shown,541 concludes on this very mixed note: 
 
Díka dè toîj mèn paqoûsin maqeîn æpirrépei<  
tò méllon d’ æpei génoit’ 
$an klúoij< prò cairétw< 
#ison dè t^_ prosténein<   
toròn gàr 7xei súnorqron a÷gaîj (250-4). 
 
6.4 Agamemnon 40-257: the inextricability of justice and injustice 
 
One may note how the dramatic complexity of the parodos allows for the comparison 
with some aspects of Presocratic cosmology to extend even further. Besides the 
attention dedicated to the two aspects of time and necessity, the Chorus present the 
justice of the Trojan War as tightly interlocked with injustice. Indeed, when closer 
attention is brought to the context in which this depiction takes place, one may discover 
that a portion of the events (109-59; 184-249) preceding the war of Troy are, 
simultaneously, the same events leading up to another act, namely, the sacrifice of 
Iphigenia (218-49).  
 
It has long been recognised that the portent of the eagles and the hare is the strongest of 
the links that bind the story of Troy to the sacrifice of Iphigenia. This is due not only to 
the most obvious fact that it is the omen itself which provokes the anger of Artemis 
and, hence, the sacrifice of Agamemnon’s daughter, but also because the link between 
the loss of innocent lives which the war must bring and the reckless sacrifice of 
Iphigenia is itself foreshadowed in the portent. Most scholars concur in interpreting the 
eagles as a symbol standing for the Atreidae and the hare as a symbol standing either 
for Iphigenia,542 for the loss of innocent lives which the war will involve,543 or for a 
combination of the two.544 
                                                
540 1968: 65. 
541 Cf. Ch. 4.1. 
542 Stanford 1939: 143-4; Finley 1955: 252; Whallon 1961: 81. 
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I have already recalled how, through the language of telos, Aeschylus manages to 
create a connection between distant events and how, in the parodos, the twofold 
appearance of protéleia connects the Trojan War (65) to the sacrifice of Iphigenia 
(227). In between, the words of Calchas interpreting the portent (126-55) restate in a 
veiled but powerful manner the connection between these two events. Indeed, I would 
follow Vidal-Naquet in his observation that Calchas himself seems to emphasise the 
underlying ambivalence of the portent. On the one hand the hunted hare with young is 
Troy, whose capture are subsequently described through the metaphor of a hunting net 
which neither young nor adult is able to overstep (357-60).545 On the other hand, as the 
detailed demonstration of Stanford has illuminated, the ambiguity of line 136 suggests 
that the hare is also Iphigenia sacrificed by her father. 
 
 Whereas the primary meaning of a÷tótokon prò lócou mogeràn ptáka 
quoménoisin, referring to the eagles, is: ‘slaying a trembling hare and its young before 
their birth’, it could also mean, if taken to refer to the Atreidae, for whom the eagles 
stand: ‘sacrificing a trembling cowering woman, his own child, on behalf of the army’. 
As Stanford points out, ptáx or ptÍx originally meant a ‘timorous cowering thing’ 
and became only subsequently attached to the hare. In Eumenides it is applied by the 
Erinyes to Orestes  (326), and although most commentators, taking it metaphorically, 
translate it as ‘hare’,546 I would be inclined to follow Stanford in regarding this 
translation as inaccurate. My reason for rejecting it is that the Erinyes refer to Orestes 
as a ptÍka to then add: ‘a proper sacrifice to cleanse a mother’s murder’ (326-7). To 
regard the slaughtering of a hare as a proper sacrifice for the purpose indicated sounds a 
bit incongruous.  
 
Instead, I believe that ptÍx should be taken simply to mean ‘trembling animal’, with 
reference to the wretchedness of Orestes in his present position of a sacrificial victim; a 
position which the Erinyes probably regard much more literally than metaphorically. 
                                                                                                                                          
543 Lloyd-Jones 1962: 189; Kitto 1961: 66. 
544 Peradotto1969: 246; West 1979: 4-5; Winnington-Ingram 1983: 99; Nussbaum 1985: 245-6; 
Vidal-Naquet in Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1988: 147. 
545 Vernant and Vidal Naquet 1988: 147. 
546 Sommerstein, for instance, 2008: 397. 
 171 
Stanford’s analysis proceeds by showing the ‘quintuple ambiguity’ of the verse thus: 
a÷tótokoj, by analogy with a÷tópaij and a÷tógonoj, means ‘self-produced’, his 
own ‘child’; the first and most common meaning of lócoj is that of ‘host’ or ‘band’ - 
whereas, in fact, that of ‘child-birth’ is rarer – and thus prò lócou can mean both ‘in 
front of’ or ‘on behalf of the host’; and, finally, the literal meaning of qúein is of 
course ‘to sacrifice’ before than ‘to slaughter’. Hence this verse is, no doubt, ‘an 
astonishing feat of amphibological dexterity’, 547 asserting in the most powerful way the 
connection between the Trojan War and the sacrifice of Iphigenia also restated by the 
twofold appearance of the word protéleia.  
 
The sacrifice of Iphigenia is certainly among those passages in which, as Romilly 
expresses it, ‘distant memories and future prophecies join together’.548 As a corrupted 
sacrifice, an aberrant protéleia, the slaughter of Iphigenia, Calchas predicts, will 
allow for the rise of ‘a fearsome, guileful keeper of the house, a Wrath that remembers 
and will avenge a child’ (154-55). In the prophet’s oracular words, which are 
themselves a distant memory of the Chorus who is narrating, ‘the coming sacrifice of 
Iphigenia is half-identified with the wrath it will generate’,549 and thereby joined to the 
future developments of the whole play. Vidal-Naquet writes that ‘in one sense the 
whole play is going to show how this corrupt sacrifice […] follows upon others and 
brings others in its wake just as that monstrous hunt, the feasting of the eagles, is 
preceded and followed by others’.550 
 
Finally, it should be noted how the Trojan War and the sacrifice of Iphigenia are also 
linked through the theme of necessity. I have already shown how the expedition against 
Troy, presented as an act of retributive justice supported by Zeus and Moîra is 
constantly immersed in an atmosphere of inevitability. A similar sense of compulsion 
hovers over the sacrifice of Iphigenia as the Chorus, to describe Agamemnon’s resolve 
to proceed with the sacrifice, immortalise this moment of decision-making as a 
subjugation to necessity: ;anágkaj 1du lépadnon (218). Hence, West was right in 
                                                
547 Stanford 1939: 143-4. 
548 de Romilly 1968: 77. 
549 Sommerstein 2008: 19. 
550 Vernant and Vidal Naquet 1988: 148. 
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writing that ‘we are justified in asking whether the business of Artemis and the hare 
does not have some deeper significance in relation to Agamemnon’s whole destiny’, 551 
Linguistically, contextually and factually linked, the Trojan War and the sacrifice of 
Iphigenia are, above anything else, immersed in the same atmosphere of inexorability. 
 
In conclusion to this section some further considerations may be adduced. The parodos, 
which is centred on the events preceding the expedition against Troy, begins by 
focusing on the fault of Paris and the just punishment carried out by Menelaus and 
Agamemnon, and, in a compositional twist, ends by focusing on Agamemnon’s 
monstrous slaughter of his daughter. Since the death of Iphigenia will be put forward by 
Clytemnestra as one of the motives behind her killing of Agamemnon (1417; 1432), his 
daughter’s sacrifice is destined to define Agamemnon as guilty in the eyes of at least 
one other character of the play. As such, a portion of the events that, in the language of 
the Chorus, characterise Agamemnon as a prosecutor of justice and executioner of 
divine punishment, also lead him to commit an injustice he will have to pay for.552  
 
The sacrifice of Iphigenia, in the context of the war, is only the first example of a long 
list in which an act of justice (díkh) is entangled with an act of injustice ( ;adikía), in a 
cycle of revenge by means of which each ‘victor’ is transformed into a ‘victim’. Thus 
‘Iphigenia and the war are inextricable’,553 and, in their conjunction, they set the first 
example of the inextricability of justice and injustice, so characteristic of all the 
retributive acts that, in this tragedy, follow one another. In so doing the parodos 
anticipates what one eventually discovers to be a central concern of the whole trilogy: if 
retributive acts among humans always involve the interlocking of justice and injustice, 
the vendetta of the ‘blood for blood’ takes the form of an everlasting cycle. Truly, ‘an 
ode composed on this scale is no mere prelude to action, no mere decoration; in fact, it 
lays down, as firmly as can be, the intellectual foundations of the whole trilogy’.554 
 
                                                
551 West 1979: 4. 
552 Lesky1966: 82-3. Cf. Winnington-Ingram 1965: 41: ‘It is characteristic of Aeschylean 
tragedy that the penalties are inflicted by human-beings on one another’. On this point we shall 
return. 
553 Winnington-Ingram 1983: 75. 
554 Kitto 1961: 65. 
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The cycle of retributive acts among human beings presented by the Oresteia can be 
structurally comparable as the tragic counterpart of the cycle of retributive acts among 
the opposing elements in Presocratic cosmology where the ‘law of nature’ is envisaged 
as a cyclical sequence of requitals in which the participants cede and take in turn in 
accordance with their allotment. From Anaximander B1 in particular, it emerges how 
this justice is closely linked, on the one hand, to a sense of ‘compulsion’ or ‘necessity’, 
and, on the other, to some sort of inexorable time-limit, respecting which, the 
‘pendulum’ of justice must swing back and fro.  The parodos has proved a valid case-
study to demonstrate how the justice of the war of Troy and the injustice of the sacrifice 
of Iphigenia, in their unity, are also connected to a sense of necessity and to an idea of 
the inexorability of payment imposed through time. As such the first acts of retributive 
justice presented in the Oresteia immediately acquire a ‘cosmic’ dimension that is 
comparable to that of Anaximander B1. In both conceptions alike ‘the idea of justice 
[…] was not looked upon as a mere convention, but as an immanently effective norm 
inherent in reality itself’.555 My subsequent study shows that the parodos is no isolated 
instance, but that a similar metaphysical backdrop emerges equally from the analysis of 
other passages. 
 
6.5 Agamemnon 355-502 
 
The first stasimon picks up many themes from the parodos. During the opening 
anapaests (355-66) the victory against Troy is simultaneously celebrated as: a victory 
supported by Zeus and as a victory belonging to the glories of Night (355-6; 362-3), a 
victory that involved slavery and suffering for adults and youngsters alike (358-61), a 
victory to be conceived as a divine punishment against Paris (363-6). Hence, the theme 
of a war ordained by superhuman powers as a requital is vigorously restated during this 
anapaestic preamble both at the level of language and imagery: while the Chorus make 
no mention of the Atreidae’s pair, Zeus Xenios is said to have ‘brought this about’ (tòn 
táde práxanta, 363), ‘having long since bent his bow at Alexander’ (æp’ 
ŒAlexándr_ teínonta pálai tóxon, 363-4), whereby they convey the figure of a 
‘god-executioner’.  As noted by Fraenkel, the passage is an ‘unmistakable echo’ of 60 
                                                
555 Jaeger 1947: 35. 
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ff. in the parodos in which Zeus is said to have sent the Atreidae against Alexander (æp’ 
ŒAlexándr_) and that ‘the stretching of the bow coincides with the sending out of the 
avenging expedition’.556 The unmentioned Menelaus and Agamemnon are conspicuous 
in their absence, especially considering the insistence on the direct involvement of Zeus 
in the matter, figuratively and linguistically underlined by the image of the bow and the 
verb prássein, a verb central to the dynamics of linguistic appropriation of justice: it 
is used both by Agamemnon (dikaíwn q’ *wn æpraxámhn, 812) and Clytemnestra 
(\tima d’ o÷k æpraxáthn, 1443) in their claims of rectitude for their deeds. 
 
At the commencement of the lyrical part, the theme of Zeus’ direct intervention in the 
business of the war is picked up through the concise dictum 1praxen Ìj 1kranen 
(369), in which the linguistic assonance between the two verbs points at the twofold 
nature of Zeus’ power, both promoter and executioner of justice. As the lyrics unfold, 
the theme of justice is enlarged and the faith in the gods is restated: whoever expresses 
scepticism about the concern of the gods with human affairs is impious, for the gods 
will punish those who, having acquired abundance in excess, have ‘kicked the altar of 
Justice into oblivion’ (369-84); Paris’s story exemplifies the pattern of crime and 
punishment (o*ioj kaì Párij [...], 399), whereas that of Helen allows the Chorus to 
introduce the theme of the great suffering ‘because of someone else’s wife’ (448-9) and, 
thereby, to remind us of the disproportion between the crime and punishment in 
question. In this way, at the end of the fifth stanza and in preparation for the last one, 
the long-delayed mention of the Atreidae is powerfully striking (451).  
 
Recalling their epithet in the parodos, they are defined through the vocabulary of dikê, 
the ‘prosecutors’ (pródikoi) by means of which the metaphor of the war as a lawsuit is 
recalled.557 But unlike the corresponding passage in the parodos they are here invoked 
in connection with the resentment and the sorrow caused, as the Chorus will again 
lament the day of Agamemnon’s return, ‘on account of Helen’ (800). The intratextual 
reminder achieved through the language of dikê and the legalistic metaphor contribute 
to forcefully underline the shift in focus between the parodos and the first stasimon, in 
                                                
556 Fraenkel 1962: 191. 
557 Cf. Rutherford 2012: 131ff.; Macleod 1983: 31ff., Fraenkel 1962: 27. 
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which the Chorus moves from an assessment of the role of the Atreidae in the Trojan 
war in terms of punishment to an assessment of their role in terms of crime. Those who 
were described as the prosecutors of justice are now – that ‘the enemy’s soil covers its 
conquerors’ and that ‘instead of human beings urns and ashes arrive back at each man’s 
home’ (454-5; 434-6) – described as the perpetrators of injustice.  
 
In the last antistrophe, the theme of the war-caused bereavements reaches its climax558 
and the undulant pattern of thought developed during this ode comes full circle. No 
doubt, the ode culminates with a theme that harks back to the beginning: the faith in the 
inescapable punishment sent by the gods against those who sin (461-70). Thus the 
whole ode is characterised by circularity, a literary form that suits the meaning 
conveyed. Indeed, although not mentioned overtly, Agamemnon is the unmistakable 
referent at whom the Chorus’ veiled utterance points: first, vv. 459-60 seems to allude 
to the ‘possibility of a coup d’etat’ against one of the Atreidae; 559 second, the theme of 
‘excessive praise’ (468-70) anticipates the atmosphere of the ‘carpet scene’; finally, the 
Chorus’ wish never to be a ‘sacker of cities’ points forwards to the epithet they will use 
to welcome Agamemnon on his return (ptolipórqhj, 472; 783). Thus Fletcher is 
certainly right in claiming that ‘in the final antistrophe a premonition of Agamemnon’s 
imminent doom breaks to the surface of the elders’ thoughts’.560  
 
To put this in doubt, as Fontenrose has done by suggesting that the elders are thinking 
of Paris once again,561 corresponds – in my opinion – to a failure to grasp the 
dramaturgic subtleties here developed and the very essence of the message conveyed. 
For the reticence of the Chorus should be understood as stemming from the emotion of 
anxiety they are immersed in (460) and their comprehensible resistance to accepting the 
uncomfortable conclusion that Agamemnon is as blameworthy as Paris. But, as in the 
parodos, this is precisely the realization towards which the Choral narration moves: the 
inextricability between justice and injustice.562 If Agamemnon is then the main referent 
                                                
558 Cf. Athanassaki 1994: 156. 
559 Sommerstein 2008: 54. 
560 Fletcher 1999: 32. 
561 1971: 77. 
562 Cf. Lebeck 1971: 37: ‘although Paris and the Trojans may be the ostensible subject in the 
opening strophes […], each statement is filled with implication involving Agamemnon’. 
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of the last stanza, the ode opens with the theme of the punishment of Zeus and Night 
against the crime of Paris and Helen and terminates with the theme of the punishment of 
Zeus and the Furies (463) against the crime of Agamemnon. Thereby the formal 
circularity of the ode mirrors the circularity of the cycle of vendetta which the ode 
conveys in content.  
 
What is more, the first stasimon introduces the traditional theme of ‘surfeit’, a 
widespread concept among the poets of the time. The notion of kóroj is key to the 
understanding of Presocratic cosmology. For instance, according to Kirk, 
Anaximander’s B1 refers to ‘the constant interchange between opposed substances’ in 
which the prevalence of one substance at the expense of its contrary is ‘injustice’, 
whereas the infliction of punishment is that reaction leading to the wrong-doer being 
deprived of part of its original substance. This is then given to the former victim in 
addition to what was his original portion. Thus, the former victim is now itself led to a 
condition of surfeit (kóroj), committing in turn injustice against the former aggressor. 
563 Similarly, the theme of surfeit plays an important role in the cycle of crime and 
punishment enacted by the Oresteia, and this is particularly evident in the first stasimon, 
in which it represents another linking factor between the crime of Paris and that of the 
Atreidae. Hence both Anaximander and Aeschylus derived the theme of kóroj from 
their common cultural background and adapted it to fit their individual aim. What 
should be noted, however, is the profound similarity in structure of these two separate 
operations: the idea of excess is attached to a conception of injustice perceived as the 
transgression of a limit, and a conception of justice perceived as the reparation of such 
transgression within the larger cosmic picture of an iterative cycle.   
 
Indeed, the Solonian couplet ‘excess breeds insolence, whenever great prosperity comes 
to men who are not sound of mind’ (6. 3-4), could be used as a concise moral formula to 
explain Agamemnon’s attitude in this play, but, as noted by Sommerstein,564 it seems 
also to be alluded to by the Chorus at the beginning of the first stasimon with reference 
to Paris: 
                                                
563 K.R.S. 2007: 119-20. 
564 2008: 46. 
 177 
 
[…] pneóntwn meîzon $h dikaíwj 
fleóntwn dwmátwn øpérfeu (376-7) 
 
[…] o÷ gár æstin 1palxij 
ploútou pròj kóron ;andrì 
laktísanti mégan Díkaj 
bwmòn eêj ;afáneian. (381-4). 
 
Worth noticing in this passage is the newly refined meaning and further variation on the 
theme of dikê, which, by means of its juxtaposition with the concept of kóroj seems to 
gain here a connotation more in the direction of ‘measure’, ‘moderation’, and ‘respect 
of one’s own limits’. This seems to be the kind of justice administered by Moîra, the 
deity who allocates to everyone his lot and metes out punishment for its infringement. 
In an ode in which the intervention of Zeus is first associated with Night and then with 
the Furies – in this trilogy mother and sisters of the Moîrai respectively – it seems very 
fitting that justice may gain the sort of colouring suggested. One may find Vlastos’ 
definition particularly illuminating: 
 
 Cosmic justice is a conception of nature at large as a harmonious association, whose 
members observe, or are compelled to observe, the law of measure. There may be 
death, destruction, strife, even encroachment (as in Anaximander). There is justice 
nonetheless, if encroachment is invariably repaired and things are reinstated within 
their proper limits.565 
 
Hence, by the same reasoning, the kóroj of Paris becomes here in the first stasimon a 
cosmic injustice: it is the infringement of a law of measure; the human and moral law of 
moderation.  
 
Although the word is not repeated, the concept of surfeit and lack of moral measure is 
restated with reference to Agamemnon: 
 
                                                
565 Vlastos 1947: 156. 
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tÏn poluktónwn gàr o÷k 
\skopoi qeoí, kelai- 
naì d’ ’Erinúej crón_ 
tuchròn 3nt’ \neu díkaj 
palintuceî trib^= bíou 
tiqeîs’ ;amaurón, æn d’ ;aís- 
toij teléqontoj o5tij ;al- 
ká.tò d’ øperkópwj klúein 
e%u barú (461-70). 
 
The proverbial wisdom of ‘excess breeds hybris’ is linked here - in which the idea of 
excess is underlined by prefixes such as polu- or øper - to other traditional ‘truths’ 
such as the alternating pattern of fortune and the supervision of Zeus over human affairs 
as the guarantor of justice.   
  
Hence, in the first stasimon the Chorus move from an initial optimism expressed by the 
faith in the gods and a feeling that those guilty have paid their due to the growing 
pessimistic realization that Agamemnon must also be called to respond for his crimes. 
However, this shift of perspective, which has been aptly defined as a sort of ‘internal 
dialogue’ of the Chorus,566 far from enfeebling the overriding theme of retributive 
justice allows it to acquire a most powerful tragic dimension. Athanassaki and Fletcher 
have both demonstrated the complexity of this stasimon’s choral voice.567 Fletcher, in 
particular, by identifying the three narrative voices of the poet, the chorus in its persona 
as Argive elders, and the characters in the chorus’ narrative, and by showing the way 
these voices blend and separate throughout the ode, was able to show its intricate 
polyphony. I therefore partially rely on Fletcher’s analysis to enhance the points I made 
thus far and to prepare the grounds for those I make next. 
 
As mentioned above, from their posture of great authority at the outset of the ode the 
Chorus speak as if they were conveying an unequivocal interpretation: the justice of the 
gods has been accomplished and the Chorus speak as if the causes of the war had to be 
raised and understood above the personal motives of Menelaus and Agamemnon. This 
                                                
566 Fletcher 1999: 33. 
567 Fletcher 1999; Athanassaki 1994. 
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unilateral and unemotional perspective is abandoned, as noted by Fletcher, in the second 
strophic system, in which the Elders, who until then were letting no other voices speak, 
allow the words of the dómwn profÖtai to intrude into the narrative. The long 
scholarly debate attached to these mysterious figures’ identity does not concern us here 
as much as does the question concerning the closure of their discourse and, most 
importantly of all, its function and effect. 
 
To the best of my knowledge there have been four suggestions concerning the 
demarcation of the profÖtai’s discourse: Wilamowitz, Deveroux, and Paley end the 
quotation at 411, as if the speech had to be confined to a brief outburst of grief; Murray, 
Thomson and Lattimore end the quotation at 415; Campbell at the end of the strophe at 
420; whereas the majority of scholars beginning with Pauw, Shütz, Wecklein, followed 
by Verrall, Fraenkel, Page, Rose, Lloyd-Jones, West, and Sommerstein, concur in 
placing the end of the quotation at 426, for, as Fraenkel explains, the quotation would 
thereby terminate at the corresponding position in the antistrophe to that at which it 
begins in the strophe. Finally, Athanassaki has gone even further in putting the end of 
the quotation at the close of the third strophe (455).568 Such variety of suggestions has 
its cause in the lack of explicit indication in the text and the fact that no hypothesis on 
where to place the closure, as demonstrated by both Athanassaki and Fletcher, is utterly 
unambiguous. This is not the place to argue in favour of one position over the other: for 
that would be contrary to my conviction that such ambiguity is a deliberate narrative 
technique devised by the author to blend various voices together.   
 
Indeed, both Athanassaki and Fletcher, notwithstanding their divergent interpretations 
of where to demarcate the closure of the profÖtai’s speech, have already underlined 
the fact that the poet ‘has opted for the powerful effect of the ambiguity that results 
from lack of clear demarcation’, in order to create a ‘speech which seems to issue from 
two separate sources’.569 In other words, the choral voice of the dómwn profÖtai, 
speaking through the choral voice of the Argive Elders, allows the reader to contemplate 
the Trojan War from a simultaneity of different points of view. Whoever they may be, 
                                                
568 For this summary see Fletcher 1999: 37, Athanassaki 1994: 150; Fraenkel 1962: 223. 
569 Athanassaki 1994: 161; Fletcher 1999: 36. 
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these figures allow with their speech for a more intimate and personal tone to 
intersperse the plain gnomic continuum of the previous strophic pair. Through their 
discourse we come closer to Menelaus’ individual and human misery as we see what 
cannot be seen (fásma, 415) and we hear a lament we cannot hear (sigâj, 412).  
 
Therefore, to Athanassaki’s and Fletcher’s observation that this passage is double-
voiced it should be added that is also triple-viewed, for it involves the Chorus of Elders 
recounting the speech of the profÖtai, reporting in turn the painful experience of 
Menelaus. When the description of Menelaus’ suffering comes to an end, and 
presumably the narration is resumed as the direct speech of the Elders, the polyphonic 
effect prepared can be heard at its best. From the suffering of an individual man closely 
focussed through this kaleidoscope of multiple perspectives, the poet retrocedes through 
a zooming out that moves from the suffering of the individual man to that of the whole 
house and, again, from this single house to a grand panoramic of every house in Greece 
(427-31). The pathetic description of Greece’ suffering, as observed by Lebeck, 
parallels and renders almost insignificant that of Menelaus’ suffering,570 while at the 
same time, involving a further shift in perspective: at 449 one realises that what came 
first must have partially been the choral voice of each Greek household joined together 
in their grief for the dead. 
 
This shift in perspectives is also accompanied by an enormous shift in time dimension: 
from the suffering of Menelaus caused by Helen’s elopement before the War, we reach 
the suffering of the Greeks after the War. Hence, the multiplicity of perspectives is 
matched by a ‘multiplicity of timeframes’,571 and yet the transition form one to the other 
is perfectly smooth. Two factors contribute to this effect of smoothness: the thematic 
analogy between the personal and collective woes and the predominance of the present 
tense for a summation of both Menelaus’s sorrow at the origin of the war and of the 
aftermaths of the very same war (tad’ æsti, 428 ⁄ táde tij baÅzei, 431).572 This 
temporal anomaly ‘gives the narrative’, as Athanassaki puts it, ‘an iterative quality, 
                                                
570 Lebeck 1971: 44. 
571 Athanassaki 1994: 160. 
572 But also: páresti êdeîn, 411-12; 1rrei, 419; páreisi, férousai, 421; tá and at 415 even 
a future: dóxei ;anássein, 415; prépei, 431; qiggánei, 432; ;afikneîtai, 436; pémpei, 441; 
gemízwn, 443; sténousi, légontej, 445; katécousin, 454. 
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pointing out thereby the recurrence of the feeling of grief and anger over a very long 
period of time’, 573  but also dissolves the consecutio temporum in a sort of 
contemporaneous blend. The double-voiced quality of the narration allows for the past 
grief of Menelaus recounted by the profÖtai to overlap with the present grief of the 
Argives recounted by the Chorus, to the effect that one perceives the past as a ‘living 
and controlling element’.574 
 
Hence, through this passage, Aeschylus conveys the law of retributive justice at an 
emotional level. Rather than as a logical transition, the movement from a perspective 
showing the Atreiadae’s action in terms of justice to one showing it in terms of crime, is 
conveyed emotionally through the blending of past and present sorrows, with the latter 
outdoing the former. The multivocal quality of the central strophes, in which different 
points of view overlap and coexist, allows for a subtle shift of reference and time-frame, 
by means of which the suffering of the past becomes one with that of the present. As put 
by Kitto: ‘we are to feel that the Past is an active factor in the Present; not merely that 
the characters do what they do because of something that happened before, but that the 
past horror is waiting to be reincarnated as a present horror’.575 The suffering which was 
part of the cause of the war blends with the suffering that is the consequence of the war.  
 
As the Chorus resume – although one cannot say exactly when – their role of unilateral 
narrators, they restate, as we have seen, the same truths which were valid for Paris with 
reference to Agamemnon; and, although together with the re-appropriation of their 
supremacy in the narration they also regain a gnomic and detached tone in their 
utterance, the emotional response provoked in the recipient of their message has 
changed, to the effect that their ‘revised perspective on the events seems absolutely 
natural’.576 Finally, it should be noted how, at the culmination of this ode, which so 
powerfully conveys the theme of retributive justice, the themes of the ineluctability of a 
divinely ordained justice and the indefiniteness of time are, once again, joined together.  
 
                                                
573 Athanassaki 1994: 160. 
574 Kitto 1961; 73. 
575 Kitto 1961: 72. 
576 Fletcher 1999: 42. 
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The justice of the gods is not ‘without a scope’ (o÷k \skopoi qeoí), it is a far-
reaching sight that pierces through different time-frames indiscriminately, bringing 
together apparently separate events in a sort of abstract present tense: as Zeus’ bow did 
not miss the target of Paris when he sent a Fury against him, it will not be  \skopoj in 
sending black Furies against Agamemnon. Thus at the end of the first stasimon the three 
themes of retributive justice, necessity, and time are, once again, majestically combined. 
As I have shown, the Chorus engage in a sort of internal dialogue by means of which 
the unilateral and detached tone of their gnomai is confuted in the light of the human 
condition: the impact of the cosmic law of retributive justice on human existence is 
conveyed through the polifocal viewpoint of multiple and simultaneous perspectives. 
 
As usual in the Oresteia various attitudes and interpretations of reality coexist: first, the 
characters, including the Chorus, present and interpret the flow of events in which they 
are immersed according to the traditional outlook of cosmic justice and Zeus’ will. Yet 
this world-view is simultaneously problematized from within: for the characters often 
either manipulate this world-view to their advantage or they portray the unbearable 
suffering it imposes on the individuals and the collectiveness. In both cases, the intimate 
and relativistic perspectives of single and group characters are constantly brought to 
clash with the universal utterances about justice, time and necessity, with which they 
alternate.  The parodos and the first stasimon can then be seen each as a miniaturised 
exemplification of this dramatic technique, in which certain truths are presented so as to 
be assimilated both at the level of judgment and at the level of emotions. Hence in the 
Agamemnon not only ‘action and dialectic’ are ‘made lyric’,577 but lyricism is presented 
as a – perhaps the most immediate – human response to the dialectical essence of 
reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
577 Kitto 1961: 74. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
The Workings of Dikê 
 
7.1 Setting the mood 
 
At the end of Choephori, after the culmination578 of the cycle of sanguinary vendetta in 
Orestes’ slaughter of his own mother, the Chorus sing: 
 
1mole mèn díka Priamídaij crón_, 
barúdikoj poiná< 
1mole d’ eêj dómon tòn ;Agamémnonoj 
diploûj léwn, diploûj #Arhj< 
1lase d’ eêj tò pân 
ñ puqócrhstoj fugàj 
qeóqen e%u fradaîsin Ìrmhménoj. (935-41) 
[…] 
1mole d’ **= mélei kruptadíou mácaj, 
doliófrwn Poiná< 
1qige d’ æn mác= ceròj ætÔtumoj 
Diòj kóra – Díkan dé nin 
prosagoreúomen 
brotoì tucóntej kalÏj – 
;oléqrion pnéous’ æp’ æcqroîj kóton. (946-52) 
 
This is the first strophic pair that opens the third and last stasimon near the end of 
Choephori. In the strophe, the Chorus, as if turning back to scrutinise the past in search 
of some causal explanation, give an account of the main chain of events that has 
preceded and led to the final murder: the Trojan War, which brought about the fall of 
the family of Priam (935-6), the murder of Agamemnon at the hands of Clytemnestra 
and Aegisthus (937-8),579 and the matricide committed by Orestes under the influence 
                                                
578 The Chorus themselves perceive the act thus: notice the verb æpakrízw at 932. 
579 Most commentators read diploûj léwn with reference to Orestes and Pylades (Garvie 1986: 
304; Collard 2008: 195; Sommerstein 2008: 333; Medda 2011: 452). For alternative 
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of Apollo (939-41). Here, unmistakably, díkh is equated with poinÔ  and is portrayed 
by the Chorus as the connecting principle between past and present, as the overarching 
law governing each sanguinary act. The equation of díkh with poinÔ is skilfully 
prepared through style as well as content. The threefold anaphora 1mole… 
1mole…1mole580 marks the steps of this process of identification: first, the equation is 
plainly stated by means of apposition (díka, poiná) and further underlined through the 
epithet barúdikoj;581 second, the past is connected to the present (1mole mén…1mole 
dé) to the effect that each act of vengeance is read as a manifestation of the same 
retributive justice; third, the last repetition of 1mole, which opens the antistrophe, 
expounds the equation between justice and retribution in more abstract terms.  
 
The exact coincidence between strophe and antistrophe, with the striking 
‘correspondence of epithet + poiná’,582 is particularly worthy of notice: while both 
adjectives, as compounds, add conceptual layers to the idea of justice, the stylistic 
repetition has the function of underlining the fact that the antistrophe should be read as 
an elaboration of the ‘facts’ collected in the strophe. ‘Crafty-minded revenge’ has come, 
while Justice, who is the very daughter of Zeus – we are told – and who ‘breathes 
deadly wrath against the enemy’ (952) has touched ‘the hand involved in the battle’ (æn 
mác= cerój, 948).583 Indeed, Garvie is right in recognising Orestes as the implied 
subject of the action and the owner of the hand, yet the lack of an explicit referent 
allows the ‘hand’ to acquire simultaneously a less personal connotation. The æn mác= 
                                                                                                                                          
interpretations: Valgimigli 1980; Hiltbrunner 1950; Higgins 1978 :30. I read diploûj with 
reference to the common action of two metaphoric lions (Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, cf. Smyth 
1957) and not to the double action of one lion. Diploûj is the cause of a similar ambiguity at 
Cho. 375-9 (cf. Garvie 1986: 142), and its understanding bears some weight in my argument. 
Throughout the Oresteia Aeschylus makes mainly two uses of the adjective: first, to describe a 
repetition of the same action or a double of the same entity (Ag. 642; Cho. 973; Eum. 129, 944); 
second, to describe two distinct effects or aspects of the same action or reality (Ag. 325, 537; 
Cho. 761). However: the only other time in which the adjective is used in the nominative in 
conjunction with a concrete subject is Cho. 973, where Orestes refers to Clytemnestra and 
Aegisthus as diploûj turanníj; when Aeschylus describes the twin-effect of an action, he is 
more explicit and uses expressions such as diplÖ sumforá (Ag. 325; Cho. 931); and Orestes’ 
singleness (mónoj) against two (dissoí) opponents was stressed at 866-7. Finally, calling the 
downfall of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus ‘the house of Agamemnon’ (937) would be odd. 
580 935, 937, 946. 
581 Similarly, Garvie 1986: 305. 
582 Garvie 1986: 308. 
583 My translation. 
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cerój could almost stand for every hand which has been touched by Justice in a 
moment of revenge: it could be the hand of Agamemnon when he was destroying the 
house of Priam, or that of Clytemnestra when she was vindicating Iphigenia, as well as 
being the hand of Orestes during his matricide. Hence, at the end of Choephori, by 
linking Orestes’ murder of his mother to all the acts of vendetta that preceded it, the 
Chorus present in the most powerful way their interpretation of justice as a divine penal 
mechanism: Díkh, daughter of Zeus, is identified with PoinÔ, and each retributive act 
is presented as the element of a pattern. 
 
Overall, the Chorus sing in a joyful mood: their song is one of triumph which celebrates 
the victory of Justice and the restoration of the house  (942-5), the hope of a new era of 
light (pára te fÏj êdeîn), freedom and purification from evils (961-71). They sing of 
the gods with pious devotion: for always, it seems, ‘divine power prevails’ (krateî d’ 
aêeí pwj tò qeîon) against ‘ills’ (kakoîj, 959). However, this mood of joy and 
declaration of faith in the capability of the gods to cure evils rapidly succumbs when the 
Chorus is confronted with the actual horror of matricide. At first, Orestes, whose speech 
opens the final scene, picks up the same triumphant mood of the Chorus’ (973-1076). In 
his proud presentation of his deed (‘behold!’, #idesqe, 973), he offers a firm account of 
the details of his act and the motives behind it: Clytemnestra is presented as a tyrant and 
a monster, and he seems to have no doubts that justice has been attained (973-1006). 
However, the general atmosphere rapidly changes as the Chorus challenge Orestes’s 
boldness in their first two anapaestic interventions (1007-9; 1018-20): transfixed by the 
horror of matricide, instead of responding to Orestes they address Clytemnestra’s corpse 
directly (which is the subject of dieprácqhj) and refer to the act as a sorrowful deed 
(1007). What is more, they now remind Orestes that ‘for him who remains, suffering 
comes into flower’ (1009) and that if ‘some troubles are here now’, also ‘some will 
come later’ (1020). Orestes’ initial indignation as he asks 1drasen $h o÷k 1drasen> 
and calls his deed a níkh (1017), quickly gives way to nerve-racking fear:  
 
                       
  Pròj dè kardí= Fóboj  
##=dein çtoîmoj Òd’ øporceîsqai Kót_ (1024-5) 
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As he begins to feel the burden of his deed, his certainty gives way to the frantic 
urgency of self-justification, by means of which Orestes anxiously seeks to plead the 
justice of his murder (1026-1044): his matricide, he says, was not without justice (o÷k 
\neu díkhj). And indeed it was not – one may add – for Orestes’ justice is that very 
one about which the Chorus sang in their stasimon: the justice of retaliation, a justice 
‘who breathes deadly wrath (kótoj, 952) against the enemy’ and who has now begun to 
breathe her wrath against Orestes. The introduction of his madness is accompanied by 
the suggestion that he must now himself suffer as a consequence of the same retributive 
law which caused his mother’s death. Orestes’ incipient realization of this, matched by 
his tangible emotional upheaval, leads the Chorus-leader to yet another reversal of 
mood. 584   As Orestes begins what has been defined as ‘a dramatic race with 
madness’,585 the Chorus-leader adopts a comforting role; as if unwilling to accept 
Orestes’ increasing despair, she comments: ;all’ e%u g’ 1praxaj (1044). But rational 
arguments and consciousness of rightness are now too feeble as antidotes to the onset of 
madness; the visions begin (1048) and Orestes departs pursued by his ‘mother’s 
wrathful hounds’ (1054).  
 
From a jubilant song and a confident speech to anguish, despair, and madness: the 
exodos of Choephori most powerfully depicts the clash between two possible ways of 
looking at retributive justice. The abstract and rational analysis of the mechanism of 
such justice is portrayed in its juxtaposition to human psychology and emotions; the 
recognition of the infallibility of divine power, which intervenes with surgical accuracy 
to remove evil and administer the equality of the lex talionis, is dramatized in its 
moment of culmination as something wholly unsustainable for a human being.  Orestes’ 
consciousness of the righteousness of his deed does not prevent him from going mad as 
a reaction to the horror of matricide. Thus Choephori ends with the portrayal of a tragic 
impasse. In the concluding anapaests, after Orestes’ departure, the audience’s attention 
is redirected to past events (1065-74), but the mood is utterly different from that of the 
stasimon: each event is perceived as a ruinous tempest (ceimÍn, 1066). The tone varies 
                                                
584 This undulating emotional pattern, in which one or both party undergoes a substantial (or 
several) change of attitude, is a typical characteristic of the interaction between Chorus and 
characters in the Oresteia. Conacher has accurately studied it in 1974: 323-343, although this 
specific instance does not feature among his examples. 
585 Conacher 1987: 125. 
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from pathetic – as when emphasis is being placed on the ‘sad suffering’ (mócqoi 
tálanej, 1069) – to utterly desperate:   
 
Poî dÖta kraneî, poî katalÔxei 
metakoimisqèn ménoj \thj; (1075-6) 
 
There seems to be no end in sight for the cycle of blood-vendetta and relentless action 
of #Ath, as long as Díkh, daughter of Zeus, remains the same thing as PoinÔ. 
 
7.2 Díkh as PoinÔ and the code of revenge 
 
At a very simple level of significance, díkh is the code of revenge of the lex talionis, 
which involves a balance of action and suffering (i.e. no offence must go without 
retaliation). This code is stated by various characters at various points of the narrative, 
for instance: by the Herald, with regard to Paris and Troy, neither of which ‘can boast 
that what they did was greater than what they have suffered’ (æxeúcetai tò drâma 
toû páqouj pléon, Ag. 533); by Cassandra, in her prophecy of Clytemnestra’s and 
Aegisthus’ death which will counterbalance her own and Agamemnon’s death: ‘when a 
woman dies in return for me, a woman, and a man falls in return for a man who had an 
evil wife’ (1318-19); 586 as well as by Electra in her prayer ‘for the killers to meet 
justice and perish in their turn’ (toùj ktanóntaj ;antikatqaneîn dík+, Cho. 144). 
 
But this díkh code is most forcefully formulated by two highly emotional choral 
passages: the long epirrhematic exchange between the Chorus of Elders and 
Clytemnestra after the murder of the king in the Agamemnon and the great kommos 
shared by Orestes, Electra and the Chorus of Female Slaves around the tomb of the dead 
king in Choephori. 587  In the Agamemnon (1407-1576), the Chorus engage with 
                                                
586 As Fraenkel comments: ‘Striking expression is here given to the idea of the inevitability of 
talio’, 1962: 615.  
587 A note on modern terminology: it is a scholarly habit to call kommos every lyric or semi-lyric 
exchange between a Chorus and one or more actors, notwithstanding their content. Instead, I 
choose here to call kommoi only those epirrhemata (semi-lyric) and amoibaia (fully lyric), or a 
combination of the two, which are also lamentations in content. Considering the threnodic 
nature of the Chorus’ ephymnia at 1489-96 and 1512-1520, the epirrhema between the Chorus 
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Clytemnestra in a dramatic exchange over 150 verses long, in which the law of blood 
for blood is repeatedly invoked by both parties: first, after the murder of Agamemnon, 
the Chorus remind Clytemnestra that she will ‘suffer stroke in return for stroke’ (túmma 
túmmati teîsai, 1430) and, shortly afterwards, the same rule is repeated by 
Clytemnestra herself: \xia drásaj, \xia páscwn (1527). Subsequently, the Chorus 
reinforce Clytemnestra’s dictum by means of four formulas, each except the last also 
picking up and exaggerating Clytemnestra’s phonetic iteration though several 
ostentatious polyptota:  
 
3neidoj !hkei tód’ ;ant’ ;;oneídouj. (1560) 
 
férei féronta. (1562) 
 
æktínei d’ ñ kaínwn. (1562) 
 
paqeîn tòn 1rxanta. (1564) 
 
Similarly, during the long and complex kommos of Choephori (306-478), as the Chorus 
remind the siblings of the uncompromising and ineluctable requirements of retributive 
justice, the foundations of the code of vendetta are, once again, laid down in strikingly 
analogous terms:  
 
;antì mèn æcqrâj glÍsshj æcqrà glÏssa teleísqw.  
                                                                                 (309-10) 
 
;antì dè plhgÖj foníaj fonían plhgÕn tinétw. (312) 
 
drásanti paqeîn. (313) 
 
These foundations, which are vigorously said to be cried out by Justice herself (Díkh 
még’ ;aüteî, 311), are described with three mottos all of which add to the Agamemnon’s 
list. As Kitto writes: ‘With this there is a gathering-together and an emphatic 
                                                                                                                                          
and Clytemnestra to which I refer above could be regarded as a quasi-kommos.  For further 
details and bibliography cf. Cornford 1913: 41-4 and Garvie 1986: 122. 
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restatement of the old themes’.588 In particular, the dicta expressing the idea that passive 
retribution awaits active guilt sound closely akin with each other: \xia drásaj, \xia 
páscwn, drásanti paqeîn, paqeîn tòn 1rxanta. 
 
The inexorability of this law (nómoj), which dictates a balance of action and suffering, 
is also depicted in this kommos through the powerful image of blood dripping to the 
ground: ‘when drops of gore flow to the ground, they demand other blood’ (foníaj 
stagónaj | cuménaj eêj pédon \llo prosaiteîn | a*ima, 400-2): the lex talionis is 
literally depicted as a ‘law of blood for blood’. And when lifeblood flows to the ground 
and it is drunk by those chthonic powers who enforce the justice of retribution, in their 
awakening they bring ‘further ruin upon ruin’    (\thn | çtéran æp’ \t+, 403-4). As 
Lebeck writes: ‘The blood which falls to earth leaves an indelible stain which only 
blood can wash away […]. Hence one act of vengeance requires another in 
atonement’.589 
 
Gathered together and scanned in a single glance, these mottos display a remarkable 
consistency: they all point to the symmetry of retaliation, in which wrong-doing, here 
underlined by the verbs 1rdein and drân, is followed by equal suffering (páscein), 
and the inexorability of this rule is conveyed by means of anaphoric repetitions and 
gnomic-sounding utterances. However, when one looks at them in their context, 
considering the emotional dynamics in which they are embedded, as well as the 
utterances about the divine with which they are connected, these detached formulas 
acquire many nuances and broader levels of significance. In both passages, through the 
progression of the interaction between the characters and the Chorus, the rule of 
vengeance is slowly revealed in its tragic dimension.  
 
7.3 Agamemnon 1407-1576 
 
 Before the murder of the king, Cassandra had twice prophesied all the future deaths, 
namely Agamemnon’s, Clytemnestra’s and her own, as well as the past crime of Atreus, 
                                                
588 Kitto 1961: 82. 
589 Lebeck 1971: 80, who offers an in-depth analysis of the whole motif of dripping and flowing 
in the trilogy, which she treats as an ‘outgrowth of the gnome paqeîn tòn 1rxanta’. 
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ancestor of the house. In other words, her ‘vision adds the final link to the chain of 
causes which can only end in Agamemnon’s death’.590 Considering that the main focus 
of the play had hitherto been that of Paris’ guilt and the Atreidae’s disproportionate 
retribution for it, Cassandra’s scene marks a clear shift of emphasis and is pivotal to the 
dramatic advancement of the play. It also represents the perfect preparation for the 
scene and the epirrhematic exchange to follow.  
 
As the idea of abiding wrath in the family is evoked and described through the image of 
the Erinyes – a choir of unpleasant singers and a human-blood drinking band that never 
leaves the house (1186-1190) – a new, more distant starting point than that of Helen’s 
elopement is established as the primeval source for the house’s present calamities 
(prÍtarcon \thn, 1192). 591  Moreover, as the horrific crime of the preceding 
generation, the slaughter of the innocent children of Thyestes, is evoked, one cannot 
help making the link with the horrific slaughter of the innocent child of the present 
generation. Indeed, the sacrifice of Iphigenia, one may recall, was said by the Chorus to 
rouse hereafter in the house a fearsome Wrath ‘that remembers’: mímnei gàr foberà 
palínortoj | oêkonómoj dolía, mnámwn MÖnij teknópoinoj (154-5). Thus 
Agamemnon’s crimes are linked to those of his father, Atreus, their savage and all-
daring character displayed in the horrific killing of innocent children. 
 
Also, through Cassandra’s prophecy, a connection between what she describes and the 
war is established. This connection, which has perhaps already been proleptically 
suggested by the symbolism of the pregnant hare, is that the war ‘was inspired by the 
same spirit’: 592 a spirit of hatred and violence, a spirit of wrath and horror in which 
crimes are punished through a justice that always entails an equivalent or even graver 
action than what preceded it, representing thus a cycle in which hybris begets hybris and 
                                                
590 Lebeck 1971: 53. 
591 Similarly Kitto in 1959: 30; see also Doyle 1983: 59, according to whom to define an event 
as prÍtarcoj is to treat it as the cause of other events. Interestingly, in a recent article 
Sommerstein argues in favour of this \th as the only instance in this trilogy whose primary 
meaning is that of ‘mental aberration’ instead of the more frequent ‘disaster, ruin, destruction’. 
Assuming hence this \th to be mainly causative, Sommerstein interprets it as ‘the folly that 
possessed the mind of Thyestes and Aërope’, 2013: 7. 
592 Ibid. 
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atê comes upon atê.593 This connection is also made explicit through Cassandra’s 
repeated juxtaposition of the suffering of the city of Ilium, (first at 1167-1172 and later 
at 1286-8 in which she also describes Agamemnon’s death as a ‘verdict’ received 
‘before the tribunal of the gods’) with all the sufferings that have been imposed or will 
be provoked by a new act of vengeance: the suffering of Thyestes’ children at the hands 
of Atreus (1096-7; 1215-22), that of Agamemnon at the hands of Clytemnestra and 
Aegisthus (1100-4; 1223-31) and the suffering Cassandra herself had to endure on 
account of Apollo (1149; 1256-81). Before the murder of Agamemnon takes place, 
Cassandra’s speech reveals the similar spirit which animated every retributive act up 
until this moment and in many ways prepares the grounds for the confrontation of 
Clytemnestra with the Chorus. 
 
In the long epirrhematic exchange after the murder of Agamemnon, the theme of 
retributive justice is investigated as a causal explanation. The prelude of Cassandra’s 
scene introduces all the missing elements for the theme of retribution to be investigated 
as such. Indeed, both participants can now avail themselves of the idea of the mnámwn 
MÖnij and of a daimon residing in the house. This, however, far from implying a 
convergence between Clytemnestra and the Chorus, determines instead a fierce 
dialectic. The nature of the exchange around the theme of responsibility is a heated 
debate in which neither party seems capable of committing themselves to a univocal 
position and keeps influencing the other’s attitudes in a relentless interchange of 
emotions. As Winnington-Ingram comments: ‘the traditional form of lamentation is 
complicated by a divergence of sympathy between the participants, by argument and 
counter-argument, and by reference to the deepest philosophical issues of the trilogy’.594 
I shall now proceed to illustrate the main stages of this debate. 
 
This epirrhema could be described as an ever-receding sequence in which the queen and 
the Chorus embark together on a desperate search for a causal explanation of the 
murder. The whole exchange is preceded by a long monologue in which Clytemnestra 
                                                
593 Ag. 763-6; Cho. 402-4. 
594 Winnington-Ingram 1983: 111. 
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gives open avowal to her hatred for Agamemnon (1371ff) and states with triumphant 
defiance her full responsibility for her deed: 
 
!esthka d’ 1nq’ 1pais’ æp’ æxeirgasménoij. 
o!utw d’ 1praxa, kaì tád’ o÷k ;arnÔsomai, 
Ìj mÔte feúgein mÔt’ ;amúnasqai móron. (1379-81) 
 
To which she adds, after the Chorus’ first amazed reaction (1399-1400), the following 
remark:  
 
         o*utój æstin ;Agamémnwn, æmòj 
pósij, nekròj dé, tÖsde dexiâj ceròj 
1rgon, dikaíaj téktonoj. (1404-6) 
 
With this reply Clytemnestra restates her indifference to the Elders’ judgment as well as 
her responsibility for the act. Yet, this time, the statement gains a specific colouring: it 
becomes a statement of justice (1406) and a defiant admission of her identity as 
Agamemnon’s wife (1405). With this reply the epirrhema proper begins: the Chorus’ 
agitated singing, a mixture of attacks against the queen and lamentations for the king, 
are answered by Clytemnestra’s spoken replies. 
 
The Chorus’ first and aggressive intimidation: ;apédikej ;apétamej ;apópolij d’ 1s+ 
(1410), made emphatic through anaphoric repetition, elicits a long response from 
Clytemnestra,  in which the reasons for her hatred of Agamemnon are revealed. First 
she introduces the theme of the sacrifice of Iphigenia, to which she refers through the 
pathetic circumlocution: ‘he sacrificed his own child, the darling offspring of my pangs’ 
(1417-18). It is worth noticing that the theme of the sacrifice of Iphigenia has been 
purposely suppressed for much of the play. Thanks to the way Clytemnestra phrases it, 
namely, by juxtaposing the piteous love of the mother (filtáthn æmoì Ëdîna) against 
the indifference of the father (1qusen aøtoû paîda), the first reference to Iphigenia’s 
death since the parodos is extremely efficacious. 
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A similar schema to the one described above is repeated in the first antistrophe: to the 
Chorus’ menacing remark túmma túmmati teîsai, this too characterised by a stylistic 
care which involves alliteration and an initial polyptoton, the queen responds with an 
oath sworn in the name of ‘Justice that was due for my child’, in the name of Atê and 
Erinys, through whose aid she claims to have slain Agamemnon (1431-3). 595 
Furthermore, she evokes Agamemnon’s extramarital relationship with ‘the various 
Chryseises’ as well as the most recent one with Cassandra (1438ff). By the end of the 
first antistrophe then, the Chorus, having moved as they have from the threat of exile to 
a more lethal penalty, have sharpened the tone of their threats, whilst Clytemnestra has 
made a full list of all her personal motives for the murder as well as a powerful assertion 
of the righteousness of her deed. The Argive Elders seem at this stage temporarily at a 
loss and ready to direct their emotions elsewhere.  
 
So they switch their fury against Helen. It has been argued by Conacher that the 
Chorus’ turn against her is prompted by Clytemnestra’s reference to Aegisthus (1436ff) 
and the idea of adultery associated with him.596 Yet no mention of Helen’s adultery is 
made here, nor do the Chorus seem to pick up on the queen’s bold speech about her 
lover. Rather, in the Chorus’ reply, the emphasis is placed on the idea of the suffering 
that Agamemnon and so many others had to endure for the sake of two women (1453-
61). Helen, although a new name to the present debate, had already been the main target 
of the Chorus’ passionate invective during the second stasimon.597 There too, what 
prompted their rant against Helen was the news of the shipwreck and the many 
sufferings she had managed to cause to both Trojans and Greeks. There too, as here 
(1461), Helen was associated with Eris and Erinys (698; 749). Hence, the primary 
reason behind the Chorus’ introduction of the ‘Helen motif’ is not a rational move 
prompted by an argumentative will to denounce Clytemnestra’s adulterous behaviour, 
but rather an emotional impulse to turn against a woman whose evil action and fatal role 
                                                
595 I do not see in Clytemnestra’s mention of Díkh a suggestion that Justice herself is here a 
coadjutor in the murder. The context is still that of Clytemnestra’ exposition of her own 
personal motifs and the proud affirmation of the legitimacy of her deed. To begin reading so 
early in the text, as Conacher 1974: 326 does, the beginning of Clytemnestra’s withdrawal of 
her deed from the sphere of personal will does not do justice to the dramatic momentum of this 
passage. 
596 1974: 326. 
597 The so-called ‘Helen Ode’. 
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is still fresh in their memory. In their paralleling of the two sisters and their destructive 
power, the Chorus’ mind is still occupied with the bewilderment deriving from 
Clytemnestra’s murder of their king. 
 
Most significantly, the introduction of the Helen motif has a nodal importance in the 
development of this epirrhematic composition which is marked by a formal change: the 
simple schema of the Chorus’ brief stanzas answered by Clytemnestra’s replies in 
trimeters is abandoned in favour of a more elaborate structure. Henceforth, the Chorus 
embark on a formal ode in which they sing each time one stanza followed by an 
ephymnion that is then followed by Clytemnestra’s more solemn anapaestic replies.598 
Indeed, the initial and simple dynamics of the Chorus accusing Clytemnestra and of the 
queen defending herself are broken by the introduction of the theme of Helen’s guilt. 
Therefore, the second strophe represents a new stage of the debate about which several 
observations must be made.  
 
First, although it is Clytemnestra’s deed that prompted the Chorus to make the 
association with Helen, in the first ephymnion the Chorus seem almost to forget 
temporarily the responsibility of the queen and direct all their anger against Helen alone, 
whom they now address in the second person (1455-61). So much does their new target 
absorb the Elders, that they even bring themselves to blame the murder of Agamemnon 
on Helen herself: nûn teléan polúmnaston æphnqísw (1459). Second, the Chorus’ 
introduction of the Helen motif pushes for the first time the causation of Agamemnon’s 
suffering back into the past, to an earlier stage of the king’s life and beyond the present 
circumstance. Last, they give Clytemnestra the opportunity to allude to other aspects of 
Agamemnon’s guilt besides the sacrifice of Iphigenia as well as to turn the comparison 
with Helen to her own advantage. 
 
With her following anapaests, Clytemnestra reproves the Chorus for their outburst 
against Helen (mhd’ eêj ‘Elénhn kóton æktréy+j, 1464-5) and reminds them that she 
is not the only one who brought death to the Greeks. In this way, the epirrhematic 
exchange repeats in more compressed terms what has been a constant oscillation 
                                                
598 Kranz 1919: 301-20; Fraenkel 1962: 660; Conacher 1974: 328. 
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throughout the play, namely, the alternating attribution of the Greek casualties to both 
Helen and Agamemnon. The Chorus has repeatedly admitted during the play the share 
of Agamemnon in causing so much suffering to his people, often declaring the general 
resentment against him; now that the Chorus accuse Helen of being the only 
;androléteira (1465), Clytemnestra simply retorts against them a view that, before 
this exchange, they had often expressed themselves. 
 
The second antistrophe represents, once again, a further stage in the epirrhema. It 
begins with the emphatic vocative daîmon followed by a long relative clause !oj..., by 
means of which the Chorus describe the assaults of the daimon on the house, Menelaus 
and Agamemnon (significantly called ‘the Tantalids’), and the power the daimon 
exercises through the agency of like-souled women: krátoj t’ êsóyucon æk 
gunaikÏn […] kratúneij, (1468-71).599 After their initial fervent invocation, directly 
addressed to the daimon, in the following period the Elders go on to describe him in the 
third person. By describing the daimon as ‘standing over the corpse’ (æpì sÍmatoj 
[…] staqeíj), and since it is, in fact, Clytemnestra who is standing over the corpse, the 
Chorus seem to make here a partial identification between the two.600 As pointed out by 
Fraenkel, this identification is endorsed by the presence of the verb æpeúcetai (1474), 
a clear intratextual reference to both æpeúcetai at 1262, by means of which Cassandra 
described Clytemnestra’s attitude towards the murder, and also to æpeúcomai at 1394, 
which is used by Clytemnestra herself in her first monologue, while she is standing over 
the corpse, to describe her feeling of satisfaction for the murder.601 In her reply (1475-
80) Clytemnestra agrees with the Chorus’ idea (nûn #wrqwsaj stómatoj gnÍmhn, 
                                                
599 As explained by Fraenkel 1962: 695-8, it is difficult to reach any satisfactory interpretation 
of the obscure êsóyucon: a) the adjective introduces a comparison between the two women and 
the temper of men, b) it introduces a comparison between krátoj and the spirit of the two 
women (Smyth 1963: 131), c) it is the yucaí of the two women to be compared with each 
other. b) seems perhaps a more natural reading. However, given the Chorus’ insistence on the 
similarities of Clytemnestra and Helen, sharply juxtaposed in the preceding strophe (1453-4), it 
is also tempting to accept c) and treat êsóyucon as a transferred adjective from gunaikÏn 
(Denniston and Page; Sommerstein; Medda). Perhaps this recent translation is the best 
compromise: ‘are exercising equal-souled power from women’ (Raeburn and Thomas 2011: 
223). Luckily this unsatisfactory conclusion does not bear much on the present argument.  
600 Fraenkel 1962: 699; Sommerstein 2008: 179; Medda 2011: 348. I here take the participle to 
refer to the daimon and not to Clytemnestra, as for instance does Page in printing staqeîsa 
(1972: 190). 
601 Fraenkel 1962: 699. 
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1475) and vehemently endorses the idea of a daímwn as the primeval source (æk) of the 
‘lust to lick blood’ (1rwj aëmatoloicój, 1478) which possessed her during the 
murder. This image perfectly mirrors and overturns the image previously created by the 
Chorus: the power which the daímwn derives æk gunaikÏn is turned by the queen into 
a lust the gunÔ derives æk daímonoj (daímona […] æk toû, 1477-8). 
 
As a consequence of this temporary and ironic agreement imposed by Clytemnestra’s 
rhetorical skills, the Elders are submerged by an even greater wave of desperation (feû 
feû […] êÎ êÔ): in the third strophe they pick up for the third time during three 
consecutive stanzas the idea of the daímwn, of which they imagine the importance 
(mégaj) and exceeding wrath (barúmhnij, 1481-4). Furthermore, the Chorus invoke 
now the name of Zeus himself, thereby reaching a further point in their retrospective 
quest for an original cause to the present ;athrÕ túch (1483). The spirit and the ruin 
which assail the house are now presented by the Elders as the will of Zeus, ‘Cause of all 
things’ (panaítioj), ‘Effector of all effects’ (panergéthj), according to whom all 
comes to pass (teleîtai) for mortals (1486-7). Indeed, the first stanza of the third 
strophe ends with the Chorus’ theological dilemma: tí tÏnd’ o÷ qeókrantón 
æstin>602 
 
Hence, the Chorus and Clytemnestra, by arguments and counterarguments, have 
embarked together on an ever-receding search which moves from a survey of the all too 
human motives of Clytemnestra, reaches the divine agency of the family’s daimon and 
culminates with the mention of Zeus ‘Cause of all things’. From Clytemnestra’s initial 
and powerful assertion of responsibility for her deed, the participants of this exchange 
have opened a vista of multiple determinations. This is why the Chorus, in the second 
ephymnion, as if realizing the risk they are running, feel the need to restate the concrete 
agent of the murder: they feel the need to remind themselves that the assassination of 
the king may derive æk daímonoj but it has also been committed  æk cerój of 
Clytemnestra. 
 
                                                
602 This rhetorical question has often been cited in this thesis. Here it can be finally appreciated 
in its dramatic context. 
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What follows is a proper coup de théâtre. Clytemnestra’s reply, as she asks the Chorus 
indignantly  
a÷ceîj e%inai tóde to#urgon æmón> 
“mÕ      ” mhd’ æpilecqØj 
’Agamemnonían e%inaí m’ \locon> (1497-9) 
 
 represents a complete reversal, point by point, of what she claimed at the outset (1404-
6) when she claimed Agamemnon’s corpse to be ‘the work of this right hand of mine’. 
 
Now, after the queen and the Chorus have followed together a backward-looking 
inquiry into the divine causes of the murder, Clytemnestra is able to deny in the most 
confident way every trace of personal responsibility. As Conacher rightly says: ‘the 
murderer herself expresses, within a hundred verses, first the personal and then the 
supernatural explanation of the deed, each in mutually exclusive terms’,603 for indeed 
Clytemnestra moves on to claiming to be the very palaiòj drimùj ;alástwr 
’Atréwj, and to have only lent the semblance of her body to the avenging spirit of the 
house (1500). As pointed out by Raeburn and Thomas, by talking of herself in third 
person (‘taking the likeness of this corpse’s wife’, 1500), Clytemnestra ‘is detaching 
herself as far as possible from the murder’.604 The Chorus, once more baffled by the 
queen’s extreme argument and her unexpected attempt to shift responsibility away from 
herself, aggressively respond:  
 
Ìj mèn ;anaítioj e%i  
toûde fónou tíj ñ marturÔswn; (1505-6) 
 
Their initial unwillingness to yield to Clytemnestra’s denial of her responsibility is soon 
accompanied, however, by the compromising suggestion: ‘But an avenging spirit from 
his father’s crime might be your accomplice’ (patróqen dè sullÔptwr génoit’ $an 
;alástwr, 1507-8). 
 
                                                
603 Conacher 1974: 329. 
604 Raeburn and Thomas 2011: 225. 
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By this point, then, various divine figures, # Erij, the daímwn, and the ;alástwr, spirits 
akin to each other that have turned the house of Atreus into their permanent dwelling, 
have entered the discussion and recalled Cassandra’s vision of the Erinyes. The 
remaining portion of the epirrhema is a partial repetition of the previous discussion, in 
which Clytemnestra reasserts her hatred for Agamemnon (1520ff), reconnects to the 
Iphigenia motif (1526; 1555) and eventually reasserts the full responsibility for her deed 
(1552ff). But although this last portion of the exchange is indeed characterised by a 
regression to ‘the present, the personal and the particular’,605 it is also the place in which 
the discourse about retributive justice gains a broader dimension, and the participants 
show in turn a fully developed control over their formulations about it. Indeed, it is in 
this last section of the discussion that Clytemnestra and the Chorus utter several of those 
mottos which I listed earlier.606 They can now be appreciated in their context and for 
both their argumentative and lyrical effect. 
 
The last stage of this bitter and complex confrontation is marked by what seems an 
attempt by both parties to take possession, in their claim for justice, of the truth of 
‘blood for blood’. The tragic dimension is given by the irony that, indeed, they are both 
right. So, when Clytemnestra’s gnomic wisdom \xia drásaj, \xia páscwn (1527) 
is pronounced in connection to her murder of Agamemnon as a punishment for his 
murder of Iphigenia, she is certainly right: Agamemnon did make a payment that 
matched his deed. But so are the Elders right when, thinking about what is still to come, 
they turn the queen’s wisdom against her and remind her that paqeîn tòn 1rxanta 
(1564). Indeed, the queen – she who has acted – shall suffer too.  
 
At the end of this exchange and thanks to the themes which emerged in their 
confrontation with Clytemnestra, the Chorus have no doubt that although one shower of 
blood is ending, ‘Moira is sharpening the sword of harm on another set of whetstones, 
for Justice to do another deed’ (1535-6), because this is the ordinance (qésmion) which 
‘remains firm while Zeus remains on his throne’ (1562-3). 
 
                                                
605 Conacher 1974: 330. 
606 § 2. 
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Once the confrontation is over, the issue of Clytemnestra’s responsibility has been 
explored in all its complexity. To use Conacher’s words: the idea of ‘an individual 
responsibility for a consciously chosen deed of violence which may also be seen as the 
fulfilment of the will of Zeus or of a family curse’ is one of its leading themes.607 This 
theme functions here as the very heart of the exchange between Clytemnestra and the 
Chorus and, simultaneously, it reiterates in a final climax what has been a constant issue 
since the beginning of the play.608 Moreover, both the participants have undergone 
various remarkable psychological alterations. Clytemnestra has moved from fervent 
affirmation of her responsibility to vehement denial of it and back again to the initial 
position; at the same time, the Chorus have moved from fervent affirmation of 
Clytemnestra’s responsibility to a more timid acceptance of the possibility of 
Clytemnestra’s co-responsibility with an avenging spirit. At another level of analysis, it 
may also be observed how the queen’s initial and triumphant boldness has progressively 
given way to fright and worried contemplation of what may be reserved for her in the 
future. 
 
Finally, through the form of the epirrhematic composition, the theme of retributive 
justice has been enlarged and problematized:  díkh as poinÔ is here conveyed as an 
irreducible idea which can be valid from several perspectives and thus liable to 
simultaneous appropriation by a plurality of subjects. The dynamics of this process of 
appropriation have been presented as a complex mechanism in which human agency is 
contemplated together with divine agency and the personal motives of the individuals 
are inscribed within the higher will of Zeus, to whom the ordinance of the lex talionis is 
ultimately attributed. Retributive justice is thus depicted as a complex geometry in 
which human motives, family curses, avenging spirits and divine will meet and 
converge.  
 
In this long passage the characters express a conception of the universe in which human 
action is conceived as a reflection of cosmic dynamics. And even when confronting 
each other, the characters seem almost invariably to believe or exploit the conception of 
                                                
607 Conacher 1974: 324. 
608 The sacrifice of Iphigenia is another example of a consciously chosen deed which may also 
be seen as the fulfilment of divine will. 
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a universe in which various spheres are interwoven into a complex metaphysics. 
Throughout the Agamemnon, at least, even when characters disagree with each other, 
their disagreement never originates from the clash of different world-views. It would be 
wrong, in other words, to view these exchanges as Vernant sees those in Antigone: ‘For 
each protagonist, enclosed in his own universe, the vocabulary used remains for the 
most part opaque; it has one sense and one sense only’. 609  Here, conversely, conflicts 
originate from within the same understanding of reality and events are explained in 
strikingly similar terms.  
 
Thus, even the most vehement confrontation takes place within the same conceptual 
grid, which is complex enough to allow room for divergence with regard to the 
particular, but in which the participants make use of the same referents. It is always the 
same conception of Justice, as Kitto describes it, a justice that is ‘intolerable’, for it is 
‘inspired by wrath and carried out by crime’, the justice of the ‘punishment of a crime 
by worse crime’.610 Thus this metaphysics is a metaphysics of ineluctable conflict, 
something about which the characters of this tragedy show constant and touching 
awareness. Indeed the Chorus conclude: ‘Who can cast the seed of the curse out of the 
house? The family is glued fast to ruin’, a statement which Clytemnestra cannot 
contradict: ‘You have struck on this oracular saying with truth’ (1565-8). 
 
7.4 Choephori 306-478 
 
At the core of the Oresteia’s second play lies the horror of an inhuman equation: 
vengeance as matricide. The whole play is concerned with Orestes’ responsibility and 
with the dilemma posed by an act of vengeance which is simultaneously an act of 
purification and an act leading to further pollution. Thus, this play brings the paradox of 
retributive justice to perfect culmination. In the kommos - the centrepiece of the play – 
Orestes, Electra, and the Chorus of Trojan female slaves unite in an ecstatic dirge which 
                                                
609 They never amount, for instance, to a conflict such as that between Antigone and Creon in 
which  physis is brought to clash with nomos. Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1988: 42. 
610 Kitto 1959: 38. 
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is also a prodigious appeal for help: as they lament Agamemnon’s death, they 
simultaneously invoke his ghost to assist Orestes’ vengeance.  
 
This kommos has been widely studied. Scholars have grappled, in particular, with its 
connection to the preceding trimeters and with the question of its relation to the 
subsequent action. 611 Since Wilamowitz’s moral interpretation (followed later on by 
Srebrny), according to which the kommos shows the development of Orestes’ decision 
from doubt and anxiety to decision and determination, critics are still divided on the 
question of its dramatic purpose.  According to some scholars, such as Schadewaldt, 
Reinhardt and Kitto, the kommos is static and devoid of any debate or internal conflict 
on Orestes’ part, whose resolve to kill his mother had already been expressed and whose 
manifestation of uncertainty during the lyrics is purely conventional.612 According to 
others, such as Lebeck and Lesky, the kommos is dynamic, the conventional motif of 
lamentation has a deeper significance, and Orestes is still troubled by ‘the problem 
posed by an act simultaneously right and wrong’.613 Finally, both Sier and Garvie, 
finding the mean between these two positions, hold that although there is no indication 
in the kommos of Orestes’ internal struggle, the kommos must be understood as 
dramatically dynamic. Whereas according to Sier this piece serves the purpose of 
enhancing the impression of Agamemnon’s spiritual presence, according to Garvie the 
kommos has the function of showing Orestes reaching his decision ‘not so much at 
different and consecutive times, as paratactically, in different but parallel ways’.614  
 
Following those who attribute a dynamic quality to the kommos I believe in its parallel 
unfolding of many levels of Orestes’ decision, for although it is certainly true that 
Orestes takes part in it after having already taken the decision to kill his mother, as 
Conacher put it, ‘there is a difference between logical choice and the emotional impetus 
                                                
611 Gruber 2009: 393-410; Sier 1988; Garvie 1986: 122ff; Winnington-Ingram 1983: 138ff; 
Conacher 1974: 330ff; Lebeck 1971: 110ff; Srebrny 1964: 55ff; Kitto 1959: 43ff, 1961: 81ff; 
Kraus 1957: 98ff; Pohlenz 1954: 58ff; Reinhardt 1949: 112ff; Lesky 1943; Setti 1935: 112ff; 
Schadewaldt 1932; Engrer 1857. 
612 ‘Nicht der Mensch ist zu Anfang weniger entschlossen, dann mehr und völlig, sondern das 
Bild seiner Entschlossenheit ist zuerst gleichsam nur im Umriss da, dann öffnet es seine 
Gründe, gewinnt bestimmtere, tiefere, leidenschaftlichere Züge’, Schadewaldt 1932: 351.  
613 Lebeck 1971: 114 
614 Garvie 1986: 123-4; Sier 1988: 82. 
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which the deed itself requires’.615 Moreover, although Schadewaldt has shown the 
undisputable presence of typical threnodic elements in this kommos, in the light of 
Swift’s recent study, it is easy to expect them to have been twisted or in some way 
subverted.616 Enlarging Garvie’s rather isolated observation that Aeschylus adapts the 
ritual form of lament to the ‘specific dramatic requirements of his play’, I argue that 
beyond the question of Orestes’ decision, the kommos has the dramatic function of 
reintroducing the theme of retributive justice and of bringing once more to the fore the 
universal code on which Apollo’s command is based.  
 
 
During the prologue, the parodos and the first episode of the play, the threnodic 
atmosphere and the ritual context for the kommos have been carefully constructed: 
Orestes sees a ‘gathering of women […] so striking in their black garments’ and he 
correctly infers their role as libation bearers for his father (10-15); in the first strophe of 
the parodos the Chorus of Slaves describe the traditional behaviour of female mourners 
– rapid beating of hands, cheeks furrowed by nail-cuts, and torn garments – (23-31); 
and Electra, by asking them for advice on the words to use during ‘these drink offerings 
of mourning’ (87), resembles the chief mourner who leads the lament.617 Undoubtedly 
the parodos seems to begin with what amounts to a threnos in honour of Agamemnon 
and to replace ‘the dirge which was denied him at his funeral’.618 These funerary 
overtones constitute the perfect preparation for the subsequent kommos.  
 
Retributive justice is one of the centrepieces of this exchange: it can be viewed as the 
focal point for converging lines of force. Its thematic significance emerges clearly from 
the opening anapaests (306-314) in which the Chorus of female slaves begin by 
imparting to Orestes, in uncompromising terms, the ineluctable law of Justice: 
 
 
                                                
615 Conacher 1974: 339. 
616 Swift 2010: 298-364. For more on this topic cf. Athanassaki and Bowie 2011: Chs. 17; 18. 
617 Beside Swift see also Alexiou 2002: 4-7; Garland 1985: 23-31 and on this specific passage 
Vickers 1973: 88; for Aeschylus’ manipulation of conventions see Hutchinson 1985: 178-81; 
also compare Denniston on E. El. 146-9, and Stevens on E. Andr. 826 ff. 
618 Garvie 1986: 54, but, similarly, also Kitto 1961: 81. 
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;;all’, %w megálai Moîrai, Dióqen 
tØde teleutân, 
*+ tò díkaion metabaínei. 
“ ;antì mèn æcqrâj glÍsshj æcqrà  
glÏssa teleísqw”, to÷feilómenon 
prássousa Díkh még’ ;au}teî< 
“ ;antì dè plhgÖj foníaj fonían  
plhgÕn tinétw.” drásanti paqeîn, 
trigérwn mûqoj táde fwneî. (306-14) 
 
 In their black outfits visually reminiscent of the Erinyes, the Female Slaves begin by 
addressing the Moirai. As the two divine guilds are often associated, the Chorus’ 
invocation to the Moirai follows naturally on Apollo’s threats concerning the Erinyes 
and their striking appearance seems almost an embodiment of the god’s menace.  In this 
guise, the female slaves instruct the royal pair in the terrible law of drásanti paqeîn, 
through what must have been a most visually and verbally compelling effect.  
 
These anapaests are in sharp contrast with both Orestes’ speech before the kommos and 
his sung reply to it. In the last speech before the kommos, Orestes firmly voices his 
resolution and the many motives (polloì !imeroi) both human and divine that, joined 
together, point the same way (299ff) to a ‘deed’ (#ergon) that ‘must be done’ 
(ærgastéon, 298). Although Lebeck is inaccurate in claiming that Orestes does not 
mention ‘the law of Dike’ among his reasons,619 certainly his appeal, when compared to 
what comes in the kommos, is rather feeble:  
 
eê mÕ méteimi toû patròj toùj aêtíouj 
trópon tòn a;utón, ;antapokteînai légwn. (273-4)620 
 
                                                
619 Lebeck 1971: 113. 
620 I adopt the punctuation of Page and Sommerstein where trópon tòn a;utón must be taken 
with what precedes. The following ;antapokteînai légwn assumes thus an epexegetic 
function detrmining that ‘in the same manner’ means ‘killing in return’. With the alternative 
reading – followed for instance by Garvie – which takes trópon tòn a;utón toghether with 
what follows, the meaning is weaker: ‘to kill them in the same manner in their turn’, i.e. by 
deceit. 
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By means of this hypothetical period Orestes refers to the lex talionis only to clarify the 
nature of the vengeance that Apollo’s oracle has imparted: retribution has to be equal 
(trópon tòn a;utón), an equivalence which (following the punctuation I have chosen) 
implies killing in exchange ( ;antapokteînai). Yet vengeance and the manner of 
execution are here described in terms of human action dependent on the god’s 
command, but no reference is made to the universal code behind such divinely imposed 
obligation.  
 
By contrast, from the opening anapaests of the Chorus the law of díkh acquires another 
dimension: to Apollo’s command, which Orestes presented as the main ‘divine’ motive 
behind his otherwise human intentions, the female slaves add a much older cause 
(trigérwn mûqoj, 314). In the words of the Chorus, Moirai, Zeus, and Justice are 
united as the main powers presiding over the law of retributive justice, and as a deed 
encouraged by their assembly, Orestes’ action acquires immediately a new aspect.  
Some elements of their speech are particularly striking. The stylistic features of the 
formulaic expressions denoting the lex talionis have already been noted above;621 here 
the whole idea of justice is complicated and made emphatic through the double pair of 
alliterative synonyms teleísqw/tinétw and ;au}teî/fwneî and the juxtaposition of tò 
díkaion with the personification of Díkh and her shout.622  
 
The latter juxtaposition in particular allows the idea of justice to acquire two layers of 
significance: one given by tò díkaion which – whatever the exact meaning of 
metabaínei may be – conveys the idea of a mutable and thus individual-related justice, 
and the other given by Díkh which, through the solemnity of her divine form,623 
conveys a sense of immutability and certainty. What is more, in this passage a 
connection is established between the two: it is Justice as a personification who, 
shouting aloud, lays down the abstract and eternal foundations upon which individual 
                                                
621 p. 10, vv. 309; 312; 313. 
622 As noticed by Garvie, the two concepts are not quite the same (p. 128). See also Garvie for a 
discussion of the possible meanings of metabaínei. 
623 Her status as a divine figure is not explicitly declared here, but the passage suggests a 
parallel with Moirai. The connection between Justice and Moira is an insisted one (Ag. 1535-6; 
Cho. 648.9) and later in the play Justice is called ‘daughter of Zeus’ (948-9). 
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action (i.e. Orestes’) must be based.624 Yet, of course, an action based on a law saying 
that suffering comes to those who act is no reassuring prospect: the generalization of the 
phrasing allows for the intuition to creep in that the deed Orestes is compelled to 
undertake will entail no resolution. The cycle of suffering has no end. With their 
confident opening anapaests the Chorus set then what will be the tension running 
throughout the whole kommos and anticipate some of the paradoxical conclusions which 
Orestes reaches only at the end of this exchange (438; 461). In what follows, I shall 
illustrate the ways in which a tragic consciousness of the cosmic dimension of 
retributive justice is progressively acquired by the participants of the kommos. 
 
After these opening anapaests, the first part of the kommos falls into four lyric triads, 
each of which is divided by the anapaests of the Chorus and in each of which the first 
strophe is sung by Orestes and the antistrophe by Electra (AA, CC, DD, FF), the two 
being separated by a stanza of the Chorus. Moreover, the four stanzas of the Chorus are 
also two pairs of responding strophai and antistrophai (BB, EE).625 This complex 
structure reflects the content and marks out the dramatic progression of the exchange: 
initially the Chorus have a confident leading role and with a sequence of firm 
exhortations they attempt to direct the avengers’ feelings and thoughts to full resolve for 
vengeance, but by the end their confidence vacillates and their role is taken over by the 
avengers themselves. Thus, during the first section of the kommos the Chorus and the 
avengers exchange emotional states: in the first two triads the Chorus’ confidence 
stands between Orestes’ and Electra’s wailings (ABA, CBC), in the second pair of 
triads the Chorus’ anxiety stands between Orestes’ and Electra’s growing vim (DED, 
FEF). Hence, the theme of retributive justice is here developed within a single climactic 
unity of oscillating emotional states. 
 
To Orestes’ and Electra’s first interventions (AA), which have been effectively 
described by Conacher as amounting to ‘little more than plaintive attempts to reach the 
                                                
624 I reject Sommerstein’s personification of tò díkaion in his translation (2008: 251) as well 
as Gagarin’s reading of it in terms of abstract justice (1976: 70), for in both cases the tension of 
the passage would be lost. 
625 For this division of the kommos cf. Conacher 1974: 335ff; Garvie 1986: 124. 
 206 
shade of Agamemnon’,626 the Chorus respond in each case with the reassuring notion 
that lament may turn into revenge (B-anaps.): first, by reminding Orestes that 
Agamemnon’s frónhma lives on and thus a copious góoj will reach him (324-31);627 
second, by reminding Electra of god’s (qeój) ability to turn ‘the laments at a tomb’ 
(qrÕnoi æpitumbídioi) into a paean (340-4). The initial lesson of the Chorus, who in 
the opening anapaests instruct Orestes and Electra in the law of ‘blood for blood’ is 
slowly absorbed by both the avengers, who in the second lyric triad (CC), begin to react 
to the Chorus’ lead each in turn expressing the impossible wish that Agamemnon had a 
different destiny from the one he met: 
 
eê gàr øp’ ŒIlí_ […] páter. (345-6) 
mhd’ øpò TrwÈaj […] páter. (363-4) 
 
Orestes wishes that his father had died in a more glorious way at Troy, while Electra in 
her responding antistrophe echoes and ‘corrects’ her brother by suggesting what should 
really be wished for: 
 
pároj d’ oë ktanóntej nin o!utw damÖnai, 
<x –> qanathfóron aôsan 
prósw tinà punqánesqai 
tÏnde pónwn #apeiron. (368-71) 
 
In this passage, at last, the idea of Clytemnestra’s and Aegisthus’ murder, constantly 
alluded to by the Chorus since the opening anapaests, is finally adumbrated in the words 
of one of the two siblings. Yet the notion of the lex talionis makes its entrance in the 
consciousness of Electra in the tenuous manner of a wishful prayer: ‘may instead his 
killers have been slain so’.628 What is more, not only does Electra wish for the killers to 
                                                
626 Conacher 1974: 335. 
627 The connection between lament and revenge at 330 remains whether one follows M.’s 
#endikoj or Murray’s emendation æk díkan which I follow here: the point is in both cases the 
semi-personified góoj’s ability to reach the death and eventually lead to revenge. 
628 The passage is controversial: I take here o!utw damÖnai to mean loosely ‘to have been slain 
in the same manner as Agamemnon’, i.e. ‘being killed and dying ignominiously’ and not, as 
Garive does, ‘fighting at Troy’. As pointed out by Sommerstein (and Garvie himself) that would 
be inapplicable to Clytemnestra. Even without ‘looking for realism in what is an unreal wish’ 
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have been slain instead of Agamemnon, but she describes also their hypothetical murder 
as a death appointed by aisa: a personified power whom the Chorus will vividly depict 
as the ‘swordsmith’ of Justice (646-52).629 Orestes’ and Electra’s wishes still work here 
then to detain the action to be taken and the focus keeps being diverted from Orestes’ 
task: he may have already made the choice, but still something is missing for him to 
attend to the question of vengeance with full emotional adherence. Once more, it is the 
Chorus’ role to redirect their attention to the matter at hand and to convert their lament 
into action (372-9). Thus, during the first two triads, the central strophai and 
antistrophai of the Chorus as well as their conclusive anapaests, are a sequence of firm 
exhortations which have the purpose of emboldening the avengers and which seek to 
engage them with the powers of the underworld which Agamemnon is said to inhabit.  
 
The anapaests linking the first and second pair of triads (372-9) determine a shift in the 
general attitudes of the participants. Through them, the Chorus finally hit the mark and 
Orestes’ vindictive fervour is awakened. Their poignancy is reflected by their formal 
centrality and length630 and the decisive effect they have in directing Orestes’ thoughts 
as they pierce his ear, as he himself claims, ‘like an arrow’, is openly stated: now ready 
to direct in full his energy towards revenge, Orestes invokes the various avenging forces 
– Zeus and ‘østerópoinon #atan’– which will support his deed (380-5). From this 
moment on the roles of the participants are inverted and the rhythm of the exchange 
increases: we see the Chorus’ confidence becoming unsteady as they describe their 
inner feelings (386-93; 410-17); we feel the pace of the kommos being quickened once 
the theme of retributive justice is brought more prominently into focus. From the third 
triad onwards, it could be said – borrowing Reinhardt’s vivid expression – that lament 
truly turns into revenge (‘Klage wird zu Rache’). 631  
 
                                                                                                                                          
(Garvie 1986: 141) the fact still stands that Electra could ‘hardly wish for a glorious death for 
Aegisthus’ (Sommerstein 2008: 259). In support of my my view cf. Georgantzoglou 1990: 227-
30. 
629 Moreover, cf. Ag. 1535-6 in which Moira features in the same role covered here by Aisa. The 
two are strongly linked and used almost interchangeably throughout the trilogy. 
630 Twice that of the other two. 
631 1949: 114-5, 119. 
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Orestes’ first voicing of the theme is striking, although it is only the first example of a 
long list of utterances which adds layers of significance to the notion of retributive 
justice. At the end of his invocation of Zeus, as he turns from the universal functions of 
Atê to the present situation, Orestes adds the controversial remark: ‘but nevertheless for 
my parents there will be fulfilment’ (tokeûsi d’ 8mwj teleîtai, 385). The fact that 
Orestes abandons his direct invocation of Zeus in favour of the impersonal teleîtai, 
marks in style the avenger’s emotions: it could almost be taken as an expression of the 
fact that Orestes, who is processing his newly acquired knowledge, still hesitates to 
draw a direct link between his future deed and the universal code behind it. Moreover, 
the plural tokeûsi represents a striking circumlocution for ‘mother’ through which 
Orestes achieves a double effect: first he avoids too explicit a formulation of the 
matricidal essence of the vengeance to be taken; second and most notably, by means of 
the plural form a significant ambiguity is produced. 632 Indeed, as pointed out by 
Lebeck, the verb teleîtai can in fact mean ‘fulfilment of revenge for the father, for the 
mother penalty paid in full’, whereas the dative, as pointed out by Sommerstein, could 
be both ‘the dative of the recipient (“to my parents”) or of the agent (“by my 
parents”)’.633 Thus tokeûsi, lending itself to antithetical readings, encapsulates the 
essence of the law of ‘like for like’, in which one parent will pay retribution to the other 
by means of the same penalty.  
 
Orestes’ appeal is reiterated by Electra in her responding antistrophe (D) in which the 
theme of revenge is further developed. Electra echoes her brother by calling on Zeus 
and the nether powers (klûte dè Gâ cqoníwn te timaí) to aid him and by picking up 
                                                
632 Other solutions have been offered. Cf.: Garvie, 1986: 145; Lebeck, 1971: 118. The main 
obstacle is represented by the fact that if tokeúj in the singular means ‘father’, in the plural it 
means ‘parents’. What is then the meaning of this plural? May Orestes be referring to both 
Clytemnestra and Aegisthus as ‘parents’? This is most unlikely. A popular interpretation is that 
of treating the plural tokeûsi as a sort of ‘generic’ plural used to refer to Clytemnestra only 
(Medda, 2011: 403). However, translations of tokeûsi as a singular miss entirely, in my 
opinion, the point of the passage: the ambiguity of 385 must be preserved, for it is functional to 
the development of one the kommos’ principal themes. 
633  Lebeck, 1971: 118; Sommerstein, 2008: 260. In order perhaps to enhance his point, 
Sommerstein 2008: 260 also prints ñmÏj (and translates thus, ‘For my parents, both alike’ […]) 
losing the important antithesis of 8mwj with the preceding østerópoinon. This antithesis is 
very natural, especially since Orestes moves here from his considerations of the universal 
workings of Atê – who can generally be ‘late-avenging’ – to the immediate circumstance of his 
tokeîj, who will ‘nonetheless’ be exposed to such workings.  
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his restlessness with regard to his revenge’s delay; she is echoed in turn by her brother 
in his appeal to the nertérwn turannídej and fqitÏn ;Araí (405-6). However, what 
is most striking about Electra’s response is the way she presents retribution as a righting 
of injustice: díkan d’ æx ;adíkwn ;apaitÏ, something which the Chorus immediately 
elaborate in their subsequent anapaests with abundance of details. The demand of 
‘justice in place of injustice’ is characterised by the slave women, unmistakably, as a 
‘law (nómoj) of blood (foníaj stagónaj) for blood (\llo a*ima)’ where injustice is 
a slaughter crying out for a Fury to bring ‘further ruin upon ruin’ (\thn çtéran [...] 
æp’ \t+, 403-4). 
 
 Electra’s díkan d’ æx ;adíkwn ;apaitÏ is particularly worth noticing since it is 
‘corrected’ by one of Orestes’ subsequent cries, in which retribution is instead presented 
as a clash of two equivalent justices: #Arhj #Arei xumbaleî, Dík= Díka (461).634 The 
opposition between Electra’s and Orestes’ ways of envisioning retribution gives the 
measure of the distance which separates Orestes’ final realization from this point of the 
kommos and is therefore crucial for an analysis aiming to unravel the dynamic quality of 
this piece. Orestes’ personal elaboration of the struggle he must face and the 
implications of his vengeance represents his tragic realization: the paradox of retributive 
justice, posed as a matricide, is also the ultimate thematic illumination in which the 
whole kommos culminates. The next portion of my analysis follows therefore the thread 
leading to Orestes’ final utterance, in which his heightened emotional state coincides 
with perfect clarity of mind: he will express his impetus in terms of a crystalline 
understanding of the real breadth and paradoxical terms of the law behind his action. 
 
Hitherto, we have seen how the first half of the kommos is characterised by a slow 
inversion between the emotional states of its participants: in the first two triads the 
Chorus’ self-confidence is framed by Orestes’ and Electra’s laments, in the second two 
triads the Chorus’ fear is framed by Orestes’ and Electra’s vehemence. The second half 
of the kommos (423-55) presents a further reorganization in structure and a new 
disposition of the participants’ roles. Electra takes sides with the Chorus in urging 
                                                
634 This passage was also quoted in Ch. 5. 3. with reference to Zeus as the promoter of 
contrasting justices. 
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Orestes to act according to the schema: strophai-ABC antistrophai-CAB, in which 
Orestes sings only antistrophe C. His lyrics are hence isolated between those of Electra 
and the Chorus. The new schema matches the reorganization of the characters’ roles: 
while Electra and the Chorus join forces to narrate the outrageous events which 
followed the murder of Agamemnon, Orestes’ choice becomes the thematic linchpin of 
this section.  
 
After Electra’s and the Chorus’ description of the insulting burial and degrading 
treatment of Agamemnon’s corpse (429-33; 439-43) Orestes responds with his first 
explicit promise, since the beginning of their exchange, of personal vengeance: 
 
patròj d’ ;atímwsin %ara teísei 
6kati mèn daimónwn 
6kati d’ ;amân cerÏn. 
#epeit’ ægÎ nosfísaj ;oloíman. (435-8) 
 
To this Electra and the Chorus reply in turn in an attempt to consolidate his decision 
(444-50; 451-5). In particular, the Chorus’ encouragement to record this decision by 
implanting it within the ‘quiet depths’ of his ‘mind’ is especially effective and revealing 
of their determination to pierce through his consciousness:  
 
gráfou< di’ 4twn dè sun- 
tétraine mûqon Ósúc_ frenÏn báqei. (451-2)635 
 
As the kernel of this section of the kommos, Orestes’ decision is emphatically coloured 
with several shades of meaning, each contributing to nuance the notion of justice as 
retribution within the context of the trilogy. His words deserve close attention. 
 
                                                
635 Some scholars (e.g. Lloyd-Jones; Conacher 1974: 338), following Sidgwick’s gráfou 
“páter” at 450, read Electra’s and the Chorus’ response as an application of the goad of 
shameful mutilation to the spirit of Agamemnon himself (1884). Yet I believe, with the majority 
of the editors (e.g. Garvie; Sommerstein; Page; Thomson; Collard et al.), that this narrative is 
here exclusively addressed to Orestes. 
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In only five verses Orestes manages to refer to all the entities, both human and divine, 
which are or will be caught in the cycle of retribution: his father (patrój); his mother, 
who will pay (teísei) for the murder of Agamemnon; the gods (daimónwn); and 
himself (ægÍ). When looked at in connection with the opening anapaests of the Chorus, 
these words truly reveal that Orestes has fully absorbed, metabolised, and made his own 
the initial lesson of the slave women. Justice will be attained ‘by the help of his hand’ as 
well as ‘by the help of the gods’, because, as the Chorus reminded him, tò díkaion 
(308) depends on and derives strength from the superior will of Moirai, Zeus and 
Justice. The intratextual reference (tinétw/teísei, 313, 434) is appropriate for the 
context: for Clytemnestra’s insulting burial of Agamemnon Orestes will indeed exact 
‘hostile words for hostile words’ and ‘a bloody stroke for a bloody stroke’ (309-13). 
Finally, with his last claim #epeit’ ægÎ nosfísaj ;oloíman Orestes seems also to have 
already processed the full implication of his deed. As argued by Garvie, Lebeck, 
Srerbny and Lesky,636 the strong optative in remarkable juxtaposition with the aorist 
participle probably means something more here than a conventional formula to express 
longing:637 Orestes is aware that his own action might lead him to his own destruction; 
he understands the implication of the unabated law of drásanti paqeîn. 
 
About this portion of the kommos, two other brief observations must be made: first, the 
participants’ accusations are more overtly directed to Clytemnestra; second this section 
anticipates in metre, and is thus closely linked to, the final section of the kommos. 
Indeed, to Electra’s utterance of the word ‘mother’ (422), long avoided in explicit form 
since the beginning of the kommos, the Chorus respond with a spate of lamentation. The 
subtle change in awareness, with regard to what is at stake, is marked by a change in 
metre: the Chorus burst now into a dirge in lyric iambics, which, as noticed by 
Conacher, anticipate the direct appeals to Agamemnon at the end of the kommos.638 
Thereby a closer link between these elements is engendered: a more explicit accusation 
of Clytemnestra leads to a more explicit invocation of Agamemnon. The matricidal 
nature of vengeance and the appeal to Agamemnon are interwoven strands that form a 
                                                
636 Garvie 1986: 162-3; Lebeck 1971: 200; Srebrny 1964: 83; Lesky 1943: 95. 
637 This is the view held by Pohlenz 1954: 60 and Reinhardt 1949: 117ff; whereas Zeitlin in 
1965: 496 argues that Orestes finds the deed so repulsive that he really wishes for his own 
death. 
638 Conacher 1974: 338. 
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single climactic unity and give dramatic body to Orestes’ previous utterance tokeûsi d’ 
8mwj teleîtai (385), the momentous ambiguity of which I explained above. 
 
The kommos ends with a series of emphatic appeals to Agamemnon himself. In this last 
portion of the exchange Orestes finally takes the lead and the preceding structure of the 
kommos is reproduced in miniature: the three parties share a single strophe and 
antistrophe (456-65) followed by a final strophic pair (466-78) in which the Chorus 
alone cry out their conclusive remarks about the nature of this internecine retribution. 
After a threefold invocation to Agamemnon in the first strophe, at the beginning of the 
following antistrophe Orestes pronounces the aforementioned #Arhj #Arei xumbaleî, 
Dík= Díka (461). Stylistically very elaborate, these words form Orestes’ last utterance 
in the kommos.  As the culmination of an intense dramatic progression by means of 
which the notion of retributive justice has acquired several layers of significance, 
Orestes’ utterance stands as an isolated statement of fact within repeated prayers, 
symbolising the fact that in his full resolve the avenger has gone past the stage of mere 
wishing. 639  
 
Orestes’ awareness of the complex nature of the looming conflict is most effectively 
conveyed through style: the chiastic disposition #Arhj #Arei Dík= Díka around the 
sylleptic xumbaleî confers a striking symmetry to the sentence. Formal symmetry 
points here to the symmetry of justice and the employed rhetorical devices underline the 
double nature of the conflict: a violent conflict as well as justice. Moreover, the 
sentence not only conveys the brutal nature of the struggle Orestes has to face, but also 
its paradoxical essence: Dík= Díka states that justice will clash with justice, and 
Orestes thereby expresses his understanding that Clytemnestra will defend her deed in 
terms of ‘justice’ too.640 Orestes’ gnomic-sounding statement seems almost to ‘correct’ 
Electra’s previous prayer for justice to come instead of injustice (398), and the kommos 
culminates with the tragic realization of the deadlock imposed by retributive justice 
within the family.  
 
                                                
639 For this reason, I believe with Garvie that Pauw’s xumbaleî is preferable to Porson’s 
xumbáloi, and as the description of future action it is also preferable to M’s xumbállei. 
640 ‘Each individual can interpret justice to suit his own claim’, Vickers 1973: 28. 
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In the concluding stanza, the Chorus respond with terror (trómoj, 463) to this justice 
appointed by ‘fate’ (tò mórsimon, 464). In their final outburst further emphasis is laid 
on the intrafamilial essence of Orestes’ vengeance: in the first strophe they lament it as 
a pónoj æggenÔj, as a bloody stroke of ruin, and a pain hard to bring to an end (466-
70); whereas in the antistrophe each element is repeated and somewhat spelled out until 
the whole description of the mechanisms of this justice is powerfully defined as a hymn 
sung by the gods below:  
 
dÍmasin 1mmoton 
tÏnd’ \koj, o÷d’ ;ap’ \llwn 
1ktoqen, ;all’ ;ap’ a÷tÏn, 
di’ Ëmàn # Erin aëmathrán. 
qeÏn tÏn katà gâj 8d’ 0mnoj. (471-5) 
 
 
Now that a general overview of the dynamic evolution of the kommos has been given, I 
will turn to those elements in it which point to a subversion of the ritual conventions. 
Throughout the kommos the Chorus, Orestes, and Electra were united in an ecstatic 
dirge containing and yet twisting various elements of a ritual threnos. In her recent 
study, Swift outlines the conventions of ritual lamentation, and draws several 
conclusions about the genre’s style and preoccupations, some of which are particularly 
relevant for the present analysis. Looking at the kommos, it is crucial to bear in mind the 
following points: first, mourning is often depicted and described as an ‘activity 
segregated along gender-lines’, in which women were expected to ‘behave in a 
distraught manner’, while men were expected to display more self-restraint.641 Second, 
the threnos is a public event, conceived to convey universal messages and to draw a 
moral from the situation at hand: as such, personal grief was avoided in favour of an 
appeal to the inevitability of suffering in human life. Last, there seems to have been an 
expectation of both a eulogy of the deceased and often also of an idyllic description of 
the place inhabited by the dead, characterised as both divine and pleasant. As we shall 
presently see, the kommos of Choephori simultaneously alludes to and twists each of 
                                                
641 Swift 2010: 305. Cf. Alexiou 2002: 4-10. 
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these components which are expected of a traditional funerary lamentation.642 This 
distortion, however, is functional to the dramatic progression of the piece; its funerary 
motifs are skilfully subverted so as to match the paradoxical circumstance of a death 
which is in fact the murder of a husband at the hand of his wife and which is mourned 
by the joint lament of their respective children.  
 
The first blatant example of subversion is given by the inversion of the traditional roles 
of the participants. This emerges clearly from the opening anapaests (306-14) in which 
the Chorus of female slaves, far from behaving in a distraught and plaintive manner, 
begin by imparting in uncompromising terms to Orestes the ineluctable law of Justice. 
Indeed, in this kommos not only are women and men united in a practice which 
traditionally conceives them as segregated, but the sober consolatory role usually 
allotted to men is here covered by the Chorus of slave women who attempt throughout 
to turn Orestes’ and Electra’s laments into effective action. As a consequence, the 
lament proper is interspersed with the theme of revenge and various threnodic elements 
are in fact twisted so as to bridge the gap between the two: they are twisted so as to turn 
sorrow into emboldening anger. This is particularly clear with both the elements of 
eulogy and the description of the place inhabited by the dead:  in their first strophe and 
antistrophe (BB), the Chorus sing of the life of Agamemnon in the underworld, not an 
idyllic place but the realm of the nether powers, in which the king maintains his position 
as a prominent ruler (355-62). Thus, the traditionally gender-based positions are here 
inverted: manly behaviour is given to the women and Orestes takes on the feminine role 
together with his sister. Another element Aeschylus deliberately subverts is the public 
dimension of ritual lamentation. Indeed, the whole exchange is almost immersed in an 
atmosphere of secrecy (sigâq’, 8pwj mÕ peúsetaí tij, %w tékna, 265) and the first 
portion of it, contrary to the ritual praxis, is interspersed with Orestes’ and Electra’s 
descriptions of their personal circumstances (405-9; 418-22; 445-50) and of Electra’s 
and the Female Slaves’ detailed descriptions of Agamemnon’s death (429-33; 439-43).  
 
Now, what is most interesting about this process is the way in which, from the 
beginning to the end of the kommos, some of these subversions are slowly ‘rectified’. At 
                                                
642 Swift 2010: 298-364. 
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the beginning of the second part of the kommos (423ff), in which Electra and the Chorus 
join forces to infuse vindictive fervour into Orestes, the female slaves finally readopt a 
mourning behaviour similar to the one they had during the parodos (23-31) and proceed 
by describing it in powerful terms: through the figura etymologica 1koya kommón and 
by comparing themselves to professional mourners, as the êhlemistría seems to 
suggest,643 they introduce a lengthy description of their self-beating and hair tearing 
(423-8). Simultaneously, as Orestes becomes emboldened he abandons his position of 
self-pity and wishful praying in favour of self-confidence and determined resolve (434-
438) and, as previously mentioned, in the last part of the kommos he is able to adopt a 
leading position formally comparable to that of a leading mourner (456ff).  
 
It is almost ironic that only when lament has finally turned into revenge and the essence 
of retributive justice, fully spelled out through the powerful assertion #Arhj #Arei 
xumbaleî, Dík= Díka, the three parties finally rearrange their role and their exchange 
acquires a more traditional appearance. Yet, this should not be seen as arbitrary. Rather, 
it is the product of careful dramaturgical design: Orestes draws from lament the impetus 
he needs to act, but when his resolve is finally fully processed the essence of his lament 
is revealed by the framework in which it is presented. In this way, the theme of the 
subverted threnos is deployed by Aeschylus to bestow further strength on the dynamic 
progression of this formidable exchange. 
 
In conclusion, it is surely wrong to view this kommos as a static piece or as simply an 
invocation aiming to arouse Agamemnon’s ghost or Orestes’ spirit of vengeance.644 
This is a complex piece in which various thematic patterns alternate, cross, and 
converge into a single climactic unity. Meanwhile ‘lament turns into revenge’, grief and 
fear alternate with self-confidence, horror is interwoven with urgency. However, I have 
also shown that the theme of retributive justice can be identified as the focal point of the 
piece, to which each character constantly refers and in which these patterns meet. Only 
in this sense then is Kitto right in claiming that with the kommos ‘there is a gathering 
                                                
643 Sommerstein 2008: 266. 
644 ‘The working up of Orestes and of the spirit of Agamemnon to vengeance is all part of the 
same operation’, Conacher 1974: 339. 
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together and an emphatic restatement of the old themes’.645 This restatement is all the 
more emphatic precisely because it is presented as a dynamic process.  
 
What is more, in the three sections of the kommos, the main superhuman forces behind 
this law of justice are evoked and addressed in turn: Zeus, Dikê, Moirai, Aisa, Atê and 
Erinys, the continual evocation of Earth, the underworld, and the gods below, contribute 
to colouring these powers with a distinct chthonic tinge, which is in keeping with the 
setting of a dirge that takes place at a tomb. The direct appeals to Agamemnon suggest 
that his ghost, now a chthonic daimon too, will contribute as well to Orestes’s deed. 
Therefore, almost all the forces that were mentioned in the Agamemnon as co-
responsible entities for the murder of the king are now in Choephori invoked by Orestes 
and Electra for the murder of Clytemnestra and the law on which matricide is based is 
reasserted before the deed is accomplished.  
 
As we reach the end of this analysis, the dramatic development of this piece can be 
further illuminated through a comparison with the Presocratic material. For while 
Electra’s request for vengeance: díkan d’ æx ;adíkwn ;apaitÏ (398) presents 
retribution, in parallel fashion to Anaximander B1, as a righting of injustice, Orestes 
presents dikê, less straightforwardly, as a clash of two equivalent justices (461). 
Similarly to the Heraclitean conception, dikê is described by Orestes’ desperate cry as a 
principle of conflict. Hence the opposition between Electra’s and Orestes’ ways of 
envisioning retribution resonate with the contemporary philosophical debates around the 
question of cosmic justice. Like the Elders of the third stasimon,646 Electra and Orestes 
seem to have internalised at a deeply emotional level the fearful nature of divine 
retribution; what is more, they also seem capable of producing, throughout their 
dynamic exchange, more than one perspective on the elusive question of dikê. The main 
function of this tripartite kommos is then to recapitulate the complexity of the law of 
blood for blood in the Oresteia: simultaneously presented as stretching towards a 
cosmic dimension as well as irremediably confined to a stifling familial enclosure; 
simultaneously universal and yet excruciatingly personal 
                                                
645 1961: 82. 
646 Cf. Ch. 8.1. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
A Cosmos of Opposites 
 
The trilogy ends with a partial sense of closure: Orestes has been acquitted and the cycle 
of vendetta has come to a halt, the rift between Chthonic and Olympian powers which 
dominated the whole of Eumenides has been healed, and the people of the city 
(;astikòj leÍj, 997) are said to have reached some form of wisdom in due season 
(swfronoûntej æn crón_, 1000), with the joint aid of Zeus and Moîra (1045-6). 
Thus at the end of the trilogy – after the question of justice and its shortcomings has 
been brought to the fore – there is a gathering together of three fundamental themes: 
time, necessity and the unity of opposites.  
That ‘Aeschylean tragedy is antithetical in its structuring of the material’ has long been 
noticed.647 Opposites genuinely pervade the world of the Oresteia. However, what has 
perhaps not been sufficiently stressed, is how such structural choices bear a 
philosophical as well as a dramatic significance. Just as in the thought of Anaximander, 
Heraclitus, and Parmenides, opposites play a fundamental function that is at the same 
time literary, symbolic, and cosmological. Whereas in the previous chapters I showed 
how the oscillation between justice and injustice requires a temporal dimension of 
continuity and the ineluctable tie with a dimension of necessity, here I investigate 
further the configuration of the unity of opposites in the trilogy. More specifically, I 
offer an interpretation of the dramatic development of the Oresteia as a movement from 
a confusing oscillation between opposites to a harmonious unity of opposites.648 
8.1 Opposites in the Agamemnon and Choephori 
In the fist two plays, and the Agamemnon in particular, conflict often engenders a 
confusion of opposites. The very beacon which promises to bring a happy release from 
                                                
647 Rosenmeyer 1982: 335, but see also Reinhardt 1949: 68ff. 
648 This differs from Seaford’s interpretation (2003; 2013) who sees the action of the trilogy as a 
movement from ‘the Heracleitean unity of opposites to their Pythagorean reconciliation’, 2013: 
17. Cf. Int. I. 3. 
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misery (e÷tucÕj génoit’ ;apallagÕ pónwn, 20) is awaited as a ‘fire of darkness’ 
(;orfnaíou purój, 21). Having appeared it is described as a ‘day-like light in the 
night’ (nuktòj ÓmerÔsion | fáoj, 22). The sequence not only ‘emphasises the 
symbolic contrast between light and darkness’, 649  its paradoxical essence also 
encapsulates the general state of affairs.650 The inversion of traditional norms and the 
abhorrent redisposition of social roles are configured around the polarization of the 
sexes and a symmetry of radical oppositions. The opposition between Zeus and Artemis 
in the parodos – and the confusing mixed message they send to humans: ‘auspicious but 
not unblemished’ (dexià mén, katámomfa dé, 145) – as well as that between 
Agamemnon and Clytemnestra stand out as powerful examples. As illustrated in 
Goldhill’s accurate depiction, the conflict between the latter two is structured as a 
struggle between various oppositions: man and woman, husband and wife, king and 
queen. But most importantly, this polarised symmetry engenders a confusion of 
opposites in which the ‘woman becomes man-like and the man becomes feminised’. 651 
Powerfully symbolical of this confusion of roles is the description of Clytemnestra’s 
‘male-counselling heart’ (gunaikòj ;andróboulon […] kéar, 11) in which the 
juxtaposition of gunaikòj ;andro- emphasises the inversion of normal Greek gender-
roles.652  
Social disorder, underpinned by inversion of roles, finds its counterpart at an emotional, 
cosmological and divine level. The alternation between joy and sorrow, which can be 
easily traced in the prologue, is picked up in the paradoxical refrain a#ilinon a#ilinon 
eêpé, tò d’ e%u nikátw (121; 138; 159) and is often recalled during the first play, 
where we repeatedly witness the frustrated efforts of various characters to conceive of 
one without the other. This is particularly obvious in Clytemnestra’s imaginary 
description of the sack of Troy (321-50) and her wish for unequivocal good to prevail 
(tò d’ e%u kratoíh mÕ dicorrópwj êdeîn, 349), as well as in the Herald’s wish not to 
defile a day of good omen by the uttering of bad news’ (e5fhmon %hmar o÷ prépei 
                                                
649 Raeburn and Thomas 2011: 69. 
650 For the negative side of the beacon imagery see Tracy 1986: 257-60; for a study of the fire 
imagery in the whole trilogy see Gantz 1977: 28-38. 
651 2004: 36; cf. Seaford 2013: 20. 
652 Raeburn and Thomas 2011: 67. For a very engaging study of Clytemnestra’s masculine 
characterization see Winnington-Ingram 1983: 101-19. 
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kakaggél_ Ã glÍss+ miaínein, 636-7).  
In both instances the optimistic desire for gain to outweigh loss is frustrated: 
Clytemnestra’s initial picture of the opposite emotional states of conquerors and 
conquered – conceived in their unmixed unity as vinegar and oil in the same vessel 
(322-3) – gives way to the suggestion of a probable reversal of fortunes (341ff);653 
similarly, the Herald’s desire not to pollute his good news is frustrated by the necessity 
of having to communicate the news of the disastrous shipwreck. Despite both 
characters’ desires for ultimate differentiation and lack of balance between bad and 
good news, opposites states combine in an undifferentiated unity. In the Herald’s 
speech, this confusion is projected onto the cosmological sphere and despite his desire 
not to mix good and evil (pÏj kednà toîj kakoîsi summeíxw, 648), his words 
cannot keep them apart anymore than the opposite elements of fire and water could be 
prevented from conspiring together: xunÍmosan gár, 3ntej 1cqistoi tò prín, | 
pûr kaì qálassa, 650-1). 
The attitude and vocabulary of Clytemnestra and the Herald are reminiscent of those of 
the Elders in the parodos and their use of the image of justice with a pair of scales 
(Díka […] æpirrépei, 250; mÕ dicorrópwj, 349; pÖma d’ o÷k ;antirrépei, 574). 
The idea of stability – or lack thereof – is often evoked in the language of scale-
weighing: a symbolic usage whose poignancy is comparable to that of the bow and the 
lyre in Heraclitus, but whose significance does not entirely coincide with theirs.654 In 
fact, the scale is not employed here to describe a condition of harmonious unity of 
opposites – which is its ultimate potential – but rather to evoke disastrous oscillation. In 
this sense the scale is a multivalent symbol: it captures well the Anaximandrian idea of 
alternation between ;adikía and díkh, and as a symbolic object one could compare it to 
the keys of interchange (klhîdaj ;amoiboúj) held by polúpoinoj díkh in 
Parmenides’ proem (B1. 14). Yet it also expresses the characters’ frustration about 
instability and their aspiration to put an end to their constant reversal of fortunes. So, 
while Seaford is right in claiming that ‘equilibrium in Aeschylus is not a dead 
                                                
653 Notice the construction mÔ+subjunctive expressing fear of concrete possibility. 
654 Contra Seaford 2003: 151; 154. Whereas he sees ‘the need to differentiate united opposites’ 
as a ‘dominant idea’ in the Oresteia (2003: 150) I argue precisely the opposite: the action of the 
trilogy finds it culmination in the reconciliation and unity of opposites in an harmonious whole. 
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metaphor’,655 he is wrong in the one-sided interpretation he gives of it.656 As an 
instrument of justice, its symbolic value in the Oresteia is as ambiguous as justice itself: 
in the cycle of vendetta dramatized in the first two plays justice is the weighing out of 
action and counter-action and it implies anxiety as much as hope; in Eumenides, in 
which action moves towards a reconciliation of opposite forces, it is the idea of justice 
as simultaneous rather than alternating equilibrium that prevails. So when Athena, using 
her power of persuasion, charms the Erinyes’ wrath away, the image of the scale 
reappears: 
o÷ t$an dikaíwj t^+d’ æpirrépoij pólei  
mÖnin tin’ $h kóton tin’ $h blábhn strat^_< (Eum. 888-9) 
 
It would be unjust for the Erinyes to ‘let fall’ or ‘bring down’ (æpirrépein as in a scale) 
any wrath when justice is finally equated with balance.657 
 
In Choephori, the same themes as in the Agamemnon are restated with even greater 
emphasis. Orestes takes the place of his father in the opposition of genders (an 
opposition which is replicated in the nexus Orestes-Electra; Aegisthus-Clytemnestra; 
Orestes-Clytemnestra; Apollo-Cassandra) and the oscillation of díkhn didónai is 
almost overtly conceptualised. The whole scene around the tomb of Agamemnon is 
characterised as a paradox. The libation ordered by Clytemnestra is presented as a 
‘graceless favour’ (cárin ;acáriton, 44)658 and determines for Electra a confusing 
mission, one in which she is therefore forced to mix opposite intentions within a single 
prayer:  
 
taût’ æn més_ tíqhmi tÖj kednÖj ;;arâj, 
keínoij légousa tÔnde tÕn kakÕn ;arán (145-6) 
 
                                                
655 2003: 151. 
656 ‘Like the bow and the lyre of Heraclitus, scales in equilibrium embody unity of opposites, 
but are also – unlike bow an lyre – an instrument of divine Justice. It is this that implies hope’, 
2003: 154. 
657 Cf. Ch. 8.4. 
658 Cf. Ag. 1545. 
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Just like her mother and the Herald before her she is unable to keep good separate from 
evil. The self-contradictory nature of her task is then asserted through the oxymoron 
paiÏna toû qanóntoj (151) which picks up the idea of the paiÏna ŒErinúwn at 
Ag. 645: the same ritual song unites the opposite modes of celebration and lament.659 
  
Most importantly, in this play, the cycle of offence and counter-offence is 
conceptualised in the form of an abstract unity of opposites: a unity, just as in 
Heraclitus, which is primarily rendered through style and language. In chapter 2.2, we 
saw how the three pairs of sulláyiej in B10 – the united oppositions of 8la kaì o÷k 
8la, sumferómenon diaferómenon, sun^=don di^=don – differ from the kind of 
opposites deployed in other fragments (e.g. B88), in that they are raised from the 
particular to the universal. These types of conceptual antitheses, reached through a 
binary logic like that of ‘yes’ and ‘no’, can be recognised in the two striking lines from 
the Agamemnon:660 
 
túmma túmmati teîsai (Ag.1430), 
\xia drásaj, \xia páscwn (1527) 
 
They are re-employed even more frequently in Choephori: 
 
;antì mèn æcqrâj glÍsshj æcqrà glÏssa teleísqw (Cho. 
309-10), 
;antì dè plhgÖj foníaj fonían plhgÕn tinétw (312) 
 
#Arhj ##Arei xumbaleî, Dík= Díka (461) 
 
Here the antitheses between equal elements are enhanced by the formal symmetry of 
their formulation. In each of these compressed sayings the opposition of mutually 
annulling actions is raised from the particular to the universal (i.e. we read of ‘hostile 
words’, ‘bloody strokes’ and clashing ‘violence’ and ‘justice’ and not of their specific 
                                                
659 Cf. Ch. 7.4.  
660 Cf. Ch. 7.3. 
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concretization) and the dramatic specificity of each instantiation dissolves temporarily 
in the realm of abstraction. 
 
Even at the end of the play, when the action is about to culminate in matricide, Orestes 
and Clytemnestra choose to detach themselves from their deed and ascribe 
responsibility to the neutral agency of destiny: 
 
Clyt.: Ó Moîra toútwn, %w téknon, paraitía.  
Or.: kaì tónde toínun Moîr’ æpórsunen móron. (910-11) 
 
The specificity of this death (móroj) is linked within the symmetry of stichomythia to 
the broader agency of destiny (Moîra), thereby raising the particular oppositions of the 
two murders (regicide and matricide) to the status of abstract opposition between equal 
non-human forces. 
 
However, just as Heraclitus links the sphere of human cognition to the governing 
principle of the cosmos (B1; B45), so in the Oresteia conflicting moîrai can be found 
both at a cosmic level, as we have just seen above, as well as within the intimate sphere 
of private interiority:  
tò d’ æpì gân pesòn !apax qanásimon 
própar ;andròj mélan aõma tíj $an 
pálin ;agkalésait’ æpaeídwn> 
o÷dè tòn ;orqodaÖ 
tÏn fqiménwn ;anágein 
Zeùj †a#ut’ 1paus’† æp’ ;;ablabeí=> 
eê dè mÕ tetagména 
moîra moîran æk qeÏn 
eôrge mÕ pléon férein, 
profqásasa kardía 
glÏssan $an tád’ æxécei. 
nûn d’ øpò skót_ brémei 
qumalgÔj te kaì o÷dèn æpelpomé- 
na potè kaírion æktolupeúsein 
zwpurouménaj frenój. (Ag. 1019-33) 
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This passage – the second antistrophe of the third stasimon (975-1034) of the 
Agamemnon – is interesting and deserves careful consideration. The Argive Elders are 
as usual prey to confusion and conflicting emotions. The whole ode – which follows the 
critical entrance of Agamemnon into his palace – opens with a question that well 
encapsulates their anxiety: ‘Why, why does this fear persistently hover about, standing 
guard in front of my prophetic heart?’ (975-8). As the ode unfolds, the Elders illustrate 
in more detail the nature of and reasons behind their confusion: even though they 
witnessed with their eyes the return of the king, no reassuring confidence (qrásoj, 
982; 994) sits ‘on the throne of their heart’ which uncontrollably intones the ‘unlyrical 
dirge’ of the Erinys (982-92). This chant of terror is perceived by the Chorus themselves 
as spontaneous, unhired (;akéleustoj \misqoj, 979), and self-taught (a÷todídaktoj, 
992); it is indeed the product of an undeniable knowledge – that of the law of retributive 
justice – that has slowly implanted itself in the Elders’ consciousness through their 
reflections on past events.661 This painful awareness is described in terms of a ‘heart 
whirling in eddies that betoken fulfilment around a mind that understands justice’ (996-
7).  Through this vivid description of their inner emotions, the Chorus communicate 
what could otherwise be expressed in rational terms as – in Sommerstein’s paraphrase – 
their ‘certainty that wrong will not go unpunished, that justice will surely be 
fulfilled’.662  
 
Yet this knowledge of justice, held by the Elders in their ændíkoij fresín (996), is as 
irresistible as it is visceral and ineffable. When it comes to the point of expressing it, the 
Elders find themselves lacking the ability to speak.663 Most poignantly, the Chorus 
interpret their speechlessness in the face of their fearful foreboding as a further 
mechanism of dikê: 
 
 
 
                                                
661 Cf. Raeburn and Thomas 2011: 172: ‘The ode is no longer structured by a narrative of past 
events as in the earlier choral movements’. 
662 2008: 116.  
663 ‘The song never proceeds beyond instinctive emotion to explicit understanding’, Thalmann 
1985a: 99. 
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eê dè mÕ tetagména 
moîra moîran æk qeÏn 
eôrge mÕ pléon férein, 
profqásasa kardía 
glÏssan $an tád’ æxécei. (1026-9) 
 
In these conclusive words of the Chorus resonate the two main motifs running through 
the whole ode: the Chorus’ unrelenting description of their disquieting feelings 
(profqásasa kardía | glÏssan $an tád’ æxécei), and their unwelcome faith in 
divine ordinance (æk qeÏn). Yet the focus on the inevitability and unalterability of the 
mechanism of justice is narrowed here to its physiological applicability. The anatomical 
restriction of a speechless heart, a reflection itself of the Elders’ psychological restraint, 
is described in the language of universal allotment (moîra): the heart shall not overstep 
its measures and hold a task the gods apportioned to the tongue. Aeschylus’ 
employment in this passage of the concept of a ‘double’ moîra has puzzled 
commentators over the years; its refined dramatic significance deserves indeed all the 
attention received.664 
 
The main points of interpretation are which moîrai the Chorus have in mind and in 
what sense and why one imposes a constraint over the other. Their stylistic 
juxtaposition (moîra moîran) suggests a contrast, but scholars disagree on whether 
their irreconcilability is also due to a difference in nature between the two.665 Scott for 
instance reads moîra together with tetagména and only moîran together with æk 
qeÏn. According to this interpretation the passage would read something like ‘were it 
not that the destiny prescribed prevented the destiny from the gods from getting more 
than its due’ and would imply a difference of type between the two moîrai. 666 The 
tetagména moîra – as the lot of man in general – is contrasted to the moîran æk qeÏn 
as a fate specifically given by the gods. 667  I personally follow the majority of 
                                                
664 Cf. Fraenkel 1962: 463ff; Scott 1969: 339ff; Bollack and Judet de la Combe 1981-2: Vol. II 
257-68; Thalmann 1985a: 99-118; Raeburn and Thomas 2011: xxxviii; 178ff. 
665 See Thalmann 1985a: 100-1 for a very clear summary of interpretations. 
666 Cf. Fraenkel: ‘The tetagména moîra is the lot of man in general, established and ordered 
by God (or by the natural order); it is his fate or destiny. […] On the other hand, the following 
moîran indicates the portion or lot with which the individual is endowed’, 1962: 463. 
667 Scott 1969: 339-40. 
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commentators in taking together moîra æk qeÏn tetagména with eôrge: i.e. the 
constraint proceeds from the gods and moîra has the same sense in each case.668 Surely, 
‘a conflict, in Greek belief, between “fixed fate” and a particular destiny’ seems odd,669 
and in the normal state of things, the ordinance of moîra and that of the gods go hand 
in hand: indeed, even the Erinyes speak later on of their charter ordained by a moîra 
and accepted by the gods (qesmòn Ã tòn moirókranton æk qeÏn doqénta téleon, 
Eum. 391-3). To take æk qeÏn as the source for both moîrai results in a linguistic 
dovetail; its stylistic purpose is to seek in syntax the sense of equilibrium between the 
two ‘apportionments’ conveyed in content. 
 
To what, then, do these moîrai refer? The thought must be related to its immediate 
context as well as the broader dramatic context of the stasimon and the whole play. 
Only in this way is it possible to grasp the manifold significance of the Elders’ 
ambiguous phrasing. First of all, I believe 670  that in the direct context of the 
hypothetical clause to which moîra moîran belongs, their first meaning should be 
understood in relation to the two nouns of the apodosis: kardía and glÏssan, whose 
juxtaposition picks up the case sequence nominative + accusative. Thus in the 
immediate context moîra moîran refer to tongue and heart respectively. Like in 
Theognis 1187-8, in which moîra is said to be the source of boundaries (térma),671 
here in Aeschylus moîra is the apportioned function of things which is externally 
limited by the apportioned function of other things: while the protasis of this clause 
alludes to this universal principle, the apodosis shows its application to the internal 
physiology of humans. The heart, which is endowed with its own moîra shall not usurp 
that of the tongue. 
 
However, seen against the backdrop of the whole ode, the Elders’ words acquire a 
broader significance and the notion of moîra resonates with universal implications. In 
                                                
668 Kitto 1959: 25; Goodwin 1877: 82; Bollack and Judet de la Combe 1981-2: Vol. II 265-6; 
Thalmann 1985a: 101; Raeburn and Thomas 2011: 179. 
669 Thalmann 1985a: 101. 
670 This view has been held by various scholars before me: see Thalmann 1985a: 102, n. 13 for 
their review. 
671 o5tij \poina didoùj qánaton fúgoi o÷dè bareîan | dustucíhn, eê mÕ moîr’ æpì 
térma báloi  
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the scene preceding the stasimon, Agamemnon entered his house after treading on the 
purple-dyed robes Clytemnestra laid ahead of him. So when the Chorus sing of the fatal 
end (térma) which awaits ‘a man in his insatiable pursuit of fitness’672 (1001ff), it is 
hard not to relate the Elders’ words to their king’s unscrupulous display of wealth. Yet 
the Chorus, incapable of speaking openly about their fearful foreboding, express their 
thought in general terms: first, they use the metaphor of the heavily laden ship which 
can be refloated and saved from disaster only by jettisoning a portion of its cargo (1008-
16), then, in the words leading up to the moîra passage, they speak of the inexorability 
of human death: ‘But once the black blood of death has fallen on the earth in front of a 
man, who by any incantation can summon it back again?’ (1017-24). In both cases, 
Zeus is seen as presiding over these ordinances (1014; 1024): indeed, they are both 
cases of moîrai descending æk qeÏn. 
 
A tension between a fearful unsaid and the outspoken reflections that originate from this 
unsaid charges the whole of the ode. Wary not to formulate in too explicit a statement 
their intuition about Agamemnon’s impending doom, the Chorus meditate in a general 
tone on the limits of human existence. The fil rouge running through the ode seems to 
be that human destiny is governed by limits that are not to be transgressed, for when 
they are – such as in Asclepius’ case (1021-4) – a superior force is bound to intervene 
and restore the perturbed order. In their concluding words, the Elders return to the 
feelings of terror and torment with which they already opened their song, but their 
recent meditations lead them to describe their psychological paralysis in terms of 
conflicting moîrai. The idea of the organs’ particular allotment and the boundaries 
between them epitomises at a deeply personal level a universal rule: ‘the principle of 
reciprocal restraints on one another by the moirai of different things, by which this 
order is maintained, is dikê’.673 
 
Hence, what Anaximander and Heraclitus observe about natural phenomena, 
Aeschylus’ Elders claim in no too dissimilar terms about their inner organs. Just as Dikê 
and the Erinyes in Heraclitus’ B94 guard against the sun overstepping its measures 
                                                
672 The verse is corrupt: I rely on Sommerstein’s edition and translation (2008: 117). 
673 Thalmann 1985a: 104. 
 227 
(métra), Dikê and the Erinyes in the Oresteia ‘prevent’ each individual moira ‘from 
getting more than its due’. This understanding is deeply rooted in the consciousness of 
various characters and resurfaces at important junctures of the narrative: 674 in a striking 
dramatic paradox, the Elders of the third stasimon express their understanding of divine 
retribution as a fear that their heart, being itself an organ subjected to a similar 
mechanism of justice, is not allowed to verbalize; Clytemnestra swears her ‘righteous 
oath’ by ‘the fulfilled Justice that was due for my child’ (mà tÕn téleion tÖj æmÖj 
paidòj Díkhn), ‘by Ruin and by the Fury’ (#Athn ŒErinún te, 1432-3); and the Chorus 
will later on retort against her that ‘Moîra is sharpening the sword of harm on another 
set of whetstones, for Justice (Dík=) to do another deed’ (1535).675 With its narrative of 
human experience presented as a regular alternation of occurrences, deeds, and 
conditions, the Oresteia dramatizes the human perspective on dikê as a cosmic force 
presiding over the world-order. In parallel fashion to early Greek thought, it can be said 
that the Oresteia too depicts a world-order structured around conflicting parties and 
their individual moîrai. Hence in this universe, not only oppositions are decreed by 
destiny: different destinies are in opposition with each other. 
 
8.2 The unity of opposites in Eumenides 
At the end of Eumenides, we see Moîra and Zeus forming a union (sugkatéba, 
1046), and just as at the outset of the trilogy, we see light (that of the procession) 
moving through darkness.676 The fundamental polarity between day and night, light and 
darkness, is deeply rooted in the trilogy and its symbolic poignancy can only be 
compared to that of Parmenides’ poem.677 But unlike the choral refrain at the beginning 
of the Agamemnon, which incited words of sorrow while inflaming hopes for good 
(a#ilinon a#ilinon eêpé, tó d’ e%u nikátw), the choral refrain at the end of the trilogy 
encourages only auspicious words and cries of victory (e÷fameîte, 1035, 1038; 
;ololúxate, 1043, 1047). The new harmony among gods and the people of Athens is 
                                                
674  So that ‘beneath the apparent confusion in the minds of his chorus, the motifs and the basic 
thoughts of the play continue’, Scott 1969: 337. 
675 For the image of Destiny as swordsmith for Justice cf. Cho. 648-9. 
676 For a full analysis of the significance of the torches of Eumenides in connection to the 
beacon and others fires in Agamemnon and Choephori cf. Gantz 1977: 38. 
677 Cf. Ch. 3.4. 
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accompanied by cries of unmixed joy for all: caírete, caírete [...] daímonej te kaì 
brotoí. As we shall soon explain, the restoration of peace at the end of the Oresteia is 
presented as a harmonious unity of opposites to be kept æj tò pân (1044). 
 
Such are the blessings that accompany an ‘honourable victory’ (níkhj mÕ kakÖj, 903) 
– namely a victory which does not discredit the winners and imply for them disastrous 
consequences678 – around which revolves an ordered cosmos: 
 
kaì taûta gÖqen 1k te pontíaj drósou 
æx o÷ranoû te< k;anémwn ;aÔmata 
e÷hlíwj pnéont’ æpisteícein cqóna< (904-6) 
 
Not any more the confusion of elements we saw in the Herald speech, in which inimical 
elements conspired together to bring about misfortune (Ag. 650-1), rather the 
harmonious joint effort of elements respecting their individual moîra and collaborating 
to bring about an abundance ‘not to fail with the passage of time’ (mÕ kámnein crón_, 
908). This is the cosmic balance which derives from the unity of divine opposites as the 
placated Erinyes accept to share a residence with Athena and the other Olympians: 
 
déxomai Palládoj xunoikían, 
o÷d’ ;atimásw pólin 
tàn kaì Zeùj ñ pagkratÕj #Arhj 
te froúrion qeÏn némei (916-19) 
 
The temporal emphasis is now either on the permanence of such order or on the 
appointed time (crón_ tetagmén_) for further fertility (944-6). Indeed, this is a 
different kind of victory and divine union from the one wished for by Electra in her 
prayer at the tomb:  
 
Ómîn dè pompòj #isqi tÏn æsqlÏn \nw 
sùn qeoîsi kaì G^+ kaì Dík+ nikhfór_. (Cho. 147-8) 
 
                                                
678 Cf. Sept. 716. 
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In this final settlement, then, in which the human avenger (dikhfóroj) is transfigured 
into the judicial prosecutor (dikastÔj),679 and the Erinyes are transfigured into Semnaì 
qeaí (Eum.1041), a different kind of justice is at play: not a justice ‘bringing victory’, 
rather a victory bringing justice – not any more díkh as poinÔ which cyclically tilts the 
weight first one way then another, but a justice which brings the scales finally on 
balance. How can we explain this shift from one type of unity of opposites to another? 
One way of doing it is to show how, underneath the events, the Oresteia dramatizes a 
movement from a cosmological model in which opposites either clash or coalesce to 
one where, after their initial differentiation, opposites are united in a harmonious whole. 
 
As shown above, the cycle of offence and counter-offence dramatized in the first and 
second plays is analogous to that which in Presocratic thought is projected onto the 
cosmos: not only a simple cycle of vendetta limited to a social process, but the 
alternation of a ‘justice’ enacted among equal parties alternately injured and injuring. 
The tragic mechanism at play in Agamemnon and Choephori is firmly placed within the 
framework of an ordered universe, characterised for the most part by conflict and 
obscurity, but nonetheless devoid of chaos.680 This is not a universe ruled by a 
benevolent or providential order, but nor is it ruled by an accidental one: the strict 
pendulum of dikê is precisely what makes human suffering and defencelessness all the 
more despairing. 
 
 In this cosmos, as in the Anaximandrian model or in Parmenides’ repeated imagery,681 
the temporal dimension of the oscillating pendulum of justice produces a transition 
between opposites which seem impelled by an impersonal necessity. Each action is 
presented as provoking a reaction, this tragedy of ‘intrafamilial violence and conflicting 
obligations’, as put by Goldhill, is a pattern of revenge which is also a pattern of 
                                                
679 The poignant alternative between dikastÔj and dikhfóroj was introduced by Electra at 
Cho. 120. 
680 Contra Kitto: ‘In the Agamemnon […] their [i.e. Olympians and Erinyes] joint system of 
Justice, which they share with all the human actors in the play, ends in chaos’, 1961: 89. Cf. 
instead Cairns’ statement about the OT which would apply here: ‘This is not a benign or 
providential vision, but nor is it a random one […]. This model may derive from attempts to 
explain what appears to be, from a human perspective, a random and absurd universe, but it is 
not itself descriptive of such a universe’, 2013: 159. 
681 Cf. Ch. 3.4. 
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‘reversal, where the very act of taking revenge repeatedly turns the revenger into an 
object of revenge’.682 At this stage the dimension of time has almost a circular quality to 
it: distant connections link present events with past and future in eternal repetition.683 
But unlike the sense of cosmic equality which derives from a circular conception of 
time in the Preosocratic models, the temporal circularity of tragedy is perceived as a 
threat.684 Moreover, the backdrop to this is a divine world where dark chthonian forces 
and Olympian gods conspire towards the same punitive end, i.e. in which divine 
opposites coalesce. 
 
In Choephori, the bankruptcy of this system of justice is displayed, through matricide, 
in its absolute culmination.  Since after Clytemnestra’s death no human avenger is left 
to carry out the deed, the Erinyes are forced to act in their own persons:  in this way, the 
divine onto which retributive justice has been constantly projected – chthonic powers, 
gods, and ghosts – appear on stage and fall heir to man’s conflict. In Eumenides 
Orestes’ deed becomes the object of divine conflict and the problem of justice has to be 
faced by the gods themselves. Human conflict is ultimately mirrored at a divine level 
through the clash of Olympian and Chthonic powers. The rift which separates the 
Olympians from the Erinyes at the beginning of the play, namely the differentiation 
within the divine sphere, is the first step towards the creation of a new order in the 
world of men.685 
 
8.3 Differentiation of opposites in Eumenides 
While in Choephori Apollo allies with the Erinyes whom he invokes in his insistence on 
matricide (Cho. 283), in Eumenides Apollo and the Erinyes are emphatically opposed as 
                                                
682 2004: 26-27. 
683 Cf. Rosenmeyer: 1982: 330ff: ‘The unity of the curse infecting the house of Atreus, crime 
merging with crime as if they were all part of one and the same central, timeless stain, testifies 
to the synoptic understanding’. 
684 Cf. de Romilly 1968: 25; Vernant 1988, Also, cf. Csapo and Miller 1998: 87-125, who 
distinguish between an ‘aristocratic temporality’ characterised by unity, continuity, and eternal 
repetition and ‘democratic temporality’ that is by contrast linear, historical, and privileges 
present and future over the past. For a study of choral intertemporality in the Oresteia: Grethlein 
2013. For a study of the diminishing import of the past from Ag. to Cho. and Eum. cf. Kyriakou 
2011: 89-184. 
685  Cf. Lebeck in 1971: 134-41, although I would reject her interpretation of the Furies 
becoming now the subject of drásanti paqeîn. Cf. also Sommerstein in 2010: 272. 
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Olympians and chthonic and their roles are repeatedly differentiated. 686  This 
differentiation is effected, as already noted by Seaford, ‘by the juxtaposition of Apollo 
and the Erinyes in a visual contrast of opposites’:687 in particular stand out the four 
oppositions of female/male, old/young, ugly/beautiful and dark/bright.688 The Erinyes 
themselves especially insist on that last contrast in the first stasimon, where they 
describe their nocturnal and chthonian nature:  
 
mâter !a m’ 1tiktej, %w 
mâter Núx.     (321-2) 
 
dóxai d’ ;andrÏn kaì mál’ øp’ aêqéri semnaì 
takómenai katà gâj minúqousin \timoi 
ßmetéraij æfódoij melaneímosin. (367-70) 
 
toîon æpì knéfaj ;andrì músoj pepótatai, 
kaì dnoferán tin’ ;aclùn katà dÍmatoj 
a÷dâtai polústonoj fátij. (378-80) 
 
;atíeta diépomen lách 
qeÏn dicostatoûnt’ ;analí_ láp=. (385-6) 
 
kaíper øpò cqóna táxin 1cousa 
kaì dusálion knéfaj. (395-6) 
 
The ode opens with the invocation of their mother Night: from whom they, like the 
Hesiodic KÖrej (Theog. 211; 217),689 derive their function as merciless avengers (322) 
which they lay claim to in opposition to Apollo (323) – the place of Night is then 
significantly taken by Moîra in the antistrophe (335). As the ode develops the 
darkness of their nocturnal origin is progressively linked with the deadly realm of the 
underworld (katà gâj/øpò cqóna), depicted – in opposition to the bright surface (øp’ 
aêqéri) where men pursue their vainglories and the Olympians (qeÏn) reside – as a 
                                                
686 Eum. 69-73; 185-91; 197; 350-2; 365-6; 385-6. 
687 2012: 269. 
688 For this last pair: Eum. 52, 370/182 (where Apollo has a golden bow). 
689 Cf. Sommerstein 2008: 395 n. 82. 
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‘sunless slime/darkness’ (;analí_ láp=/dusálion knéfaj). At the end of the ode, 
after the word ‘darkness’, Athena makes her entrance. To her question of who they may 
be (408) the Erinyes restate their connection to Night (Nuktòj aêanÖ tékna, 416) and 
the underworld (’Araì d’ æn o#ikoij gÖj øpaì keklÔmeqa, 417). Finally, this 
darkness is most significantly transferred – in Apollo’s subsequent words – to another 
kind of realm: the darkness of a mother’s womb (æn skótoisi nhdúoj, 665). 
 
Clearly characterised, in opposition to the Olympians, as nocturnal and chthonian, the 
Erinyes also define themselves as straight-judging (e÷qudíkaioi, 312) – enforcers of 
the inexorable justice of the ‘ordained laws’ (nómwn qesmíwn, 490-1) according to 
which the doer must unconditionally suffer (312-20).  Their previous insistence on their 
matrilineal connection to Night explains their particular repulsion towards matricide 
(425; 427; 493) and underlines their opposition with Orestes and Apollo, both men 
representing their fathers’ side. For the Erinyes – e÷qudíkaioi and so concerned with 
restating their difference – Athena’s upright judgment (e÷qeîan díkhn) must be the 
product of diacritical differentiation: 
 
;all’ æxélegce, krîne d’ e÷qeîan díkhn. (433) 690 
 
It is as if after having weighed out everything on the scale of argument and 
counterarguments Athena is expected to use the authority, conferred to her by the 
Erinyes themselves (434-5), to pick one side and carry out old-fashioned punishment. 
Instead, after having heard the case, Athena plainly declares: 
 
tò prâgma meîzon, e#i tij o#ietai tóde 
brotòj diaireîn< o÷de mÕn æmoì qémij 
fónou dikázein ;oxumhnítouj díkaj (470-2) 
 
 The institution of the Areopagus is born out of the divine recognition that human action 
can only be dealt with by taking into account the complexity of motives behind it (426). 
                                                
690 Orestes will subsequently pick up the imperative demand: sù d’ eê dikaíwj e#ite mÔ, 
krînon díkhn< (467). This whole exchange contains a virtuosic literary play on the word dikê: 
cf. Goldhill 1986: 29ff. and Mitchell-Boyask 2009: 99-100. 
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Athena suspends her judgment and her intervention marks the beginning of a 
reconciliation of all oppositions.  
 
8.4 The reconciliation of opposites in Eumenides 
Athena herself embodies a fundamental unity of opposites. A motherless woman 
(mÔthr gàr o5tij æstìn !h m’ ægeínato, 736), and thus – as she likes to underscore – 
her father’s child in the fullest sense (kárta d’ eêmì toû patrój, 738) she defies the 
female/male binary opposition hitherto at play. The opposition between the Erinyes, 
champions of Clytemnestra, and Apollo’s champion of Orestes, relied in fact heavily on 
the female versus male logic: Apollo, in defending Orestes speaks for Agamemnon as a 
‘noble man’ (\ndra gennaîon) killed by the hands of a woman (pròj gunaikój, 625-
7), and subsequently, he disparages the motherhood of Clytemnestra with his famous 
Anaxagorian argument of the theory of procreation. The female versus male opposition 
finds in Athena a way to coexist.  
Daughter of ‘Olympian Zeus’ (664), and therefore unfamiliar with the darkness of the 
womb (665), Athena casts her vote in favour of Orestes. However, although her vote 
goes to him due to her earnest preference for the male (737),691 it is important to stress 
that Athena’s choice brings about a tie,692 in which the cases of both parties are 
eventually given equal recognition.693 This is precisely the argument the goddess will 
adopt in her attempt to persuade the Erinyes that they have not been dishonoured (o÷k 
1st’ \timoi, 824) or defeated:  
o÷ gàr neníkhsq’, ;all’ êsóyhfoj díkh 
æxÖlq’ ;alhqÏj, o÷k ;atimí= séqen. (795-6) 
 
Since the result of the trial (díkh) is a truly equally divided vote (êsóyhfoj),694 the 
scale of justice has not been tilted one way or the other. Orestes is acquitted but not 
                                                
691 An interesting discussion of this point remains Winnington-Ingram 1983: 124ff. For an 
account with which I disagree see Porter 2005: 1-10. 
692 Cf. Int. I. 3 for my position on this issue. 
693 Although, technically, the votes condemning matricide outnumbered the others. 
694 I prefer this to the possible alternative rendering ‘a trial where the voting was fair’ (Podlecki 
1989:184). 
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declared innocent and the reputation of the Erinyes is safe. This new form of justice 
(díkh) is not a victory (níkh) which inexorably follows the rules of necessity (i.e. one 
commits injustice and therefore it must be punished); it is the balanced result of a 
process of persuasion – a tie between equally attention-bidding cases.695 
With reverence and care (848-50), and the promise of future glory (oøpirréwn gàr 
timiÍteroj crónoj | 1stai polítaij toîsde, kaì sù timían | !edran 1cousa..., 
853-5), Athena eventually persuades the Erinyes to stay in the land. 696  Their 
assimilation and transformation marks the ultimate reconciliation of opposites into a 
harmonious whole. The older goddesses unite with the young (882-4), and their fear-
inspiring role (517-9) is absorbed by the new system (990-4). The whole trilogy ends 
with the ultimate image of a unity of opposites: the reconciliation between dark and 
bright, old and new, female and male, Olympian and Chthonian: Moîra, the ancient 
female deity who was previously claimed to have assigned the Erinyes their functions 
(334-5; 961), is now reunited with Zeus to the benefit of the citizens. 
8.5 Fear in time and the golden midpoint 
Hence, the Oresteia dramatizes a transition from one type of cosmological order to 
another. The cosmos of the first two plays is pervaded by opposites either alternating or 
locked together in tragic confusion. The same governing forces which affect the cosmos 
affect the social order of man.  In this cosmos a cyclical conception of time prevails 
where retributive justice takes place according to the rules of a strict necessity. Past, 
present, and future join together in a place of horror: humans fear the unknown and their 
inexorable destiny. With Eumenides we move into a different universe. It has been 
argued that ‘in Eumenides we move […] into a stable cosmology pervaded by the 
prevalence of one opposite over the other’.697  I argued the reverse, namely that with the 
                                                
695  On the relationship between Necessity and Persuasion and the potential influence of 
Eumenides on Plato: cf. Rabinowitz 1981; Winnington-Ingram 1965: 48ff; Cornford 1937: 
362ff.  
696 ‘Athena, with her dignity and courtesy, is far more impressive; as the protectress of the men 
of Athens and foundress of the Areopagus she carries more weight’ [than Apollo], Winnington-
Ingram 1983: 125. 
697 Seaford 2012: 273. I do not believe that the dramatic movement of the Oresteia can be 
interpreted so squarely as a movement from one type of Presocratic cosmology to another as he 
seems to believe (cf. 2013: 17).  
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last play, we move into a universe in which opposites are initially differentiated and 
then reunited into a harmonious nexus. The finale of the Oresteia dramatizes the 
ultimate unity of opposites.  
 
 With the final foundation of polis institutions,698 we also see a change in the shape of 
time and the role of fear. As the focus moves from the contemplation of the 
mythological past to the contemplation of the historical present, in an exquisite 
metatheatrical twist, the stage is turned into a mirror for its audience. If as some have 
said, tragedy has been ‘designed to resolve temporal tensions’,699 the Oresteia has also 
been designed to resolve, through time, tragic tensions. In the historical ‘now’, 
epitomised on stage by the foundation of the Areopagus, a different type of justice is 
sought – one where persuasion prevails over necessity – and time is exalted in its 
aspects of linearity and perpetuity.700 Simultaneously, fear is no longer connected to the 
temporality of alternation and impending doom but to the punctuality of the present. If 
the Erinyes had illustrated the role of fear likewise: 
 
1sq’ 8pou tò deinòn e%u 
kaì frenÏn æpískopon 
deîm’ \nw kaqÔmenon< (517-19) 
 
Athena’s subsequent speech shows that fear is not dissipated, but forms the basis of the 
new order:  
æk tÏn foberÏn tÏnde prosÍpwn 
méga kérdoj ñrÏ toîsde polítaij< 
tásde gàr e5fronaj e5fronej aêeì 
méga timÏntej kaì gÖn kaì pólin 
;orqodíkaion  
préyete pántwj diágontej. (990-5) 
 
                                                
698 For a recent discussion of their function and significance in both Athenian democracy and 
Aeschylus’ Eumenides see Mitchell-Boyask 2009: 98-107. 
699 Burke 1966: 137 subsequently cited by Rosenmeyer 1982: 330 and Barret 2007: 255. 
700 853-5; 898; also notice the repeated temporal expression æj tò pân (83; 291; 401; 670; 891; 
1044). 
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 Just as the old and the new order are connected through the interplay of opposites, so 
does fear represent another element of continuity. But just as opposites are reassembled 
in a new organic whole, so individual horror of the unaccountable evolves into the 
beneficial foundation of social respect and justice under law. As noticed by Gantz, even 
the imagery of the puridápt_ lampádi (1041-2) after summarising and re-echoing all 
the appearances of fire in the trilogy – a very Heraclitean element indeed –conveys how 
even this element preserves its destructive ‘devouring’ properties. Yet in this, it 
symbolises the threat of old violence ‘put to a constructive purpose’: ‘men have learned 
to judge questions of right and wrong in a civilised manner’ and thus ‘even fire has 
transformed accordingly’.701 
 
Ironically, after their description of the importance of fear the Erinyes had formulated a 
principle closely recalling that of Zeus’ páqei máqoj: 
 
xumférei 
swfroneîn øpò sténei. (520-21) 
 
and then had proceeded by urging the citizens thus: 
 
mÔt’ \narkton bíon 
mÔte despotoúmenon 
aênés+j< 
pantì més_ tò krátoj qeòj 4pasen, \llì \ll= d’                               
æforeúei. (526-30) 
 
This equilibrium founded on fear is the wisdom of good sense (swfroneîn, 521; 1000) 
– verbal echoes suggest that it may be the ultimate expression of the god’s cárij 
bíaioj: a violent grace, a fearful harmony, a wisdom (swfroneîn, 181) bestowed on 
men against their will. The triumph of good sense and balanced antitheses is the first 
experiment of democracy, the golden midpoint between anarchy and despotism 
favoured by the supreme and timeless unity of all opposites: qeój. 
 
                                                
701 Gantz 1977: 38. 
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